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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the production of kinnar identity in the context of state politics in 
Madhya Pradesh. As a subordinate group, living on the margins of history, religion, 
gendered practice, and the social imagination, kinnars (or hijras) are often represented 
to and by the public as an impoverished and deviant group, who fail to fit into 
mainstream society. The election of seven kinnars in the state of Madhya Pradesh 
between 1999 and 2009 provided an opportunity for kinnars to be represented in a new 
way to the public, both in Madhya Pradesh and nationally. Their electoral victories and 
tenures paralleled a wider theme in respect to the entry of previously marginalised 
individuals into deliberative and legislative bodies, usually of lower-caste status, with 
the aim of gaining legitimation and formal recognition of their identity. In this thesis, I 
explore the relationship between representation and the production of kinnar identity 
in modern India. I analyse how kinnars and their supporters constructed kinnar identity 
as a viable, political identity, negotiating and narrating a new representation of their 
idiosyncratic bodies and behaviours. I argue that political participation was not 
beneficial for kinnar politicians, in the sense that they obtained few, if any, ostensible 
material or symbolic gains. Moreover, the case of these kinnars’ participation raises 
wider questions regarding marginal identity and recognition by the Indian State. 
Throughout the thesis, I explore how kinnar identity is located on the margins of 
various societal arenas and how entry into and representation within central spaces 
entails a significant negotiation and re-presentation of kinnar identity. I argue that 
modes of recognition fix individuals within an identity that is intelligible to the Indian 
State but fail to contain the heterogeneous forms of kinnar identity, forcing kinnars to 
identify in a particular way in order to be recognised. 
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Conventions and Orthography 
 
 
Transliteration Conventions 
 
All Hindi words have been transliterated in this thesis using the English Roman script 
and are consistently italicised. All Hindi language transliteration is based on the 
modern form of transliteration used in R. S. McGregor’s Oxford Hindi-English Dictionary 
(1993). Spellings of deity names and names of individuals from classical Hindi texts 
have been obtained from W. J. Johnson’s A Dictionary of Hinduism (2009). Words from 
Tamil have been transliterated according to the scheme adopted in the Syndicate of the 
University of Madras’ Tamil Lexicon (1982). 
 
Notes on Style 
 
1. Unless indicated otherwise, emphasis within quotations is found in the 
original.  
2. When discussing a specific author, I adopt their spellings and transliterated 
terms. 
 
 
9  
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
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account for males who do not identify as men) 
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ST  Scheduled Tribe 
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Glossary 
 
ali  alternative term for hijra (Tamil Nadu) 
aravaṇi alternative term for hijra (Tamil Nadu) 
ardhanārīśvara epithet and form of Śiva; literally ‘lord who is half woman’ 
āśrama Hindu life stage, dictating behaviour 
badhāī payment for and ritual work itself; performing blessings 
bahin sister 
berūpia  both active and passive role in same-sex, sexual intercourse; ‘people 
of a different form or face’ (Reddy 2005) 
beṭī  daughter  
bhāt  cooked rice; a wedding ceremony 
bindī forehead mark of Hindu married women, used aesthetically by hijras 
būā paternal aunt 
burqā black dress and veil worn by Muslim women 
cāṭla  sari 
celā disciple 
chakkā slang word for a hijra, literally ‘six’ 
‘chibry’ hijra without a penis, after emasculation (Hossain 2012) 
crore unit of measurement; 10 million 
dāī midwife 
dādī paternal grandmother 
dargāh mausoleum 
dīdī elder sister 
dūdh milk 
dupaṭṭā scarf worn with śalvār qamīz  
gāṇḍu a term derived from gāṇḍ (ass): ‘one who uses his ass’; pejorative 
(Reddy 2005) 
gharānā family, lineage (Delhi) 
grām  village (unit of rural governance) 
grām sabhā rural form of decentralised government, requires full village 
participation 
grām pañcāyat rural form of decentralised government of elected representatives 
guru spiritual guide; teacher; hijra leader 
halāl that which is allowed; in regards to meat, from ritually sacrificed 
animals 
hijragiri collecting alms and performing badhāī (Hossain 2012) 
izzat honour (Reddy 2005) 
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‘janana’ hijra with a penis (Hossain 2012) 
janpad  block (unit of rural governance) 
jātivihīn caste-less 
jogin form of koti; ascetic worshipper; ritually married to goddess (also 
jogappa; Reddy 2005) 
kaḍa-cāṭla  form of koti; non sari-wearing; not linked to hijra kinship structure 
(Reddy 2005) 
kalaśa ritual vase used in śobhāyātrā and other Hindu worship 
kāndra hijra ‘sex-worker hijra’ (Reddy 2005, as opposed to badhāī hijras) 
khāndān lineage, family (Madhya Pradesh) 
koti ‘man’: ‘effeminate’; passive role in same-sex, sexual intercourse 
lakh unit of measurement; 100,000 
liṅgāṃ ‘mark’, ‘sign’; a representation of Śiva (phallus) 
luṅgī cloth worn around the waist 
mā mother 
mausī maternal aunt 
maṭkā  earthen pot  
mukti salvation 
namāz daily prayers (Muslim) 
nānī maternal grandmother 
napuṃsak grammatical third gender; literally ‘neuter’ 
nāran  woman 
nāyak leader in hijra community or household 
nirvāṇ ‘spiritual rebirth’; name given to emasculation operation 
paan  preparation of betel leaf with areca nut and tobacco; to be chewed 
panti ‘man’: ‘masculine’; active role in same-sex, sexual intercourse 
pūjā Hindu ritual of worship 
śalvār qamīz  loose top garment and trousers worn by women 
‘sadrali’ ‘real’ hijra (Hossain 2012) 
sammelan inter-regional gathering 
sannyāsī renouncer or ascetic 
śobhāyātrā procession at the end of a sammelan 
śiva-sati  form of koti, possessed by Śiva (Reddy 2005) 
tālī hand clap, used in specific ways by hijras 
tapas  process of generating ascetic heat and product 
tahsīl district 
tahsīldār  subcollector of the District Revenue Department 
tirunaṅkai ‘auspicious woman’; alternative term for hijra (Tamil Nadu) 
tritīya prakṛti literally ‘third sex’ 
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ustād ‘teacher’; used for hijra household leaders (Madhya Pradesh) 
zenāna  male koti; female mannerisms and gestures; not linked to hijra kinship 
structure (Reddy 2005) 
zilā  district (unit of rural governance) 
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Introduction 
 
Kamla Bua was elected as the mayor of the Municipal Corporation of Sagar city in 
Madhya Pradesh in December 2009. First-time candidates win seats all the time in the 
vast field of Indian politics, with new actors frequently elected from the level of the 
village to the national level. What was remarkable about Kamla’s election was the fact 
that Kamla is a kinnar, or hijṛā,1 a member of the subordinate ‘hijra’ community, 
categorised in multiple ways, but most frequently as ‘eunuchs’ or ‘transgenders’ by the 
Indian State and national media.2 Kamla’s victory was the most recent election of a 
‘eunuch’ in Madhya Pradesh and the seventh victory since 1999. The Mayoral seat in 
Sagar city is always reserved for a member of the Scheduled Castes, alternating 
between reservations for men or women from one term to the next. In the 2009 election, 
the position was reserved for a Scheduled Caste woman. On the nomination form there 
was a box marked 'Caste' with three choices available: 'Scheduled Caste', 'Scheduled 
Tribe', and 'Other Backward Class'. Kamla did not choose any of these options but 
instead wrote ‘jātivihīn kinnar’ or ‘caste-less kinnar’. In so doing, she identified as an 
individual ‘without’ caste, as a ‘kinnar’ who did not fit into these caste categories. She 
went on to win the election but only served two years of the five-year term. In 
December 2011 she was unseated by the Sagar District Court which ruled that she had 
not sufficiently proved her ‘Scheduled Caste’ status and thus her election was void. 
 Kamla’s attempt to self-identify and the failure of current reservation 
categories—devised on the grounds of caste—to account for the marginality of her 
status as a kinnar introduces the main question for this thesis: what is the relation 
between representation and the construction of kinnar identity in modern India? Kamla 
identified in a way that did not meet the usual classification required in order to stand 
for a reserved seat. Accordingly, her status was not recognised by the State, despite the 
reality of her subordinate status. How an individual may identify can be at odds with 
the way the State recognises—or chooses to recognise—its subjects, and this reveals a 
failure of categories that are constructed in order to identify and to benefit different 
subject groups whose marginalisation is politically at stake. Kamla’s unseating 
indicates an oversight by the Indian State, since it failed to recognise that kinnars are a 
subordinate and politically marginalised community, who, through daily 
discrimination and social violence, deserve equal protections and opportunities that 
                                                      
1 According to transliteration conventions, the correct English spellings are ‘kinnar’ and ‘hijṛā’. 
For the thesis, I adopt ‘kinnar’ and ‘hijra’ (without diacritics) for easier reading. 
2 The term ‘hijra’ is used widely throughout India; in Madhya Pradesh, the preferred term is 
‘kinnar’ and is used by local communities. Kinnars say it is an ‘older’ and more ‘respectful’ term, 
rather than ‘hijra’ which they see as derogatory (on the term as an ‘abusive epithet’, see Hall 
1995: 156; 1997: 442-6). Throughout the thesis, I adopt the terms that individuals use to describe 
themselves, primarily ‘kinnar’ in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat, and ‘hijra’ in Mumbai and Delhi 
and to describe the wider ‘community’ across India. 
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are afforded other caste groups conventionally seen as marginal. Although the Indian 
State has made efforts to plan and implement policies to address the very real 
inequalities that are consequent of hijras’ low social identity, these efforts begin by 
defining a certain figuration of what a hijra subject is or might be. For individuals from 
marginalised communities, representation is crucial in order to gain rights and 
benefits. However, the way in which individuals identify is often incommensurate 
with formal categories that are recognised and sanctioned by the State, rendering that 
identity unintelligible to State mechanisms. Moreover, positing a particular form of 
identity as normative and intelligible might close down the heterogeneity inherent in 
the subject group.  
I explore the question of representation in reference to the two related but 
discontinuous forms of representation theorised by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. 
Spivak questions the inherent contradictions in the practice of representation, based on 
the subject who speaks ‘for’ and ‘as’, presenting themselves as a singular or 
homogenous entity, even though the person who represents is ‘always a multiplicity’ 
(2000: 1432), the product of different configurations of discourses (1985: 341). She 
distinguishes between representation as, on the one hand, ‘speaking for’, in the sense 
attributed to political proxy, and on the other, as re-presentation, as in the sense of 
making a portrait in art or philosophy. I adopt Spivak’s theorisations and explore both 
forms of representation through three case studies of political participation of kinnars 
in Madhya Pradesh (hereafter MP). I explore how kinnars represented or spoke ‘for’ 
their constituents, as political proxies, and simultaneously spoke ‘as’, represented by 
both themselves and the mainstream public as candidates who were a better 
alternative to professional politicians who were perceived as corrupt and inefficient. 
Kinnars were elected by constituents who were disillusioned with mainstream parties 
and politicians and were thus represented as able to represent voters’ better through 
their inherent difference from professional politicians, as lacking a party agenda and 
personal needs, as incorruptible, and more likely to serve their constituents’ interests. 
Representational practices such as signs, symbols, rhetoric, and narratives surrounding 
kinnars’ campaigns and elections produced a reinterpretation of what kinnar identity 
was, both in relation to the political sphere and outside this sphere. I argue that kinnar 
identity was reconstructed through and by local political discourse and demonstrate 
that kinnar identity was both represented and re-presented, in order to produce a 
political candidate who appealed to voters from a variety of social groups and 
networks. Commonly held stereotypes about kinnars were manipulated for political 
ends, presenting a specific version of what kinnar identity was expected to be, which 
had an impact, more generally, on how kinnars were viewed. The construction of a 
specific version of kinnar identity, circulated through discourses about political kinnars, 
produced a normative and intelligible form of kinnar identity for the voting public, 
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despite the heterogeneous range of identities collated under the term ‘kinnar’ or ‘hijra’, 
which precludes the forms of representation available. My analysis of the production 
of kinnar identity through the case studies of political participation in MP demonstrates 
the intersecting axes of state mechanisms, politics, and mainstream society, and their 
impact on the construction and production of individual identity.  
Representation in local deliberative and legislative bodies,3 in the case of the 
kinnar community of MP, failed to represent local communities and individuals within 
them adequately through the institution of a specific form of kinnar identity. Political 
representation for marginalised communities can have positive functions, including 
symbolic, expressive, and educative functions due to the increased presence of 
minority groups in political and legislative bodies. In the Indian context, certain groups 
have guaranteed privileges and opportunities on the basis of their caste status. 
Similarly, measures implemented to benefit hijras could have advantages for many in 
the community. But this is only half of the story. Representation might be beneficial in 
symbolic and material ways, but does not ensure that previously marginalised groups 
gain a status that is considered normative. In fact, efforts to ensure recognition might 
reinforce marginal identity in other ways. State recognition of an identity, rendering it 
intelligible to State mechanisms and the mainstream public, aligns that identity with 
pre-existent normative categories and recognisable modes of interpretation. 
Representation, through engagement with the law and State mechanisms, has the 
ability to ‘de-radicalise’ the subaltern subject, producing and regulating them through 
normative modes of identification and expected behaviour (see Kapur 2009). The 
subject is rendered intelligible through a process of normalisation. As Spivak posits, it 
is the non-narrativisable nature of the subaltern that makes subjects subaltern, where 
their acts cannot be framed within modes of interpretation (1990: 144). Mechanisms to 
ensure representation cement a particular form of identity and absorb that form within 
a pre-constructed mode of civic intelligibility. In relation to their political participation, 
I argue that representation served to reinforce kinnar identity by focusing on the very 
aspects that made the group marginal within mainstream society, ironically, at the very 
                                                      
3 The term ‘local bodies’ refers to state (MP) level and regional level democratic institutions. I 
use the terms ‘deliberative and legislative’ to refer to democratic institutions that focus on 
legislation and deliberation, which are key to producing decentralised, democratic processes. 
There are three levels of ‘local’ governance in Madhya Pradesh. The Legislative Assembly (or 
Vidhan Sabha), based in Bhopal, forms part of the State Government of MP and is the legislative 
branch of the government. It consists of 230 elected representatives from single-seat 
constituencies. Urban local bodies consist of municipal corporations, municipal councils, and 
nagar parishads (city councils). The distinction between these bodies is based upon the number 
of the local population. Rural governance is based on the Pañcāyatī Rāj system and functions on 
three levels: grām (village), janpad (block), and zilā (district). Urban local and Pañcāyatī Rāj 
institutions (PRIs) were formalised through the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments (1992) 
and implemented in MP soon after the amendments, to aid development and improve 
administration through the decentralisation of power and resources (see Behar 1999; Goel and 
Rajneesh 2003). Significantly, state, urban, and rural institutions maintain quotas for Scheduled 
Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backwards Castes, and women in order to increase 
representation of marginalised groups.   
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moment that kinnars sought to enter a sphere of civil society. Marginality extends to 
multiple areas of kinnars’ lives, including gender and sexual performance, religious 
identity, and even grassroots activism in modern India. This marginality was brought 
into political discourse and reified as a core aspect of their identity, reinforcing the 
marginality that political participation ostensibly had the potential to eradicate. 
Moreover, modes of identity that were non-narrativisable, such as identity and status 
within hijra society and heterogeneous identifications that seem paradoxical according 
to mainstream norms, remained uninterpreted, such that specific aspects of kinnar 
identity were rendered intelligible at the expense of others.  
I consider the main academic contribution of this thesis to be as follows. First, 
the thesis contributes further data to literature on hijra identity, which is not an 
extensive area of study, particularly on communities in many states in India (including 
Madhya Pradesh). Work has largely been confined to the South and focuses on gender 
and religious practices. My investigation amongst the kinnar community in MP 
supplements existing literature on hijra communities in modern India. Second, a focus 
on political participation, in state politics in MP and LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and 
Transgender) activism in India (in Chapter Five), engages with current ways in which 
hijra identity is being renegotiated in the Indian context. Hijras are often perceived as 
outside of and unwilling to engage with mainstream society. Whilst this is true to an 
extent, there are numerous and significant attempts to enter mainstream spaces made 
by hijras and kinnars across India and this thesis assesses the impact that representation 
within mainstream political spheres has had on hijra identity. Third, I address how 
minority group identity is shaped through an engagement with democratic and State 
processes. Recognition by the State is necessary in order to acquire benefits and 
representation, as a result of political participation and activism, has the potential to 
redress the manifold inequalities hijras experience. At the same time, representation 
functions to reify certain aspects of identity, and I offer a theorisation of the effect of 
recognition by democratic and State processes on a minority identity. I explore specific 
mechanisms of political participation in MP and Indian LGBT activism that construct 
hijra identity in modern India and consider how they fail, ultimately, at constructing an 
identity that makes any claim to normativity. 
 
I. Preliminary Literature Review 
 
Scholarship on the hijras has focused on their sexual or gendered identity, structure 
and function of communities, and religious practices. However, there has been little 
written on hijras and their engagement with democratic processes. There is, of course, 
an established body of scholarship on the relationship between caste and democratic 
politics, as well as research into the role of women and political movements and 
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participation in India. Yet, there has been a lack of research on hijras and their political 
participation in the study of political praxis in India, except for one article by Gayatri 
Reddy (2003), which questions the presumed relationship between hijra 
marginalisation and their social emancipation through electoral participation. Despite 
the potential of creating a new understanding of citizenship and sexual representation, 
Reddy argues that identification with regulatory Hindu norms allows for the 
legitimisation of far-right moral agendas that intend to ‘re-masculinise’ the nation. 
Given that hijras are not a formal caste group, or a gender recognised as ‘equal’ to male 
and female, their political practices have not been researched in relation to literature on 
caste and politics or gender and politics. The hijras are uniquely positioned with 
respect to their political participation, as an ‘unrecognised’ social grouping on the 
grounds of caste and by having a gender identity that does not conform to normative 
stereotypes of men or women in politics. An analysis of hijra participation in politics, 
therefore, has the potential to open up new avenues for conceptualising the functions 
of social grouping and gender in political practice and processes. The cases of the three 
kinnars of MP that I examine in this thesis, for example, supplement current 
theorisations of political practice in India, especially with regard to scholarship on 
caste-based political practice and the assessment mechanisms for affirmative action in 
relation to gender rather than caste.  
Scholarship tends to focus on the hijras as a subject of study in itself, rather than 
in relation to wider social structures in India. This is understandable given that hijra 
communities function as any community might, in relation to their own social spaces, 
customs, and kinship relations. Moreover, hijras stay involved in their own affairs, 
apart from their dealings with the mainstream public in day-to-day interactions often 
connected to their ritual work. The community thus tends to be considered in isolation. 
However, in the last fifteen years, there has been engagement with democratic 
processes throughout the country, with hijras standing for elections and campaigning 
in many parts of the country with varying success. Their electoral victories have added 
to an awareness among wider hijra communities regarding their citizenship rights and 
many hijra candidates have campaigned with specific demands for the hijra community 
in mind. The occurrence of hijras contesting elections demands that new research be 
undertaken into documenting and analysing the structures and links being built 
between a previously isolated group and the wider public, as they are played out in the 
field of democratic politics. Past topics of study regarding the hijra community include 
their gendered, religious, or social practices, with an emphasis on the hijras’ perceived 
non-heteronormative gender and sexuality. Based on feminist and anthropological 
writings in the 1970s and 1980s, hijras were often classified along archetypal gender 
lines, determined as either ‘deviant’ or as ‘liberated’ from normative gender categories. 
Literature on hijras tended to focus on their role as an alternative ‘third’ sex, a distinct 
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gender and sex position from the western binary model of sex and gender (see Herdt 
1994; Nanda 1994; Nanda 1999). The third term, Marjorie Garber writes, allows for a 
conceptual move from a dual relation to a chain of elements: 
the ‘third term’ is not a term. Much less is it a sex, certainly not an instantiated 
‘blurred’ sex as signified by a term like ‘androgyne’ or ‘hermaphrodite’, although 
these words have culturally specific significance at certain historical moments. The 
‘third’ is a mode of articulation, a way of describing a space of possibility. Three 
puts in question the idea of one: of identity, self-sufficiency, self-knowledge.  
(1992: 11) 
A discursive position as ‘third’ framed such writing on the hijras, positing them as an 
alternative gender role, standing in for the possibility of difference.  
However, western-focused scholarship on gender and sexuality has provided 
other important avenues through which hijra identity might be analysed, particularly 
work by Judith Butler and Judith (Jack) Halberstam on the performativity of gender. 
Butler’s work on gender, as a ‘stylised repetition of acts’ (1990: 140), reveals the ways in 
which the body and identity are constituted through the processual reiteration and 
reification of normalising practices. The subject is constituted within a matrix of gender 
relations, but appears naturalised through the productive power of the reiterated 
practice over time.  ‘Sex’ functions as a regulatory ideal, a practice of resignification 
that belongs to a sanctioned set of conventions, which must be reiterated in order to 
produce the effect it names. Processual, reiterated practice reveals the instability of 
identity (1993: 127), creating the possibility for subversion where the subject recognises 
the production of norms and the political interests inherent within them (ibid.: 30). 
Butler’s work therefore can help to frame a discussion of hijra identity, as that which is 
constructed within a heternormative matrix that posits such an identity as different, or 
deviant. Moreover, Halberstam’s work on the policing of gender and the multiplicity 
of identities and vernaculars (in particular relation to female masculinity) provides a 
further conceptual framework in which one might examine hijra identity (1998). 
Halberstam, in contrast to literature that relies on ‘thirdness’, perceives such reliance as 
stabilising the gender binary that such a term or concept should disrupt. Instead of 
subsuming multiple identities under a term such as as ‘third gender’, Halberstam 
focuses on multiplicity, positing that such a study of ‘a queer subject position…can 
successfully challenge hegemonic models of gender conformity’ (1998: 9). By 
questioning the use of singular categories of understanding, Halberstam calls for ‘new 
and self-conscious affirmations of different gender taxonomies’, perhaps by refusing to 
engage with conventional gender norms (ibid.). Multiple, unlimited displays of gender 
are therefore necessary rather than constituting a separate ‘third’ category for those 
who are deemed non-normative, such that new or ignored categories can be added to 
an understanding of the gender spectrum.   
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Scholarship on the hijras has taken up and developed such approaches, 
critiquing an earlier attitude of scholarly claims that celebrated the ‘liberatory’ 
potential of hijras and other ‘third-sex’ identities from constrictive westernised gender-
binaries. These critiques have problematised the ‘third-sex’ category and called for 
deeper analysis of individuals’ lived experience (Cohen 1995), including focusing on 
the construction of identity through linguistic markers (Hall 1995, 1997), and the 
necessity of investigating the heterogeneity of performance and behaviour which 
demands a reconceptualisation of sexual identity in relation to discourses of religion, 
nationalism, colonialism, and class, as well as other markers of identity, such as race, 
ethnicity, region, and caste (Patel 1997; Reddy 2005). More recent literature on gender 
and sexuality, drawing on transnational discourses concerning ‘minority’ sexualities, 
contemplates hijras as a form of MSM (‘men who have sex with men’ or ‘males who 
have sex with males’ to account for males who do not identify as men) or transgender 
identity, in order to theorise the sexual practices of these communities in modern India. 
Such literature is informed by scholarship regarding sexual practices in the time of 
AIDS and transnational LGBT and queer movements (Cohen 2005; Bose and 
Bhattacharyya 2007; Narrain and Gupta 2011; Dutta 2012b; Roy 2012). Such work is 
often focused on metropolitan sites such as Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Bangalore, 
and calls attention to the numerous sites and discourses through which sexuality and 
identity is played out, particularly sexualities and gender identities traditionally seen 
as non-heteronormative in Indian society. There has also been research into hijra 
identity and citizenship, exploring how hijras’ identities and performance might 
disrupt narratives of citizenship and the law through the performance of gender 
identity that refuses categorisation and problematises existing classificatory 
mechanisms and modes of recognition (Narrain 2007; Atluri 2012; Dutta 2012a).  
Work on the hijras that does not focus on their sex or gender is less extensive, 
and primarily tends to examine the religious or ritual performances or social structures 
in the community (Carstairs 1957; Opler 1960, 1961; Shah 1961; Sharma 1989). Hijras’ 
practices are viewed as deviating from normative models of religious practice or 
kinship networks found across the Indian subcontinent, blending religious traditions to 
suit communal and individual needs and by adopting the structures associated with 
traditional kinship networks and practices and re-employing them within hijra 
communities (Sharma 1989; Jaffrey 1997; Bockrath 2003). Both hijras’ religious practices 
and social structures are often seen as ‘borrowing’ from traditional Indian norms, and 
thus as secondary to or derivative of normative practice. Ultimately, hijras are 
portrayed as deriving significance and meaning from their adoption of mainstream 
practices. A notable exception is research done on the hijras and the annual festival at 
Koovagam in Tamil Nadu. Hijras are specifically known as ‘aravaṇi’ or ‘tirunaṅkai’ in 
this state. There is a body of literature on tirunaṅkai ritual practices at this festival, 
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where tirunaṅkais give themselves in marriage to the god Aravāṇ and mourn his death, 
as widows, on the following day (Hiltebeitel 1995; Pattanaik 2002; Craddock 2012). A 
further body of work on the hijras traces both the mythological and historical trajectory 
of the community (Zwilling and Sweet 1993, 1996, 2000; Preston 1987; Agrawal 1997; 
Jaffrey 1997; Gannon 2009), fixing the figure of the hijra as a modern identity that 
draws its legitimacy from a historical past, which has had a formative impact on hijra 
identity today. These works enable a historical understanding of hijra communities, 
and are important in bringing together some of the threads used by hijras in 
constructing their identity in modern society.  
While the majority of scholarship has focused on a specific aspect of hijra 
identity, such as gendered performance or social structure, the two most influential 
works written on the community are ethnographies of two communities’ lived 
experience. Both works provide an understanding of what is often considered a 
subordinate and secretive community and these two works are widely credited with 
providing much of what is known about the hijras. The first is Serena Nanda’s Neither 
Man nor Woman: The Hijras of India (1999, 2nd edition), a study of a hijra community 
located in an unnamed city referred to as ‘Bastipore’ in South India. Nanda offers an 
ethnographic account of this community and highlights its subordinate status, focusing 
on hijras’ narratives to explore gendered, religious, and social practices. Nanda’s work 
contemplates hijras’ daily lives, drawing on individual stories to explain how 
individuals joined the community and left their natal families, the emasculation 
operation, how the community functions, their relationships with one another and men 
outside the community, and the social violence they suffer. Nanda calls the hijras 
‘neither men nor women’, and views them as a specific sex/gender categorisation 
(although subordinate to male and female categories). The second influential study is 
Gayatri Reddy’s With Respect to Sex: Negotiating Hijra Identity in South India (2005), 
focusing on hijra communities living in Secunderabad and Hyderabad in Andhra 
Pradesh. Reddy’s work provides a fuller analysis of hijras’ gendered presentation. Her 
work is significant in reconceptualising the hijra subject in answer to the literature that 
focuses on sexuality as a primary marker of hijra identity. She argues that subjectivity 
and hijras’ own understanding of sexuality is mediated through an experience of other 
modes of difference, such as caste class, regional, and life-historical specificities, and 
through engagement with the concept of izzat, or honour. Reddy provides a thorough 
discussion of historical and contemporary work on the hijras and of the performance of 
religious identity in the Hyderabadi context. She focuses on how gender and sexed 
identity is constructed in relation to other modes of difference, questioning how 
‘sexuality studies’, as a field of research, is conceptualised and conducted. I discuss 
both authors in greater detail in the first chapter, presenting an overall view of hijra 
communities in India. Given that political participation was the primary focus of my 
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research, I supplement my discussion about communities and households in MP and 
in India with their (and other) research, focusing on comparisons and similarities. 
It is significant to note the regional focus of scholarship on the hijras, since there 
are communities found throughout India, with significant variation from region to 
region, not just in terms of identification but social practice. Hijras in central India, as I 
found in the case of MP, construct their identities in ways different to those of the hijras 
in South India, through performance, language, and belief. Both Reddy and Nanda 
focused on communities in the South, and, as mentioned above, there has been 
excellent research produced on tirunaṅkais in Tamil Nadu. On the whole, 
anthropological work on the hijras has been confined to the South, with recent research 
on sexual identity and sexual health in metropolitan cities that discusses hijra sexuality. 
One exception is Kira Hall’s work on hijras in Banaras, Uttar Pradesh (1995). There is 
little or no academic scholarship on hijra communities in most states of India, including 
MP.  
The occurrence of individual hijras’ political success in MP, alongside other 
successes throughout the country, introduces a new theme for research regarding the 
hijra community and group identity. Research on specific individuals and their local 
communities in MP, compared with previous scholarship, revealed that there is a vast 
range of variation among the community, in terms of practice, belief, and 
understanding of what it means to be a hijra or kinnar. Such variation highlights the 
need for further studies in order to appreciate significant differences and divisions 
among hijra communities in terms of outlook and practice. An engagement with 
contemporary social processes, including political practice and social activism, is 
having a significant impact on the way hijras create a sense of their identity, both 
among and in relation to the hijra community and the mainstream public. 
Contemporary political participation forces hijras to reframe their identity in relation to 
modern normative social categories and sanctioned modes of interpretation. Current 
activism, including within LGBT movements, demands that hijras are understood in 
relation to discourses on sexuality and gender, circulating not only in India but 
internationally. In light of hijras’ political participation as candidates, campaigners, and 
voting participants, and in the wider context of an ‘opening up’ of democratic spaces to 
various minority and marginalised communities, I believe that it is necessary to 
address the relationship between hijra identity and the concept of representation and to 
ask in what ways representation shapes and informs an understanding of hijra identity 
in contemporary India. 
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II. Theoretical Framework  
 
Given the nature of the thesis in crossing multiple fields of study, different chapters 
will address and review literature that is directly relevant to my analysis and 
discussion. In this section, however, I will outline the literature that is directly related 
to my overall argument with respect to the theoretical frameworks employed and the 
structure of the thesis.  
 The thesis sets out to consider the impact that representative practices have had 
on kinnar identity in Madhya Pradesh, focusing in particular on individuals who have 
been elected into democratic institutions at the state and urban body level. I theorise 
representation by drawing upon Gayatri Spivak’s two forms of representation, in 
which the subject speaks ‘for’ and ‘as’, revealing the inherent contradictions in any act 
of representation (1990). Her theorisations complicate kinnars’ political participation 
and representation, I believe, through a consideration of how kinnars both represented 
their constituents, speaking ‘for’ them as representatives, and how kinnars spoke ‘as’, 
being re-presented as individuals who would better serve those they represented due 
to their marginality from mainstream networks and spaces. 
 In discussing representation in the sense of ‘political proxy’, I will draw on 
literature that addresses the political representation of marginalised groups in 
deliberative and legislative bodies, as a means of rectifying historical and existing 
inequalities (Kymlicka 1989; Williams 1998; McMillan 2005), alongside the problems 
with identifying beneficiaries for preferential schemes (Williams 1998; Mansbridge 
1999) and then examine various critiques of preferential schemes, particularly in the 
Indian context (Sowell 1990; McMillan 2005; Sisodia 2007; Yadav 2009; Kulkarni 2012). 
Kinnars served as proxy representatives of their constituents, by—in two of the three 
cases examined in this thesis—contesting seats that had been reserved for other 
‘marginalised’ groups, given that there are no reservations for kinnars according to 
current schemes. I will consider how the representation of marginalised groups occurs, 
particularly drawing upon the work of Jane Mansbridge on descriptive representation 
(1999), who argues that descriptive representatives tend to mirror the experiences and 
outward manifestations of the represented group. However, the re-presentation of 
kinnars functioned simultaneously with discourses that spoke to their ability to be 
proxy representatives. Kinnars were discursively constructed as politicians who were 
more likely to serve public needs, as self-sacrificing and honest, unlike previous 
politicians. I draw upon Stuart Hall’s work on representation, as the production of 
meaning through language (2002), in order to explore how kinnars were represented as 
potential politicians.  
Hall offers a nuanced way in which to concentrate on the modes through which 
representation occurs, such as can be demonstrated through an exploration of kinnars’ 
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campaigns and elections. Hall argues that language builds up a culture of shared 
understandings so that a representational system produces meaning for a specific 
group, through shared modes of interpretation (2002: 1), where meaning is produced 
and exchanged in every interaction (ibid.: 3) through shared conceptual maps and 
shared language (ibid.: 17). For Hall, representation is the ‘production of meaning 
though language’ (ibid.: 16), through representational systems of concepts and signs, 
although it only occurs through an active process of interpretation (ibid.: 32) and is thus 
contingent and historically specific. Hall focuses on a discursive approach to language, 
which emphasises the ‘historical specificity of a particular form or regime of 
representation’ (ibid.: 6), and not on language itself as a general concern or how 
language produces meaning (the semiotic approach). 
Hall’s work explicitly links representation to identity production, through a 
study of the concrete modes through which representation occurs, and I will adopt his 
approach in an analysis of the specific representative practices surrounding kinnar 
elections in MP, which, I argue, focus on kinnars’ lack of identifiable characteristics and 
their presumed marginality from normative social spaces. An emphasis on their ‘lack’ 
of identity’ (a lack of caste, religion, gender, and of belonging to society) reified kinnars’ 
marginality, portraying them as outside of normative social structures. I will argue, 
therefore, that kinnar identity cannot be said to be representative, in terms of a 
descriptive sense or in relation to other forms of representative-constituent 
relationships, as theorised by Mansbridge (2003). Mansbridge discusses four normative 
forms of representation, aside from descriptive representation, as ‘promissory’ 
(promises are made to voters), ‘anticipatory’ (people vote in a retrospective manner), 
‘gyroscopic’ (representatives act without external incentives, according to their own 
beliefs), and ‘surrogate’ (the surrogate representative shared experinces with a 
surrogate community, advancing substantive interests). In each, forms of relationships 
between representative and constituent occur in different—but not mutually 
exclusive—forms, such that representation between representative and constituent 
works in multiple and complex ways. I will use her theorisations to frame my 
conclusions regarding the representative relationships developed between kinnar 
politicians and their constituents. I will argue that relationships were developed akin to 
gyroscopic and anticipatory models, where kinnars were presumed to a greater 
commitment to the public good, and where characteristics such as their presumed 
honesty, incorruptibility, and lack of social ties were taken into account, in relation to 
the experience of previous politicians who had failed in relation to promissory and 
anticipatory forms. Kinnars thus served their constituents’ needs of a particular time 
and location; however their re-presentation within political spheres reified their 
presumed difference from others within their localities, remarginalising them within 
local democratic spaces.  
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 Furthermore, I will argue that kinnars were unable to accrue significant material 
or symbolic gains through representation, including benefitting in terms of raising 
their social status or increasing positive stereotypes about kinnars in general. I frame 
this conclusion by employing Pierre Bourdieu’s theorisations on capital, arguing that 
kinnars were unable to translate their experience within political spheres into lasting 
gains for themselves and their communities. I will outline his theorisations here in 
order to more clearly frame my later discussion in chapter four. 
Bourdieu’s model of social capital removes the concept of ‘capital’ from purely 
economic activity and economic theory and points to three fundamental guises in 
which capital may present itself in: (1) economic, which is directly convertible into 
money and may be institutionalised as property rights; (2) cultural, which, in certain 
conditions, is convertible into economic capital and may be institutionalised in the 
form of educational qualifications; and (3) social, made up of social obligations, which 
may be converted into economic capital in certain conditions, and may be 
institutionalised in the forms of a title (Bourdieu 1986; 1989: 17). Capital is a resource 
that is valued because of its scarcity (ibid.), and acts as a social relation ‘within a system 
of exchange’ (Harker et al. 1990: 13). It is also the basis of domination, although 
participants may not recognise this. Accumulation of capital allows individuals to 
thrive and succeed; Harker et al. argue that the most powerful conversion of capital is 
to ‘symbolic’ capital, which is the form in which different forms of capital ‘are 
perceived and recognized as legitimate’ (ibid.). Bourdieu writes that in the struggle for 
‘the production of common sense, or more precisely, for the monopoly over legitimate 
naming’, agents use the symbolic capital that they have acquired ‘in previous struggles 
and which may be juridically guaranteed’ (1989: 21). Symbolic capital might be 
‘officially sanctioned and guaranteed’, such as a title, ‘a socially recognised 
qualification’, such as a school diploma, which is a ‘piece of universally recognised and 
guaranteed symbolic capital, good on all markets’ (ibid.). Bourdieu argues that it is an 
‘official definition of an official identity, it frees its holder from the symbolic struggle of 
all against all by imposing the universally approved perspective’ (ibid.: 21-22). 
Symbolic capital is necessary for an individual to generate symbolic power. Bourdieu 
describes symbolic capital as power, one which can ‘impose upon other minds a vision, 
old or new, of social divisions’, and as a credit: ‘it is the power granted to those who 
have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition’ (ibid: 23). 
The accumulation of symbolic power is of ultimate importance so that actors can 
impose their vision and views upon fields and contests within those fields, by virtue of 
recognition of their legitimate position. 
Bourdieu theorises the interaction between ‘strategic action’ (which is aimed at 
accumulating or transferring capital) and structural forces and institutional norms by 
referring to ‘fields’ within which the struggles for particular resources are played out 
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(Jeffrey 2001: 220). Each field is shaped by forces, such as state institutions, which are 
not connected to actors and their strategies, however, fields are reproduced and 
transformed by the practices of agents within them (ibid.). Fields, Harker et al. argue, 
identify areas of struggle, such as the field of intellectual life, of literary and artistic 
taste, of politics, and so on (1990: 9). Possession of power, through forms of capital, 
commands access to profits that are valued and at stake in each field. Strategies and 
struggles are intimately tied to fields in order to attain capital and thus power. Power 
is therefore central to Bourdieu’s model since an acquisition or loss of power changes 
the position of agents within the field, leading to its restructuring.  
Capital is generated through labour and is embodied in the dispositions of the 
habitus. The habitus refers to a set of dispositions, which are ‘created and reformulated 
through the conjuncture of objective structures and personal history’ (Harker et al. 1990: 
10). The habitus is internalised, and its dispositions drive an individual’s meaningful 
practices and perceptions and ways of contesting any given field. Habitus includes a 
person’s knowledge and understanding of the world, which ‘contributes to the reality 
of that world’ (ibid.: 11). Habitus, crucially, is never fixed: as positions within fields 
change, so do the dispositions that constitute an individual’s habitus (ibid.).4 Harker et 
al. write that habitus is ‘intimately linked’ to capital since some habitus, such as that of 
dominant social and cultural fractions, will ‘act as multipliers of various kinds of 
capital’, and thus constitute a form of symbolic capital in and of themselves (ibid.: 12).  
As I will show, while each kinnar had some economic and cultural capital 
(objectified, but not embodied or institutionalised), their social capital, as a member of 
the kinnar community, was only intelligible within the field of hijra society itself. Thus, 
I will argue, it did not benefit them in the political sphere and did not convert into 
symbolic capital. The inability for kinnars to convert their social capital indicates that 
there was no framework of reference available by which to understand their entry and 
participation in politics. 
 
III. Fieldwork, Methodology, and Positionality 
 
I carried out fieldwork in 2010 and 2011 in Madhya Pradesh, Delhi, Mumbai, and 
Ahmedabad and Becharaji in Gujarat. The aim of my fieldwork was to investigate 
kinnars’ political participation in MP and I decided to undertake the research using 
various data collection methods. In formulating the project, it was clear that qualitative 
                                                      
4 There are however constraints upon individuals’ agency, including the habitus of socialising 
agents (through the influence of others’ ritual practices), the principles of the corresponding 
habitus, and the objective conditions of the material and social environment (Harker et al. 1990: 
11-12) 
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fieldwork5 undertaken in Madhya Pradesh, particularly in the localities in which 
different kinnars had been elected, would be a key component of my research. This was 
necessary in order to collect data on the specific locations in which kinnars had been 
elected and to conduct interviews with kinnars themselves, given that only one article 
has been written on kinnar electoral victories in Madhya Pradesh (Reddy 2003). While 
fieldwork was key to shaping the project, it is clear that—perhaps fittingly given the 
focus of this thesis on ‘representation’—the data that would be produced as the result 
of the kind of research I was undertaking, as well as the discussion that I would 
undertake in order to collate and make sense of such data, would be partial. As James 
Clifford asserts, ‘ethnographic truths are thus inherently partial—committed and 
incomplete’, however, once this fact is accepted and built into ethnographic practice, ‘a 
rigorous sense of partiality can be a source of representational tact’ (1986: 7). Clifford 
argues that the practice of ethnography is embedded in and enacts power relations, 
performing a complex and ambivalent function within these relations (ibid.: 9). 
Qualitative fieldwork as part of this study, therefore, provided a partial description 
and analysis of the complex disourses and events that resulted in the election of kinnars 
in Madhya Pradesh, but it was employed as a method that allowed for an in-depth (but 
necessarily incomplete) study of electoral success among a marginalised group of 
which very little has been studied previously. Moreover, the choice of specific electoral 
victories that would be studied, within a particular state and time frame, also 
decreased the scale of this study.  
 As a result of time in the field and as a means by which to discuss kinnars’ 
elections, I chose a case study approach in order to provide a comparative framework 
for my study and analysis. Given time and resources’ limitations, due to the size of MP 
state itself and the distance between different localities in which kinnars had been 
elected, a case study approach allowed for a more in-depth study of three electoral 
victories, rather than attempting to collect data on elections from six different sites (of 
the six kinnars which I knew had been elected at the start of my fieldwork). It was 
important to have more time to spend in each location, given that the study required a 
thorough understanding of each location and the conditions for each electoral victory. 
Moreover, a case study approach, focusing on three elections, provided data which 
could be analysed for similarities and differences. Although three cases could not 
necessarily provide conclusions that could be extended to theorise the entry of other 
marginalised groups within democratic spheres, which could be a limitation of this 
approach, these case studies did allow for conclusions to be drawn concerning the 
                                                      
5 I use the phrase ‘qualitative fieldwork’ rather than ‘ethnographic research’ to indicate the 
purpose and nature of my research in Madhya Pradesh. I was focused on researching a set of 
events in the past and examining the outcomes of these events, rather than being embedded in 
different kinnar communities and intending to provide a rich, ethnographic description of those 
particular communities and their environments.    
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construction of kinnar identity within discourses relating to decentralised democracy in 
contemporary India, alongside conclusions pertaining to the construction of identity 
within political rhetoric. The case study approach therefore provided a framework for 
this study and allowed for more in-depth discussion on individual elections.  
Another method employed in this research was qualitative, semi-structured 
interviews. Interviews were chosen as the method through which to collect data in the 
form of people’s opinions and assessments in relation to the subject of kinnars’ 
elections. Interviews provided an effective method to learn about what people thought 
and believed, and generated large amounts of data that I could assess afterwards. I 
attempted to access multiple groups in the interview process, but acknowledge that 
due to time and resources (including interpreters’ time, and occasionally, interest), I 
was unable to access and interview certain social groups in particular localities. Fully 
structured interviews, as I found after the first interview, proved to be too rigid a 
process. I opted for a semi-structured approach where I had questions planned and 
topics that I wanted to discuss, and this provided flexibility, particularly in reacting 
with additional questions based on interviewees’ responses. Most interviews took 
place in interviewees’ place of work or homes, both during office hours and in the 
evenings and at weekends and the majority of interviews were tape-recorded and 
transcribed.  
I conducted sixty semi-structured interviews in MP with kinnars who had been 
active in politics; kinnars’ supporters, voters, and their critics; journalists; and local 
politicians and people who worked in local government offices. I also interviewed 
around ten more kinnars and hijras in Mumbai and Gujarat, in a more informal 
capacity, and not focused on the political participation of kinnars in MP. I knew of six 
kinnars who had successfully contested elections in MP between 1999 and 2009 and 
learned of a seventh towards the end of my time in the field. I met and interviewed five 
of the seven kinnars, four on numerous occasions: Shabnam Mausi, Kamla Bua, Heera 
Bai,6 and Kamla Jaan, respectively in the locations of Shahdol and Anuppur, Sagar, 
Jabalpur, and Katni, all located in central to eastern MP. Interviews focused on their 
political participation, although three were willing to speak about other and more 
personal subjects. With other non-kinnar interviewees in the above named locations, I 
focused primarily on the nature of the kinnars’ campaigns, elections, and tenure, 
including interviewees’ impressions and assessments of the kinnar in question. 
Interviews were often open-ended or semi-structured, providing the opportunity for 
people to become involved in the process and allowing for a more flexible approach in 
conducting the interviews. Interviews were conducted between the subjects, 
interpreters, and myself. Often other people were present for the interviews; on one 
occasion, around twenty people were watching the interview take place, wanting to 
                                                      
6 For a discussion of Heera Bai’s election and time in office, see Appendix A. 
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know what was going on. On the occasion that the subjects wished to speak English, 
my interpreter remained present. Interviews were driven, to a degree, by the 
interpreters themselves, and there was some negotiation between myself and the 
interpreters as to the direction the interview might take, if not dictated by the subject. 
One limitation, therefore, was language and the use of interpreters. I was able to enlist 
the help of or employ different individuals in each location who acted as translators 
and facilitators during interviews and interactions. Thus, in certain regards, access to 
subjects was hindered through the presence and use of interpreters. Although access to 
language or meaning could at times be a limiting factor in the interview process, 
occasionally interviews were hindered by the interpreters’ themselves, in terms of both 
driving or managing interviews in directions they wanted or thought was important, 
and again, by belonging to the communities in which we were located (that is, being an 
‘insider’ and knowledgeable of different events and contexts). Most of the interpreters 
lived and worked as part of the communities in which we conducted interviews, and 
occasionally there was reluctance on the part of interviewees to speak about matters 
with someone who was not seen as an outsider or ‘unbiased’ to the situation. Kinnar 
interviewees, for example, occasionally became displeased with how questions were 
phrased, or irritated if an interpreter suggested a different viewpoint. At the same time, 
the use of an interpreter influenced the interview context. Many interviewees seemed 
happy to speak to me and answer questions, as a perceived outsider to the situation. 
Often stories varied according to the interviewee, as well as the emphasis placed on 
certain facts within those stories; it thus appeared that such a telling was for my benefit, 
to put across what the interviewee thought was important. 
Oral consent was taped or agreed before every recorded and non-recorded 
session, with signed consent given by the kinnar subjects involved. Most interviews 
were recorded and later transcribed. A few subjects wanted to remain anonymous but 
were happy to be recorded; another interviewee was interviewed but later wanted the 
recording deleted and I was refused one informal interview by a group of kinnars 
because their guru was not present. I was told to return when she was. In a few cases, I 
approached the subjects with a transcription and asked them whether they wanted 
anything changed or removed. I took a qualitative approach to this work, stressing 
subjective and contextual accuracy. Many of the dates, ‘facts’, and events that I discuss 
were narrated by individuals who have a stake in the way the story was told and 
recorded, and their accounts often differ from other versions of the same event. It is not 
my intention to mediate the veracity of these accounts but to present them as the 
subjects of my research did. Some inaccuracies stem simply from people’s memory of 
the fact, due to time elapsed. 
Finally, a note on my positionality in a thesis about representation. I am, as 
Homi K. Bhabha might suggest, a ‘hybrid’ subject/product, negotiating the multiple 
30  
ways in which fixed subject positions contest and collide and constructing the guise of 
an identity in the spaces in-between. As Bhabha writes in his introduction to The 
Location of Culture:  
What is theoretically innovative, and politically crucial, is the need to think beyond 
narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and to focus on those moments or 
processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences. These ‘in-
between’ spaces provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood—singular 
or communal—that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of 
collaboration, and contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself. 
(1994: 1-2) 
 
Bhabha writes that subjects are formed ‘in-between’, or in excess of, the sum of the 
parts of difference: the perspective of the in-between is the space in which selfhood, 
singular or communal, is formed, a ‘hybrid’ of two opposing cultures. Every time I met 
someone new during my fieldwork I was asked, ‘where are you from?’ and the answer 
was never accepted until I said ‘China’. As racially Chinese with generations of my 
ancestors having been born and raised in Malaysia, baptised a Methodist as a result of 
my parents’ schooling in colonial and then post-colonial Malaysia, confirmed a 
member of the Church of England, with only a British passport, having been born in 
Paddington, the first daughter of economic immigrants, only speaking English, and 
having visited China for two weeks during one vacation when I was 11, but having 
spent over a year, over my lifetime, in India, ‘China’ not only seemed a very simplistic 
answer, but one that identified one aspect above all others and represented who I was 
to that person in an intelligible way. Identity and representation thus come to be 
mutually constitutive, where representation expresses one’s identity and makes it 
intelligible, and identity, to be recognised, must be represented. Hijra identity seemed 
for me to be the ultimate product of representation, and indicative of the extreme 
marginalisation that individuals can face, positioned as they are on the edges of 
society, gender and religious practices, and ‘normative’ anatomical forms, but I wanted 
to investigate further how a position of ‘in-between-ness’ affected their lives and sense 
of selfhood. Hijras are true hybrid subjects, produced in the moments of the 
articulation of cultural difference. I do not claim here to offer a ‘truer’ hijra subjectivity, 
but acknowledge the role that I too play in representing the hijra subject.  
 
IV. Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter One provides an introductory overview of hijra or kinnar identity, focusing on 
several—but interconnected—aspects of their identity in contemporary Indian society. 
Despite their ritual role of performing blessings for newly wed couples and newly born 
infants, hijras face social marginalisation in many aspects of their lives, due to their 
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gendered performance and the way in which hijra communities are structured and 
function. I use this chapter to explore the multiple ways in which hijras are represented 
throughout India today, both by the mainstream public and by the hijras themselves in 
answer to common stereotypes about their behaviour and lives. I focus on four areas: 
literature (both historical and contemporary), gender practice, religion, and hijra 
society. Historical, legal, and literary sources have played a crucial role in producing 
various representations of the hijra, informing how this identity is constructed and seen 
by non-hijras and hijras alike. References to individuals of ambiguous gender and 
sexuality exist throughout classical sources and mythological narratives and eunuchs 
played an important role in the medieval courts as advisors, harem keepers, treasurers, 
and confidantes. Hijras use both discourses to attest to the important role they have 
played throughout the history of the subcontinent, providing a measure of legitimacy 
and respect for their identity, which is significant given its supposed modern deviancy. 
During the colonial era, many of the hijras’ social practices were criminalised and their 
gender read as deviant. Colonial legislation, particularly in the form of the Indian 
Penal Code (1860) and the Act for the Registration of Criminal Tribes and Eunuchs 
(1897), criminalised the hijra subject, relating to sexual practice, emasculation, forms of 
income, and practices that ensured social reproduction. Contemporary hijras carry 
traces of both these positions—celebrated and criminalised—within their modern 
identities, performing an ongoing negotiation with these historical representations in 
the ways hijras forge their identities today. Hijras also negotiate gendered practices, 
navigating and manipulating stereotypes of both masculine and feminine behaviour to 
create a gender identity that contradicts expected gendered behaviour. Hijras blur the 
boundaries of gendered behaviour and expose the performance of gender norms, 
blending elements typically seen as masculine or feminine. A crossing of practices is 
mirrored in hijras’ religious practices. Hijras borrow fluidly from traditions that are 
viewed conventionally as mutually exclusive. In MP, hijras draw upon Muslim and 
Hindu traditions, generating a unique religious identity and praxis. By amalgamating 
various elements of practice and belief from both traditions, hijras construct a sense of 
religious identity that explains and gives significance to their marginality in society. 
Making sense of their marginality is also evident through the construction of numerous 
networks and structures that are particular to hijra communities. Unlike kinship 
networks based on consanguinity and marriage, hijra networks and relationships are 
maintained out of choice, providing support, protection, and an integral source of 
comfort for hijras, who are usually ostracised from normative social networks. Various 
relationships are formed to establish networks between hijras and are a source of love 
and community. Through an exploration of these four aspects, I demonstrate that hijra 
identity is represented in specific ways, both by hijras themselves, in answer to 
mainstream narratives regarding the groups’ difference and deviancy, and by 
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mainstream society, as they locate hijra identity in relation to normative social, gender, 
and religious practices. Comprehending these representations is crucial for 
understanding what hijra identity ‘is’ in modern India, in terms of past images of the 
community, present representations, and future visions. I aim to present the ways in 
which hijras have been constructed as individuals whose practices are subordinate to 
and marginalised within normative social, religious, gendered, and historical models. 
While this discussion might indicate their marginalisation in multiple spheres, at the 
same time I highlight the active ways in which hijras construct their identities in 
relation to these discourses.  
In Chapter Two, I discuss my fieldwork on kinnars’ political participation and 
present the case studies chosen for the thesis. My research was predominantly 
conducted in the eastern part of Madhya Pradesh between November 2010 and August 
2011. I had four sites of research: the cities of Jabalpur and Sagar and the towns of 
Katni Murwara and Shahdol, with additional trips conducted to other parts of eastern 
MP and to Mumbai in Maharashtra and Ahmedabad and Becharaji in Gujarat. Sagar, 
Katni, and the town of Shahdol were three of the sites where kinnars were elected 
between 1999 and 2009, which constitute the three case studies for the thesis. MP 
proved to be a rich location in which to conduct fieldwork, as the state in which kinnars 
have had the greatest success in contesting elections and due to a lack of research on 
kinnars within this state. I present key findings from my fieldwork, concentrating on 
specific actors in each location and points of interest about each election and the kinnar 
involved. I also discuss a sammelan (an inter-regional gathering) I attended in Sagar, 
which has value in adding to research conducted on social structures and functions 
within the setting of MP; Becharaji, where the temple of the patron goddess of the 
hijras, Bahuchara Mata, is located; and meetings with Laxmi Narayan Tripathi, a social 
activist and hijra in Mumbai. In the second half of the chapter, I examine the three case 
studies: Kamla Jaan, Mayor of the town of Katni Murwara, 1999-2002, Shabnam Mausi, 
Member of the Legislative Assembly for Sohagpur, Shahdol district, 2000-2003, and 
Kamla Bua, Mayor of the city of Sagar, 2009-2011. I present key interviews that were 
conducted during fieldwork and explore important aspects of the kinnars’ campaigns 
and elections. I discuss the specifics for each case study, focusing on how each came to 
run for office and the nature and efficacy of their campaigns, including the way each 
was represented to the voting public as a suitable candidate, given their lack of 
political experience and education and their identity as a kinnar. Significantly, kinnars 
were presented as viable political candidates by highlighting their difference from 
professional politicians and in the case studies I address certain issues relating to the 
representation of kinnar identity in the sphere of local politics.  
In the next two chapters, I investigate how kinnar identity has been shaped by 
and through political participation and consider the relationship between 
33  
representation and individual and group identity in MP. Although each case study has 
significant differences, in terms of the individuals themselves—their personalities, 
situations, and the way in which they participated in local politics—there are 
important similarities regarding each locality and how each was represented as a 
candidate, and this reveals how kinnar identity was moulded and manipulated in a 
particular way in order to win elections.  
In Chapter Three, I theorise the concept of representation that I use throughout 
the remainder of the thesis, focusing on the question of representation for previously 
marginalised groups in political and legislative bodies. I adopt Spivak’s theorisations 
of two distinct forms of representation, representation as political proxy and ‘re-
presentation’ as presentation, in this case, as a result of political participation. For the 
second theorisation, I draw upon the work of Stuart Hall who theorises how 
representation (the production of meaning through language) is inherently linked to 
identity production and offers concrete methods through which to analyse the ways in 
which representation occurs. I focus on both theorisations of ‘representation’, 
addressing how kinnars were representative of their constituents and how kinnar 
identity was represented to the public through, as a result of, political participation. 
Spivak’s theorisations of the practices of representation can be linked to Judith Butler’s 
work on the performance of gender identity. Butler posits that the gendered and sexed 
body is brought into being through the processual repetition of gender performance 
(1990, 1993), pointing to the constant performance of identity into order to render the 
body gendered, and significantly, legible. In the practice of representation, kinnars’ 
identities and bodies were brought into being through political rhetoric, shaped by 
narratives that dictated how their characteristics, bodies, and behaviours made them 
more suitable political representatives. Later in the chapter, I focus on the ways their 
identities were constructed through the repetition of norms and narratives associated 
with kinnar identity.7  
                                                      
7 There is significant potential for this bridging of theory, focusing on the construction of the 
subaltern subject and the performance and intelligibility of such an identity within normative 
discourses. Spivak’s theorisation of representation and intelligibility here can be informed by 
theory concerned with the performance of identity, particularly that offered by Judith Butler 
and her work on gender performance. I have attempted to include queer theory in certain parts 
of the thesis, especially considering queer theory’s contribution in the sense of rethinking 
concepts and structures afresh. In particular, ‘queer’ theory has been used to complicate certain 
arguments in relation to kinnars’ ‘queer’ history (chapter 1); gender performance (chapter 1); the 
notion of ‘failure’ in relation to kinnar politicial participation (chapter 4); and the potential for 
kinnars to embody a ‘different’ politics (chapter 4). While I employ queer scholarship at various 
points in the thesis, I want to address limitations it might have in theorising the ‘queer’ hijra 
subject. Queer theory offers significant frameworks in order to critique normalising systems 
and discourses, but has traditionally focused on sexuality and nonheteronormative bodies, 
place, and time, and their resistance to heteronormative conceptions in the West. An 
overreliance on queer theory could potentially interpret hijra subjectivity within modes of 
thinking which are legible within queer paradigms, rather than understanding the hijra as 
intelligible in its own terms, including understanding the hijra primarily as a sexual subject. I 
attempt to balance my discussion by both employing important frameworks offered by queer 
theory and by considering hijra subjectivity within its own frames of reference.   
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I begin the chapter by addressing the theorised rationales for the representation 
of marginalised groups in deliberative and legislative bodies in order to redress 
existing and historical inequalities and analyse problems with identifying beneficiaries. 
Group representation through preferential, compensatory schemes in the Indian 
context has prompted critiques, including the caste-based criteria for identifying 
beneficiaries, the solidification of caste identities, the creation of a ‘creamy layer’ of 
beneficiaries among specific groups, and the expansion, rather than reduction, of such 
policies. Given that reservation policies can be extended to recognise beneficiaries on 
multiple grounds on which their political marginalisation is based, I then address the 
question of reservation for kinnars in political bodies. In the second half of the chapter, I 
consider the re-presentation of kinnars’ identity through political participation, 
addressing the second form of representation theorised by Spivak. I argue that a new, 
negotiated representation of kinnar identity was constructed, rendering kinnar identity 
intelligible within the sphere of politics and for potential voters. I analyse the forms in 
which representation occurred, including electoral rhetoric, rumours, and public 
narratives about kinnar identity. Kinnars were presented as lacking experience, 
including party agendas and interests, as well as caste, religious, and community ties. 
Their ‘lack’ of identity was promoted as a strength, such that kinnars were positioned 
as more representative of a variety of constituent groups. The necessity of maintaining 
marginality appears contradictory to each attempt to gain kinnars a central place in 
local politics, and I argue that this marginality is what limited kinnars from being 
representative of their constituents. Moreover, by making specific aspects of their 
identity intelligible to constituents, kinnars’ lack of identity and marginality was 
manipulated in order to portray them as viable political candidates, reifying that very 
marginality. 
In Chapter Four I theorise kinnar political participation, offering three possible 
ways to interpret kinnars’ political success. The first interpretation mirrors initial 
analyses of the spate of electoral victories in MP, where electoral success was 
interpreted as a ‘proof’ of democracy. The context for kinnars’ victories is made 
possible by a functioning and decentralised form of democracy. The electoral success of 
kinnars might be read as having symbolic, expressive, or educative effects, where 
representation is an end in itself, allows different interests to be translated into 
legislative policy, or has a didactic effect on institutional members and the institution 
itself. Yet, their performance in office was seen as no more successful than previous 
politicians and kinnars were represented as marginal to mainstream society and unable 
to speak for themselves. I argue that there were few positive effects to their elections in 
symbolic, expressive, or educative terms. These conclusions are at odds with an 
assessment of their elections as a proof of democracy. A second interpretation posits 
kinnars’ electoral success as a mockery of the democratic process. Kinnars were elected 
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to protest against politicians perceived as corrupt and inefficient and political parties 
seen as out of touch with voters’ needs. The mockery was that anyone could be elected, 
even a kinnar, who symbolised incompetence and impotence; this interpretation is 
supported by assessments of kinnars’ campaigns and elections as a ‘joke’, part of a 
popular revolt, and as a ‘failed experiment’. Kinnars were not expected to perform well 
in politics, mocking both the democratic process of electing representatives and 
professional politicians who needed to be punished. The third interpretation is that 
political representation is not always beneficial for minority groups and may not 
translate into symbolic or material gains. I focus on material gains, specifically social 
status, and argue that there was no change in their social status as a result of political 
participation, focusing on stereotypes that were generated about the three kinnars 
whilst in office and after, where they were perceived as unqualified, ‘impotent’, reliant 
upon other people, and behaving in a way that reinforced negative stereotypes about 
kinnars. The production of negative stereotypes reinforced widely held assumptions 
about kinnars and thus kinnars’ social status (both individual and group) was not raised 
as a result of political participation. I theorise a lack of social status and gains by using 
Pierre Bourdieu’s theorisations of capital. While each kinnar had some economic and 
cultural capital (objectified, but not embodied or institutionalised), their social capital, 
as a member of the kinnar community, was only intelligible within the field of hijra 
society itself. Thus, it did not benefit them in the political sphere and did not convert 
into symbolic capital. The inability of kinnars’ social capital to convert indicates that 
there was no framework of reference available by which to understand their entry and 
participation in politics. 
In Chapter Five, I consider the question of representation beyond the level of 
local politics. By broadening the angle of vision regarding ‘representation’, I explore a 
further avenue through which increased representation might run the risk of reifying 
the marginality of the hijra subject. I question how ‘hijra’ identity is represented in 
relation to contemporary LGBT and queer activism and attend to the impact that 
‘representation’ as a member of the LGBT collective has had on contemporary hijra 
identity, particularly through the inclusion of hijra identity under the label of 
‘transgender’. The reading down of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code has led to a 
proliferation of State attempts designed to recognise the hijra or transgender subject, in 
order to address lasting inequalities faced by individuals in multiple walks of life. 
Representation for the ‘community’ is secured through certain voices, often from 
metropolitan and educated backgrounds, who have access to transnational discourses 
on LGBT rights. Such representation has the potential to construct a normative ‘T’ 
subject and an idea of normative hijra identity, bounded within LGBT and HIV/AIDS 
prevention discourses. I argue that representation of a specific version of hijra identity 
and the ‘hijra community’s’ interests runs the normativising the hijra subject and 
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closing down the heterogeneous possibilities for identification with the category ‘hijra’. 
The focus of this final chapter is on highlighting the contradictions inherent in the 
practice of representation within the field of contemporary LGBT activism and to ask 
what space hijras and kinnars have as part of this movement. I explore the extent to 
which representation necessarily entails a re-presentation of identity that is aligned 
with predetermined modes of understanding and interpretation, ultimately 
normativising hijra identity.  
My thesis concludes by arguing that, as exemplified by the case of the hijras or 
kinnars of MP, representation has the potential to alleviate historical and existing 
subordination but, at the same time, is inherently contradictory through an insistence 
on homogeneity and a singular understanding of an identity. Representation, as 
demonstrated throughout this thesis, can result in the re-marginalisation of a particular 
identity, because the heterogeneity that is present within any group is necessarily 
denied in order to render a subject intelligible within existing modes of interpretation 
and knowledge, particularly those that serve in the interests of legibility in the process 
of statecraft (Scott 1999). Representation creates the possibility for group benefits, but 
at the cost of individuals having to trade on the very identity that is the basis of and 
which maintains their marginality, in order to become intelligible. As Spivak writes, it 
is representation that renders the subaltern ‘narrativisable’, so that the subaltern no 
longer exists. Instead of the subaltern remaining at the ‘absolute limit of the place 
where history is narrativized into logic’ (1985: 346), the subaltern is named, is made 
narrativisable and legible, and consequently loses their subalternity. Hijras and kinnars’ 
inclusion within the fields of local MP politics and activism renders them legible to the 
modern State, such that they cease to be marginal and instead are made visible and 
normativised through naming and categorisation. Thus, representation might not end 
up ameliorating the social condition of the group in question, but can remarginalise 
many of the members of the group.  
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Chapter One 
The Hijra ‘Subject-Effect’: Configuring Subjectivity in Literature, Gender 
Performance, Religious Practice, and Social Spaces 
 
Hijras occupy a particular place in the public imagination, identified on account of their 
non-normative gender practices and existence on the margins of society. In this chapter 
I investigate how hijras have been represented in literature and contemporary 
scholarship, and in relation to their gendered and religious practices and social spaces, 
focusing on the state of Madhya Pradesh. I consider how hijras have been represented 
in these fields, responding to Gayatri Reddy’s call to consider how multiple facets of 
identity engage with modes of gender and sexuality, rather than studying hijras’ sex 
and gender as the primary marker of their identity. Figures with ambiguous gender 
and alternative sexualities played prominent roles in Hindu mythology and classical 
literature, as well as in the Islamic courts of Mughal India, but the way that ‘eunuchs’ 
were perceived by the British colonial administration significantly affected how these 
individuals were identified, through cataloguing, and then criminalising, the group’s 
practices. In turn, contemporary scholarship has theorised hijra identity as primarily 
sexed and gendered, especially in relation to analyses that focus on their ‘thirdness’. 
Hijras construct and negotiate their gender and sexed identities in relation to other 
MSM identities, through gender performance, and in relation to discourses regarding 
authenticity. Hijras frame their religious practices in reference to Hindu or Muslim 
traditions, borrowing somewhat fluidly from both and creating a unique sense of hijra 
religiosity. Amalgamative religiosity is necessary due to members joining communities 
from various social backgrounds; such practice might also stem from hijras’ own 
interpretations of their genealogy, from Hindu, Jain, and Islamic traditions. Hijra 
communities provide significant spaces for interaction, support, and structure; I argue 
that religion and community practices are two important aspects that serve to construct 
hijra identity as a distinct communal identity. In this chapter, I explore how hijra 
subjectivity, or the hijra ‘subject-effect’ (to borrow Gayatri Spivak’s phrase), is 
negotiated, as the effect of various knottings and configurations of multiple and 
discontinuous strands (1985: 341), including those relating to ideology, belief, history, 
caste, class, sexuality, and religiosity. I draw upon findings from my fieldwork, 
supplemented by extant scholarship on hijra identity. The reason for an extensive 
discussion of established scholarship in supporting the research in this chapter is that 
much of my fieldwork was focused upon political participation among kinnars in 
Madhya Pradesh. Research conducted with kinnars who had served as politicians was 
primarily focused on this subject, rather than investigating their historical subjectivity, 
gendered and religious practices, or their social structures, although there is, of course, 
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an intertwining of multiple aspects of hijra subjectivity that were evident and discussed 
throughout my fieldwork.  
 
I. Figures of Ambiguous Sex in Literary Traditions 
 
Historical representations and contemporary theorisations of hijra identity are 
significant to an understanding of hijra identity in modern India. I will examine 
references to individuals of ambiguous gender and sex in ancient myths and texts, 
writings from the medieval period, and colonial archives, and then move on to analyse 
contemporary academic scholarship, focusing on a critique of the literature that 
categorises hijra identity as a ‘third’ sex or gender. Contemporary classification 
through scholarship has fixed the hijra firmly as an alternative gender, distinct from 
male and female and homogenised as a ‘third’ category, yet it fails to consider the 
differentiations that exist among hijras themselves and in relation to a wider group of 
gender-variant individuals.  
 
i. Myths and Ancient Texts 
 
Hijras gain legitimacy as ‘sacred’ and powerful beings through references to characters 
with ambiguous gender and alternative sexualities in Indian mythology and ancient 
texts.1 Hijras employ myths and narratives from various periods throughout history, 
drawing upon a cultural tradition shared by hijras, in which they make sense of and 
construct their identities in modern India. Studying sacred and historical narratives in 
the construction of the ‘queer’ subject has been a significant area of study, as evidenced 
through work done on queer history, for example, by Michel Foucault (1978) and 
David M. Halperin (1990) 2 and scholarship on hijras has considered narratives used in 
                                                      
1  The term ‘hijra’ is not included specifically among the terms used for varying gender 
ambiguity. These terms relate to individuals who practice transvestism and transgenderism; 
undergo transsexual transformation; or are categorised as ‘unmales’, ‘eunuchs’ or ‘klibas’ 
(perhaps from the adjective ‘klīv’, ‘impotent’); a third—and fourth—gender referred to as 
‘napuṃsak’; or those of a third sex, ‘tritīya prakṛti’. The last term is generally translated as ‘third 
sex’, but Zwilling and Sweet write that this term refers to ‘feminised’ males, who are effeminate 
and/or transvestite but are distinguishable from women (2000: 112). Elsewhere they conflate 
hijra and the ‘unmales’ and third sex ‘of earlier times’ (1996: 363). These terms are not 
interchangeable and are problematic by simultaneously being exclusionary and ‘blanket’ terms 
for a wide range of acts and ‘identities’ under the general homophobic and heteronormative 
rubric of a ‘man who does not behave as a man should’ (Doniger 1999: 279-80; Zwilling and 
Sweet 1993: 592-4). Categorisations fail to include adequately variations in materiality, sexual 
object choice, and sexual role. Arguably, the hijras range in as much variation as the persons to 
whom these terms referred. 
2 Textual analysis proved an important method for early discourses of queer theory, focusing on 
the construction of the knowledge of sexuality and the use of language. Considering the texts 
and mythology used by hijras could be important in making sense of how hijras employ 
multiple sources in representing their identity to mainstream society and negotiating negative 
stereotypes about hijra subjectivity. However, an emphasis on textual analysis might render the 
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the construction of hijra identity (Nanda 1999; Reddy 2003, 2005; Hossain 2012). 
Narratives that hijras use are part of a greater theme in ancient Hindu literature 
concerned with sexual ambiguity, transvestism, and sexed and gendered 
transsexualism (Goldman 1993; Doniger 1999, 2002; Pattanaik 2002). Better-known 
myths include those of the warrior Aravāṇ, who married Viṣṇu in an incarnation of the 
maiden Mohinī (Hiltebeitel 1995); Arjuna, the hero of the Mahābhārata, who spent a 
year at King Virāta’s court disguised as a ‘eunuch’ during the Pāṇḍavas thirteenth year 
of exile (Pelissero 2002; Custodi 2007); and Ambā/Śikhaṇḍin, a woman who attained 
physical and psychological masculinity in order to aid Arjuna in killing Bhīṣma,3 the 
forefather of the Pāṇḍavas and Kauravas (van Buitenen 1978: 493, 532; Doniger 1999: 
281-3). Hijras identify particularly with Arjuna, who was transformed into a eunuch for 
spurning the advances of the nymph, Urvaśī. It is unclear whether Arjuna underwent a 
physiological transformation or was just ‘cross-dressing’ (Custodi 2007: 211-2).4 Hijras 
also refer to a myth associated with the Rāmāyaṇa (which does not appear in the text), 
in which Rāma blesses their devotion to him and states that they will rule the world in 
the future.5 The myth projects hijras’ hopes for better treatment in the future and 
indicates Rāma’s specific blessing upon their community. Numerous myths refer to the 
creation of the first hijra and concern hijras’ ability to bless or curse; I outline these 
myths in further detail below. 
Myths and references from sacred texts play a significant role in constructing 
hijra identity. By referring to individuals of an ambiguous gender status or to 
individuals who had a special relationship with Rāma, hijras point to the existence of 
gender variant individuals in ancient times and claim an authentic identity that has 
existed throughout history and is recorded in sacred texts. By claiming association with 
prominent individuals in history and mythology, such as Arjuna, hijras make claims 
regarding their nature and character, attempting to challenge derogatory stereotypes 
about hijras in contemporary society and project an image of how they want to be seen: 
                                                                                                                                                              
hijra subject intelligible within queer paradigms, instead of contemplating this subject in its own 
terms, given that hijras do not emphasise texts as the basis upon which they create a sense of 
historical and contemporary identity. Hijras use such narratives in individual and unique ways, 
in many cases, not pointing to texts themselves as the basis for their claims. Oral narrative 
practices are a key feature of the way such narratives are shared within hijra communities, with 
many hijras not knowing particular narratives or any narratives about a specific figure, or 
indeed, from where such narratives come. For a further discussion of narrative and identity 
construction, see Ung Loh (forthcoming). 
3 Bhīṣma himself is a figure of ambiguous gender since he renounced his ‘sexuality’ and right to 
procreate as a vow to his brother (see Flood 1996, Fitzgerald 2007). 
4 Custodi adds that the nature of Arjuna’s gender as ‘Bṛhannadā’ is never explicitly given, as 
eunuch, hermaphrodite, or transvestite. His ‘ambiguous’ name means ‘great man’ but in the 
feminine gender (which van Buitenen translates as ‘having a large reed’; 1978: 9). 
5 Lord Rāma returns after fourteen years of exile to find those who are ‘neither man nor woman’ 
waiting on the banks of the river, from which he had left the city of Ayodhya. He sent the ‘men’ 
and ‘women’ home, but these individuals, being neither, remained there. Rāma blesses these 
people for their devotion, telling them that they will rule the world in the future (Reddy 2003: 
190). 
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as individuals who have existed throughout history and who are important within 
sacred history for their actions. 
Further, hijras gain legitimacy as sacred beings through the Hindu 
philosophical association of asceticism with creativity: most dramatically demonstrated 
in the myth of Śiva’s asceticism in order to create the world (Radice 2001: 45). Śiva’s 
self-castration represents the immense power that can be gained through ascetic 
practice, known as ‘creative asceticism’; this conceptualisation is demonstrated in the 
power and honour given to the figure of the sannyāsī. I elaborate on this discussion 
below, where the ‘creative asceticism’ of hijras will be discussed in relation to Hindu 
renunciate practices. 
A third aspect of the legitimacy of the hijra subject is found in the adoption of 
both male and female elements. The most perfect association of both male and female 
elements is found the form of Śiva Ardhanārīśvara, literally translated as ‘lord who is 
half woman’ (Goldberg 2002: 1). This form represents Śiva united with his śakti, or 
female creative power (ibid.; Pande 2004).6 Depictions of this unity are found in 
mythology, ritual, and art: these representations transmit ‘the Hindu world view’ 
(Nanda 1999: 20) and are an example of the variation ‘permitted’ among sexes and 
genders in India, from which hijras create a sense of self. 
One of the earliest literary references to grammatical gender is found in the 
Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (roughly eighth to sixth century B.C.E). Leonard Zwilling and 
Michael Sweet, writing on third sex constructs in ancient India, discuss three 
grammatical genders as pumlinga (masculine), strilinga (feminine), and napumsakalinga 
(neuter), but note that applying the neutral gender to humans is problematic. 
‘Napumsaka’ (literally ‘not being a male’) means to possess characteristics of both sexes 
(1996: 372) but is ambiguous, referring to males who did not conform to gender-role 
expectations, including those who were impotent, effeminate, or transvestite (1996: 
362). ‘Napumsaka’ as the term for the third grammatical gender assumes that the 
‘unmale’ is the true third sex (ibid.). By the beginning of the Common Era, the third sex 
was held to be determined at conception by biological causes, and, Zwilling and Sweet 
write, ‘it is quite possible that it was among the schools of traditional medicine that a 
term actually meaning “third sex” was introduced’, ‘tritiya prakriti’. By the fourth 
century the term was used as an equivalent for napumsaka (1996: 362-3), although it is 
unclear whether it refers to defective males, a recognised ‘third sex’, or a variation of 
gender identity. Zwilling and Sweet state that this term refers to ‘feminised males’ or 
transvestites, but distinct from women (2000: 112). Elsewhere they note that ‘the class 
of transvestite singers, dancers, and prostitutes known as hijras are the contemporary 
representatives of the unmales and third sex of earlier times’ (1996: 363), explicitly 
                                                      
6 Goldberg suggests that the epithet suggests a gender hierarchy since the male Śiva’s status is 
privileged with the title ‘īśvara’ (‘lord’, ‘master’) while the female Pārvatī is designated as ‘nārī’ 
(‘woman’) (2002: 1).  
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linking ancient ‘third sex’ identity and the modern-day hijras. Maintaining an 
association between ancient and modern identities is significant to contemporary hijras 
in order to authorise a modern identity that has its conceptual origins in antiquity.  
 Zwilling and Sweet maintain that the Jains offered the most developed theory 
about a ‘third sex’. Prior theories were deemed inadequate because they were based on 
the absence of primary or secondary sexual characteristics (the ‘Brahminical’ view), or 
on the presence or absence of procreative ability (the ‘Buddhist’ view). Impotence 
denoted membership of the napumsaka category (1996: 365-6). 7  The Jains were 
concerned with how underlying sexuality motivated sexual behaviour, providing a 
more detailed relationship between biological sex, gender role, and sexuality and 
differentiating between biological sex, or dravyalinga [material sexual mark] and 
psychological state, or bhayvalinga [mental sexual mark] (ibid.: 367). By the fifth century 
C.E., the ‘masculine’ purusanapumsaka was differentiated from the feminine napumsaka 
on the grounds of appearance by looking, dressing, and acting as a man (1996: 369-70).8 
These theories deny an understanding of sex as linked to materiality, allowing the 
development of a more nuanced theory of gender, sex, and sexuality. 
Theorisations concerning a ‘third’ (and fourth) sex and references to individuals 
of ambiguous gender and sexuality in classical literature and mythology demonstrate 
the literary and historical presence of alternative gender identities in India. Modern, 
variant gender identities in contemporary India construct themselves in reference to 
these themes and references in ancient, literary sources. Kinnars in MP, for example, 
clearly derived legitimacy from ancient narratives, particularly mythological sources, 
referencing individuals who had played a prominent role in sacred history (see 
Hossain 2012). In certain ways, modern subjects can find ‘mythological’ and ‘historical’ 
legitimation for alternative gender identities in India, by attesting to their existence—
and occasional prominence and importance—in ancient times.  
 
ii. Medieval Sources and European Travel Writing 
 
References to individuals of a ‘third nature’ throughout the medieval period of Indian 
history are more scarce, but what does increase dramatically are references to 
‘eunuchs’ in South Asia, especially in the writings of European travellers to the 
subcontinent. Several scholars have researched the presence and function of eunuchs in 
the Islamic world (Ayalon 1999; Marmon 1995; Scholtz 2001), as an extension of 
medieval travellers’ fascination at eunuchs’ status and their prominent roles as political 
                                                      
7 For the importance of impotence rather than castration, see Zwilling and Sweet 1993: 596, 602. 8 Both third and ‘fourth’ sex individuals were characterized as endowed with both male and 
female sexualities (Zwilling and Sweet 1996: 372), as bisexual (ibid.: 371), and hyperlibidinous 
(ibid.: 372).  
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advisors, administrators, generals, and guardians of the harem, or female quarters 
(Reddy 2005: 22). Reddy notes that explicit references to South Asian eunuchs increase 
with the arrival of Muslim rulers in the eleventh and twelth centuries (ibid.), notably in 
relation to the privilege they enjoyed as members of royal and imperial court culture 
during the Delhi Sultanate and the later Mughal Empire. Positions of privilege within 
‘Islamic’9 court culture might suggest that hijras are granted a means of historical 
legitimacy insofar as they can identify with ‘Islamic’ eunuchs and the prestige and 
position they enjoyed in this period.10 Both eunuchs and hijras are similar in relation to 
anatomical form, since impotence and/or castration are markers of both identities. 
While impotence and/or castration means that the eunuchs of medieval India are not 
hijras’ biological predecessors, hijras gain a measure of legitimation and social tolerance 
by drawing upon a discourse that refers to the power and prestige once held by court 
eunuchs, constructing a non-biogenetic genealogy that is not based on procreation and 
natal families. Hijras make this association in order to allude to eunuchs’ historical 
prestige, even if ‘hijras’ and ‘eunuchs’ are not the same in terms of physical being. More 
important is the position both identities maintain in relation to a normative gender 
binary, as opposed to the physical ‘truth’ of their bodies. 
Studies of eunuchs in medieval India focus on how eunuchs became valued 
within courtly practices, concentrating on their social and embodied difference. Often 
eunuchs were outsiders, brought in from outside the ‘empire’ and bound to their 
owners as slaves (Gannon 2009: 163). What is stressed commonly is eunuchs’ 
embodied difference as impotent or castrated individuals, making them trusted and 
loyal servants due to their inability to pose a sexual threat to women and thus 
perpetuate their own lineage. Gender-neutral individuals were perceived as being 
beyond politics that involved self-promotion.11 Ayalon notes that eunuchs rose to 
positions of power and prominence through the practice of gender-segregation of 
social spheres, the ‘special character of the Muslim slave institution’ where non-Arab 
slaves were bound to their patrons, and to the stereotype of eunuchs as trustworthy 
and loyal servants who had access to all areas of the population (1999: 15).  
                                                      
9 The term ‘Islamic’ here points to the discursive way in which Islamic notions and discourses 
were used in particular ways to shore up power and authority, particularly by the 
Persian/Mughal courts and rulers.  
10 Ironically, Gannon argues that during British rule a semiotic reassignment occurred, in which 
positive qualities such as trustworthiness, lack of sexual desire, and respectability came to be 
identified with harem (that is, non-hijra) eunuchs, whilst characteristics viewed by the British as 
negative were attached to the hijra (sodomy, begging, dancing, immorality). The hijra was 
defined in contrast and relation to the eunuchs (2009: 162). One argument linking hijra and 
eunuch identity is that the term ‘hijra’ is derived from a Persian word, hīz, originally meaning 
‘effeminate’, but is used today with the meaning ‘lewd’ or ‘lascivious’. Jaffrey notes that other 
suggestions of the term’s ‘etymology’ are hich and hichgah (1997: 143), or hīč and hīčgāh, meaning 
‘not any’ and ‘nowhere’ and ‘never’ in Middle Persian.  11 Conceptualisations of hijras as ‘beyond’ impropriety and corruption in politics have been 
revived in regards to contemporary hijras in modern Indian politics; I address this 
representation in Chapters Three and Four. 
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The presence of eunuchs, especially within the holy cities of Medina and Mecca 
(see Marmon 1995), greatly disturbed the imagination of the European travellers. 
Unable to comprehend their anatomical form, gender and sartorial practices, and the 
prestige that these individuals enjoyed, various authors portrayed eunuchs as 
‘avaricious’, ‘licentious’, ‘barbarous’, and generally ‘disgusting’ individuals.12European 
explanations regarding their prominence pointed to a sexual or gendered function as 
opposed to a role as trustworthy servants: they guarded the harem, because they were 
not a sexual threat. The racial element became more pointed in the late eighteenth 
century, causing as much discomfort as their asexuality (see Marmon 1995: 100). Reddy 
points out that these accounts silence eunuchs’ own voices, and reveal as much about 
the authors and their anxieties—especially regarding bodily modification and the 
extraordinary prestige given to these particular individuals—as it does about the actual 
historical practices of eunuchs and courtly traditions (2005: 22, 24).  
References to eunuchs are important when considering the textual evidence 
that provides a historical account of alternative sexualities in India. Hijra identity 
should not be conflated with courtly eunuchs due to differentiations in roles, bodies, 
and behaviours, nor is hijra subjectivity derived solely from the ‘Islamic’ courtly 
traditions of eunuchs, due to their attested existence in earlier ancient texts. Yet, a 
study of the prominent position of the eunuchs within the medieval period adds to an 
understanding of the construction of the hijra identity in modern day India.13 Hijras are 
part of the wider tradition of gender ambiguous individuals and the role played by 
eunuchs provides a further narrative that hijras can adopt in their construction of 
identity. Nanda writes that ‘the religious roles of the hijras, derived from Hinduism, 
and the historical role of the eunuchs in the Muslim courts’ are ‘inextricably entwined’. 
She argues that while the collapsing of the different roles of hijras and eunuchs leads to 
‘certain contradictions’, these contradictions are incorporated into hijra culture and it is 
‘only the Western observer seems to feel the need to separate them conceptually’ (1999: 
23). 
 
                                                      12 In her novel, The Invisibles (1997), Zia Jaffrey includes examples of travellers’ accounts, such as 
those of Niccolo Manucci (1653-1708), François Bernier (1656-68), and James Forbes (1749-1819). 
Eunuchs are portrayed as having ‘extreme covetousness’, ‘immeasurably avaricious’, and 
‘elated as if they were the greatest men in the world’ (1997: 65), ‘most licentious’ and ‘most foul 
in speech’ (66), ‘[employing] their time in barbarous intrigues’ (112), and, writes Forbes: ‘I was 
called…to examine some of these people: my visit was short, and the objects disgusting’ (170). 
Marmon writes that ‘the very sight of “whole men” kissing the hands of these “repulsively 
ugly…startlingly emaciated” sexless creatures’ must have been upsetting to Europeans who 
were uncomfortable with the reverence given to the eunuchs (1995: 95). 13 The term ‘eunuch’ is often used synonymously with the term ‘hijra’. Part of this conflation 
was due to British classificatory attempts at identifying hijra identity; an understanding of hijras 
as eunuchs permeates in modern India. English print media perpetuates such an association, by 
translating the term ‘hijra’ as ‘eunuch’ and through consistent use of the term ‘eunuch’.  
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iii. Classification and Criminalisation 
 
Arguably the most important category of literature that has lasting effects on how 
hijras are perceived in academic scholarship today is that of the colonial period. Shane 
Gannon writes that ‘colonial depictions’ serve as the very ‘conditions of possibility’ for 
an academic understanding of the hijra, arguing that it is through colonial cataloguing 
and criminalisation that a conceptual framework has been constructed, through which 
the academy examines and analyses the hijra subject in contemporary scholarship (2009: 
104). Evidence from colonial archives presents how hijra identity has come to be 
framed through the perspectives of the colonial administration. Texts from this period 
emphasise two aspects of the colonial project: (1) a desire to know their ‘subjects’, 
cataloguing hijras as a caste or tribe and classifying them according to religion and 
gender and (2) an intention to criminalise the hijra subject, where a discourse of 
criminalisation was based upon colonial assessments of the nature of Indian society 
and influenced by constructions of crime and deviancy within Victorian England.14 
Hijras are listed as a distinct caste or community in several glossaries of the 
castes and tribes of India, including one compiled in the 1880s that claims it contains ‘a 
list of all the castes and tribes as returned by the people themselves and entered by the 
census enumerators’ (Kitt 1885: v; see Crooke 1896). In order to make classification 
easier, hijras were divided occasionally into male and female, as well as Muhammadan 
and Hindu hijras, notably in William Crooke’s observations of the 1891 census (1896: 
495).15 It is not clear whether ‘male’ and ‘female’ hijras refers to divisions made by hijras 
themselves according to masculine or feminine roles, or whether ‘female’ hijras refers 
to women who were dependent on differing hijra groups (Reddy 2000: 26; see Agrawal 
1997). However, the binary framework—male or female, Hindu or Muhammadan—
indicates that the classification ‘hijra’ was not detailed enough, but was required to be 
broken down into more ‘essential’ categories that were intelligible to census 
enumerators and others who would utilise such documents.  
Lawrence Preston writes that the British, in their ‘zeal’ to organise social 
categories, ‘compounded their problems of hijra history with false distinctions’. He 
notes that in reality, the hijra community seems to have borrowed ‘rather freely from 
the cumulative social backgrounds’ of its members’ (1987: 376). The British, in their 
classificatory attempts, might also, therefore, have unwittingly cultivated notions of 
‘authenticity’ among hijras themselves. Discourse on the ‘nature’ of hijras stated that 
                                                      
14 Knowledge, Bernard S. Cohn argues, ‘enabled the British to classify, categorize, and bound 
the vast social world that was India so that it could be controlled’ (1996: 5).  15 Lawrence Preston recounts that Goldsmid of Indapur, the Assistant Collector to the Collector 
of Pune in 1836, recorded that although the hijras came from any caste, upon emasculation, they 
‘take the names of Musselmanee women, and as such, live and are buried’ (1987: 376). He writes 
that prior religious or caste status before entry to the hijra community did not seem to be 
problematic and that Hindu and Muslim hijras were perceived as alike in all respects ‘except 
they did not interdine’ (ibid.).  
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there were three types of hijra: ‘naturally impotent men’, males born with ‘congenital 
malformation’, and ‘artificial’ or ‘self-made eunuchs’ (Reddy 2005: 28). This was an 
elaboration on the stated difference between natural eunuchs known as ‘khasua’, and 
artificial eunuchs like the hijras (Preston 1987: 374, quoting Russell 1916). Preston notes 
that the term ‘khasua’ is presumably from the Arabic ‘khasi’, which properly refers to 
‘created’ eunuchs, particularly those who had only their testicles removed, and this 
differs from the colonial use of the term to mean ‘natural eunuch’.  
The second aspect of the colonial project was the British intention to criminalise 
the hijra subject. Gannon writes that from the 1850s onwards, accounts about hijras 
begin to reveal a larger institutional anxiety figured predominantly ‘as a legal concern, 
in terms of inheritance, sodomy, castration, extortion, and trafficking in children’ (2009: 
126, 139-157). The British administration criminalised hijra practices, including 
homosexuality and the emasculation operation in the Indian Penal Code (IPC) of 1860 
in Section 320 on ‘grievous’ hurt and Section 377 on carnal intercourse ‘against the 
order of nature’. As an extension of their ‘criminal practices’, hijras were described as a 
‘criminal caste’ under an amendment to the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871, ‘An Act for 
the Registration of Criminal Tribes and Eunuchs’ (1897). This statute classified as 
‘eunuchs’ people of the male sex who admit themselves as impotent or appear to be 
impotent upon medical inspection (Clause 24).16 Local governments were to keep a 
register of the names and residences of all eunuchs who had committed ‘offences’ 
under Section 377 (IPC) (relating to sex ‘against the order of nature’) and those who 
were ‘reasonably suspected’ of kidnapping or castrating children (Clause 24A). The 
People’s Union for Civil Liberties (Karnataka) states:  
Being a eunuch was itself a criminal enterprise, with surveillance being the 
everyday reality. The surveillance mechanism criminalized the quotidian reality of 
a eunuch’s existence by making its manifest sign, i.e., cross-dressing a criminal 
offence. Further, the ways in which eunuchs earned their livelihood, i.e., singing 
and dancing, was criminalised. Thus, every aspect of the eunuch’s existence was 
subject to surveillance, premised on the threat of criminal action. The police thus 
became an overt and overwhelming presence in the lives of eunuchs. Further, the 
very concept of personhood of eunuchs was done away with through disentitling 
them from basic rights such as making a gift or adopting a son.  
(2003: 45) 
 
By the early twentieth century, many sections of this act extended to the whole of 
British India (Reddy 2005: 26). Joseph Bockrath notes that the ‘criminalization of 
virtually every characteristic and expression of a group [is not] far from making the 
status itself a crime’ (2003: 87). 
Criminalising ‘eunuchs’ entailed the construction of a category and the 
collection of a body of knowledge which defined the characteristics and practices of 
                                                      
16 The Act also made provision for individuals to request to be removed from the register of 
eunuchs (Clause 25). 
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India’s ‘eunuchs’ (Reddy 2005: 27). Similar to the way caste identity was passed 
through generations, it was assumed that criminal traits were passed on through 
‘criminal castes’. Notions of hijras’ criminality were legitimised by the nature of the 
work that hijras performed. Alongside their traditional work, some hijras engaged in 
sexual practices, described by one Assistant Collector as being ‘of a nature too 
revolting to be mentioned’ (Preston 1987: 377). Engaging in sexual practices legitimised 
the moral condemnation of the hijra caste. In order to deter and penalise potential 
recruits and current community members, the British enacted laws to criminalise 
eunuchs’ means of survival. By criminalising homosexuality in Section 377 (IPC), hijras 
could not practice prostitution and benefit economically. Moreover, by criminalising 
the emasculation operation (which ensured ‘full’ membership of the group), hijras 
could not admit new members. A further denial was the removal of their claims to 
public revenues through grants of cash and land, which they had enjoyed under 
previous rulers (Preston 1987: 372). 17  The British eliminated this practice by 
transforming begging rights into life holdings for the current incumbents (ibid.: 383), so 
that hijras no longer begged with the explicit sanction of the government and were 
forced into the urban underworld, which included the practices of illegal begging and 
prostitution (ibid.: 387; Reddy 2005: 27). 
The classification of hijras as criminal subjects reflects how the British viewed 
their purpose in India, by putting an end to ‘barbarous practices’ (Preston 1987: 372) 
and focusing their attention on social progress (ibid.: 379). ‘Progress’ included the 
criminalisation and moral condemnation of specific caste groups, presumably with a 
view to reforming subjects and ‘ending the excesses of the deluded’ (ibid.: 372, 379). 
Legislative and moral actions were enforced through British political dominance. 
Political and social dominance theoretically extended to sexual dominance: all forms of 
Indian sexuality were perceived as inferior to British sexuality and there were attempts 
to reform Indian sexuality, so that it adhered to ‘rightful’ notions of Victorian morality. 
The link drawn between these forms of power justified British colonisation, in turn 
reinforcing the British dominant form of masculinity, especially over forms of sexuality 
that deviated from the two-sex model (Gannon 2009: 203). Yet, the masquerade of 
British hyper-masculinity was contingent upon the ‘effeminacy’ and weakness of the 
colonised subject, both women and men (Reddy 2005: 29). Colonial classification of the 
‘eunuch’ paralleled Orientalist notions of the other as sexually corrupt, effeminate, and 
morally degraded. ‘Eunuchs’ were thus produced as a category in the colonial 
imagination, along with associated characteristics and acts. The colonial imagination 
had a profound impact on the way in which hijras are studied and classified, providing 
                                                      
17 Gannon discusses Act No. XI of 1852 which removed hijras’ right to grants of land held 
without rent (inams) in the Bombay Presidency, because observing conditions of tenure was 
considered against the laws of the land and public decency, highlighting hijras’ immorality 
(2009).  
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the conceptual framework, historical documentation, and conceptions of the hijra 
subject upon which later scholarship was based.  
 
iv. Hijras as Sexed and Gendered Subjects  
 
An increasing interest in policing the eunuch subject in India was motivated by and 
entwined with the development of the European discipline of sexology in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Classificatory and criminalisation schemes 
employed during British colonialism were informed by an anthropological interest in 
sexual and gender variance in the non-European world, used to both shore up and 
contradict Western sexological projects.  
 From around 1860, studies on sexuality were prompted by physical and 
cultural anthropology. Although supposedly detached from the moral rhetoric of 
religious authorities, the discourse of sexology developed as part of a wider project 
concerned with social hygiene and order, in which class, race, and gender were 
regulated, regulating potentially threatening behaviour from the laboring poor, 
educated women, prostitution, homosexual subcultures, and the tropicalisation’ of 
Europeans in the colonies (Bleys 1996: 145-151). Scientists and physicians enjoyed 
greater authority, although discourses remained conservative in upholding traditional 
beliefs and tempering public opinion. A theory of sexual psychopathology was 
developed in which sexual anomalies were relocated to the human brain, rather than 
being viewed as a bodily disorder (ibid.: 145-6). The representation of same-sex 
behaviour changed, from an act to an identity, where same-sex behaviour derived from 
a permanent condition; as Michel Foucault writes, ‘the sodomite had been a temporary 
aberration; the homosexual was now a species’ (1978: 43). 
 Evolutionary theory was supplemented by a theory of ‘degeneration’, Rudi 
Bleys argues, built upon Lamarckian theory concerning the inheritability of acquired 
characteristics, in which deviations from normality increase in time, from an initially 
perfect state (1996: 152). Such a theory influenced public debates on race, class, and 
increasingly the study of gender and sexuality, intertwining all three domains within 
the logic of ‘progress’. Sexual disorders were interpreted as a process of mental 
disorientation, although there was little consensus as to whether deviant sexuality 
reflected a more primitive state of being or was a response to historical and social 
circumstances. Despite disagreement as to its ontology, the theory functioned as a 
guideline for social policy in which deviation was seen as a symbol of social decay 
(ibid.: 155-6).  
Theoretical innovation about sexual ‘deviancy’ required clarification regarding 
the manifestation of such practices among other races, as well as in relation to newly 
defined ‘sexual minorities’ in Europe. Theorisations were confirmed through 
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ethnographic evidence, resulting in the further regulation of sexuality within Europe 
and overseas. Bleys notes that the mapping of ‘homosexual vice’, however, remained 
fraught with ambiguity and contradiction (1996: 146). Whilst homosexuality was 
defined as a ‘perversion’, sexologists were unable to produce a universal theory 
clarifying sexual variance. Instead, from a position of moral reticence and theoretical 
disagreement, they produced ad hoc, descriptive narratives, which ‘revealed’ a lack of 
morality among indigenous people, reflecting European discourse on their ‘otherness’. 
Yet, an ideological comparison was drawn between sexual ‘deviant’ individuals in 
Europe and abroad, with ‘primitivity’ (through sexual deviancy) serving as ‘the 
definitional buttress to the term “civilized”’ (Hoad 2000: 147). As Neville Hoad writes, 
a position on ‘the fringes of the normative evolutionary narrative’ is shared by both the 
European ‘decadent/degenerate’ and the ‘primitive’, despite sequential issues as to 
their common existence among both ‘the backward savages of the present and in the 
advanced cultures of Europe’s past’ (2000: 137).  
The ambiguous image of homosexual deviance provided through ethnographic 
narratives—as ‘both a degenerative syndrome away from an original, heterosexual drive, 
and a regression into an original, “polymorph” sexuality’ (Bleys 1996: 189)—reflected 
differing theories about homosexual identity in the West. Moreover, such ambiguity 
could be beneficial: Hoad argues that groups could mobilise unstable narratives, both 
to stigmatise homosexuality further and to depathologise and decriminalise it (ibid.: 
139). Ethnographic data concerning ‘primitive’ people in the colonies—despite 
attempting to erase its colonial influence by describing ‘authentic indigenous cultures’ 
(see Cohn 1996: 11ff)—played an important role in reconstructing the evolutionary 
theorisation that posited the white European as the most advanced subspecies and thus 
was linked directly to the European civilising mission in understanding the primitive 
state of promiscuity (in which promiscuity is seen as a defining attribute of the 
‘primitive’)  (Bleys 1996: 160-1; Hoad 2000: 142). Same-sex practitioners were portrayed 
as hedonistic and egocentric; evidence from multiple locations corroborated an image 
of the universal deviance of primitive people, at the same time as demonstrating how 
such practices were essentially different from European homosexuality (Bleys 1996: 
191). Same-sex praxis was seen as a sign of the lower status of non-Western people, 
who occupied a lower position on the evolutionary scale, a characteristic trait, such 
that these practices were viewed as inferior to white sexuality. Racialist discourse, 
Bleys argues, posited ‘endemic’ homosexuality to indigenous people and reserved a 
‘minority’ model in relation to the West, conceptualising same-sex sexual practice as 
both a sign of inferior evolutionary status and of degenerate heritage or circumstance 
(ibid.: 192). Both theories of evolution and degeneration called for anthropological data 
and cultural surveys, which justified social policy and regulation, despite the 
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impossibility of generalising about indigenous practices to serve evolutionary theory 
and pathologise homosexuality.  
An anthropological interest in sexual variance has continued in the aftermath of 
the ‘age of empire’. Hoad writes that narratives and deep rhetorical patterns have 
maintained the problematic universalism at the core of evolutionary narratives, such 
that they pervade various contexts today, including gay cultural self-representation 
and the international politics of homosexual identity (2000: 147). Likewise in academia, 
an interest in sexual and gender variance in the non-European world has been 
maintained and this can be demonstrated in relation to hijra identity. Scholarship on 
the hijras’ has primarily focused on their sexed or gender ambiguity. Early literature 
distinguished between sexual practice and religious or ritual practice, such as the 
Carstairs/Opler debate that concerned itself with the sexual and ‘professional’ identity 
of hijras (Carstairs 1957, 1960; Opler 1960, 1961). Both agreed that hijras were castrated 
or penectomised men who dressed as women, but Carstairs argued that the hijras were 
prostitutes, while Opler thought they were ritual specialists and devotees of Bahuchara 
Mata. Scholarship in the 1960s to 1980s took a more ethnographic approach, examining 
social factors such as organisational practices and recruitment, ultimately positioning 
hijras as ‘deviant’ individuals (Shah 1961; Sinha 1967; Sharma 1989). 
Scholarship in the past twenty years has framed hijra subjectivity within the 
debate of sexual difference, sexual ambiguity, and binary categorisation. Hijras are 
portrayed as an archetypal example of a ‘third sex’ or ‘third gender’ and are compared 
with other ‘third’ sex or gender groups such as the two-spirit of North America, the 
kathoey of Thailand, the xanith of Oman, the mahu of Tahiti, and the fa’afafine of Samoa.18 
Alternative gender roles are contrasted with the Anglo-European binary-gender 
system, often suggesting a ‘Western intolerance’ for sexual ambiguity and gender 
variation (Herdt 1994; Nanda 1999). Kira Hall argues that this sort of third-sex writing 
is a product of feminist rethinkings of gender in the 1970s and 1980s. A challenge to the 
dichotomous notion of gender influenced anthropological literature, as it sought to 
demonstrate how notions of gender are constructed psychologically, socially, and 
discursively in Western culture. Since gender and sexuality was constructed plurally in 
non-Western cultures (1995: 26), interest turned towards the study of ‘third sex’ groups, 
challenging the hegemony of Western notions of binary gender. However, 
anthropologists had to prove the validity of alternative categories, showing that ‘these 
existences were both culturally recognised and socially integrated’ (ibid.: 27). It is thus 
unsurprising that anthropologists portrayed alternative genders as plural and 
                                                      
18 Kath Weston argues that the use of ‘indigenous‘ categories in a discussion of local practices is 
‘no more neutral in its effects’ than earlier, less reflective use of the term ‘homosexuality’ to 
generalise various forms of same-sex practice. She argues that the use of ‘foreign’ terms 
constructs the subject as ‘always and already other’, and is implicated in a new form of 
orientalism where linguistic terms ‘subtly reify differences and buttress ethnographic authority’ 
(1998: 158-9). 
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liberating: Hall argues that an ‘intellectual desire for the existence of plurality, coupled 
with an anthropological interest in the exotic over the familiar, has led to skewed 
representations of the cultural value placed on alternative gender identities’ (ibid.: 28). 
A history of the methodology of ‘third sex analysis’19 explains how ‘third sex’ identity 
came to be conceptualised as liberatory and multiple, which may ignore the harsh 
realities faced by individuals in everyday life. 
 One work that exemplifies the category of ‘third sex analysis’ is Serena Nanda’s 
well-known ethnography, Neither Man nor Woman: The Hijras of India (1999). Originally 
published in 1990, Nanda’s ethnography focused on hijras’ personal narratives, 
presenting them as ‘full human beings’. The exclusion that hijras face on a daily basis, 
from their natal families and wider society, is evident throughout the book. Yet Hall 
critiques Nanda for occasionally giving a ‘false impression of the status allotted to 
these ambiguously sexed figures’ (1995: 30), by celebrating their ritual status, which 
suggests they might be priviledged and honoured in society, contradicting their 
narratives of marginalistion. The second edition, published in 1999, included as the 
final chapter, ‘The Hijras in Cross-Cultural Perspective’. Nanda writes that revision 
was necessary, given new cross-cultural work on gender variation, historical work on 
third genders in ancient Indian texts, and ethnography among hijras, praising the 
ground-breaking work done by Gilbert Herdt in Third Sex, Third Gender (1994) on the 
diversity of alternative gender roles (xii). However, Reddy points out that despite the 
caveat in Herdt’s introduction that an ‘emphasis on the third category is merely a 
heuristic device that stands in for the possibility of multiple categories’, many chapters 
in Herdt’s volume emphasise ‘thirdness’ as the solution to the sexual dimorphism 
question (2005: 32). An emphasis on ‘thirdness’ is found in Nanda’s chapter in Herdt’s 
book, as well as in Neither Man nor Woman. In the final chapter, she writes: 
in my view, the hijras are an institutionalized third gender role that has its roots in 
ancient India, and that has been strengthened by the historical role of the eunuchs 
in the Mughal Courts…I believe [Zwilling and Sweet’s] meticulous analysis of 
ancient Jain and Hindu texts supports the view that the hijras are a separate 
sex/gender, which is, however, marginal rather than equal to male and female. 20 In 
comparison with other (non-Western) cultures, particularly, the hijras stand out as 
a well-defined, culturally and socially acknowledged, organizationally set apart, 
ritually specialized, historically continuous, sex/gender variation. 
(1999: 144; my emphasis) 
 
While Nanda highlights that hijras are a ‘marginal’ sex/gender, who are ‘not equal’ to 
male and female, they are described as a ‘well defined, culturally and socially 
acknowledged…sex/gender variation’. Nanda’s ‘third sex analysis’ posits hijras as an 
                                                      19 I borrow this term from Gayatri Reddy (2005: 31).  20 Nanda notes that this conclusion—hijras as a separate sex/gender—is not the conclusion 
given by Zwilling and Sweet, who conclude that the third gender is ‘ambiguous’ (see 1996: 362). 
However, she employs their analysis to support her conclusion of the possibility of a separate 
sex/gender (1999: 144). 
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institutionalised and alternative sex/gender and provokes reflection on the Western 
belief that there are only ‘two sexes and two genders, each naturally and permanently 
biologically determined’ (ibid.: xi). 
‘Third sex’ analysis is useful in highlighting cross-cultural variation of sexual 
difference and questions the potentially harmful Western framework of binary sex and 
gender. However, several critiques have been raised. First, a study into the existence of 
third sex categories does not necessarily challenge the dichotomy between sex and 
gender. Nanda herself recognises this problem in analysing comparative cultural 
constructions of gender variation in relation to the degree of differentiation in a 
particular culture and to the cultural concept of the person (ibid.: 145-149). She argues 
that Hindu gender ideology admits overlap, providing greater flexibility in admitting 
alternative genders (ibid.: 145), despite differentiated and hierarchical gender roles for 
men and women. Yet, gender diversity does not necessarily challenge the dichotomy 
between sex and gender by virtue of its existence. As Nanda notes, they are marginal, 
rather than equal, to male and female. Thus, as Anuja Agrawal states, the ‘thirdness’ of 
the hijra is not transgressive, since ‘a third gender appears to have come into being only 
though a cultural institution of a third body’ (1997: 294).  
The second critique of third sex analysis is that it ignores individuals’ lived 
experience. Lawrence Cohen argues that authors who employ the label ignore the 
violence done to members of this category (1995). The academic reverence given to 
‘third’ identities, liberated from a dichotomous gender binary, might ignore the 
prejudice and marginalisation experienced by ‘third’ individuals. Hijras’ own 
experiences within the rigidly enforced binary gender system in India might be 
ignored, as well as individual gender constructions in response to the system. While 
Nanda describes the hijras as ‘neither man nor woman’ based on hijras’ self-designation, 
Hall writes that this is only part of the picture. In her interviewees’ narratives, collected 
during fieldwork in Banaras in 1993, Hall notes that hijras viewed themselves as 
‘deficiently’ masculine and ‘incompletely’ feminine’ (1995: 31). During fieldwork in MP, 
the majority of kinnars I encountered identified as female kinnars, adopting feminine 
speech patterns,21 and sartorial and behavioural patterns. While it did not appear that 
they saw themselves as ‘incompletely’ feminine, kinnars had a clear notion of what it 
meant to have and perform a specific gender, particularly femininity, and emphasised 
such behaviour. The construction of hijra gender identity is in response to a rigidly 
enforced system that challenges hijras’ gender presentation, in which hijras negotiate 
their own identities and make individual identifications, through self-pronouns, 
                                                      
21 While it is beyond the remit of this thesis, Kira Hall has done excellent work on linguistic 
patterns among the hijras (1995). Hall argues that the use of gendered linguistic markers is more 
complex, where hijras alternate between feminine and masculine speech for identifiable reasons 
and that such use was not ‘random’ (see Nanda 1990: 17). Language, Hall writes, reflects a 
lifestyle ‘that is constantly self-defining’, in the effort through which hijras gender themselves 
(1995: 56). Hall also discusses hijras’ use of their own ‘code’ language (1995: 175ff). 
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appearance, and behaviour.22 By labelling hijras as a ‘third sex’, hijras’ own designations 
of self through speech, behaviour, and gender performance in relation to established, 
binary gender systems are ignored and the nuances of their gender performance 
disregarded.  
A third critique is that the label ‘third sex’ homogenises those who occupy the 
subject position. Cohen notes that many individuals identified as ‘third’ are different 
and experience gender differently (1995). Gayatri Reddy’s excellent ethnography 
explicitly recognises this variation. She emphasises the importance of ‘variations of 
thirdness’, which differ according to the ‘temporal, spatial, and life-historical 
positioning’ of the individual actors involved (2005: 45). She suggests a spectrum of 
identities within ‘thirdness’ with differentiations made between individuals as to how 
they become ‘third’, how they construct their identities, and how they enact them. In a 
further critique, Reddy maintains that variations of thirdness are embodied within 
other axes of difference, such that ‘third sex analyses’ only serve to reify the study of 
sexuality as a monolithic field. She argues that ‘third sex’ analyses, while admirable in 
illustrating the cultural context of third-sex differentiation, have ignored the 
intersections of sexuality with other modes of difference by effectively separating the 
‘domain of sexuality from that of political economy and the analysis of other axes of 
identity’, thus ‘limiting its usefulness as an articulation of the complexity of everyday 
life’ (ibid.: 32). Thus, other axes of identity and modes of practice must be explored in 
relation to the study of sexuality (ibid.: 35). 
With these critiques in mind, I want, in the remainder of this chapter, to focus 
on other aspects of hijra identity that are separate but inherently intertwined with 
gender, sexuality, and sexual practices, including religious and social practices. First, I 
turn to discuss hijras’ gender and sexed identity, acknowledging that these aspects of 
hijras’ identities are inextricably bound up and constituted through engagement with 
other facets of their identity, including regional location, caste, class, and religious 
identity. These intersections between various axes of difference configure multi-
dimensional and compex structurations of subjectivities collated under the category 
‘hijra’.  
 
II. Performing Gender 
 
Scholarship on the hijras reveals the assumption that ‘hijra’ identity is an identity that is 
always gendered, as an alternative to male and female. The figure of the hijra is 
represented as marked by a divergent gender identity (Suresh 2011: 379) and 
                                                      
22 As Hall puts it: ‘instead of occupying a position outside the male-female binary, hijras have 
created an existence within it, one that is constrained by rigidly entrenched cultural 
constructions of femininity and masculinity’ (1995: 12-13). 
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scholarship has conceptualised them, first and foremost, as gendered beings, seeking to 
theorise or explain their sexual behaviour or practices, gender performance, and 
sex/gender identity. First, I explore some of the variations among kothi (receptive MSM 
identities) sexual identities in India, analysing Reddy’s ‘sexual cartography’ of 
Hyderabad. I discuss her theorisations of various MSM identities, since the question of 
hijra identity and its relation to other forms of MSM identity in MP was not a focal 
question for my thesis. I then consider corporeal and performative practice specific to 
hijra identity and consider how these practices are conceptualised in relation to 
discourses of authenticity. 
 Euro-centric scholarship on gender and sexuality, particularly that of Judith 
Butler and Judith Halberstam, can add to a theorisation of hijra gender identity. I 
discussed above Halberstam’s work on the multiplicity of female masculinities. 
Halberstam calls for new affirmations of ‘different gender taxonomies’, which may or 
may not engage with conventional gender norms (1998: 9). Hijras’ gender performance, 
in turn, engages with conventional norms but also inhabits and subverts them, such 
that their performance might not be seen simply as mimicry, given the idiosyncratic 
adoption of such norms. Moreover, Butler’s and Halberstam’s work on the 
performance of gender identity can inform a study of hijra identity. By focusing on the 
construction of gender in relation to heternormative standards and the social policing 
of gender practices, both authors point to the ways in which gender performance may 
be recognised and accepted, or subverted and ignored; a distinction which is also clear 
in hijras’ gendered practices as they negotiate conventional norms and their own 
disruptive behaviour. Butler’s work on performance, in particular, is useful in 
theorising the performativity of identity. In Bodies That Matter, Butler argues that the 
materiality of the body is bound up with signification (1993: 30), such that there is no 
essence that defines the gendered subject; rather, the subject appears naturalised 
through the productive power of the reiterated practice, constituting the materiality of 
the body’s sex and sexual difference, according to a heterosexual imperative (ibid.: 2). 
Yet, the apparent stability of the subject is, in fact, destablised through the repetition of 
norms, creating a possible crisis in which Butler rejoices, since subjects might, through 
recognising the production of norms and their political interests, be able to serve 
different political aims and allow for a radical resignification of such norms (ibid.: 30). 
Her work, therefore, informs conceptions of how bodies are constructed through 
repeated practice, highlighting modes of resistance within discursive practice that 
allow for competing valuations of different bodies (ibid.: 22). Her theorisations can 
inform a study of hijra identity, particularly in identifying how gender identity—
indeed, all identity—is processually brought into being, and the radical potential that 
different bodies might have, at the same time that they shore up and reify conventional 
norms.  
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i. Variations among the ‘Third Sex’ 
 
Differentiations exist among the hijras, in physical, practical, and conceptual terms. 
According to a definition by Vinay Lal, the hijras are described in variously scholarly 
and popular literature alike as: 
eunuchs, transvestites, homosexuals, bisexuals, hermaphrodites, androgynes, 
transsexuals, and gynemimetics; and as if this multiplicity of terms were not 
enough, they are also referred to as people who are intersexed, emasculated, 
impotent, transgendered, castrated, effeminate, or somehow sexually anomalous 
or dysfunctional.  
(1999: 119)23 
 
The term encompasses a variety of practices and identifications relating to sexual 
orientation, sexuality, and anatomical form. While the majority of hijras were once, or 
still are, anatomically male, most identify as women, performing stereotypically 
feminine behaviour, and adopting feminine sartorial and speech patterns, yet hijras 
acknowledge that they are categorically distinct from women. The term ‘hijra’ is widely 
used across India, but hijras are also identified by terms such as transgender, MSM, and 
‘eunuchs’ (particularly by the mainstream media). In separate states of India hijras 
adopt variant terms, such as kinnar in the states of MP and Gujarat and aravaṇi, or more 
recently tirunaṅkai, in Tamil Nadu. The translation of the term hijra or kinnar in English 
is as ‘eunuch’ or ‘hermaphrodite’, although these are not interchangeable terms. 
 Hijra subjectivity remains physically and conceptually impossible to pin down, 
due to the wide variation of bodily and gendered practices associated with the hijra 
subject. Reddy’s definition of gender roles in Hyderabad—based on bodily praxis 
rather than anatomy—aids understanding as to hijra positionality in the sex/gender 
spectrum. She proposes a tripartite gender system: ‘pantis’ (penetrative, ‘masculine’ 
men), ‘kotis’ (receptive, ‘effeminate’ men),24 and ‘nārans’ (all women), with the latter 
two positions on the same side of the ‘gender divide’ (2005: 44).25 While Reddy 
acknowledges that ‘performative aspects of bodily practice are extremely important’ in 
theorising gender difference, she asserts that the criteria of difference in identity 
configuration and their significance in an individual’s life will vary according to the 
                                                      23 Nanda includes ‘women who do not menstruate’ (1994: 380; 1999: 18). Her definition points to 
hijras’ inability to fulfill normative procreative roles.  24 Reddy writes that the word ‘koti’ in Telugu literally means ‘monkey’. Hijras in Hyderabad 
could not explain its etymology and Reddy notes the term probably has no relation to the 
Telugu term, but might allude ‘to someone who 'swings from branch to branch with multiple 
partners, much like a monkey’. She suggests that the term probably derives from a Kannada 
term for dancer and in general terms implies an effeminate man (2005: 243 n. 4). Elsewhere in 
academic and LGBT discourse, ‘koti’ is also spelt ‘kothi’. 25 ‘Women’ were explicitly separate from effeminate men. ‘Nāran’ was a generic term to include 
all women, viewed as categorically different through their ability to bear children. 
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‘temporal, spatial, and life-historical positioning of the actors’ (ibid.: 45). Through an 
examination of various koti identities in Hyderabad, Reddy avoids a simplistic 
understanding of gender difference in terms of sexual performance only, which the 
personification of hijras as a ‘third-sex’ maintains by representing hijras as primarily 
sexed individuals. An exploration of the intersections of sexual difference with, and in 
relation to, other axes of difference, reveals how identities are negotiated and contested 
at different times and for different purposes. Reddy analyses what she terms the 
‘sexual cartographies’ of Hyderabad, including general koti, hijra, zenāna, and kaḍa-cāṭla 
koti identities, as well as jogins and śiva-satis, AC/DCs, and berūpias.26 These identities 
are located within a spectrum of koti identity, involving negotiations between identities 
that indicate both difference and similarities. Moreover, potential mobility between 
categories complicates subject positions.  
Many kotis explained their effeminate role as a result of having been ‘spoiled’ at 
a young age, referring to experiences as receptive partners in sexual relationships with 
men. Being ‘spoiled’ referred to the desire to perform this role in sex or that they were 
spoiled for future heterosexual intercourse (Reddy 2005: 46-7; Nanda 1999: 176-7). 
Reddy argues that kotis are differentiated from other men because ‘all kotis desire 
pantis’, although the manner of their relationship and interaction with pantis—and the 
degree to which particular kotis adhered to the rhetoric of asexuality—differed 
according to individuals (Reddy 2005: 47). Kotis (including hijras) can be married and 
have children due to social obligation. Individual sexual practice was dependent on 
status and ‘place in life’: generally, younger kotis—particularly hijras—thought it 
important to have their own panti, but sexual practice was denied among older hijras, 
who drew emphatically upon discourses of asceticism and renunciation (ibid.: 48). 
While I did not discuss sexual relationships with my kinnar interviewees, relationships 
between hijras and men were intimated through discussions, with older hijras, 
particularly gurus and nāyaks (senior leaders of the hijra houses), frowning upon the 
practice.  
Reddy discusses five koti identities: hijra, zenāna, kaḍa-cāṭla koti, jogin, and śiva-
sati, ‘differentiated on the basis of idealized asexuality, dress, kinship patterns, 
religion, ”respectability”, and the centrality of the body to their understanding of self’ 
(ibid.: 52-3). She discusses interaction, dual-membership, and mobility between groups. 
Membership of distinct categories involved evaluations of authenticity, hierarchy, and 
socio-economic and class differences. Hijras are sari-wearing (cāṭla) kotis, who 
exaggerate female behaviour, are identifiable in the public sphere, and form their own 
communities. Hijras argue that their historical legitimation places them above the other 
koti identities. Zenāna kotis, in contrast, seem like ‘normal’ men, indistinguishable from 
                                                      26 These are Reddy’s terms drawn from hijras’ and kotis’ self-definitions relating to the koti-panti 
spectrum of identities, in which hijras see themselves as akin to other ‘alternative sexual 
identities’ described under the term ‘koti’. 
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pantis in clothing and behaviour; many are married. Among other zenāna, their speech 
and gestures change, acting like hijras. Most zenānas are affiliated with a hijra house 
and have a symbolic structure among themselves, distinguishing them from other kotis 
and giving them a measure of respect in hijras’ eyes (ibid.: 59-63). The kaḍa-cāṭla kotis, or 
non-sari-wearing kotis are referred to as ‘kings by day, queens by night’. They have no 
affiliation to hijra houses but enjoy ‘homosex’ and identify themselves as ‘in this line 
for the sex and excitement’ (ibid.: 64). Sexual desire is their singular identifying criteria 
and allows identification with transnational gay communities due to an emphasis on 
sexual practice (ibid.: 64). The kaḍa-cāṭla kotis were the most numerous koti identity in 
Hyderabad, who disparaged hijras for their lack of global awareness. Many are married 
with families and are wary about revealing their alternative life (ibid.: 63-67). The last 
two koti identities, jogins and śiva-satis, are self-identified kotis, but distinguish 
themselves on account of their explicit religious identification as Hindus, whereas 
hijras and other kotis in Hyderabad identify as Muslim (ibid.: 68). Jogins wear female 
clothing, are ascetic, and are ‘married’ to the goddess; conversely, śiva-satis are often 
married and have families. Both groups claim a status almost level to badhāī (ritual 
work) hijras and many had ‘official’ affiliations with hijra houses (ibid.: 67-72). Two 
further groups exist in the Hyderabadi context: AC/DCs and berūpias. Hijras 
disparaged AC/DCs, calling them ‘double trick gāṇḍus’, because of both receptive and 
penetrative practice in same-sex intercourse.27 These individuals were reviled by hijras, 
especially those who had the nirvāṇ (‘rebirth’) operation and saw themselves as of 
higher status. Reddy writes that gaining information about this group was difficult 
because hijras were reluctant to acknowledge them: this disregard reveals how hijras 
construct their identity in contrast to AC/DC identity (ibid.: 72), where AC/DCs were 
depicted as engaging in all sex, while hijras had no desire for bodily pleasure (ibid.: 83, 
89). Another disparaged group were berūpias (‘people of a different form/face’): men 
who were pantis by behavioural definition, but imitated koti identity in gender 
performance. They were considered the most deviant, insofar as they were represented 
as ‘impersonating’ them and ‘stealing’ hijra earnings (ibid.: 54, 72). These individuals 
are sometimes referred to by hijra groups as ‘fake hijras’. Again berūpia identity reveals 
hijras’ self-constructions of identity: berūpias transgress the distinction between koti and 
panti and the performative gender boundary without the female attributes that justify 
hijras’ identity performance (ibid.: 73). Hijras construct themselves as definitively ‘not 
pantis’ and represent themselves as above other kotis through asexuality, performance 
of ritual work, proper community and dress, and historical legitimation. Thus, berūpias 
and AC/DCs are depicted as ‘false’ and ‘inauthentic’ koti identities since they ‘pretend’ 
to perform koti identity, or by engaging in sexual practices that contradict koti practices. 
                                                      
27 Kotis without an affiliation to a hijra house are sometimes called ‘gāṇḍus’, a term derived from 
gāṇḍ (ass), thus, ‘one who uses his ass’. ‘Gāṇḍu’ is a highly pejorative term and used in abusive 
or humorous contexts (Reddy 2005: 64). 
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 Narratives of ‘false’ identity and comparisons between different levels of 
‘authentic’ identity exist in the negotiations among these koti groups. Individual ideas 
regarding ‘authenticity’ frame these negotiations and explain the variations in ‘third’ 
sex identity. Sexual performance alone is insufficient to explain koti identity, since this 
identity category is revealed as differentiated through different facets of identity 
including religion, performance, sartorial considerations, and respectability.  
 
ii. Gender Within a Binary 
 
Kira Hall argues that hijras have created an existence within a normative gender binary, 
‘rigidly constrained by cultural constructions’ of femininity and masculinity (1995: 13). 
A negotiation of normative male or female bodily and performance norms is evidenced 
through hijras’ corporeal and gendered practices. Hall writes that hijras ‘seem to view 
themselves as “deficiently” masculine and ”incompletely” feminine’ (ibid.: 31), 
suggesting a negotiation of gender identity within a binary system. It is within, and 
with respect to, this framework that I explore various identifications in hijra gender 
construction, including both explicitly feminine and idiosyncratically hijra elements. I 
focus explicitly on performative aspects of gender, including corporeal, sartorial, and 
behavioural performance.  
The first aspect of hijra identity is a rejection of normative constructions of 
‘masculinity. This repeated narrative, found in many hijras’ descriptions of themselves, 
is often based on ‘anatomical proof’: the imperfection or absence of a penis (Nanda 
1999: 15). Deficiency is a marker of authenticity: if the hijra had undergone the nirvāṇ 
operation, emasculation is the proof of being a ‘real’ hijra.28 Imperfection or dysfunction 
is usually claimed prior to the operation to assert their status as ‘deficiently masculine’ 
and thus to justify their status as a hijra (see Nanda 1999: 15; Reddy 2005: 92).29 
According to Reddy, impotence was used to legitimate the decision to have the 
operation (2005: 93). The operation serves as proof of the absolute asexuality of the 
hijras. Most of the hijras I interviewed explained that they were ‘born’ this way and 
identified as female kinnars. ‘Born this way’ meant that they were not born as ‘normal’ 
males, with a functional male organ, or were born intersexed. However there was a 
strict distinction between ‘male’ and ‘female’ kinnars in MP. On one occasion, I met a 
‘male’ kinnar, with a male name. He did not explicitly identify himself to me as ‘male’, 
                                                      
28 Hossain disputes emasculation as a marker of hijra identity, citing evidence from Bangladesh, 
where hijras who successfully conceal their penises are as celebrated as emasculated hijras (2012: 
497). 29 This reasoning also alludes to historical references and to the colonial era, where impotence 
was seen as proof of eunuch status, for example, in the Criminal Tribes and Eunuchs Act (Act 
27) of 1897. Absence of genitalia is not the marker of eunuch status but ‘impotence’. 
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but wore ‘male’ clothing (that is, trousers and shirt) and had his hair cropped short like 
a man’s might be.  
In their rejection of ‘maleness’, most hijras adopt or mimic stereotypically 
female attributes. Nair writes that the hijras  
go to great lengths to bear the appearance of women, clothed in female attire and 
painfully plucking facial hair…to maintain the requisite look of hairless femininity. 
Photographs indicate that most hijras do, in fact, look like women. Or, to put it in a 
more nuanced fashion, they fulfill our criteria of what a female-gendered person 
must look like.  
(2000: 40) 
 
Most hijras adopt explicitly ‘feminine’ attributes, including wearing female clothing, 
jewellery, and make up, and keeping their hair long and faces ‘hairless’: all corporeal 
modifications indicating a deliberate adherence to assumed feminine norms.  
‘Superficial’ feminine elements emphasise an affiliation with female identity, a 
wish to be seen as ‘someone else’ through the non-verbal communication of 
appearance (Suthrell 2004: 81). Reddy writes that wearing saris distinguishes hijras 
most visibly in the public sphere (2005: 54-5, 131) and Nanda notes that style of 
clothing may vary according to the custom of the region, writing that in the North they 
might wear the śalvār qamīz [loose garment and trousers] or even Western fashions 
(1999: 17). I observed this to be the case in MP: most kinnars wore śalvār qamīz, although 
many wore saris at certain events. Nanda also considers the factor of age, observing 
that ‘middle-aged hijras wear more conservative clothing, often donning white rather 
than boldly coloured saris’ (ibid.: 126), perhaps conscious of their status within their 
community; this sartorial performance might also indicate ascetic practice. In MP, older 
kinnars and those higher in status wore simple, plain clothing compared to other 
(especially younger) kinnars who wore bright colours with embellishments. Older 
kinnars often covered their heads with their dupaṭṭās, the scarf worn with śalvār qamīz, 
especially in public or when men were present, assuming a more modest appearance. 
Ahonaa Roy argues that a hijra’s choice of dress is part of the construction of the body 
in relation to her performances: dress presents the body as gendered, representing the 
act they want to perform, such as sex work or begging (2012: 62). She states that 
western dress among the hijras of Mumbai often reflects the commercial (and therefore 
‘modern’) demands of sex work (ibid.). 
Hijras wear jewellery and observe feminine adornment practices such as nose 
and ear piercing. Both accentuate their femininity, even if they are just plastic or fake 
jewels; older and more senior hijras often wore more expensive gold jewellery. At the 
sammelan (inter-regional gathering) I attended, many traders had set up make shift 
stalls to sell their jewellery, knowing that wealthy hijras from several states were in 
attendance. They had a range of silver and gold jewellery, including very large and 
heavy items. Hijras also wear facial make-up to appear more ‘fair’. In the socio-cultural 
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context, fairness equates to beauty, especially among women. Hijras attempted to 
achieve this effect: Reddy writes that hijras would even bleach their faces, not only to 
hide their facial hair but also to look ‘more like a woman’ (2005: 127-8). Some kinnars in 
MP wore simple make-up, but I did not find it was common practice. In contrast, the 
hijras in Mumbai would wear extensive make-up, accentuating their eyes and lips in 
particular and covering blemishes. Their make-up kits were extensive and attaining a 
female appearance was a costly habit. Putting on make-up was part of the ceremony of 
adopting one’s persona as a hijra; as one hijra told me with a laugh, no one would 
recognise her without her make-up.  
Another normative feminine characteristic is long hair. Reddy writes that hijras 
are obliged to wear their hair long, as a marker of beauty, and not keeping long hair 
would result in a fine (younger hijras sometimes wore false attachments) (2005: 128).30 
The importance of long hair is demonstrated by the punishment given for a serious 
infraction of rules or for misbehaving: a hijra’s hair may be cut as a way of humiliating 
or publicly stigmatising her from the community (Nanda 1999: 41). I found that certain 
kinnars placed significance on long, lustrous hair, while others did not. Many kinnars in 
MP had short hair, although kept in a feminine style, and it seemed to be individuals’ 
choice rather than dictated by their community. One hijra in Mumbai wore hair 
extensions regularly, even owning several styles of various lengths. Good quality hair 
extensions are an investment so they are not an option for all hijras. Furthermore, hijras 
place significance of the ‘hairlessness’ of their faces. No hijras I met had visible facial 
hair. Reddy writes that a common practice was the use of cīmṭe (tweezers) to pluck out 
facial hair to give a more ‘feminine’ appearance, whereas shaving was seen as 
masculine and encouraged coarse hair growth (2005: 124-125).31 A more modern 
technique is facial hair removal, or electrolysis, which is believed to enhance the 
texture of one’s skin and is a permanent hair loss method (Roy 2012: 69).  
 There are also more extreme methods to produce ‘femininity’ through 
corporeal modification. Breasts are an important marker of feminine identity. In an 
attempt to achieve ‘voluptuous female bodies’, hijras pad out their bras (Nanda 1999: 
17) and even try to encourage bosom growth by taking hormones in large doses 
(Reddy 2005: 132-3); these oral contraceptives (containing oestrogen and progesterone) 
can be bought from pharmacies. A more risky method was the injection of hormones, 
bought illegally from local pharmacies, especially because hijras often do not know the 
side-effects or the risk of sharing needles and lacked medical training (India 
HIV/AIDS Alliance 2013). Risks are seen as worthwhile in order to gain a more 
                                                      30 Reddy noted that hijras would tell her to grow her short hair out, since it would mark her 
gender; she noted this irony—that they ‘as men’ wanted long hair while she kept it short—was 
not lost on them (2005: 129).  31 Bradford (1983) notes that jogappas in Karnataka used tweezers to remove their beards, called 
‘darśan’, to remove their beards. According to Reddy, hijras use this term (literally a ‘viewing’) 
both to refer to the beard and the act of plucking (2005: 124-7, 255 n.4). 
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‘feminine’ body shape.32 In certain circumstances, breast augmentation surgery is an 
option. A few hijras I met in Mumbai had surgery performed in order to create the 
appearance of breasts (see Roy 2012: 68, 77). They often chose large implants to create a 
voluptuous shape. Another corporeal symbol of femininity is the vagina. I was not 
aware of any kinnars who had operations to construct vaginas after the nirvāṇ 
operation, although many hijras need medical help or surgery to address urological 
complications (Chakrapani 2004: 13). Reddy reports that several sex-work hijras had 
repeated operations to construct a vagina post-nirvāṇ. She notes that this is not 
equivalent to a transsexual operation since it resulted in the appearance of a vagina 
only ‘for show’ (ibid.: 133).33 The symbolic value placed on breasts and the appearance 
of a vagina indicate the importance placed on stereotypically female corporeal aspects 
in constructing hijra gender identity; these practices reinscribe normative female 
gender attributes (Roy 2012: 51-83). 
In addition to adopting bodily and performative practices associated with 
women, hijras perform idiosyncratic gender behaviours, attracting attention to 
themselves as distinct from men and women and refusing strict categorisation. Reddy 
writes that this performance signals ‘difference and disruptive potential, both 
social/symbolic and physical’ (2005: 137). Hijras proclaim their status and court 
ambiguity by using disruptive performative behaviour to identify themselves as 
distinctly hijras: the most visible performances are the use of hand clapping and ‘skirt-
raising’.  
The ‘hand clap’, or tālī, is peculiar to hijras and has various meanings. It is loud 
and distinctive, where the palms strike one another, with fingers outspread and arched 
backwards. It is used in accompaniment to ritual work, or as an insult to men, hinting 
at their impotence or their wife’s unfaithfulness. Yasmin Nair writes that the clap is a 
‘cultural signifier’ that circulates outside the hijra communities to signify doubt about 
virility or homosexuality (2000: 50-1). The clap draws attention to hijras and symbolises 
the potential of hijras to shame the public and strip them of their respect. It is also used 
by hijras’ with one another to add stress when making a particular point or argument 
and reinforce their authority. Reddy notes that it is used as a marker of relative respect, 
to proclaim self-superiority, or to reinforce the authority of one hijra over another (2005: 
138). It is a clear statement of allegiance to the identity and community: impersonations 
of hijras always include this distinctive clapping (Reddy 2005: 55). Hall notes further 
that the system of clapping can provide a system of communication among hijras. She 
gives various examples of the hijra tālī and their meanings, which include an indication 
                                                      32 In addition to a desire for breasts, some hijras desire ‘working breasts’ which produce milk 
(Reddy 2005: 133; Nanda 1999: 81). 33  Several emasculated hijras claimed to Reddy to have ‘periodic discharges’ like female 
menstruation, although they were not blood or semen (2005: 134). 
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of badhāī fares, a way of evaluating non-hijras, and various negative indications (1995: 
191-2).  
A second type of distinct hijra gender behaviour is the raising of one’s skirt in 
order to show the physical site of excision. This, according to Nair, ‘marks the 
specificity of the hijra and a disruptive region that threatens to wreak havoc on the 
supposedly normal bodies around it’ (2000: 51). Hijras are said to perform this action 
because they have ‘no shame’ and thus are freed from regular society’s restraints. Since 
hijras realise the shame they can provoke in others through exposing their absent 
genitalia (due to which they have ‘no shame’), this powerful act forces public 
compliance and identifies hijras as authentic and powerful. Hijras often use this act to 
shame those who disrespect them, signalling their power over others and implicitly 
alluding to their potential power to curse and render those viewing impotent. 
Furthermore, Reddy reads this action as one of reclaiming respect (2005: 139).34 By 
shaming others, hijras force others to meet their demands and respect their power. 
Corporeal and performative practices are enacted by hijras within the 
framework of normative masculine and feminine behaviours and bodies. They deny 
‘maleness’ and emulate a female gender identity, alongside performative acts, that are 
interpreted as neither ‘male’ nor ‘female’.35 Hijras construct an idiosyncratic hijra 
identity, confined within a normative binary gender system, and present an identity 
that can be read as ‘part male, part female’. However, hijras’ gender performance is not 
simply a reinscription or a subversion of normative gender roles so that their identities 
can be interpreted as an amalgamation of ‘both’ male and female or ‘neither’ male nor 
female. As Reddy argues, hijras ‘do not, in any simple way, merely subvert or 
reinscribe gender difference, but actively and intentionally court ambiguity’ (2005: 141), 
even if this process is unconscious or non-deliberate. Hijras realise the constructed 
nature of their gendered identities, employing different attributes and notions to 
present a layered and complex identity. Ambiguity is important, even if it is used 
reactively, or unconsciously. Their gendered discourses and practices allow for 
multiple gender identities to be performed by different individuals, differentiated by 
age, class, status, region, and religious considerations, and at different times. The 
practice of mimicking female attributes and employing idiosyncratic ones signify hijras’ 
disruptive potential as ambiguous figures.  
 
                                                      34 Many hijras desire the nirvāṇ operation in order to prove themselves as ‘real’ hijras when 
disrespected by the public. Despite pain and discomfort, emasculation creates the form of a 
‘real’ hijra. Reddy writes it is a ‘marker of authenticity’, that outweighs its physical costs (2005: 
93, 225, 227).  
35 A further behaviour seen as explicitly ‘not female’ is hijras’ use of vulgarity and sexual insult. 
See Hall 1995: 139-73. 
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iii. ‘Authentic’ Identities 
 
Both the range of identities included in the koti spectrum and the performative gender 
practices enacted by hijras reveal the potential and multiple configurations of hijra 
identity. This potential for variety can be developed further through an exploration of 
the notion of ‘authenticity’, in the sense of what practices and elements make a more 
‘real’ hijra subject. This is a common theme in the discussions above, where notions of 
authenticity are evident in the process of identifying and categorising hijras. Hijras 
claim greater authenticity than other koti identities as ascetic, emasculated, socially-
structured, sari-wearing individuals. Moreover, hijras’ mythological and historical 
legitimation strengthens the authenticity of their particular identity against other ‘false’ 
kotis/pantis.  
Distinctions are made between hijras regarding the level of their authenticity 
and their ‘status’ within their communities. There are various ways a hijra may become 
‘more authentic’, such as performing ritual as opposed to sex work, having the nirvāṇ 
operation, adhering to ascetic discourses, and renouncing one’s previous life upon 
entry to the community. Traditional badhāī work is considered as more worthy of 
‘honour’, since hijras maintain that traditionally they did not perform sex work, which 
is perceived as an ‘inauthentic’ and improper form of work. The vast majority of hijras 
say that they only perform ritual work.36 Kinnars in MP did not admit to sex work, 
although non-kinnars say that younger and ‘good-looking’ kinnars were engaged in sex 
work or had sex with men. It was perceived, including by non-kinnars, that sex-work 
degrades kinnar identity. Gurus and nāyaks particularly deny the practice of sex work, 
arguing that ‘real’ hijras do not desire men and deny that they themselves engaged in 
sex work, or sexual relationships with men in the past. 37  Badhāī work requires 
harnessing the goddess’ power in order to perform blessings, so ideally hijras should 
have undergone the nirvāṇ operation to prove their status as ‘real’ ascetics. Being a 
‘real’, emasculated hijra signals status and respect among hijras and provides a measure 
of honour in regard to the outside world, according to the hijras. Emasculation is thus a 
marker of authenticity: Reddy and Nanda both argue that one becomes a ‘real’ hijra 
irrevocably after the operation (Nanda 1999: 24-6; Reddy 2005). Ideally, in tandem with 
the nirvāṇ operation—legitimised by anatomical deficiency—hijras are ascetics, since a 
lack of desire for men is said to signal ‘true’ hijra identity (Reddy 2005: 83). The rhetoric 
of asceticism and renunciation not only relates to sexuality but other social ties. An 
absence of marital relations is expected, along with severing ties to one’s natal family. 
                                                      36 Reddy notes hijras would only admit to sex work when pressed on the issue. She argues these 
occupations seemed to be mutually exclusive and were not practiced simultaneously (2005: 56, 
82). Many sex working hijras argued that there was a trajectory from sex work to badhāī work, 
once their bodies or desired changed; this history was denied by badhāī hijras (ibid.: 56-7, 82). 
37 Reddy confirms that nāyaks and gurus maintained their asexuality, despite stories from other 
Hyderabadi zenānas who ‘cruised’ with them in their youth (2005: 83). 
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Although many hijras were abandoned, Reddy argues that hijras invoked a discourse of 
renunciation in order to more closely associate with the sannyāsī self-image (ibid.: 150). 
In contrast, Adnan Hossain points to evidence regarding hijras in Dhaka, Bangladesh, 
that disputes claims that emasculation and the severing of natal ties are markers of hijra 
authenticity (2012). He writes that many hijras in Dhaka perform ‘hijragiri’ (collecting 
alms and performing badhāī) away from their heterosexual households where they 
have wives and children, marking a significant departure from extant narratives where 
hijras sever all ties with non-hijra kin (2012: 500). He notes that ‘all men who publicly 
transgress normative masculine ideals are relegated to the status of hijra’, but only 
those who carry out ‘hijragiri’ are considered to be authentic or ‘sadrali’ hijras (ibid.). 
Moreover, while many hijras invoke the trope that they were ‘born that way’, many 
hijras in Dhaka have a penis and those gifted in the art of concealment are as celebrated 
as those who have undergone emasculation (ibid.: 497). Hijras with penises are known 
as janana and those without as chibry, but both perform hijragiri, Hossain argues, 
without a distinction as to their authenticity. Hossain writes that ‘it is not on account of 
emasculation but rather by dint of one’s ability to learn and subsequently conduct 
hijragiri that one becomes, and is publicly recognized as, a hijra, regardless of one’s 
genital status’ (ibid.). 
Despite the evidence discussed by Hossain, kinnars in the context of MP 
invoked discourses regarding their authenticity, pointing out their status as kinnars 
based on the performance of ritual over sex work, the ‘truth’ of their bodies (as ascetics 
and regarding dysfunctional sexual ability) and the severance of natal ties, 
complimenting theorisations by Reddy and Nanda. Discourses of authenticity are 
significant to hijras’ sense of self-worth, in the face of marginalisation and 
subordination. Such discourses not only construct hijras as superior to other koti 
identities but in relation to society at large, such as through ascetic practice.38 Reddy’s 
discussion of the notion of ‘izzat’ (honour) ties in with discussions of authenticity (2005: 
15). Hijras gain a measure of respect through claims to authenticity and it is this self-
assertion that helps to unpack hijra identity and suggest how to see hijras as hijras see 
themselves.39  
 
                                                      38 Arguments regarding authenticity between kotis have increased in recent years, especially 
with tension between ‘real’ and ‘false’ hijras. In Bhopal, there has been talk of ‘licensing’ hijras in 
order to distinguish ‘real’ from ‘fake’ following acts of violence, such as after the arrest of eight 
hijras who forcibly emasculated a ‘fake hijra’ for stealing their income (Reddy 2005: 246 n.38; cf. 
Nanda 1999: 11; Niazi 2008).  39 The notion of ‘authenticity’ is useful for other analyses of hijra identity, such as participation 
in politics, in which hijras depict themselves as authentic renunciates who can better serve their 
constituents through their lack of desire for power and money and lack of kinship 
responsibilities. I develop these arguments later in the thesis. 
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III. Religious Identifications  
 
Often hijras are identified as ‘Hindu’ or ‘Muslim’ and these identities are seen as 
mutually exclusive. Yet, the syncretism of religious roles and practices discussed in 
scholarship on the hijras instead suggests that variation and individuality are 
important when considering the religious identifications made by hijras, based on an 
individual’s beliefs, background, and spatial, geographical, and historical context, 
which forms a unique sense of hijra religiosity. A framework designating practices as 
either Hindu or Muslim may be problematic, but the discussion below frames hijra 
religiosity in the terms they use, despite a lack of adherence to an overall tradition. 
 
i. Syncretic Religious Identities? 
 
Hijras ‘religious’ identities may be interpreted as an amalgamation of traditions, 
through a borrowing of practices and rituals seen as explicitly ‘Hindu’ or ‘Muslim’. 
This ‘blending’ is often explained by the ‘paradoxical’ nature of Indian religious 
traditions which can accommodate variant religious practices without 
‘compartmentalising’ conflicting beliefs and practices. Hijras have managed to 
negotiate apparently conflicting traditions in order to form an idiosyncratic religious 
identity for the communities in which they live and individual hijras themselves.  
The ‘religious and communal syncretism’ among the hijras identified and 
explored by Lawrence Preston is, as he argues, common in village India, probably 
confused by the British—and perhaps nowadays of a modern—‘predisposition to 
order’ (1987: 375-6). Preston notes that hijras borrow ‘rather freely’ from the cumulative 
backgrounds of those who joined the community (ibid.: 376), adopting particular 
practices that reflect the need of the specific community based on temporal, spatial, 
and regional contexts. Pluralistic religiosity is also the product of individuals joining 
their communities from different religious, caste, and regional backgrounds, such that 
single households might contain, as seen during my research, both Hindu and Muslim 
hijras (see Nanda 1999: 41) and members from various caste groups (see Reddy 2005: 
111; Jaffrey 1997: 104-5). Hijras’ religiosity is also a product of their interpretation of 
their genealogy, as evidenced through my discussion of the construction of hijra 
identity through historical and literary traditions, in which Islamic, Hindu, and Jain 
traditions are referenced. Their practices suggest an inclusive form of religion among 
the hijra community, precluding a concrete definition. There does not seem to be a 
conflict between the practices of hijras’ religious orthopraxy. Nair writes that this 
amalgamated identity is due to the fluid and itinerant nature of their identities, which 
‘disallows any fixed sense of their practiced faith’ (2000: 115-6, n.1).  
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Two further conclusions may be considered. First, Nair suggests that hijras’ 
congregations and practices can be understood as an ‘affirmation of community’ rather 
than of faith (2000: 116 n.1), in which religious practices reveal a hijra’s affiliation with a 
specific region, highlight a particular practice significant to that hijra, or demonstrate 
adherence to a practice befitting a hijra’s social status and function. Their practices 
construct and affirm the communities to which they belong, whether regional, social, 
or ritual; moreover, hijra religiosity affirms belonging to the identity ‘hijra’, by shaping 
traditional discourses and gaining respect and legitimacy for their identity. Second, as 
Navtej Purewal and Virinder Kalra suggest, discussing women’s popular practices in 
Indian and Pakistani Punjab, a consideration of women’s popular practices might offer 
a new angle by which to comprehend the social context of cultural and spiritual 
practices, which, crucially, does not rest on fixed notions of religious belonging or 
categories (2010: 383). They argue that popular practices are often considered 
‘informal’, such that women’s popular practices are interpreted as cultural rather than 
religious, consigning these practices to the margins and constructing a singular view of 
religious identity (ibid.: 389). Similarly, I would suggest that hijras’ adoption of aspects 
of both ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ traditions might offer a lens through which to read the 
religiosity and social context of marginalised communities, without interpreting these 
practices as ‘informal’ or cultural. Hijras appropriate various religious symbols from a 
position of liminality, allowing for heterodox religious practices. While the way in 
which these practices are interpreted and performed might be unique to hijra society, 
they form a key process through which hijra identity is constructed and negotiated, 
allowing hijras to assert their self-consciousness and affirm their identities (see Zene 
2000: 70).  
 
ii. Hindu Rituals 
 
The first aspect of hijras’ religiosity associated with Hinduism is worship of the Hindu 
pantheon, specifically Bahuchara Mata, 40  the patron-goddess of the hijras. 41 Hijras 
perform their ritual role of giving blessings of fertility or prosperity in her name and 
act as her servants in her temple in Gujarat.42 It is through the practice of emasculation 
that hijras believe that they become the vehicle of the goddess’ power. The majority of 
                                                      
40 I use this name as it is widely used in literature on the goddess. In MP, I also heard her 
referred to as ‘Bochrama’. 41 Preston writes that the deities worshipped by both Muslim and Hindu hijras are always 
Saivite (1987: 376), but other authors stress hijras devotion to the Mata goddess as her devotees 
and servants, including among ‘Muslim’ hijras (Shah 1961: 63; Hall refers to ‘Becrā Mātā’: 1995: 
248, 294, 366; Reddy 2005: 108; cf. n.18). Reddy calls her ‘Bedhraj Mata’, a name deriving from 
the location of her temple at ‘Bedhrajpur’ in Gujarat. 
42 One Hindu kinnar told me that kinnars are the priests of her temple and parents bring their 
children there for blessings. At the temple, there were kinnars present but I did not observe 
them acting in such a role among the other priests present. 
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hijras worship Bahuchara as their spiritual guide. Although I found that many kinnars 
did not know any stories or myths associated with the goddess (see Hall 1995: 325), 
they worshipped her because she affords them protection. Most kinnars had a portrait 
of the Mata in their homes. Shabnam Mausi explained that ‘a kinnar becomes a kinnar 
because of her blessing…it is believed we should not forget the Mata [since] any bad 
thing could happen to us. If someone cannot go [to the temple], they should at least 
keep a photo by their bedside’. 
There are several myths that specifically link the hijras with Bahuchara Mata. 
Hall writes that these myths are significant since, to a certain degree, the respect paid 
to hijras is dependent upon that paid to the goddess herself (1995: 114-5). These myths 
are essential for constructing hijras’ sense of identity and explaining aspects of their 
lives, including anatomical form, devotion to the goddess, and their ritual power. The 
myths that follow were narrated to me in Ahmedabad and Becharaji in Gujarat,43 by 
hijras themselves or by devotees at Bahuchara’s temple. A number of these myths are 
narrated elsewhere (see Nanda 1999, Reddy 2005).  
The goddess is associated with male transgenderism and transvestism, 
including in the myth describing the origin of her worship.44 While passing through the 
forest in Gujarat, thieves attack the maiden Bahuchara’s party. Bahuchara cuts off her 
breasts and, by removing a marker of her ‘womanhood’, she hopes that the thieves will 
not rape her. Her act secures her deification for her virtue and purity. In another 
variation, the thieves are not deterred by her act and do rape her. Bahuchara curses 
them and the thieves realise she has turned them into hijras. In a further version, 
Bahuchara is a powerful prince. When threatened by thieves, he transforms himself 
into a woman through his ‘spiritual power’. The thieves try to rape her and in her 
defence she cuts off her breasts so she no longer appears feminine, saying 'I am no 
longer a woman nor a man'. This act fails to stop them, so she prays to the god Viṣṇu to 
give her a hiding place. The earth splits open and she jumps inside. She curses the 
thieves and they become hijras.  
Bahuchara’s ability to transcend her bodily state is reflected by hijras’ desire to 
transform their own bodies. Moreover, Bahuchara is said to have transformed through 
her ‘spiritual purity’ and hijras can gain from the rhetoric of ‘spiritual power’ to explain 
                                                      
43  Bahuchara is worshipped by a large proportion of the population in Gujarat. Many 
newlyweds and parents receive blessings for fertility at her only temple, located in the town 
named after the goddess, Becharaji or Bahucharaji (Mehsana district). There are a variety of 
myths linking Bahuchara to the site, either for protecting it or ordering her temple to be built 
here (see Sheikh 2010).  
44 For alternative myths of Maya and Tara, see Hossain 2012: 504-6. Hossain notes that hijras in 
Bangladesh immediately identified an image of Bahuchara Mata as Maya. Hossain explains that 
while Bahuchara’s origin myths recount the lack or loss of genitalia which reflects hijras’ own 
sacrifice of their genitals, in contrast, Maya and Tara were janana, who could make their penises 
disappear with magical claps (506). This mythical status thus corresponds to the real life context 
of many Bangladeshi hijras with penises and indicates how mythological narratives function to 
explain bodies and behaviour, and reflect individual, regional, and social particularities.  
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their own transformation, emphasising their spirituality. Another significant aspect of 
these stories is Bahuchara’s creation of hijras where hijra identity is seen as a ‘curse’, a 
price to be paid for harming the goddess. Hijras narrate that Bahuchara created the 
very first hijra and the following myth explains their devotion to the goddess.  
In one narrative, a prince is forced to marry Bahuchara, but he does not desire a 
wife and children, since he believes himself to be neither a man nor a woman. The 
goddess curses him for ruining her life and cuts off his genitals as a punishment, 
saying that he, and others like him, will require the removal of their genitals in order to 
be reborn.45 The nirvāṇ operation is apparently obligatory for those who enter hijra 
communities, although the nature of the operation and the need to be called by the 
goddess means that many have not had the operation performed. Nanda writes that 
the practice of ‘self-mutilation’ (that is, their castration) and ‘sexual abstinence by her 
devotees’ is performed in order to secure Bahuchara’s favour (1999: 25). Initiates must 
sacrifice and devote themselves completely to the goddess through the operation. 
The goddess’ ability to curse men and make them hijras demonstrates her 
control over fertility and sexuality. I noted that there is a link between the respect paid 
to hijras and the respect paid towards Bahuchara Mata (Hall 1995: 114-5). By 
associating themselves with the goddess and her ability to curse, hijras attest to their 
own ‘powers’, claiming control over people’s fertility by channelling Bahuchara’s 
power.46 This claim legitimises hijras’ badhāī work at weddings and birth ceremonies by 
giving or denying their blessings for fertility. People who receive them into their 
homes try to keep them happy with the ‘price’ they pay for such blessings, even 
meeting what they see as extortionate demands.47  
                                                      
45 Themes of revenge and reverence relating to the goddess coincide with general ideas in 
‘mother-goddess worship’, where the mother-goddess figure expresses notions of power, 
autonomy, and primacy (see Ganesh 1990). The notion of reverence and submission is 
illustrated in other myths, for example, the cursing of Arjuna by Urvaśī. See Goldsmith 1993; 
Doniger 1999; Pattanaik 2002. 
46 Hijras’ ability to curse men is linked to the use of verbal insult and obscenity. Hall writes that 
obscenity is critical to the group’s survival (discussing communities who break expectations 
regarding linguistic purity), as a ‘necessary survival technique in a society that enforces their 
marginalization’ (1995: 155). She argues that the hijras’ curse is comparable to that of the Hindu 
widow due to their social marginalisation since both unmarried states are a curse. Both widows 
and hijras can defy social convention in regards to language use (ibid.; 1997: 442). 
47 A friend in Sagar (MP) and his wife had a baby during the time I was there. He told me that 
some weeks after his daughter was born, hijras came to his house to give their blessings. He was 
expected to ‘pay’ and there was a negotiation over the appropriate amount. He is not wealthy 
and lives outside the city but nonetheless ended up giving Rs 2500, a sari, and several kilos of 
rice, stating that it was important to keep the hijras happy. In contrast, I attended a badhāī 
ceremony with hijras in Mumbai. We were not allowed into the flat (located in a high-rise, 
luxury tower block): the woman kept the outside gate locked. The hijras sat on the floor outside 
and negotiations began, with the woman approaching the gate and offering slightly more each 
time. In the end, she refused to give more than Rs 1100, a kilo of rice, and a kilo of sugar. The 
hijras said you could not even buy a nice sari with this money. I was told it was up to the 
household how much to give, and it was not in this woman’s heart to give more. Divided 
between two gurus, the amount was 550 Rs each. Recently in August 2013, Shabnam Mausi was 
quoted in the Times of India, saying that the government should fix the rates of tips for hijras on 
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Two points are significant: the conception of hijra identity as a ‘curse’, as well as 
the potential for Bahuchara and the hijras to have control over fertility. The conception 
of hijra identity as a ‘curse’ can be seen as derogatory, in the sense that if hijra identity 
is read as a punishment, it might justify their inequitable treatment and explain the fear 
and prejudice that surrounds the group. Some hijras believe this identity ‘curse’ 
explains their low social status. Conversely, the ability to curse as a by-product of hijra 
identity can provide relief, where individuals channel the goddess’ power to punish 
those who act improperly towards them with the curse of their own identity.  
A factor linked to their unique ritual role and control over fertility is hijras’ 
practice of asceticism and renunciation, linked to discourses in Hindu philosophy. 
Hijras invoke an image of themselves as sannyāsīs, presenting ideal hijras as asexual 
renunciates (see Reddy 2005: 79; 2003: 175). Sexual and material renunciation possesses 
important moral force in India, especially relating to ‘semen anxiety’, where loss of 
semen implies a loss of vital life energy and masculine strength (Reddy 2003: 175).48 
Individuals need to learn how to refine and channel their energy, for example, through 
ascetic practices (Osella and Osella 2006: 137). Divine creative powers stem from the 
accumulation of ‘ascetic heat’ or ‘tapas’. Patrick Olivelle notes that this term derives 
from the Sanskrit root, ‘tap’. ‘Tapas’ refers not only to the process of generating heat 
(asceticism), but to the product of this process, what he terms ‘magical heat’, which has 
a creative and sacred quality (1993: 3). Immense generativity is demonstrated in one 
version of a Hindu creation myth. Śiva is asked to create the world, and retreats into 
the water for a thousand years to generate his power. In his absence, Brahmā creates 
the world and when Śiva returns, he breaks off his lingam, declaring it to be of no more 
use. His castrated phallus became the embodiment of creative tapas: as Doniger states, 
‘[the lingam] becomes a source of universal fertility as soon as it has ceased to be a 
source of individual fertility’ (1973: 135). The notion of creative generativity explains 
the hijras’ ‘power’ in badhāī work since the creative power of asceticism is associated 
with fertility and productivity. In performing this ascetic role, hijras link themselves to 
Śiva and other ascetic individuals, as well as to the Mata. Hijras explicitly use these 
discourses of creative asceticism to legitimise their lives by advocating chastity and 
emphasising their affinity with mythological asexual figures. While there is evidence to 
suggest that many hijras engage in sex work and or sexual relationships in 
contemporary India, a discourse of asceticism legitimates their ritual role and is, at 
least outwardly, emphasised by hijras. Walter Penrose notes that asceticism refers to 
                                                                                                                                                              
an economic basis. The article notes that Shabnam explains that fixed rates will save common 
people from harassment and help their community ‘make a decent living’ (Singh 2013).  48 The practice of renunciation is also the last of the four Hindu life stages (āśramas), where each 
stage of life has appropriate behaviours, including sexual behaviour. The student should be 
chaste; the householder should engage in sexual relations as a married person to procreate; the 
third stage sees one gradually withdrawing from the world, preparing for the renunciation of 
sex in the final stage of the sannyāsī (Nanda 1999: 126; see Osella and Osella 2006: 159ff). 
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abstinence from heterosexual, not homosexual activity in the Hindu tradition; 
moreover, asceticism in Hindu myths is defined as a lack of procreative sex. He thus 
concludes that hijras’ asceticism is ‘both complex and ambiguous’ (2001: 22).  
Theoretically, hijras go further than sexual asceticism to ‘ensure’ corporeal 
asceticism through emasculation. Although this is the ideal referent for hijras,49 the 
practice of ensuring the Mata’s blessings50 and the life-threatening nature of the 
operation means that not all hijras have had the nirvāṇ operation and in many cases the 
operation cannot or will not be performed for many years.51 The nirvāṇ operation links 
hijras to their mythological creation by the Mata and their devotion to her, as well as to 
Śiva in his role as creative ascetic. The operation consists of a penectomy and 
orchiectomy where both penis and testicles are removed (Reddy 2005: 94). 52 
Emasculation is the source of the ritual powers of the hijras; Nanda argues: ‘it is the 
source of their uniqueness and the most authentic way of identifying oneself as a hijra 
and of being so identified by the larger society’ (1999: 24). However, a definition of hijra 
identity as emasculated fixes hijra identity as a corporeal reality, instead of as a 
conceptual possibility. Moreover, there are corporeal variations among hijras, including 
emasculated individuals; non-emasculated but circumcised individuals; non-
emasculated and non-circumcised individuals; impotent men; and naturally born 
intersexed individuals. However the referent of the hijra who has undergone the nirvāṇ 
operation and the operation’s symbolic potential as evoking discourses of creative 
asceticism are important for hijra identity within Hindu ritual practices and ideologies.  
                                                      49 I use the term ‘ideal referent’ to refer to an ideal to which hijras aspire and the status that 
many expect of hijras, through there is some disparity between the ideal and actual bodily status 
or physical practice. Hijras are expected to be emasculated as a marker of authenticity, Reddy 
writes, paradoxically gaining a measure of respect at the same time as ‘categorical identification 
with this label stigmatises them in the eyes of the mainstream public’ (Reddy 2005: 57, 95-6). She 
quotes Margaret Trawick: ‘when you are trying to understand a story told in India it becomes 
important to consider the life of the person telling the story, and when you are trying to 
understand a person it becomes important to listen to the stories that the person tells’ (1990, in 
Reddy 2005: 90). 
50 The Mata’s blessings are crucial, especially if she did not call you for the operation (Reddy 
2005: 108). Shabnam Mausi told me that without Bahuchara Mata’s blessing, one cannot become 
a hijra. This conclusion is confirmed by Nanda who notes that hijras will only undergo the 
operation if the goddess is ‘ready’ to help them and they have signs of her blessing (1999: 27; 
see 25-6, 33). 51 For example, Nanda notes that nine of the ten nirvāṇ hijras she met had it done after many 
years (five to fifteen). In contrast, she cites Ranade’s study (1983) states that four-fifths of the 76 
castrated hijras interviewed were castrated before the age of fifteen. The proportion of 
emasculated hijras (in relation to overall numbers) is unknown. Hall quotes Mr Bhola, President 
of ‘All India Kalyan Sabha’ (a hijras’ welfare association) in 1986, saying that 98% of hijras are 
castrated, and 2% are hermaphrodites (1995). However, Mr Bhola stated in 2008 that ‘I know 
that most of the eunuchs are fake…neither the government nor the police are doing 
anything…[so] the number of fake eunuchs is increasing’ (Niazi 2008), in response to a ‘rise’ in 
‘fake’ hijras in MP and the threat to ‘real’ hijras’ livelihood.  52 See Nanda 1999 (Ch. 3) for an account of the significance and ritual of this operation. More 
recently, sex reassignment surgery (SRS) is performed by doctors in metropolitan cities and the 
government has been encouraged to draw up more comprehensive national guidelines 
regarding SRS surgery and its availability for transgender individuals (Indian HIV/AIDS 
Alliance 2013). 
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The third aspect of hijras’ religiosity linked to Hindu traditions are practices 
that reflect traditional Hindu female practices, including rituals associated with the 
nirvāṇ operation, such as the treatment of hijras as post-natal ‘mothers‘ or ‘brides’; the 
practices of mourning ‘widows’; and the ‘religious’ performances undertaken by the 
hijras. In these examples, hijras perform recognisable ‘feminine’ roles. The performance 
of feminine roles by hijras’ in enacting their own religiosity serves to indicate the 
contingent axes of gender and ‘religion’.  
The nirvāṇ operation symbolises the transformation that the initiates undergo in 
order to become hijras. It is not akin to a transsexual operation—transforming a body 
from ‘male’ to ‘female’ in the case of the hijra—but for many, the operation is about the 
transformation into a hijra and not a ‘woman’ (Nanda 1999: 118). The roles performed 
during the operation mimic feminine roles. The operation takes place at three or four in 
the morning and is traditionally performed by a skilled hijra, known as a dāī, literally 
translated as ‘midwife’ (as Hall suggests, pointing to the metaphor of castration as 
birth; 1995: 208).53 Once the emasculation has occurred, the blood must be drained off 
as it is considered ‘male’ (Nanda 1999: 28). A fourty-day recovery period follows,54 
similar to that of a woman after childbirth, with similar dietary and ritual practices.55 
After this period, the hijra is dressed as a bride, with her hair parting, hands, and feet 
decorated with henna (ibid.: 29).56 After performing pūjā to the Mata at a water source, 
the ritual is complete and a hijra is born (ibid.: 29).  
Another ‘female role’ performed by celās (disciples) is demonstrated at the time 
of a guru’s death, where they behave as Hindu widows at the death of a husband. 
‘Mimicking’ Hindu widows, they break their bangles, remove their jewellery, and don 
a white sari for the period of mourning. Reddy writes that they are permitted to wear 
coloured clothes only after they have acquired another guru (2005: 109, 162; see Jaffrey 
1997: 279-81). Hall argues that hijras transfer every ‘auspicious life-relationship’ to their 
guru, in the absence of other worldly relationships (1995: 198). In MP, many of the 
senior gurus who had lost their own gurus wore white or light, simple clothes. In part, 
this was because they did not acquire another guru, but I was told it was in respect to 
their guru’s passing. The symbolic meanings of these actions—as ‘brides’, ‘recovering 
                                                      53 One ‘dai ma’ hijra told Nanda she dreamt the Mata called her to perform operations, despite 
having no medical training (1999: 27). Having a hijra perform the operation has a higher level of 
ritual (rather than a medical professional) and the risks are high since emasculation is a criminal 
offense (Section 320 IPC).  
54 Hossain notes that it is only a twelve-day period following emasculation among chibry hijras 
in Dhaka. See Hossain 2012: 506-7 for a discussion of the ritual surrounding baraiya, the 
completion of this period. 55 Nanda writes that similar practices are an ‘illustration of the symbolic identification of 
childbirth with emasculation as rebirth’. She documents the recovery process, including bathing 
and purifying rituals (1999: 28-9). 
56 Similarly, Roy describes the rituals at the death of a hijra, which includes dressing the 
deceased as a bride: death signifies the end of a sorrowful life and the new life will bring 
happiness for the deceased (2012: 215). 
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mothers’ and as ‘widows’—can be understood in respect to normative social practices 
in Indian society.  
One further ‘female’ performance can be seen during religious occasions. Many 
hijras take part in Hindu festivals, often acting a woman’s traditional part. 57 Reddy, in 
particular, describes the participation of Muslim hijras in one of the most popular 
Hindu festivals in Hyderabad, the ‘bonalu panduga’ in 1997 (2005: 109-10).58 Women are 
primarily involved in this festival; they carry elaborate pots to the goddess Mahakali’s 
temple where they are ceremonially broken. Reddy writes that as ‘Musalmans’, hijras 
are ‘officially forbidden to participate’ and given a ‘stiff fine’ if senior hijras find out. 
What is significant about Reddy’s account is the presence of a few badhāī hijras, the 
ritual workers, but almost all the kāndra hijras, the ‘sex-workers’.59 A hijra’s social role—
based on type of work and social status more generally—seems to affect the level of 
participation in differing ‘religious’ activities, revealing intersections between ritual 
role, social status, and religiosity. The kāndra hijras’ role in the festival is differentiated 
from the badhāī hijras’ role according to status and occupation, and this distinction is 
tied up with notions of authenticity, perhaps allowing the ‘less authentic’ hijras the 
possibility of participating in such festivals without recrimination from or justification 
to the more hierarchical households. Occupation and notions of authenticity are one 
explanation for the participation of ‘Muslim’ hijras in Hindu festivals. When 
questioning why and how individuals incorporate ‘Hindu’ elements into general 
religious practice—and to varying degrees—Reddy discusses the factor of region, or 
geographical context. The bonalu panduga is a popular Hyderabadi festival, ‘perhaps 
highlighting hijras’ affiliation with place rather than religion in particular contexts’ 
(ibid.: 110). Thus, individual regional context is a further factor in considering hijras’ 
religiosity. 
 
iii. Muslim Practices 
 
Hijras also perform specific practices seen as explicitly ‘Muslim’: hijras’ naming 
practices, daily ‘Muslim’ rituals, and the importance of shrines and festivals can be 
seen as part of the orthopraxy of Islamic doctrine. Practices here labelled or categorised 
as ‘Muslim’ might instead be the result of the adoption of localised Sufi practices or 
those which have historical roots in Mughal court cultures (in which hijras enjoyed 
comparative privilege). Such practices therefore have significance within hijras’ 
                                                      57 Shah mentions hijras going on ‘begging tours’ during festivals such as Diwali, Holi, and 
Navaratri (1961: 1327). 58 The hijras Reddy interviewed were self-identified ‘Muslims’ (2005: 114-117). 59 These are the Hyderabadi terms used to define a difference in roles: usually kāndra hijras 
become badhāī hijras, but both roles are ‘ideologically exclusive domains of practice’ (Reddy 
2005: 81). 
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religious practice, pointing to the necessity of adopting syncretic practices for a group 
who hold a position of (religious) liminality. As mentioned above, a ‘blurring’ of 
‘religious’ practices might in fact reveal more about the social context of hijras’ cultural 
and spiritual practices, as well as the historical; the term ‘Muslim’ here should 
therefore provoke a consideration of why hijras use such practices, rather than an 
interpretation of such practices as distinctly ‘Muslim’. Moreover, the incorporation of 
apparently mutually exclusive elements into hijras’ lived realities, as seen through the 
adoption of both ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ rituals and practices, should not be seen as 
paradoxical or problematic but instead reveal the complexity of religiosity among hijras.  
 One notable practice is the adoption of Muslim names. Reddy states that upon 
joining the hijra community, initiates or their gurus choose a new name for the initiate, 
often Hindu and female. In addition, they are given male Muslim names, which are 
‘the official names entered in the hijra register maintained by the nāyaks’ (2005: 103). In 
Hyderabad, while many hijras preferred their Hindu names, all of the nāyaks were 
addressed by their Muslim names, whatever their prior religious affiliation, perhaps to 
denote their superior position. Reddy’s account may be limited by the contextual 
nature of Hyderabad as a historically important Muslim location, accounting for the 
more common self-assertion of the Hyderabadi hijras as Muslims. However other 
accounts also mention hijras with Muslim names, such as Nanda’s account of Salima, a 
Muslim-born hermaphrodite, who was given this name by her guru at her initiation 
(1999: 102). Preston discusses the differences in naming practices in varying colonial 
documents. In different subdistricts of Pune, it was reported that one group of (both 
Hindu and Muslim) hijras had ‘rather fanciful, vaguely Hindu names’, yet at the same 
time, another group of hijras from the Indapur district, from varying castes, upon 
emasculation took ‘the names of Musselmanee women, and as such, live and are 
buried’ (1987: 376). In a further variation, Shah reports that in central Gujarat, the 
adoption of a woman’s name is commonplace along with the suffix ‘kumvar’ (prince), 
which usually signifies a man’s name (1961: 1326). In MP, kinnars tended to have 
singular Hindu names, both male and female, often coupled with kinship terms, 
despite explicit identification as Muslim, rather than Hindu. In contrast, the only kinnar 
I met who identified as Hindu had a Muslim name. This kinnar, Shabnam, came from a 
Brahmin family and retained the religion into which she had been born. The other 
kinnars self-identified as Muslim, but preferred their Hindu names, even when they 
had Muslim names as well. One nāyak in the community had a male name, Gopal, and 
wore male clothes. His senior status might be reflected in the use of this male name, 
which would confirm Reddy’s statement that nāyaks were addressed by their ‘official’ 
male names. Hall notes that hijras in Banaras said that hijras are named in such a way 
that no other person in the area will have the same name, in order to minimise 
confusion, but there was no particular meaning behind the names adopted by initiates 
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(1995: 268, 361). The inconsistency of naming practices at the very least indicates that 
hijras adopt new names upon their initiation, which are sometimes Muslim. The 
adoption of both Hindu and Muslim elements in naming practices may further allude 
to the syncretic nature of hijra social practices. 
Important ‘Muslim’ practices include hijras’ daily customs, such as circumcision, 
namāz (daily prayers), burial customs, and clothing. While the majority of kinnars in MP 
identified as Muslim, I was not able to find out about circumcision or burial customs: 
the first due to the personal nature of the question and the second due to the hijras’ 
secrecy. Reddy writes that circumcision was compulsory for initiates, as a 
quintessential marker of Muslim (male) identity (2005: 103). Reddy explains that in 
Hyderabad, hijras were predominately seen as Muslim because of the practice of 
circumcision. It is also a common practice of saying namāz. Though many hijras did not 
visit mosques—due to their social marginalization from sites of religious practice60—
many pray in their houses and have special rooms for these purposes. In the houses of 
hijras explicitly identifying as Muslim, I was shown pictures or printed material 
depicting mosques and Qur’anic verses (see Reddy 2005: 103-4; Jaffrey 1997: 155, 163). 
One kinnar had a specific room that served as a prayer room. 
The rituals performed at the death of a hijra are also arguably Muslim but there 
is variation in accounts. As noted above, the celās of a guru act in the manner of Hindu 
widows upon the guru’s death, but there are various opinions regarding burial 
practices. Reddy notes that the rituals performed for the deceased replicate those 
performed at the death of a Muslim man, including the washing of the corpse, the 
‘viewing’, prayers from the Qur’an, and a burial in the Muslim cemetery with the body 
carried by non-hijra men61 and placed on a north-south axis with the head turned 
towards Mecca (2005: 107). On the fortieth day after the burial, hijras from all over the 
country gather to pay their respects and are fed and housed by the deceased’s house 
(see Sharma 1989: 121).62 Zia Jaffrey writes that burial rituals were carried out in the 
middle of the night, including the burial itself (1997: 78-9). I was told, albeit from non-
hijras, that hijras are buried ‘like Muslims’, and not cremated in accordance with Hindu 
tradition. One kinnar spoke to me about death rituals in an indirect manner, saying she 
would be cremated since she had been born a Hindu, suggesting that hijras’ last rites 
                                                      
60 While not specifically a site of religious practice, Hossain highlights the acceptance of hijra 
identifications and transvestism in Dhaka by devout Muslims (2012: 501). 
61 One hijra told Hall that they do not go to cremation grounds (and presumably burial grounds) 
in the same way women do not go, so deceased hijras are taken by their neighbours, which is 
why people often do not know when hijras have died (1995: 315). The fact that neighbours will 
take the body suggests a closer relationship between hijras and their neighbours than might be 
expected, which is supported by narratives throughout Hall’s thesis in which hijras relate that 
they are not seen as outsiders in Indian society (ibid.: 286, 340-1).   
62 Reddy gives an elaborate account of burial customs, as related to her by one celā and a 
Muslim neighbour, Abbas, although she did not witness the rituals. Abbas said that hijras are 
buried like any other Muslim man in the neighbourhood, except hijras invite ‘their people’ for 
the ceremony (2005: 107-8). 
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might be dependent upon the religion individual hijras follow (see Hall 1995: 314-5). In 
contrast, a self-identified Muslim kinnar told me that kinnars must be converted to 
become a Muslim or Christian, because burial is what ensures mukti (salvation). Non-
hijras speculated that hijras are buried in other people’s graves, in the middle of the 
night, because they have nowhere allocated in which to bury their dead. I was also told 
that hijras are buried standing straight up, such as in the floor of houses. Shabnam 
Mausi (a film made about her victory as a state politician) portrayed the burial of a guru, 
who was wrapped in a shroud and buried standing straight up in the floor of a house. 
This representation might have added to the belief that this is how hijras bury their 
dead. However, no hijras indicated that any of these methods were common practices. 
In contrast to all these accounts, Roy witnessed the death and cremation of one hijra 
guru in Mumbai during her fieldwork. She writes that since this guru had converted to 
Islam, the last rites would be observed following Islamic rituals (2012: 214-5). The hijra 
had expressed the wish that vermilion be applied to her forehead, the Hindu symbol 
for a married female, by her man, and this was done, after she was dressed as a bride 
and beautified with ornaments and make-up. Roy writes that hijras believe their death 
signifies the end of a sorrowful life and the deceased with have a new life will be full of 
happiness (ibid.: 215). The priest told her that the last rites for cremation would 
consider this hijra as a man: since hijras were born biologically male, they would be 
cremated as males. The guru was cremated at the nearest burial ground (216).  
A further explicit marker is keeping halāl in dietary practices. I found that 
different households cater according to the beliefs of their members and might prepare 
different meals for different individuals, but they will eat together, in contrast to 
colonial accounts used by Preston that note that hijras of different religions do not 
interdine (1987: 376). Reddy states that halāl meat is imperative if they eat meat, 
sacrificed by one of the Muslim (by birth) hijras of the group, if not by a Muslim 
butcher (2005: 106) and this was the case in MP.  
Sartorial practices are also noted by Reddy as a significant Muslim practice. She 
notes the adoption of the burqā (black robe and veil as worn by Muslim women in 
public) over hijras’ saris, especially when going out alone or with men with whom they 
were involved, but not when going out for work in order to attract more attention (ibid.: 
104). She notes that, especially among the hijras she interviewed from a particular 
lineage, on certain ‘religious’ occasions, hijras had to wear green saris, the colour 
associated with Islam (ibid.). Though the majority of kinnars in MP identified as Muslim, 
I observed none wearing a burqā. Some would veil their heads when out in public, as a 
marker of modesty. Many would wear bindīs on their forehead; a practice that Nanda 
observed in her fieldwork site in South India (1999: 17), but this practice is in contrast 
to Hyderabad where hijras, like other Muslim women, were not ‘officially’ allowed to 
wear bindīs (2005: 101).  
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A significant Muslim practice is worship at shrines and participation in Muslim 
festivals. The most important pilgrimage undertaken by hijras which was a source of 
immense pride is going on the Hajj, the holy pilgrimage to Karbala or Mecca and 
Medina, increasing their status among hijras and wider society. In MP, hijras who had 
gone proudly added the suffix ‘Hajji’ after their name, including Kamla Bua and Heera 
Bai. Hossain writes that hijras perform the pilgrimage as men, regardless of whether 
they have been emasculated. When asked why it is performed as men, one hajji hijra 
told him: ‘you can lie to the whole world, but not Allah’ (2012: 502). Many hijras took 
part in explicitly Muslim religious events as one of the only occasions when hijras all 
over the country got together.63 These events take place at sites of religious significance, 
such as Muslim dargāhs (mausoleums) across the country, including the tomb of a 
twelfth-century Sufi saint (Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti, popularly known as Garib 
Nawaz), whose tomb is located in Ajmer, Rajasthan. Jaffrey describes how hijras from 
all over the country visit this tomb, to pay homage and to resolve household disputes 
(1997: 103-4). This shrine was important to kinnars in MP and one kinnar narrated a 
story in which a kinnar prayed everyday to this saint, asking for a son. She became 
pregnant, but was unable to give birth, so she took a knife and slit open her belly. Both 
the kinnar and her son died.64 The story demonstrates that kinnars worship this saint 
and offer special prayers to the dead kinnar and her child (Roy 2012: 34). Gathering at 
shrines also serves an important social and communal function, where hijras all over 
the country can come together.  
In the context of MP, hijras identify as either Hindu or Muslim in MP: they self-
identify as a practitioner of a tradition, but identification does not necessitate strict 
adherence to such practices or to the whole tradition itself. In fact, identification with a 
specific tradition creates a false distinction, based in part on colonial categorisations of 
hijras’ religion. Academic writing before the 1980s identified hijras as either Hindu or 
Muslim, perceiving hijra religiosity as part of a wider religious tradition. I discussed 
earlier how hijras were mentioned as a distinct caste or community in caste glossaries, 
divided occasionally into male and female, as well as Muhammadan and Hindu hijras 
(Crooke 1896: 495). The binary framework thus indicates how hijra identity was 
classified even though there might be a ‘false’ distinction in the separation of ‘Hindu’ 
and ‘Muslim’. Nonetheless, hijras borrow and adopt a variety of religious practices 
identified as ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ and I have discussed practices and beliefs that 
might be identified as belonging to a singular tradition. At the same time, 
acknowledging the constructed nature of the categories for religious practice among 
hijras provides a framework to interpret practices and rituals that might be otherwise 
                                                      
63 For literature on communal events, see Sharma 1989: 120-1; Jaffrey 1997: 103; Reddy 2005: 108. 
64 Hossain tells the same story relating to Mariom, a janana hijra (2012: 508). See Hall 1995: 49. 
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paradoxical or problematic when hijras are seen as borrowing ‘freely’ from different 
communities and traditions.  
 
IV. Hijra Society 
 
I now turn to discuss the social spaces in which hijras live and work. Alongside hijras’ 
ritual work, hijras engage in other forms of work in contemporary India, such as 
begging, extortion, and sex work. These forms of work affect how the mainstream 
public perceive the hijras and their role in society. Hijras maintain their own 
households and communities, creating social spaces that offer support and security, as 
well as providing the potential for relationships of love and support among and 
between different hijra groups. These relationships are crucial for understanding 
spaces in which hijra groups live and thrive and how they construct a sense of group 
identity. 
 
i. Social Roles  
 
Hijras perform two main roles in modern society: badhāī (ritual) work and sex work. 
Hijras also demand dues from territory over which their household has control; 
Hossain counts alms collection and badhāī work as hijragiri (2012). ‘Formal’ work and 
sex work are seen as mutually exclusive. Reddy writes that they are not practiced 
simultaneously (2005: 56, 81), but this seems to be how hijras represent the situation, 
rather than the reality of daily practice. It is important for hijras (particularly badhāī 
hijras) to stress their asexuality to legitimate their ability to give blessings. There is a 
hierarchy in the community according to the work performed by different members, 
where sex work is perceived as lower than ritual work. 
I met several hijras in Mumbai who engaged in sex work, and on occasion I saw 
them giving money to their guru which they had received from this work, but it was 
not clear whether they also practiced ritual forms of work. Kinnars in MP were more 
adamant regarding the performance of traditional work, denying sex work and 
stressing the purity of their bodies and practices. While no kinnars admitted to sex 
work, there is a sexual component to their identities and there is an assumption that 
they have sex with non-kinnars. I observed that when younger kinnars were walking on 
the streets, they were seen as dressing ‘provocatively’—by both older members of the 
kinnar community and society at large—and attracted male attention. ‘Provocative’ 
dress included low-cut or tight śalvār qamīz, which often outlined the shape of their 
bodies, particularly their breasts, or ‘western’ style clothes such as tight jeans and shirts 
such as halter-neck tops or tops with thin straps, revealing their shoulders and breasts 
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(see Roy 2012: 59), or short dresses and heels that accentuated their legs. Discussions 
about kinnars with non-kinnar men in mainstream society alluded or referred to 
prostitution or sexual practices, so there does appear to be a conflation of hijra identity 
and sexual practice in mainstream social imagination.  
Hijras draw upon discourses that explain their power to confer blessings and 
allude to their potentially destructive ability to curse those who disrespect them. 
Traditionally, hijras’ function in society was ritualistic and associated with blessings of 
fertility, performing at weddings or birth ceremonies (Nanda 1999: 4-6). While the 
practice still occurs, the demand for ritual services has decreased as individuals place 
less importance on ritual practices, especially in modern, cosmopolitan cities. A lack of 
demand, in turn, decreases the importance given to badhāī work.65 As families move 
towards contemporary ideas of the nuclear family and a more ‘secular’ society, there is 
a desire for fewer children and a move away from belief in ritual practice to modern 
practices such as medical technology, which negates the need for blessings associated 
with fertility. Hijras power over impotency is dismissed as ‘mere superstition’, 
alongside public anger over hijras’ use of fear to collect money (Hall 1997: 439).  
The decrease in demand for traditional work has forced some hijras to turn to 
‘non-traditional’ work, which includes sex work, and other forms of begging and 
extorting money from within their households’ ‘territories’. An interpretation of sex 
work as being a modern phenomenon does not mean that it did not exist before 
modern times:66 presumably prostitution and hijra sexual practices did exist but they 
may have been the result of the gratification of individual desires, rather than as a 
practice tied to the socio-economic survival of the community (Nair 2000: 116, n.2; 
Reddy 2005: 83). Sex work is a means by which hijras can provide for their 
communities. A third means of surviving economically is through begging or 
‘extorting’ money. Hijra society is divided up such that territory belongs to different 
households from which they collect ‘dues’ or ‘alms’. By claiming this right to economic 
support—in turn offering a means of ‘protection’—hijras secure a means of income, 
although this is unstable and unreliable.67 
Adopting ‘non-traditional’ work has led to the further marginalisation of hijras 
even though such practices are necessary given a lack of opportunities elsewhere. Sex 
work ‘degrades’ hijras’ ideal ascetic status, whilst begging or extortion ensures that 
                                                      
65 A lessening in demand is demonstrated by tensions that arise between different groups who 
demand their right to control territories and protect future earnings. Territorial and aggressive 
acts are on the rise against those who steal hijras’ rightful earnings, such as tensions between 
hijras and the ‘berūpias’ in Hyderabad (Reddy 2005: 72-3) and ‘real’ and ‘fake’ kinnars in MP 
(Niazi 2008). 
66 Although senior hijras argue that sex work is a modern phenomenon, Preston discusses 
colonial sources regarding hijras’ sexual practices (1987: 377). 
67 This can also be lucrative depending on the area controlled by the household. In one large city 
in MP, one non-kinnar close to the community speculated that the nāyak could collect up to Rs 
30,000 in a single day. 
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society see the community as greedy or beggars. One of hijras’ major concerns is the 
lack of work for them in a society that still—in many rural locations—structures 
different forms of work on the hierarchy of caste and denies equality of opportunity, 
whether based on caste or gender status. Hijras have two options: perform badhāī and 
retain a degree of respect but make very little money68 or practice prostitution and 
begging but degrade their theoretically ascetic status. Bourdieu’s theorisations of social 
capital, one form of which is economic capital, could be considered here, providing a 
framework for considering hijras forms of work in different fields (here, ritual or 
sexual). The accumulation of capital is necessary for survival, including economic 
capital, which is directly convertible into money (1989). Lack of work options 
elsewhere force the hijras to perform work for which they can recieve payment, which 
is only possible within these fields, but, which in turn, impacts the status they hold in 
relation to mainstream social actors. The necessity of performing sex work has led to 
problems with the integration of hijras into society, reflected in the way hijras are 
regarded and recorded in the public press or contemporary literature, which indicates 
an ‘intolerance of difference’ (Hall 1995: 31-4, Menen 2007) and a perceived need to 
regulate hijras and their working practices (Niazi 2008). These two types of work reveal 
hijras’ awkward place in society, trapped between ritual status and marginalised sexual 
practice. 
 
ii. Retheorising Kinship 
 
Trawick notes that ‘any person trying to understand South Asian culture must 
eventually examine and comprehend [its] elegant patterns of kinship organisation’ 
(1990: 118). Exploring hijras’ strong sense of communal identity and the kinship 
relations developed among and between communities aids an understanding of their 
identity based on society, organisation, and relationships. Hijra relationships—guru-
celā, familial, and hijra-husband—can be seen to mirror heteronormative kinship 
arrangements (see Bockrath 2003: 95), but instead of viewing these relationships as 
derivative, the negotiation of normative social practices might offer an understanding 
of alternative forms and meanings of kinship (Reddy 2005: 164; see Weston 1991).69 The 
variety and complexity of hijra relationships might ‘trouble’ ideas of normative kinship, 
                                                      
68 Any money made is divided among the individuals performing: in worst case scenarios, celās 
give all their money to their gurus, and in return—although they are given food and housing—
may not receive any earnings (see Reddy 2005: 158). 
69 For scholarship that discusses kinship networks, see Shah 1961, Sinha 1967, Sharma 1989, 
Nanda 1999, Jaffrey 1996, Reddy 2005. Moreover, Kath Weston’s work on the impermanence of 
natal kinship relations and the permanence of ‘the families we choose’ demonstrates a reversal 
of dominant heterosexual discourses on kinship (1991). I explore her theorisations in relation to 
the construction and meaning of relatedness and kinship among kinnar groups, focusing on 
living spaces and relationships between kinnars, including the place of children in communities, 
in a forthcoming article (Ung Loh, forthcoming). 
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based on heterosexuality, marriage, procreation, and genetic continuity. Although 
scholars have discussed hijra kinship relations, there is little discussion of the 
complexity of these relationships and their meaning. Often they are interpreted as 
mimicking heteronormative relations in Indian society, but marriage and 
consanguinity are not central to these relations. Relations are chosen and maintained 
by hijras, where ‘chosen bonds’ are presented as more important than biology and are 
seen to be ‘most reliable’ (Reddy 2005: 151). Reddy demonstrates that hijras and kotis 
are presented as family whereas husbands and partners are not (ibid.: 52, 169). 
The primary relationship among community members is between gurus and 
celās. These are obligatory, hierarchical, and mutually-beneficial relationships, based on 
a framework of duties and responsibilities: a ‘relationship of sacrifice’ is how it was 
described by one kinnar. In order to become affiliated with a specific hijra house, an 
initiate must swear loyalty to a guru, usually a well-established member of a house. 
Affiliation to a house and the guru are key to a hijra’s identity, as Hossain argues: ‘it is 
by the name of the guru or the symbolic house that s/he represents that a hijra will be 
known throughout her/is life-historical trajectory in the community’ (2012: 501). Hall 
writes that the guru accepts the initiate as a daughter-in-law (1995: 195) and that rituals 
performed correspond to those of a newly married Hindu bride entering her father-in-
law’s house, including the subversion of terms traditionally associated with sanctioned 
kinship (ibid.: 201).70  
When initiates join the community, an economic transaction cements the 
connection between initiates and their gurus. Reddy notes that at initiation, celās pay 
their gurus a fixed sum which increases by twofold every time they change their guru 
or house (2005: 157). In contrast, Nanda records that it is the guru who pays a sum to 
the nāyaks of the household on behalf of the initiate, binding the celā to her for bringing 
her into the community (1999: 44). Switching houses and gurus is not uncommon, 
kinnars told me, but if a kinnar joins a new household and a new guru, the old guru will 
demand a sum of money from the new one which covers both the loss of earnings that 
the old guru will incur by losing that celā and whatever the celā takes to her new house 
in terms of money and jewellery. Nonetheless, all these transactions bind the celā to her 
guru, resulting in the relationship, in part, being maintained through obligation rather 
than choice. 
The relationship between guru and celā is preserved through the reliance of celās 
upon their gurus, especially badhāī hijras. Initiates must learn the ritual performances 
from senior community members and it is the guru’s choice who performs, often based 
on their ‘talents’ or the guru’s favour (Reddy 2005: 158). Those with whom the guru is 
displeased are less likely to succeed in terms of upward mobility, or benefit, regarding 
                                                      
70 The notion of the hijra as bride mirrors the treatment of the nirvāṇ hijra after the operation 
when she is dressed as a bride (Nanda 1999) and Roy’s description of the deceased guru dressed 
as a bride for her funeral (2012). 
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chores assigned, free time given, and discretionary ‘presents’ (money, jewellery, 
clothing). Any money that the celās receive is shared, in whole or in part, with their 
gurus. In return, celās are given a place to live, food, belongings or gifts, and social 
security. They perform household chores, such as cooking and cleaning, and help to 
look after the guru. Despite hardship or indignities suffered at the hands of gurus, 
many hijras prefer to stay with them and receive a level of social support.71 In addition, 
each household controls a specific territory and non-affiliated hijras often suffer from a 
lack of economic opportunities if they are not part of the wider community of hijras.  
One of the guru’s chief responsibilities is overseeing the nirvāṇ operation, 
including the cost, helping the celā recover, and hosting the celebration. The celā’s 
loyalty to her guru is ensured and is a significant ‘investment’ for both the guru in 
terms of economic return and in regard to the social reproduction of hijra communities. 
The guru-celā relationship is the foremost bond in hijra kin relations since it is through a 
guru that a hijra establishes her lineage and is acknowledged as a member of a hijra 
household and house. In turn, celās become gurus, extending the hijra network.  
There are two other kinds of kin relations: familial ones akin to relationships 
between mothers, sisters, and daughters, and companionate ones among hijras and 
their partners. Both forms replace emotional relations that are lost upon separation 
from natal families: Reddy terms them ‘bonds of love’ (2005, 2006). One kinnar 
described these relations as those which give them strength to live, signifying the 
importance of relations of love and affection between kinnars, which are crucial given 
their lack of natal family and kinship ties.  
Since the majority of hijras identify as female, relationships are often referred to 
as those between mothers and daughters or between sisters. Terminology used 
parallels those used more generally in society, mirroring heteronormative social 
relationships. For example, ‘bahin’ is used between individuals who share a sisterly 
relationship, or ‘dīdī’, if referring to an ‘elder’ sister (‘elder’ may refer to age and 
seniority). Many elder gurus, particularly in MP, added suffixes to their names, such as 
‘būā’ (paternal aunt) or ‘mausī’ (maternal aunt). Furthermore, relations between a 
mother and daughter are extended; for example, a mother’s mother would be referred 
to as ‘dādī’ (paternal grandmother) or nānī (maternal grandmother). In Banaras, Hall 
notes that hijras addressed one another as mā (mother), beṭī (child), dīdī (sister) (1995: 44, 
325, 363). Reddy notes that in Hyderabad, terms for relations often have the prefix 
‘dūdh’, such as dūdh beṭī, ‘milk daughter’, referencing the nurturing bond between 
mothers and their children through a mother’s milk (2005).  
                                                      
71 Some hijras refuse strict social rules and prefer to live outside established households 
(although they belong to hijra lineages), where they can retain their independence in regards to 
finances, sexual desires, and where they live. Reddy notes this lifestyle is seen as having lower 
honour (2005: 161). Other accounts indicate that hijras have to accept this social insecurity due to 
other reasons, such as falling out with their gurus, or misbehaviour. See Nanda 1999; Opler 
1960, 1961; Carstairs 1957. 
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Relationships between ‘mother’, ‘sisters’, and ‘daughters’ do not follow guru-
celā relationships: a guru would not become her celā’s mother. However, two gurus 
might form a sisterly bond, so each one’s celās are seen as nieces, or one hijra might 
form a mother-daughter relationship with the other’s celās. Relations are maintained 
even after death. For example, when a sister dies, the living sister remains an aunty to 
the deceased’s daughters. Relationships are formalised publicly at sammelans through 
specific ceremonies. One of the functions of the sammelan is to announce and formalise 
new relations—both guru-celā and familial—in front of those present. When a new 
relation is formalised, it is recorded and each sammelan will keep a list of the relations 
formed at that meeting. I was told that relations last as long as those involved wish to 
remain relations. However, relations must be broken publicly at another sammelan, by 
stating that the participants intend to break the relation. There may be a monetary 
penalty involved in dissolving relations. The ceremonies at the Sagar sammelan I 
attended took place in an extremely large hall in the nāyak’s house. The room was filled 
with hundreds of kinnars who were watching the proceedings, including many who 
were sitting around the edges of the balconies that overlooked the hall. Kinship 
ceremonies involved discussion by the nāyaks, who sat in the centre of the room in a 
loose circle, and gift giving between those who were establishing their relations.  
Relationships between mothers and daughters are enacted through a particular 
ritual, which is the dūdh ceremony described by Reddy (2005: 165). The dūdh mā (‘milk 
mother’, literally ‘foster mother’) holds her ‘daughters’ in her lap. These hijras become 
her daughters—and one another’s sisters (‘dūdh bahin’, literally a ‘foster sister’)—
through drinking their ‘mother’s’ milk, poured from a cup held at her breast, to seal 
their relationship with her.72 In MP the ceremony is called ‘bhāt bharai’,73 where mother 
and daughter offer one another uncooked rice, fruit, and money. The term ‘bhāt’ also 
refers to a marriage ceremony where the groom’s father is offered rice by the bride’s 
family and presents are given to the bride: the exchange of gifts by mother and 
daughter replicates this ceremony. The milk pouring ceremony cements their bond and 
a social fee is levied. 
Another significant form of relationship is developed between hijras and 
children in the community. Research that examines the role of children in the kinnar 
community is practically non-existent. These relations allow hijras to experience a 
parental-child relationship that they might not otherwise experience. Two types of 
children join the community: those abandoned by poor and often lower-caste families 
                                                      
72 Sinha refers to the ‘doodh-bhaat’ (‘rice and milk’) as an initiation rite which the initiate (jankha) 
must undergo to become a full hijra (1967: 173), although it is unclear whether the ‘mother-
master’ is a guru or a mother figure or both. In contrast, Shah writes that a guru is regarded as 
‘mother’ and the initiate is the ‘daughter’, collapsing the distinction between guru-celā and 
mother-daughter relationships (1961: 1328). Thus, according to this ‘fictional kinship’, all hijras 
have sisters, aunts, and cousins. 
73 A journalist who witnessed the ritual translated this as the ‘rice’ ceremony, where bhāt means 
‘cooked rice’ and bhranā means to ‘fill’.  
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and hijra children. Abandoned children are adopted as members of their communities 
but are usually married off and leave the community. In contrast, ‘hijra children’ will 
remain with the community throughout their lives. There are a host of speculative 
stories regarding the kidnapping and forced emasculation of youths, or even adults, to 
recruit members. It is complex to ascertain exactly how children join hijra communities. 
It is a common belief in India that kinnars have the ‘right’ to claim a child who is born 
as a hijra, usually due to intersex or ambiguous sexual organs. Hijras ‘find’ these 
children in various ways:74 at a birth ceremony when the child is found to be a hijra, or 
where word is passed on from those who work at hospitals, or even when the child is 
older and people begin to suspect that the child is a hijra. The ‘right’ to claim hijra 
children is commonly believed although it is in direct contradiction to hijras’ own 
accounts. Kinnars claim that parents themselves give up the child to avoid the shame of 
raising a kinnar child. The parents know that the kinnars will raise and treat the child as 
their own. One kinnar noted that usually upper caste and well-off families give up 
kinnar children because of a sense of shame, whereas lower-caste families, especially in 
rural areas, will keep the child.75 
I met a variety of hijra children who are well-loved and cherished members of 
the hijra community. One kinnar in MP had many children whom she sent to various 
celās who took it in turn to care for them. Moreover, many of the abandoned children 
who were adopted by individual kinnars had strong bonds with the households in 
which they had been raised, spending time in the household despite being married and 
living elsewhere. It was stressed that the children brought into the community—kinnar 
or otherwise—should get an education and be raised with good morals and values. 
Education is an important issue, since many kinnars tend to be illiterate, having been 
forced to drop out of school. Recently, an additional sessions court in Surat, Gujarat, 
granted legal custody of three children to a hijra, Govind, when his brother and wife 
passed away (Indian Express 2013). The wife’s sister submitted an affidavit stating that 
Govind had no financial problems and was better able to take care of the children than 
she was, including keeping them at their private school, and the children had 
expressed a wish to stay with their uncle.  
A further kinship relation is that between hijras and their ‘husbands’. Although 
sexual practice is explicitly renounced when espousing the rhetoric of asceticism, many 
                                                      
74 One hijra told Hall that once a week they go to the municipal office and get a list of the names 
of all the children born, in exchange for a fixed sum of money (1995: 339). Thus they come to 
know of each birth and can perform badhāī work. 
75 One guru spoke to me about a lower-caste couple who had three ‘kinnar children’ in 
succession, whom they raised as daughters but were forced eventually to give them to the local 
kinnar household, where the guru’s celā adopted them.  The celā adopted another young child, 
who was described as having ‘marks’ (cihne) of both sexes. Secondary sexual organs deemed to 
be ‘abnormal’, in the sense that the organs do not look as they ‘should’, is all that is required to 
label a child a kinnar.  Some of these children will develop into women.  
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hijras do have sex, either fulfilling an individual desire or performing sex work.76 
Scholars have discussed the relationships between hijras and their partners, often 
focusing on the sexual aspects, but it is evident that hijras desire companionate 
relations with men based on love, affection, and support. Narratives from both Reddy 
(2005, 2006) and Nanda (1999) indicate that these relationships are more than sexual 
and marriages are often idealised and romanticised and seen as long-term 
commitments, based on the love or affection between partners (Reddy 2006: 178). 
Many hijras desire companionship outside of their community and on rare occasions 
live outside the community with their husbands (Nanda 1999: 39, 104). However, pantis 
are portrayed as definitively ‘not family’ (Reddy 2005: 169) and are unlikely to provide 
for their ‘wives’ in the long term (ibid.: 169, 171). Many pantis have other wives and 
children; some of these relationships are acknowledged and ‘amicable’, whereas others 
are a source of trouble (2005: 170).77 Many hijras suffer both emotional and physical 
abuse although this is considered a price worth paying for ‘love-relationships’. Reddy 
writes that a longing for ‘bonds of affection and emotional intimacy’ is what motivates 
the quest for ideal husbands and companionship (2006: 190) and a consideration of 
these forms of relationships and the negotiation of discourses of marriage, kinship, and 
love are significant to an understanding of the hijra subject on an individual and 
emotional level. 
The hijra community has found alternative ways in which to develop 
relationships of love, between hijras and one another, their children, and their partners. 
These forms of kinship reveal affection and love between hijras, as one might share 
with natal family and kin, although these relations are not based on heterosexuality, 
marriage, or consanguinity. Communal bonds are significant for a group of 
marginalised individuals and the use of female kinship terms evokes relations of 
companionship. These relations establish and extend kin relations throughout hijra 
communities, by strengthening ties between hijras and indicating lines of alliance and 
belonging, creating a network of kin relations. In contrast to obligatory guru-celā 
relations, ‘relationships of love’ are created through gifts, affection, support, and care. 
Despite their potential for informing South-Asian non-natal or non-marital kinship 
relations, these relationships have only briefly been discussed in hijra literature. Yet, as 
Reddy argues, they are important for retheorising kinship relations more generally, 
based on choice and affection among hijras, as opposed to social obligation and 
legitimacy.  
                                                      
76 Sexual relations between hijras are unlikely, given the established receptive role of ‘kotis’ in 
intercourse (Reddy 2005: 162-3). Conversely, Shah states that hijras belonging to different 
akhadas (individual ‘communities’) may marry in order to establish ‘fictional kinship’, which 
raises a hijra’s status in the community (1963: 1328). 
77 Husbands can be a source of suffering to hijra wives or other hijras in the household (see 
Nanda 1999: 106-109). Many hijras face physical and mental abuse from their husbands (Reddy 
2005: 190, 194) and have to give up their earnings, even driving hijras to commit suicide (ibid.: 
171-2, 179, 199-200). 
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iii. Local and National Organisation 
 
Since hijras do not reproduce in a procreative sense, communities have a variety of 
‘methods’ to ensure their survival. Scholarship and reports in the media focus on 
‘recruitment’ methods, including forcing parents to hand over ‘intersexed’ babies, 
coercing young and curious boys to join, and the kidnapping and forced emasculation 
of children and adults (Sinha 1967, Sharma 1989, Hall 1995, Niazi 2008). Although it is 
difficult to ascertain how individuals join the community, these methods seem to be 
exaggerated products of the social imagination regarding the ‘corrupt’ practices 
deemed likely of the hijras. While these recruitment practices suggest coercion, 
ethnographic research focusing on hijra narratives implies that many hijras chose to join 
a community of their own accord, often as adolescents, due to cross-gender 
characteristics that fail to fit heteronormative expectations (Nanda 1999: 116-9; Reddy 
2005: 78). Often informal interactions with hijra groups who show kindness and 
support (contrasting familial intolerance) lead to a more formal joining of the 
community.78 
Joining a hijra community provides a stable and supportive environment for 
many initiates who leave or are disowned by their natal families. A hijra living alone is 
subject to emotional isolation and vulnerable to violence. Living on the streets and 
away from community life, hijras are exposed to physical and sexual violence and have 
little economic or personal security. Most hijras have affiliations with specific 
households through their relationships their gurus and their own celās. The local level 
household, or ḍerā, is the primary unit, consisting of a few to around twenty members, 
depending on the size of the property. Small towns have one or more households 
while larger cities might contain hundreds. Each is an independent unit where all 
members contribute; in return, they receive shelter, food, protection, and opportunities 
for work, whether ritual work, collecting alms or dues, or prostitution. The household 
structure replicates the natal family home and includes the nāyak or ustād (literally 
‘teacher’), who is the head of the household, the gurus (the nāyak’s celās), and guru’s 
celās.  
Another dimension of social organisation is ‘houses’, or ‘lineages’. These are 
structural—as opposed to spatial—organisations. Different households and 
communities belong to one of several lineages, which are distinct from one another. 
                                                      
78 Sharma describes the institutionalisation of the hijra role as a ‘process of socialisation’ with 
three parts: overcoming an ‘identity-crisis’, development of identification with hijras, and 
locating oneself in a hijra home, accompanied by learning how to behave as a hijra (1989: 59). 
While this process seems prescriptive, many hijras become integrated into a community through 
an understanding that what they experienced was not unique (cross-gender characteristics, 
being ‘spoiled’ by men, and the denial and rejection of their families). 
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Their rituals and practices are similar from house to house, but each has been 
established separately and supports its own members. There are seven houses, but 
there is some discrepancy due to different states having different numbers of houses, 
with variant names. Nanda gives Laskarwallah, Chaklawallah, Lalanwallah, Bendi 
Bazaar, Poonawallah, Ballakwallah, and Adipur, with slight variation according to 
region (1999: 39). Reddy also names seven lineages, according to the literature and 
hijras’ accounts. They are Lashkarwala, Sheharwala, Lallanwala, Bhendi 
Bazaar/Bullakhwala, Dhongriwala, Mandirwala, and Chatlawala (2005: 237, n.14). 
Almost all the kinnars interviewed in MP were evasive about the names or specificities 
of different khāndāns (the term for a ‘lineage’ or ‘family’ which was used). Only one 
kinnar named five khāndāns in MP: Gangarwala, Lashkarwala, Lallanwala, Bhendi 
Bazaarwala, and Chatlawala,79 saying that Gangarwala, the house she belonged to, was 
the largest and most dominant in the country. There is some consistency between the 
lists, although regional variation is important. One hijra from Delhi spoke about its 
gharānās (literally ‘family’ or ‘lineage’), a term she translated as ‘varieties’ or ‘cultures’. 
She called them Rai, Sujani, Kalyan, and Mandi. She noted that the gharānās have 
differentiations within them, for example, she is of the Nafajgarh group of the Rai 
house, one of the four groups in the house.  
Houses gather together for sammelans, which occur several times a year. Not all 
houses associate with one another; only certain houses and households are invited to a 
particular gathering. At the sammelan in Sagar, I met hijras from MP, Gujarat, Delhi, 
and Uttar Pradesh. A sammelan is a significant event, usually occurring to 
commemorate the event or anniversary of an important guru’s death (see Jaffrey 1997: 
103-4), and where hijras can make and formally acknowledge new relations and sort 
out existing problems between groups and impose sanctions for transgressions. Given 
the territorial claim made by households and the mobility hijras enjoy by moving 
between households, solving disputes at the occasion of a sammelan is vital to 
maintaining peace.80 Problems often arise regarding land disputes, or the soliciting of 
another celās (see Sharma 1989: 120). Evidently certain communities maintain links and 
allegiances to one another and these congregations serve an important social and 
communal function, affirming membership of the greater hijra community (Nair 2000: 
116 n.1). 
An understanding of the general hijra community and specific hijra 
communities, alongside an investigation into the complexity of hijra kinship relations, 
                                                      
79 I have based these spellings upon those given by Reddy since I did not see these names 
written down and was unable to ask for spellings in MP.  
80 However, Nanda writes that the most important hijra meetings are those within a locality, 
such as the resolution of a dispute or the initiation of a new recruit, at which the heads of the 
houses locally will meet in a jamāt, or ‘meeting of the elders’ (1999: 40). The jamāt’s primary 
function is to host discussions in a similar fashion to a village pañcāyat (cf. Shah 1961: 1326; 
Sharma 1989: 119-20).  
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is important in order to understand how hijras adapt social structures and make sense 
of, support, and give meaning to their own communities and relationships. 
Throughout this chapter, I have investigated how kinnars’ and hijras’ sense of identity 
is shaped through the interrelated aspects of the historical and literary past, gender 
performance, religious practices, and social structures and personal relationships. 
Hijras’ narratives relating to the realms of history, gender, religion, and hijra society 
provide a way for them to negotiate common stereotypes about the community and 
render their identity intelligible to mainstream society. They also give meaning to their 
identities as hijras. Appreciating these facets of their hijra identity is significant for 
understanding how kinnars were represented as a result of their political participation. 
In the following chapter, I focus on my fieldwork in MP and explore the participation 
of three kinnars in local elections.  
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Chapter Two 
Kinnars in Madhya Pradesh: Fieldwork and Case Studies 
 
I. Choosing Sites and Research Methods 
 
From the end of 2010 and until mid 2011, I undertook fieldwork in Madhya Pradesh, 
central India. My aim was to gain a greater understanding of the reasons why and how 
kinnars had contested local elections successfully in this particular state. MP was an 
obvious fieldwork location as the state in which seven kinnars had been elected to 
public office in the last dozen years, more than any other state. I wanted to ascertain 
the causes behind such success and the factors that had propelled kinnars into 
participating in democratic, electoral processes. Moreover, as noted in the introduction, 
the majority of works written on the hijras are based in South India or do not claim a 
regional focus and there is little scholarship on the hijras of North and central India. As 
a state in which hijra identity has not been previously studied at length, and in which 
kinnars have been involved numerically significantly in politics, MP was a rich location 
in which to conduct fieldwork. I conducted my research mainly in eastern MP, from 
where all seven kinnars were elected, and I spent time in five sites: Katni; Jabalpur; 
Sihora; Shahdol and Anuppur; and Sagar.  
Each site of fieldwork is associated with a particular kinnar who was elected 
from that town or city. Six kinnars were elected in 1999/2000 and one was elected in 
2009. These elections were for a variety of official positions, from that of a Ward 
Corporator or Councillor (who is directly responsible for that particular ward and who 
partakes in the Municipal Town Corporation), to the Mayor of the Municipal town or 
city, to a Member of the Legislative Assembly, the state government in Bhopal, which 
is made up of individuals elected from individual districts throughout the state.  
The first kinnar elected was Kamla Jaan,1 as the mayor of the town of Katni 
Murwara in December 1999. Then there was a spate of elections in which three kinnars 
were elected: Heera Bai as a Municipal Ward Corporator in the city of Jabalpur; Meena 
Bai as the President of the Civic Body of the town of Sihora; and Gulshan as a 
Municipal Ward Corporator in the town of Bina, all entering local political bodies in 
January and February 2000. The next election in March 2000 was that of Shabnam 
Mausi, as a Member of the Legislative Assembly for the Sohagpur seat of Shahdol 
                                                      
1 I adopt the commonly used spellings of kinnars’ names, omitting diacritics for familial terms 
for ease of reading (jān, meaning ‘dear’, ‘beloved’, or ‘acquaintance’; būā, ‘paternal aunt’; and 
mausī, ‘maternal aunt’, and bāī, referring to a lady).  
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district.2 The last election in 2000 was that of Rani Jaan Payal as a Municipal Ward 
Corporator in the city of Sehore, west of Bhopal.3 Nine years later, Kamla Bua won the 
mayoral election for the city of Sagar in December 2009. The five locations of the five 
ex-politicians I was able to meet and interview became the sites of my research in MP.  
There were two other minor sites for my research. The first was Becharaji, or 
Bahucharaji, in Gujarat. This is the site of the only temple of Bahuchara Mata, the 
patron goddess of the hijra/kinnar community. The second site was Thane, a district 
located in the suburbs of Mumbai. Thane proved an interesting site for comparison 
with MP due to the variant lives of individuals in both locations.  
I conducted qualitative fieldwork primarily in Madhya Pradesh, but also in 
Ahmedabad, Becharai, and Thane, and employed data collection methods that 
included observation, taking field notes, conducting semi-structured interviews 
(recorded and transcribed, and non-recorded), and accessing archival material. 
Interviews were primarily one on one, but on occasion were small group interviews, 
mainly of two or three interviewees, who would answer questions together, giving 
their own opinions. My intention was to conduct interviews with kinnars who 
successfully contested elections in MP, alongside their supporters, critics, and local 
politicians. I later decided to interview local journalists, who proved informative and 
helpful for the study in providing information on elections and public opinion. I 
expected to interview people in each of the six locations (Katni, Jabalpur, Sihora, Bina, 
                                                      
2 There is some discrepancy in the election dates given in the print media sources, especially 
those that reference the elections several years after they occurred. I believe the order above is 
the most likely order of the elections in December 1999 and 2000. Aside from kinnars and 
campaigners not knowing or remembering the exact dates of elections, there is some 
discrepancy in the dates given by sources. Sources written after the event state that Shabnam 
won the Sohagpur by-election in 1998 (Wikipedia; Times of India 2011), but her election is not 
mentioned by contemporaneous national and international newspapers until March 2000 
(British Broadcasting Corporation 2000; Hindustan Times 2000). The order of elections is likely 
based on two newspaper articles: ‘Reign of the Middle Order’ (Mishra 2000), written on 28 
February, and ‘The Joke that Started It’, Hindustan Times (Archives), written on 5 March 2000. 
Mishra states that ‘voters in Katni, Sehora [sic], Bina and Jabalpur…have, by electing eunuchs as 
officials of their various civic bodies, expressed their despair and hope simultaneously’. The 
article notes that ‘they have all gone through the electoral routine in January winning their seats 
with margins that have defied logic’ (Kamla Jaan was sworn into office in January 2000, 
although the election was held in December 1999; this date is based on a dated, local newspaper 
clipping kept by a journalist in Katni). The article, published on 28th February, does not mention 
the election of Shabnam Mausi. After she is elected, her election is usually the main election 
discussed in the media due to the high-status of the position. The second Hindustan Times article 
claims that after Kamla’s victory: ‘the local media splashed the news, inspiring neighbouring 
Jabalpur, Bina and Sehora [sic] to field eunuchs as well...All the eunuchs won – Kamla Mausi 
became mayor of Katni, winning by 2,000 votes, and the three other eunuch candidates became 
corporators.’ This article was printed on 5 March as part of a full page spread about the 
elections of hijras in the Hindustan Times. The feature article of the page concerns Shabnam 
Mausi’s election (‘The Revenge of the People’), which states the results of her victory were 
announced on the 26th and 27th of February. 
3 I was not aware of Rani Jaan Payal or her victory until I received newspaper reports from 
Anuppur-based journalist Jagdish Pande in March 2011. The clippings were from the Hindi 
newspaper, Navbharat (Bhopal edition) from 2001 (Upadhyaya 2001). I then learnt of ‘Payal 
Jaan’s’ election in December 2000; she is not mentioned in other print media sources. 
Newspaper clippings about her election can be found at www.indiarightsonline.com. 
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Shahdol, and Sagar). Issues relating to time and resources limited an in-depth study of 
every location; I decided early on during the fieldwork that it would be more 
productive to adopt a case study approach in order to provide a comparative 
framework of different elections in a particular region. I chose three of the kinnar 
politicians and localities on which to focus: Katni, Shahdol, and Sagar, and focused 
upon collecting data in these locations. In each location, I focused on an examination of 
the conditions in which kinnars had been elected and their political participation, 
choosing to foreground this subject, which did limit a study more generally about 
‘kinnars in MP’. Elected kinnars did not want to speak about their personal lives and 
other intimate subjects, since I had approached them to speak about their political 
participation, although some later chose to speak about other subjects. The case study 
approach therefore provided individualistic political stories of Kamla Jaan, Shabnam 
Mausi, and Kamla Bua, focusing upon their positionality within local democratic 
spheres, rather than as situated as members of their kinnar communities. With other 
interviewees (voters, supporters and campaigners, critics, journalists, politicians, civil 
servants), interviews were designed to focus primarily on the nature of kinnars’ 
campaigns, elections, and tenure, as well as their impression and assessment of the 
elected kinnar. 
While interviews were important in learning about how people described and 
assessed the elections or their participation in them, access to archival material was 
useful for providing an account of events that had occurred in the past. As a result of 
time elapsed, many ‘facts’ had been forgotten or were represented in a different way. I 
should note that I was not concerned with having people’s recollections match ‘facts’, 
as may have been recorded in newspaper accounts, for example. I found that there 
were often no records to check people’s stories against, or that there were differing 
accounts of the same event. Yet, the existence of different accounts is significant: events 
might be represented differently over time and for particular reasons. Stories are re-
told and become memories, and I was curious about the ways in which people retold 
their stories, reflecting their contemporary position, needs, or agenda. As a result of 
focusing on ‘stories’ rather than ‘facts’, archival material became less important as a 
method during my fieldwork, while interviews and discussions became key to my 
research.  
I conducted over sixty ‘formal’ interviews in MP: the majority were recorded 
(with permission of the interviewee). In most cases, I interviewed a single person, but 
in around ten cases there were two or more interviewees present. Most interviews 
were informal, and I followed a semi-structured approach. A formal interview 
approach was not suitable in many cases; I realised early on that set questions tended 
to invoke particular responses, which limited the information that people wanted to 
share. From the beginning, at the end of each interview I asked whether there was 
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anything else that the interviewee wanted to discuss, and this approach allowed me to 
see the potential in allowing for interviewees to direct the interview in as much as my 
questions did. In Gujarat and Mumbai, I found that less formal approaches were more 
appropriate. In both locations, I spent a lot of time watching and reflecting on the 
situation and context I was in, rather than undertaking more formalised research with 
interviews.  
I have noted that I decided to pursue a case study approach. This approach 
provided a focused study of three cases, from which I wanted to analyse similarities 
and differences in the cases of three elected kinnars in Katni (1999), Shahdol (2000), and 
Sagar (2009). A case study approach enabled examination of how the electoral success 
or otherwise of each kinnar politician was the product of its own contextual specificities. 
Nonetheless, early research also revealed similarities in the ways kinnar identity was 
being reconfigured through political discourses in order to establish each as a 
legitimate political contender. Researching three cases enabled me to highlight the 
similarities between each election as well as differences that could be drawn and 
discussed. At the same time, a case study approach imposed limitations on my study, 
primarily since three case studies could not necessarily provide enough data from 
which to extrapolate wider theorisations concerning the entry of previously 
marginalised communities into state democratic processes. However, this was not an 
intention of the study and would ultimately conflict with a wider concern dealing with 
the question of how to represent specific communities with particular needs, where 
drawing wider conclusions that could be applied into other regional and situational 
contexts might negate the specificity of these individual cases. Despite acknowledging 
a limitation in the applicability of transporting conclusions from this study, certain 
discussions and frameworks in an analysis of how kinnar identity became mobilised 
within these three examples could inform wider debates and approaches concerning 
the construction of kinnar identity, and indeed the political, gendered subject, in 
contemporary India.  
 Finally, I want to discuss my positionality on a practical level in relation to my 
research methods and the study. Other authors have discussed female positionality in 
relation to research on hijras (Reddy 2005, Nanda 1999, Hall 1995) and I did not find 
any diffulties gaining access to communities in this regards. Notably, all of my 
interpreters or interview facilitators were male, which sometimes seemed to cause 
some friction, but I assess this was explained better, in most cases, due to each 
individual being from the location in which the interviews were conducted. I was 
concerned that a lack of formal introduction might hinder access to kinnar interviewees, 
but all were willing to speak to me with little information about myself or my project 
(although I went armed with a speech and books), especially since they saw the 
interview process and my research as an avenue through which they could raise their 
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issues. Initially, it seemed that my interpreters or interview facilitators were the ones 
gaining access to kinnar subjects, through knowledge of the kinnar, past meetings, or 
through the sharing of a shared cultural context in which both were located. However, 
I realised it was my positionality, as a perceived outsider, that played an important role 
in gaining access to interviewees. Most kinnars agreed to take part in interviewees as 
long as their name and details about them appeared in my study (which was as simple 
a request as their name and the name of the town where they lived). By not belonging 
to the local communities in which they lived, by not belonging to local social structures 
and networks, and by not even being ‘Indian’, nor speaking the language (which I had 
believed would be a further limitation), I was perceived as a ‘real’ outsider, someone 
who could absorb whatever they wanted to tell me, and who would transmit that 
information without ‘local’ prejudice or knowledge. It seemed that my positionality as 
an outsider in terms of community membership, language, nationality, and role as a 
researcher was important in facilitating my access to kinnar interviewees, as well as 
with non-kinnars. Interviewees appeared more willing to take part in my research 
because I did not belong to their own communities. Some were suspicious initially that 
I might be working for a newspaper, but when satisfied that I did not, usually by 
showing a business card, they were willing to speak and be recorded. The issue of 
access therefore was more complex than I had imagined in perceiving a lack of formal 
introduction, language limitations, the use of interpreters, and my positionality as an 
outsider were all reasons that would hinder this study. 
 
II. Finding Politicians 
 
Fieldwork began slowly, with failed attempts at finding an interpreter who could 
travel to various field sites with me4 and at accessing available archives in Bhopal. As 
the capital of MP, Bhopal was the most likely city to keep an archive of print and 
electronic media, but I confronted great difficulties in attaining such material.5 From 
                                                      
4 At individual fieldwork sites, I was aided regarding translation and assistance by various local 
individuals. They mostly worked at Municipal Corporation offices or were local journalists who 
had excellent spoken English. The only time I had a research assistant and translator was 
during April 2011, when Ravi Choudhary, whom I met through a friend from Delhi, travelled 
with me to Jabalpur, Anuppur, and Shahdol. 
5 Most libraries in Bhopal did not store old newspapers, neither the ‘Bhopal edition’ nor 
national edition. The ‘Old Town’ library contained a newspaper archive, but despite visiting a 
few times (it was always shut) and calling the telephone number, I never spoke to anyone and 
thus could not pursue this source. Local libraries or journalist offices in cities or towns where 
elections occurred did not yield any results: for example, after waiting a few hours to get into 
the Anuppur library, I was told that newspapers were only kept a few months and then 
recycled. Kinnars themselves and their supporters also did not have these materials available, 
often explaining this due to time elapsed. I then targeted national newspaper offices in Delhi, 
such as the Hindustan Times, Times of India, and Statesman, some of the major English-print 
newspapers. For the most part, these correspond with their Hindi equivalents (run by the same 
company). There were issues of access, mainly due to archives not being electronic and 
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January until May 2011, I travelled frequently between Shahdol and Anuppur, and 
Katni and Sagar, using Jabalpur as a middle ground. From Jabalpur, I travelled further 
east to Shahdol and Anuppur, and then north to Sihora, Katni, and Sagar. Initially, I 
intended to visit and make contacts in each town or city, to introduce myself to the 
kinnar ex-politicians, and ascertain the level of help I would need in terms of 
interpretation or general guidance. I wanted to establish when an interviewee might be 
around and available to meet, and begin to assess what sites might be significant to my 
research. I found that if people were around, they were willing to help, or I could 
arrange future appointments with them if they were not, so I would spend up to a 
couple of weeks in one location and then move on, intending to return later. The 
relevance of each site to my research depended on various factors: a kinnar politician’s 
willingness to meet with me and be interviewed, what they were happy to discuss, and 
other people’s willingness to be interviewed, or perhaps if that site offered a 
compelling or fruitful comparison with another case study or site of research.  
I met five kinnar politicians, with the exception of Gulshan in Bina6 and Rani 
Jaan Payal in Sehore (the latter whom I did not know had been elected at this point). 
My start, in Jabalpur, was slow. I arrived on the 13th January, hot, sixteen hours 
delayed, and grumpy. Jabalpur is dusty and noisy and I did not know anyone. 
Somewhat naively, I called in at the tourist office and asked if they knew how I could 
find Heera Bai, who had been elected Ward Corporator eleven years before. They 
looked at me blankly, said they did not know what I was talking about, and offered me 
some brochures of nearby attractions. I considered wandering the streets and asking 
where ‘the hijras’ lived or trying in vain to find a phone number for Heera on the 
internet. It took another two days to realise that I was staying almost next to the 
Municipal Corporation Office. They would certainly know how to contact her, but by 
then, it was Saturday and I had to wait until the office opened the following week. 
At the Municipal Corporation I was directed to Mr Sharm Bhatt, who had 
worked in the Corporation for years and held the distinguished title of ‘President of 
the Municipal Corporation Federation’. Mr Bhatt became my guide and translator and 
was integral to my research in Jabalpur throughout my fieldwork, arranging and 
accompanying me on several interviews with Heera Bai. He also facilitated an 
interview with Meena Bai, the former President of Sihora, driving me the forty 
kilometers or so on his motorbike.7 Mr Bhatt found out that Heera Bai was out of town, 
                                                                                                                                                              
occasionally ‘lost’ folders, alongside not knowing exactly when a story might be reported, if it 
was even included in the national editions. Some companies had electronic archives, but could 
only be accessed at an unreasonable cost.  
6 I travelled to the small town of Bina in February 2011 but was unable to make contact with 
Gulshan. 
7 In order to get this meeting we had to visit a local politician’s home, who knew Meena and 
contacted her to ask for an interview. We arrived around noon and were entertained by the 
politician in a vest and his luṅgī, gesticulating with his toothbrush. Later at the Municipal 
Corporation, Mr Bhatt explained my project to some men who worked there. While I was 
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so I took the train two hundred kilometers east to Shahdol town, hoping to meet 
Shabnam Mausi. Trying the Municipal Corporation trick again, I managed to meet a 
district official in charge of local development, who introduced me to one of his men, 
who was going to Anuppur town the following day and would arrange for me to meet 
Shabnam. Mr R.P. Verma and I went to Anuppur, where he introduced me to Mr G.P. 
Verma and his driver and his driver’s friend. After sitting around in a car for an hour 
(and wondering quite what I had gotten myself into), we drove to her house and 
surrounded by these four men, in this slightly haphazard fashion, I found myself 
conducting my very first interview with arguably the most famous elected kinnar of all. 
I discuss this interview and further interviews below in the case studies. Floating back 
to Jabalpur with a sense of success at having conducted my first interview, I found that 
Mr Bhatt had arranged meetings with both Heera Bai and Meena Bai and within a 
week, I had met three out of the five politicians. I was struck by the ease with which I 
could locate and meet these kinnars and the way in which they agreed to be 
interviewed, despite showing up unannounced and unexpected at their homes.8 In the 
next week, I visited both Katni and Sagar and met both Kamla Jaan and Kamla Bua 
respectively. I discuss these and further meetings with these two ‘politicians’ in greater 
detail below. Since Kamla Bua was mayor at that time, I had to arrange a meeting with 
one of her secretaries, through a local doctor in Sagar who was a contact of Mr Bhatt’s. 
This secretary was also a Public Relations Officer, Mr Rashid Hussain, who helped 
facilitate various meetings with Kamla Bua and current members of the Municipal 
Corporation. His friend, local journalist Mr Sanjay Kareer, became instrumental in 
conducting my research in Sagar, and became fascinated and engaged with my project.  
Future trips to Jabalpur, Katni, and Sagar until May and between July and 
August, allowed for more extensive interviews with local politicians, journalists, and 
other members of the public, and the kinnars themselves. In April, I made a trip 
specifically to Shahdol and Anuppur with a translator from Delhi, where I focused on 
Shabnam Mausi’s case.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
unable to understand exactly what he said, there was laughing, joking, and staring at me with 
curiosity. 
8 In this regard, I didn’t have much control over the matter. Once I had explained my project to 
Mr Bhatt, he took over: he called Heera Bai and took me to meet her at her home. Likewise in 
Sihora, Mr Bhatt got hold of Meena Bai’s address, so we went directly to her home. In Anuppur, 
Mr G.P. Verma knew where Shabnam lived, so they took me there. This also happen in Katni, 
where the journalist who had decided to help me arranged a meeting outside her home. The 
only time this did not happen was in Sagar, where there were more formal channels in place to 
meet Kamla Bua, the incumbent mayor. We met at her home, but only because she had arrived 
in Sagar late the night before, and with consent.  
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i. Attending a Sammelan 
 
On numerous occasions, I was invited to attend a sammelan by Kamla Bua. ‘You will 
stay with me’, she would say, ‘and attend as a daughter’. Luckily on the third occasion 
of a sammelan in MP, I was able to attend. It was hosted by Kamla Bua and lasted 
twelve days. Everyone in Sagar was aware it was occurring, presumably because the 
mayor was involved and, I was told, she had managed to secure donations from the 
Municipal Corporation towards it. There had not been a sammelan in Sagar for fifteen 
years; Kamla Bua was using it to commemorate the death of her guru, Suraj. The 
gathering was expected to have over 3000 guests over the twelve days. I attended the 
last four days, when disputes were being resolved and new relationships formalised, 
since all the nāyaks had arrived. I was permitted to visit Kamla Bua’s residence in the 
day, as were other non-members of the community.9 I found that some kinnars were 
happy to speak to me, some at great length, whereas others were suspicious and 
shouted at non-members of the community, including newspaper reporters, who were 
there. Shouting and abuse only occurred on the final day of the sammelan, which was 
explained as a product of the highly tense atmosphere on that day, likely due to the 
resolving of disputes and the end of a busy and long twelve days.  
Kamla’s spacious home had been transformed: there were mattresses and 
bedding placed in long lines in every room and along the corridors, where kinnars were 
sleeping, eating, chatting, and observing proceedings, including in the makeshift area 
that once was a courtyard and covered by a tent. There are three floors to Kamla’s 
house, centering around a large hall on the ground floor. The nāyaks formed a fluid 
circle in this space,10 holding discussions and performing a variety of rituals that 
everyone could observe. I was told in the evening, although I was not invited to attend 
then, that this space became an area for performance and dance. There were kinnars 
present from Delhi, Ahmedabad and Gujarat, and from all over MP, including Meena 
Bai, Kamla Jaan, Heera Bai and some of Heera’s celās.11 Most kinnars had come for the 
whole gathering, with members of their own households or lineages, but many—
especially the younger kinnars from Delhi—spoke of boredom and were happy to leave, 
                                                      
9 Alongside reporters who visited daily, there were men and women present who worked for 
Kamla or who had been hired to ensure the smooth running of the event, including a team of 
kitchen staff. There was an official photographer there, who produced photos that kinnars could 
buy from him, there were also a couple of men who controlled the audio system, so that kinnars 
in different areas of the house could hear what was going on. 
10 I make this observation as I knew—or knew of—some of the nāyaks, including Kamla Bua. 
Almost all of them were wore white clothes. Reddy notes that at the time of a guru’s death, 
hijras mimic Hindu widows, clothing themselves in a simple white sari for the period of 
mourning and only wearing coloured clothes when they acquire a new guru (2005: 109). I knew 
Kamla Bua’s own guru had died and she dressed in white, or very simple and lightly toned 
clothes, often śalvār qamīz. Other gurus also adopted this simple, often white, dress. This reflects 
Nanda’s conclusion that ‘middle-aged’ hijras often wear more conservative clothes (1995: 126).  
11 Heera Bai is Kamla Bua’s celā: during the sammelan Kamla was often aided by Heera in the 
proceedings. 
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feeling that twelve days was a long time away from the comforts of home. While I did 
not conduct any formal interviews, I spoke to a variety of kinnars from different 
locations. Mr Kareer, who acted as interpreter, had said that formal interviews would 
not be right in this setting, since it was a holiday for many kinnars, and they wouldn’t 
want to be disturbed in this way. I did find that most kinnars wanted to talk or tell me 
something and did not seem upset by my presence and that of the reporters. 
Aside from daily articles in the newspapers or clips on television, the greatest 
point of interaction for kinnars with the general public was a procession through the 
main streets of Sagar on the penultimate day of the sammelan, called the śobhāyātrā. 
Kamla explained that śobhāyātrā is a way for kinnars to engage with other people in 
society, which is why the procession occurs (Interview, 28/8/13). Five hundred kinnars 
marched, starting and ending at Kamla’s home and walking through the main streets 
of the city. The route was organised to be a tour of the main areas of the city, passing 
by various temples and mosques.  
Standing on the island between the two sides of the busy street, I noticed I was 
one of the only women present on the whole road. Sanvariya—a young hijra I had met 
at Kamla’s house—was walking on her own at the front of the procession. She came 
over to me and took my hand and I began to walk with her, joining the procession. 
From this vantage point, I could observe the procession and, thankfully, move easily 
up and down the street instead of being squashed among the crowds of men, 
brandishing their mobile phones to film the procession, who were being contained and 
occasionally beaten back by policemen wielding long sticks.  
There were different groups of kinnars in the procession, although Kamla later 
noted that there is no specific rule as to a particular order for walking, nor dress code 
(Interview, 28/8/13). At the very front were a group of kinnars, performing traditional 
dance or tricks with drums or other props, including spinning a bike wheel on top of 
their raised arms or heads, and dancing astride two drums held by the drummers. 
They were accompanied by a group of musicians. Behind them was an enormous 
sound system on the back of a truck, playing popular Bollywood tunes, behind which 
were ‘sexy’ kinnars, wearing tight śalvār qamīz or ‘Western’ clothing, including short 
skirts and tops that revealed their shoulders or stomachs, and a lot of make-up: these 
dancing kinnars, who were grinding with and pouring water on each other, were of 
particular interest to the crowd due to the sexualised nature of performance. As they 
walked past, every male spectator was glued to the screen of his mobile phone to 
capture the performance, pushing and shoving to get to the front of the crowd. Next 
was a more formal group of kinnars who followed two particular kinnars, wearing in 
red and gold saris and heavily decorated with gold jewellery and marigold chains, 
who each carried a kalaśa, a three foot high, carved, ornate metal vase, on their heads. 
Kamla explained the use of the kalaśa as a part of ‘Hindu’ rituals. Only celās of the 
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sammelan’s host can carry the kalaśa in the śobhāyātrā. A collective decision is taken to 
nominate the kinnars a week before the procession. The chosen kinnars must then 
follow strict purificatory rituals and customs to prepare them for the final day (Kamla 
Bua Interview, 28/8/13). Towards the end of the procession were older kinnars 
walking and cars that contained much older kinnars and some kinnar children. 
Halfway though the procession was a resting point, organised by the Municipal 
Corporation. There was food and drinks, and a welcome opportunity to have a rest. 
Almost all the Municipal Corporation members were present, many bent down to 
touch the feet of many of the kinnars who passed through the gate to this area. There 
was a small ceremony involving the Municipal Corporation members; one kinnar 
explained that this was to do with Kamla Bua being mayor, instead of being part of the 
kinnar gathering. Many of the female members offered the nāyaks shawls, coconuts, and 
50 Rupee notes, and in turn they were given blessings by the nāyaks. The procession 
resumed, following the same route back towards Kamla’s house. This procession 
formally marked the end of the sammelan, and on the following day final ‘disputes’ 
were resolved, money was given out to cover the cost of travel, and kinnars began to 
leave Sagar.  
 
ii. Becharaji and Thane  
 
Given the importance of Bahuchara Mata for the kinnar community, I decided to visit 
the temple dedicated to the goddess, located in Gujarat. It was a hot and dusty journey 
by bus to the tiny town of Becharaji, or Bahucharaji, in Mehsana District. The timing of 
my visit to the temple was fortunate, since it coincided with the full moon festival, 
Guru Purnima, which is when the temple is at its busiest, as Bahuchara is popular 
among the general Gujarati population. There were thousands of people crammed into 
the temple complex, with several hundred—standing in the blazing sun—forming a 
long line to enter the inner temple to pay their respects to the goddess. Some kinnars 
live in and around the temple complex, but were unwilling to talk to me without the 
permission and presence of their guru, who was in Ahmedabad. Sitting in the temple 
complex, there were plenty of opportunities to talk to lay devotees, and learn more 
about the goddess, their relationship to her, and some of the myths associated with her. 
I was told variations of myths discussed in other places, and some new myths 
altogether. As the sun set, there was dancing and worship in the temple, and at night 
was the unveiling of the statue of the goddess, followed by a procession with the statue 
through the town. Local Gujaratis played a significant role in the local practices at the 
temple, while the kinnars sat in a group under the shade of a tree in the middle of the 
complex throughout the day. At night, several ‘male’ kinnars appeared, dressed in jeans 
and shirts, and performed dances in the middle of the crowd near the entrance to the 
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main sanctum, where many people had gathered to see the unveiling of the statue. 
Apart from a few ‘male’ kinnars from Delhi at the sammelan in Sagar, I had not seen a 
group together in this manner. My guide, Mr Turner, called them ‘male kinnars’, but 
they seemed closer to the ‘kaḍa-cāṭla kotis’ (non sari-wearing kotis) described by Reddy 
(2005: 131), since I was not able to assess whether they identified as ‘male’ or not.  
A stark contrast to the kinnars at the temple of Bahuchara are the hijras of Thane, 
Mumbai. At Delhi University, a student who was involved in LGBT activism told me 
about Laxmi Narayan Tripathi, a well-known hijra in India due to her social activism,12 
including regarding transgender and hijra issues, and celebrity status in Mumbai. I sent 
off an email and got a reply from her secretary who told me to visit her at her home. 
After a difficult journey, I arrived at her flat. I was greeted by a pouty-faced Kamal, 
Laxmi’s celā, who was far more interested in her Facebook profile at that point than me. 
I sat down on what turned out to be Kamal’s bed, looking around at the surroundings 
of the small, two-room flat, including several large wardrobes full of ornate saris and 
western style clothing, and an enormous mirror that took up the whole of one wall. It 
was in this mirror that I saw Laxmi for the first time, fresh from the shower in a towel, 
displaying remarkable long legs. This was a different world that I had entered into, not 
having experienced anything near as intimate nor informal during my time in MP. 
Laxmi dressed herself and put on her make-up for the evening ahead, starting with the 
careful placement of a padded bra and the meticulous application of make up to her 
face, neck, and shoulders. She invited me to ask questions, but what I had prepared 
was cut short when she told me to watch a video that had been made for a 2010 TEDx 
conference about her life and the hijra community. On a future visit, I spent about two 
weeks with Laxmi in a variety of settings. I observed her social activism and work; met 
and spent time with other hijras, including Laxmi’s celās; attended a photo shoot for an 
internet television programme; and socialised with Laxmi and her friends.  
 
iii. Comparing Mumbai and MP 
 
Spending time with Laxmi gave me insight into her life as a ‘hijra’ and her particular 
experiences: as an advisor to a UN Civil Society Task Force, as a ‘representative’ of the 
hijra community in the national media, and an educated and cosmopolitan individual 
who lives next door to several members of her family. It is clear that Laxmi’s 
experience of ‘hijra’ identity is unlike the typical experience of many hijras. Observing 
Laxmi’s life allowed me to reflect more generally on some of the obvious—but perhaps 
                                                      
12 Laxmi is involved in a variety of causes, including a charity that helps get financial aid to 
lower-class and -caste individuals suffering from cancer, anti-smoking campaigns, and NGOs 
that work on behalf of tribal rights, alongside campaigning on issues pertaining to minority 
sexualities. 
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ignored—differences among members of the hijra community, based on individual 
experiences but also upon regional and urban or rural considerations. As an activist, 
Laxmi engages in a rights-based discourse, with the explicit purpose of creating 
awareness and fighting for opportunities and rights for hijras. This is based on her 
exposure to transnational rights discourses for minority sexualities and her work on 
rights in India and abroad. On the other hand, the kinnars of MP have little access to or 
awareness of these discourses and do not see themselves or even perhaps, to some 
extent, acknowledge, their place within these struggles. The differentiations among 
those who identify as hijras or kinnars are significant since they create a vast difference 
in outlook, expectation, and experience of life as a self-identified member of the 
community and as an individual who is identified as a member of the community. I do 
not mean to suggest that a division can be drawn between those who identify as hijra 
and those who identify as kinnar, where the former is an urban, ‘modern’ identity that 
draws upon transnational LGBT discourses and the latter is an identity found among 
rural, non-metropolitan individuals who do not know or identify with LGBT 
movements. Rather, I maintain that any category, whether hijra, kinnar, or transgender, 
contains within it a heterogeneous assortment of lived-experiences and belief systems, 
which can be contradictory with one another. Various identities are grouped together 
under a single label for the purposes of classification, most notably by the State and 
NGO groups, in order to extend rights and benefits to members of the ‘transgender’ 
community. Yet, it is important to consider differences in belief, practice, and how 
people identify with a particular identity category, all of which are based on the 
individual actor, in order to recognise contradictory—though not necessarily mutually 
exclusive—discourses among individuals who are identified under the same label. 
Laxmi and the kinnar politicians I met in MP provide an example of this difference, by 
understanding their identities in divergent ways and living contrasting lives. These 
differences are highlighted when a representative speaks on behalf of their community, 
which codifies a certain lived experience as representative of members of the group. I 
explore the diversity of the hijra or ‘transgender’ community in Chapter Five, 
highlighting the impossibility of conflating multiple identities that are collated under 
the term ‘hijra’ and the unintended consequences of such conflation upon community 
heterogeneity.  
 
III. Case Studies: How to Elect a Kinnar Politician 
 
After a few months of fieldwork, I decided to focus more closely on certain individuals 
and their elections, in order to explore similarities and difference between cases. The 
election of each kinnar had similar aspects, such as the mass support each campaign 
generated, the scale of the victory, and how each kinnar was represented to the public 
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as a suitable candidate. Yet there were important differences between each example, 
such as the way each kinnar conducted themselves in office, the lasting impressions 
that the public had of them, and their personalities and agendas. In the discussion 
below, I explore how each kinnar was named as a candidate, the development and 
success of each campaign, and a general impression of their time in and after public 
office. 
 
i. Kamla Jaan, Mayor of Katni Murwara Town, December 1999 
 
The first election of a kinnar in MP was Kamla Jaan as Mayor of Katni in December of 
1999. This was the first direct election for Mayor in Katni, inasmuch as the entire 
electorate voted in the election, and the seat was reserved for a woman. I heard that 
Kamla still lived in Katni and I travelled there for the first time at the end of January. A 
hotel manager put me in touch with the most senior journalist in town, a twinkly eyed, 
kind man with paan-stained teeth called Mr Nandlal Singh. Mr Singh spoke excellent 
English and was a scholarly man; he became invaluable to my time there. He 
summoned me a couple of days later and we made the short trip on his motorbike to 
one of the poorer wards of town where Kamla Jaan lives. We arrived to find a small 
collection of people loitering in an alley, which I later learnt was the street upon which 
Kamla Jaan’s house looked. She was sitting on a chair in the middle of the narrow way 
and we sat down with her. Kamla is about sixty years old with a kind face and gentle 
presence. Her hair was dyed red with henna and her teeth slightly paan-stained. She 
had covered most of her head with a lightly patterned shawl in public company and 
smiled as we approached. I sat down and began preparing for the interview. Suddenly 
I could no longer feel the sun on my back; I looked up and saw about twenty, young, 
Muslim men surrounding us, mostly dressed in white kurtas. They ranged in age from 
young boys to grown men, but all were fascinated by the sight—I imagine—of a young 
woman with well-known Kamla sitting in the middle of the street. The atmosphere 
was not threatening per se, but the continuous staring became unnerving and 
influenced the encounter. I handed Kamla Jaan the consent form to sign: Mr Singh 
translated for her and another journalist, Mr Arvind Gupta, seemed to advise her. 
Kamla cannot write, so she handed the form to Mr Gupta. He motioned for her to sign 
as she had been taught in office: the letter K, surrounded by a circle. 
The interview itself was short and did not provide any revelations: I asked a 
question, Mr Singh translated, Kamla hardly said anything and Mr Gupta would begin 
to reply, to which she would nod or say a few words. There was a lot of confusion over 
the date of her election and the length of her tenure. Kamla Jaan was persuaded to 
fight the election by the people of Katni and they spent effort and money on her 
campaign on her behalf: in that sense, she was a real ‘people’s candidate’. Nobody 
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mentioned that she was unseated, although Mr Singh and Mr Gupta discussed the case 
brought against her and the political motivations behind it.13 Kamla did not want to 
speak about her personal life as a kinnar, which is unsurprising given that towards the 
end of the interview, the crowd had doubled in size. Although they did not interrupt, 
many had mobile phones out to photograph the scene and they reacted to what was 
being said with quiet murmurs to one another. 
I do not think Kamla ever said more than one sentence or a few words at a time, 
and instead her answers were given by Mr Gupta and Mr Singh, and perhaps on behalf 
of the crowd. Kamla appeared quiet, demure, and happy to be spoken for: this seems 
to be symptomatic of her time in office. Kamla was represented as a figurehead, a 
mouthpiece for other people’s political desires, and thus was a silent figure, as she was 
in this interview. Her silence might have been a by-product of her illiteracy since she 
relied on other people’s help in order to campaign and serve in office, and in turn, was 
in a position where people may have taken advantage of her.14 The interview seemed 
to replicate some of the issues that were at play during her time in office in which 
Kamla was silent and others spoke for her, playing to the emotions and feelings of the 
crowd who had shown her their support. This was confirmed through discussions with 
other local journalists, particularly Mr Arvind Gupta and Mr Anil Tiwari, who told me 
stories about her campaign and time in office. Her silence could also be interpreted 
within the framework provided by Spivak in addressing the question of subaltern 
silence in ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ (2000). By asking whether the bourgeois theorist 
can ‘hear’ the unintelligible speech of the subaltern (as demonstrated by Bhuvaneswari 
Bhaduri’s political act, which is misunderstood by those around her such that she 
cannot be ‘heard’ or ‘read’), Spivak argues that subalternity must necessarily enter the 
dominant (hegemonic) language, in order to become politically or discursively 
intelligible. Moreover, silence itself can be a reply as an act of subalternity. In Kamla’s 
case, she maintained her silence such that she was spoken for, and learnt how to frame 
her demands (which may have been influenced by her supporters) in such a way that 
she became intelligible within the sphere of Katni local politics. Her ‘real’ voice, if we 
can claim such a subject, rarely seems to have emerged; instead she fit the mould of 
what was expected from her as a representative. Kamla appears not to have established 
                                                      
13 Kamla Jaan’s closest rival was the BJP candidate, Alka Jain. During this interview, I was told 
that her father (Nirmal Chandra Jain) was a governor of Rajasthan and before that, was a senior 
advocate in the MP High Court and the Attorney General of MP from 1990-92. Mr Singh noted 
that he was an influential personality, which may have been one reason for the verdict that 
unseated her, although this is conjecture.  
14 This was not always the case: Kamla would devise systems so as to make people accountable 
to her. Wanting a more efficient corporation and realising that people were not showing up for 
work on time, Kamla would stand at the gates of the corporation with a members list, so they 
would have to sign in when they arrived. In another account, Kamla found ways to test people 
who asked her to sign requests which she did not approve: getting them, and then another 
person later, to read out the petition to her and compare versions.  
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herself as an intelligible subject within the sphere of Katni politics, in part due to her 
inability to be heard or read within this different sphere.15  
On this trip and later trips to Katni, other individuals furthered my 
understanding of what had happened in 1999 and the years after. Mr Singh allowed 
me to spend time in his office, where I could ask questions and interact with him and 
other journalists at will. Mr Singh facilitated various interviews with key figures 
involved in Kamla’s election and tenure, including Mr Naresh Kosta and Mr Ajay 
Gupta, two of the men behind her successful election campaign and Mr Gupta helped 
represent Kamla in the case brought against her; Mr Kamendra Singh Dhakur, who 
submitted the petition which unseated Kamla; Mrs Alka Jain, the defeated BJP 
candidate in the mayoral election; and Mr Firoz Ahmed, a member of Kamla’s Mayor-
in-Council. Unfortunately I did not meet with Kamla Jaan again to interview her, 
although I did see her again at the Sagar sammelan. However, I chose Kamla as a case 
study since, as the first kinnar elected in MP, her victory was remarkable and the way 
she was represented as a ‘kinnar’ to the public by her campaigners was significant. She 
provided a vehicle through which the public could place their hopes and desires, and 
this is what made her successful as a candidate. At the same time, Kamla was unable to 
represent herself—both through her reluctance and others speaking on her behalf—
and this was evident in the interview conducted and the way in which she was 
represented by other interviewees in Katni.  
 
Kamla’s Campaign, Election, and Unseating 
Kamla Jaan’s election was ‘masterminded’ by a group of local businessmen who were 
disgruntled with ineffective, professional politicians.16 The three main individuals 
involved were Naresh Kosta, a tailor and shop owner, and two advocates, Ajay Gupta 
and Ayaz Khan, who were part of a larger group of campaigners. There had been 
rising public anger in Katni at the inefficiency and incompetence of the candidates that 
the major political parties backed, since they did not appear to know or respond to 
local demands. These politicians failed to develop the town sufficiently, and often 
engaged in corrupt practices, such as awarding building contracts to the highest bidder 
and taking bribes. One example given in an article appearing in the Hindustan Times 
was that the business community—which included Kosta and other local retailers—
was angry because of poor civic facilities and corruption (2000). Moreover, local 
                                                      
15 This argument is connected to my later theorisation in chapter four of a general inability by 
kinnars to establish themselves as ‘powerful’ subjects within a different sphere, here, the field of 
local democratic politics, by transferring their social capital from the field of kinnar society.  
16 I use the term ‘professional politician’ as, for many politicians, politics is a business. People 
commonly observed that many politicians do whatever they can to get ahead, often viewing 
politicians as manipulating events to serve their own interests, and using politics ‘to run their 
business and running businesses in order to run their politics’ (Anonymous Interview, 4/4/11). 
Corruption is commonly associated with ‘professional’ politicians, causing anger by 
constituents at politicians who use the political sphere for their own gains.  
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politicians had proven themselves 'impotent' after winning elections, since they failed 
to respond to public grievances or keep campaign promises. In order to teach the 
politicians a ‘lesson’, Kosta, Gupta, and Khan decided to put forward a kinnar 
candidate, who was already viewed as ‘impotent’, by virtue of her kinnar identity 
(Kosta Interview, 22/2/11). As Mr Kosta put it, why elect a 'fake' kinnar when a 'real 
kinnar' would do?17  
As the head of the main community of kinnars in Katni and already known to 
the public, Kamla Jaan was an obvious choice. Mr Kosta suggested that the public was 
united in support of Kamla to teach a lesson to the major political parties for failing to 
provide suitable candidates. The dominance of Jains in local politics has also been 
given as a reason for supporting a different candidate. In this election, both BJP and 
Congress nominated Jain candidates: Alka Jain and Aradhana Jain respectively. The 
former MLA had also been a Jain. A Hindustan Times article, published in the national 
edition a few months after the election, suggests that Kamla’s campaign was an 
‘opportunity’ for the public to teach the Jain community a lesson (5 March 2000). 
Kamla was presented as a symbol for public anger (Gupta Interview, 30/1/11) and her 
campaign quickly gained support. Supporters also covered her campaign costs, 
including leaflets bearing her election symbol of a earthern pot (maṭkā), since Kamla 
had no money of her own to fund the electioneering. Her campaign was different to 
previous campaigns by being based primarily on word of mouth and supporters going 
door-to-door and asking for votes. It was a simple and modest campaign. On the day 
that the nomination papers were to be filed, a small procession was held from the 
railway station down the main road of the city. The local press covered this story and it 
was the first time Kamla and her campaign appeared in the papers, since they did not 
have the money to ‘advertise’ prior to this. 18 The press only covered the story since the 
filing of nomination papers proved that her campaign was serious: it had previously 
been perceived as a joke. Since Kamla did not have transport of her own, her campaign 
team hired a local auto-rickshaw on which she and her team stood, appealing to the 
crowd for votes (Tiwari Interview, 22/2/11). 
Mr Nandlal Singh told me that everyone contributed something to the 
campaign, making her a true ‘people’s candidate’. One way of advocating Kamla’s 
candidacy was through the use of slogans, such as 'kamal nahīṁ, Kamla cāhie; pañc nahīṁ, 
chakkā cāhie' ('[we] don't want the lotus,19 [we] want Kamla; [we] don't want the palm,20 
                                                      
17 It transpired that Mr Kosta had a further reason to field an alternative candidate instead of 
supporting the Congress party candidate, Aradhana Jain: his father had been denied 
opportunities to contest previous elections (Hindustan Times 2000). 
18 Advertising or securing coverage in local newspapers is common in municipal elections. The 
amount of space the candidate receives is in proportion to the money paid: local journalists said 
the rate was around Rs 30,000 for one full page for one day.  
19 The lotus is the symbol of the Bharatiya Janata Party.  
20 Literally ‘five’, this term refers to the palm of the hand, the sign of the Congress Party. 
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[we] want a kinnar'.21 Supporters also utilised the myth in which Lord Rāma blesses 
kinnars and prophesies that future generations will rule. Although interviewees 
laughed when they mentioned the story and said that voters did not believe it (Singh 
Interview, 28/1/11), the myth attracted voters to Kamla’s campaign because Kamla 
was represented as fulfilling the prophesy of kinnar rule. Such rhetoric popularised 
Kamla’s campaign, and supporters said that she became a public figure as soon as she 
was put forward as a candidate and they knew that they had generated enough 
support to get her elected.  
The mayoral election was held in December 1999. Kamla won the election with 
33.05% of the vote, beating her nearest rival, Alka Jain, by just under 2000 votes.22 She 
was sworn into office in January 2000. Since she had no experience of politics and was 
illiterate, she was reliant upon the support of the men who had run her campaign: 
Naresh Kosta, Ajay Gupta, and Ayaz Khan. These men became involved in day-to-day 
matters in public office and local politics alongside Kamla. Sceptics worried about their 
influence. Journalist Nandlal Singh, for example, noted that, in his opinion, these men 
might have ‘mistreated’ Kamla by taking advantage of her position for their own gains 
(Gupta Interview, 30/1/11). He suggested that Kamla‘s inexperience hindered her at 
the start of her tenure. Moreover, in the role of mayor, other individuals advised and 
‘pulled’ her in different directions (ibid.). Firoz Ahmed, a member of the Mayor-in-
Council during Kamla’s tenure, spoke about many of her advisors ‘petty interests’ 
(Interview, 27/2/11). However, other accounts credit Kamla’s own abilities and ways 
of ensuring she was not simply a figurehead. Kamla apparently could recognise 
documents not signed by her, even though she was illiterate. She maintained she could 
recognise her signature, despite signing it in a variety of ways during the initial few 
months in office (Mishra 2000). Local journalist Anil Tiwari described the system she 
devised to know exactly what she had approved, getting the person making the 
request read it out loud and then ask another person later to read the same document 
to her. Thus, she could check how accurately the petitioner had described it, before she 
agreed to it (Interview, 22/2/11).  
Kamla's tenure was characterised by her desire to drive out corruption from the 
Municipal Corporation and to attend to practical day-to-day activities. She did not 
seem to attempt to benefit from her role as mayor: she remained in the same house in a 
relatively undeveloped ward and preferred riding on a back of a motorcycle to a car. 
Kamla took her role seriously: in the morning, she took an attendance register of those 
who worked at the Corporation, forcing people to come in on time and do their jobs 
                                                      
21 The term ‘chakkā’ literally means 'six' but is a slang word for a kinnar. 
22 Kamla Jaan won 23, 215 votes (33.05%). Alka Jain, BJP candidate, won 21,418 (30.99%). 
Aradhana Jain, Congress candidate, won 12,943 (18.42%). Three other candidates contested the 
election. This data is from the notebooks of Mr Nandlal Singh, copied from newspaper articles 
published at the time of election. 
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(Tiwari Interview, 22/2/11). She was not afraid to berate people for failing to take their 
job seriously (Bearak 2001, Mishra 2000). Another thing that seems to have singled 
Kamla out from other politicians was her availability. Numerous interviewees 
explained that mainstream politicians on the whole are not available for mass contact 
with those in the Corporation or the electorate, whereas Kamla Jaan was always 
available (Tiwari Interview, 22/2/11). During her tenure, important projects were 
started, such as the Rajiv Gandhi Shopping Complex by the railway station; New 
Circuit House, a guest house for government officials; and toilet blocks in many wards. 
Her tenure was deemed as relatively successful, particularly by her supporters, 
campaigners, and those who worked with her at the Municipal Corporation. Any 
impression of her tenure reflects the views of those who were invested in her electoral 
victory or advised her whilst in office. Her inexperience and illiteracy nonetheless 
hindered her ability to bring about the lasting changes she desired and she was further 
encumbered by not belonging to Congress, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), or any 
other party, and therefore could not ensure broader support in the Corporation for 
many of her plans.  
During the campaign Kamla enjoyed wide support, but interest in her tenure 
decreased whilst she was in office. This may have been due to the slow pace of 
development, understandable given Kamla’s lack of experience in municipal politics 
and her lack of education, as well a lack of party support. Within a month of the 
election,23 Kamendra Singh Dhakur filed a petition in the Katni District Court, saying 
that he believed that kinnars should not come under the category of ‘women’ 
(Interview, 26/2/11). The petition mirrors an initial query that had arisen on the day of 
the nominations. The Collector refused to take her paper because the seat was reserved 
for a ‘woman’. This problem had been foreseen: when I asked campaigners Naresh 
Kosta and Ajay Gupta why they had selected Kamla Jaan (and not another kinnar), they 
answered they had picked her because the seat of mayor was reserved for a woman 
and she was registered ‘as a woman’ in the voter list (Interview, 22/2/11). In response 
to the Collector’s refusal, the Chairman of the Municipality argued on Kamla’s behalf, 
telling the Collector he could not refuse her nomination on the grounds that it was for 
the courts to decide whether a kinnar could file a nomination for a seat reserved for a 
woman. Her nomination was thus accepted and it did become a question for the courts. 
The petition filed by Mr Dhakur stated that Kamla had contested a seat reserved for a 
woman but that she was registered on the electoral roll as ‘male’. Kinnars can identify 
as male or female and register as they choose, according to a 1994 direction from the 
Election Commission. The issue raised by this petition was that the electoral roll for 
1999/2000 has two entries listed with the name ‘Kamla Kinnar’. One is listed as female, 
                                                      
23 The time limit for filing election petitions after the election is declared in the government 
gazette. 
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with unknown father’s name (ajñāt). The other is listed as male, with the father’s (or 
guru’s) name as Nihora. There is a difference of three years in age between the two. 
Ajay Gupta, one of Kamla’s legal advisors, argued that Kamla is the female kinnar, and 
that when the male kinnar’s guru, Nihora, died, this kinnar left Katni. The petition by 
Mr Dhakur stated that Kamla Jaan is the male kinnar, since he believed both names to 
be for one and the same kinnar (Interview, 26/2/11).24 The question therefore, for the 
court, was to decide whether Kamla was the male or female kinnar listed, which would 
have affected whether she was allowed to stand for the reserved seat.   
The trial to hear the petition25 lasted two and a half years, during which Kamla 
continued serving her term. The case was delayed because extra petitions were filed at 
both the Katni District Court and High Court in Jabalpur by Kamla and her legal 
advisors. The trial itself was distressing26 and the burden of time and money weighed 
heavily on Kamla. Although unverified, it was rumoured that she was ‘forced’ to take 
bribes in order to fight the costly court case, especially in the High Court, where Kamla 
had filed an appeal. Ultimately, the case detracted from her ability to perform as mayor. 
Mr Gupta argued that the case damaged her reputation, through difficult questioning 
and reliance on the testimony of witnesses, particularly the oral testimony of one man, 
who worked on Alka Jain’s mayoral campaign. The witness testified that he had seen 
Kamla Jaan lift her sari during a badhāī performance and that she had a male organ; Mr 
Gupta pointed out that he believed this to be unreliable testimony (Gupta Interview, 
25/2/11). However, the case, Mayur Suresh argues, established Kamla’s identity as a 
hijra and therefore as a castrated man. Since Kamla refused to undergo a medical test 
citing a violation of modesty, there was no medical way to determine whether she was 
a (castrated) man or woman. Suresh argues that the court then turned to the question 
of succession, establishing that Kamla was the celā of Nihora and succeeded her guru, 
and was therefore a hijra because only hijras are entitled to the parentage of their guru 
and only hijras can be heirs to the guru’s property (2011: 382-3). Referencing a variety of 
sources, the court defined a hijra as a ‘castrated man’ (2011: 386).27 Moreover, this 
                                                      
24 It is not uncommon to be listed multiple times on the electoral roll. The main electoral roll is 
kept at the Katni Collectorate and a secondary roll is compiled every year: during a particular 
period of time people can add a name, delete one, or amend their details. These requests 
comprise the secondary roll and the next year they are added to the primary roll, and a new 
secondary roll is begun. There is only a short time in which to deal with such requests and it is 
often difficult to verify data, especially before electronic lists, so the onus is on voters and not 
the authority to register correctly. Therefore, it is not uncommon that there are overlaps and 
multiple entries on electoral lists (Selvendran Discussion, 5/7/11). 
25 There was a second petition, filed by another defeated candidate, Aradhana Jain. This petition 
stated that the election should be declared null and void and that Alka Jain (the ‘runner-up’) 
should not be automatically elected.  
26 The court demanded a medical examination in order to determine her sex. Kamla refused to 
give consent. Interviewees told me that Kamla was also subject to ‘immoral’ and ‘obscene’ 
questions about her gender, saying that she was disgraced. 
27  Siddharth Narrain notes that the judge quoted from the ‘Shatpath Bhahman, the 
Mahabharata, the Manusmriti, and the Kamasutra’ and historical sources to establish hijras’ 
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judgment established that Kamla was the male kinnar, given that she was the celā of 
Nihora, corresponding to one of the two listed individuals under the name ‘Kamla 
Kinnar’. Thus, the petition ruled that Kamla could not have contested the reserved seat 
legally since she was a castrated male and was listed on the electoral roll as a man.  
Kamla Jaan was unseated on 29th August 2002 by the Election Tribunal of Katni, 
presided over by Additional District Judge Virendra Singh with the ruling that Kamla 
was ‘technically’ male (Economic Times 2003). Justice S. P. Khare of the Madhya Pradesh 
High Court upheld this judgment in February 2003, maintaining that Kamla was a 
‘male’ and was therefore not entitled to contest the election as the seat was reserved for 
female candidates (McGivering 2003; Economic Times 2003).28  
Kamla Jaan continues to live in Katni and maintains her role as the guru of a 
group of kinnars. She has since returned to her life and career as before her time as 
Mayor, earning a living from performing badhāī work at birth ceremonies and 
marriages. 
 
ii. Shabnam Mausi, MLA for Sohagpur, March 2000 
 
Shabnam Mausi (Mausi means ‘aunty’) was the first kinnar I met during fieldwork. 
Flanked by the two Mr Vermas, a driver and his curious friend, we drove down the 
narrow streets towards Shabnam’s house. By the time we got out of the vehicle, the car 
blocked the entire street. Shabnam lives in a two-storey house, which also contains a 
temple to the late Sai Baba, a popular Indian saint who has both Muslim and Hindu 
followers. She lives alone in Anuppur, which is uncommon for many kinnars.29 We 
                                                                                                                                                              
gender (2009: 460). This references the discussion Chapter One relating to the construction of 
hijra identity vis-à-vis such sources. 
28 After Kamla was unseated from mayoral office, an election was held on 30th December 2002. 
Asha Kohli, representing the BJP, won with 20,570 votes (39.26%). Raj Kumai Jain, representing 
Congress, came second, with 12,758 votes (24.35%). The 2002 election was interesting in that five 
independent candidates contested it (out of eight candidates), compared to two independent 
candidates in the 1999 election. Kamla’s victory seemed to inspire other independent candidates 
to run, despite the usual defeat of independent candidates. 
29 Shabnam explained that she could not trust other people, thinking they were after her money 
or belongings. She said that she was the first kinnar who had lived in Anuppur, having been 
sent by her guru to manage this area (the area between Buhar, district Shahdol, to Bankat Nagar, 
district Anuppur) so no other kinnar could work here without her permission. Other people in 
Anuppur said another kinnar had lived there previously and Shabnam had taken over from her 
(or in some accounts, driven her out of Anuppur and claimed the town for herself). At another 
time, Shabnam said she did not like living with other kinnars because she did not like the way 
they behaved, the way they spoke, and their lifestyle choices. This comment came after we were 
discussing that kinnars’ sexual relationships with men; I asked how their gurus felt about such 
behaviour and Shabnam said that some also behaved in this fashion: she condemned such 
behaviour, saying that as a ‘religious’ person she did not perform such acts. She also mocked 
certain rituals, including the mother-daughter relationship ceremony. Evidently Shabnam’s 
religious beliefs played an important part in her life. She built the temple to Sai Baba in her 
house after her tenure as MLA. She explicitly refers to herself as Hindu, unlike many other 
kinnars I met (who identified as Muslims, or said they believe in ‘all’ faiths), clearly representing 
herself as a religious person. Despite wanting approval from others, Shabnam also does what 
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went upstairs to the main room, which contains the shrine to Sai Baba, and which leads 
off to the private areas of the house where Shabnam lives. The four men and I were 
invited to sit on the floor and Shabnam pulled up a low stool. She is quite a large and 
imposing person, but was happy that we had come to see her and welcomed us into 
her home. Her curly hair was scraped back into a bun and she was wearing a loose 
śalvār qamīz with a cardigan. After formalities and tea, we were permitted to begin our 
interview. In this initial meeting, I hoped to discuss some of her life experiences and 
her time in politics: I began by asking questions but this soon became frustrating, since 
both Mr Vermas and the driver’s friend attempted to translate and give their version of 
her story. Shabnam called for quiet, stating that she would tell the whole story, and 
then we could ask questions.  
Shabnam Mausi has an important presence: when she spoke or raised her voice 
it was enough to get everyone to be quiet immediately and listen. She began by telling 
us about her childhood and teenage years and then explained how she had come to 
politics and been elected. She was born to a Brahmin police chief in Mumbai, but was 
ordered to leave her natal home around ten years old to join the kinnars because she 
began to act like a ‘kinnar’, including dancing and wearing female clothes. During her 
teenage years, Shabnam was trained in classical dance and by seventeen had joined the 
film industry and performed dance in many Bollywood films. However she rejected 
that lifestyle and joined a kinnar community in Uttar Pradesh. She was then sent to 
eastern MP but faced many difficulties: she said the people were unfamiliar with her 
‘kinnar’ business and this caused many problems. At this time, there was discontent 
with local politicians. She said that the people of Shahdol asked her to contest the by-
election for the Legislative Assembly seat30 because they wanted an ‘original’ kinnar, as 
opposed to the ‘fake’ kinnars that they had as politicians: that is, the individuals who 
served them in the past were ‘incompetent’, as kinnars are assumed to be. She easily 
won the election and joined the Legislative Assembly in Bhopal in 2000 for two and a 
half years. We spoke briefly about projects she had begun and completed—mainly 
developmental work for Shahdol and the surrounding areas—and the difficulties she 
faced. She mentioned that she applied to the central government to make a reservation 
category for kinnars, although there was no outcome to this petition.31  
                                                                                                                                                              
she wants: she later said that she didn’t want to live by anyone else’s rules and this extended to 
the rules of the kinnar community itself. On the other hand, when I spoke to other kinnars about 
Shabnam Mausi, it seemed evident that as much as Shabnam has rejected community practices, 
they have also, in part, disassociated themselves from her. They say she has left them and acts 
as she pleases. 
30 The by-election was called because the sitting MLA passed away halfway through the term. 
Shabnam was elected in March 2000 and served until mid 2002, when the usual election cycle 
resumed (the typical term is five years).  
31 This is an important question, given the ambiguity about hijras or kinnars’ gender in relation 
to participating in politics. After the 1994 direction that hijras could register on the electoral roll 
as male or female, Shabnam wrote to the Chief Election Commissioner enquiring in which 
category hijras were classified (Narrain 2003). Self-identification is not necessarily accepted: 
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Shabnam asked me to look at her private rooms and to see photos of her when 
she was younger, while the men waited in the main room. Her house is adorned with 
large printed pictures of her throughout her life: a beautiful individual stared back 
through the pictures, proud and assured. Shabnam began crying, showing me on her 
body where she had been attacked at various times in her life, on her face, on her 
stomach: scars that narrated a very different story. Shabnam seemed to be a complex 
individual: a lonely figure who, for a moment in time, was celebrated and admired but 
now leads an isolated life. The figure described by the locals of Anuppur and Shahdol 
also demonstrated this binary: part adored and revered, part feared and loathed. 
A longer trip to Shahdol and Anuppur in April provided more information on 
Shabnam’s case. My interpreter, Ravi, and I spoke to a variety of individuals involved 
in her election. I met with a few local journalists—Ajit Mishra, Jagdish Pande, Chandra 
Shekhar Tripathi, and Kailash Aggarwal—who spoke at length about her portrayal in 
the media and the conditions at the time of her election, including public anger and the 
desire for change. Numerous stories depicted her in a bad light: Shabnam is an 
infamous figure in Anuppur and naturally there are stories and rumours about her. 
Some are sympathetic, but many are vicious in nature, painting her as another greedy 
and ineffective politician. These stories are intertwined with how people view kinnars 
more generally, assuming that they all engage in sex work, or are greedy for money. It 
became evident that since kinnars are generally viewed in a negative fashion, people 
had no qualms in pushing Shabnam into politics for their own gain: to get one up on 
local politicians. We interviewed local politicians, including Shankar Prasad Sharma, 
an elderly local ex-politician and social activist who gave Shabnam advice and showed 
kindness to her cause at the time of her election. We tried to meet both of the MLA 
candidates she defeated but both were unavailable for interview. 
On this trip, Shabnam was pleased to see us and the atmosphere was more 
relaxed and open: Ravi showed Shabnam all the due deference she would expect and I 
believe it helped that there were only two of us present at this time. We did not discuss 
her time in politics but other subjects including religious belief; gendered and sexual 
questions; naming traditions among kinnars; and the kinnar community at large 
including the structure of the community. I found that she was also curious about 
transsexuals in England, and she wished to visit, so she naturally asked questions as 
well.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Kamla Jaan and Kamla Bua were both unseated by petitions that challenged their gender status. 
Kinnar Asha Devi, ex-Mayor of Gorakhpur in Uttar Pradesh, ran for the seat reserved for a 
woman in 2000: her initial nomination was contested and she was unseated in 2003. Despite 
these unseatings, there has been no ruling on whether kinnars can contest seats reserved for 
women. A newspaper article in March 2012 noted that the Delhi election commissioner was 
seeking legal opinion on the issue, after being confronted by a groups of hijras who requested 
that hijras be allowed to contest seats in municipal corporation reserved for women (Yadav 
2012). 
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Shabnam presents herself as a strong individual, who has suffered hardship in 
her life, but who takes advantage of situations and benefits from her experiences. Her 
electoral success as a Member of the Legislative Assembly was significant, and despite 
being taken advantage of by the public as a figure to mock other politicians, Shabnam’s 
character testifies that she did not always accept the way she was portrayed or treated. 
 
Shabnam’s Campaign, Election, and Tenure 
Shabnam Mausi was elected in March 2000 as a Member of the Legislative Assembly 
(MLA) for Madhya Pradesh and held the Sohagpur seat in Shahdol district. This was a 
by-election held when the sitting MLA, Krishpal (‘K. P.’) Singh, passed away. The 
Legislative Assembly of MP is based in Bhopal and MLAs who are elected from 
districts across the state go to Bhopal and the assembly to represent their constituents.  
Shabnam has lived in Anuppur town for over thirty years and still lives there 
today. She faced difficulties when she first moved to Anuppur from Uttar Pradesh, 
since she was on her own and the public disliked the badhāī work she did as a kinnar. 
Her image changed over time: people considered her different from ‘usual’ kinnars, as a 
more noble and sober individual (Mishra Interview, 4/4/11). This image explains why 
she was persuaded to contest the MLA by-election by the people of neighbouring 
Shahdol town.32 Shabnam had decided also to contest the seat herself and sought 
advice from local politicians as to whether and how she should fight (Sharma 
Interview, 5/4/11). Her campaign was an instant success. People campaigned on her 
behalf and gave donations to her. Shabnam mortgaged her jewellery to help cover the 
campaign costs. It was a simple campaign, with hardly any campaign materials such as 
flyers or posters. Instead, the campaign relied on word of mouth, with Shabnam going 
door to door. On one occasion, Shabnam used funds that could have been spent on her 
campaign to pay the electricity bill of Burhar Municipality, a town in Shahdol district 
(Mishra Interview, 4/4/11). She proved with this act that she would work for the 
electorate, and not simply fulfil her own desires through entering politics. Shabnam 
was persuaded to contest the election because the public in Shahdol desired it, due to 
anger against experienced politicians who failed to develop the district adequately 
according to public needs, such as developing educative facilities, roads, sanitation, 
                                                      
32 The Anuppur seat of Shahdol district was reserved for people belonging to the Scheduled 
Tribe category, so Shabnam could not contest this seat. At the time of the election in 1998 and 
the by-election in 2000, the only unreserved MLA seat in Shahdol district was in Sohagpur 
(Anuppur district became a separate district in August 2003). When Shabnam filed her 
nomination paper, she listed herself as a Brahmin. It is significant that the Sohagpur 
constituency seat was deemed the most powerful out of the eight seats in Shahdol district. It 
was the most powerful seat because the individual who held the Sohagpur seat usually became 
a Minister in the MP cabinet. For example, K. P. Singh, the MLA before Shabnam Mausi, had 
been a Congress Minister in the state cabinet. Shabnam Mausi could not become a Minister 
because she held the post as an Independent. Journalist S.P. Sharma noted that the eight seats 
were usually divided among the Congress and BJP and whichever party held the Sohagpur seat 
would be supported by the other party MLAs in order to receive a post of Minister. This, in 
turn, ensured funds and development in their own constituencies (Interview, 5/4/11). 
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and overall infrastructure. ‘They are men only in name’, Shabnam declared, ‘otherwise 
they are actually kinnars’ (Interview, 20/1/11), alluding to the political and rhetorical 
conflation of impotence and incompetence with kinnar identity. Such a declaration is, to 
a degree, self-loathing, by establishing kinnar identity as impotent. Moreover, 
impotence is interpreted here, including by Shabnam, as a negative quality, which 
sustains a reading of kinnar identity as a curse (as discussed in chapter one in relation 
to myths about Bahuchara).  
This sort of metaphor is commonly used for incompetent politicians, who are 
referred to as ‘hijras’ or ‘kinnars’ due to their inability to meet campaign promises or 
voters’ expectations. The first newspaper article written about Shabnam appeared in 
Deshbandu, a local newspaper in Anuppur.33 The article argued, in jest, that she should 
contest the MLA seat. The sentiment behind the article mocked the current situation, 
asking why people should give votes to ‘fake’ kinnars when there is a real kinnar who 
could fight the election.34 During the campaigning period, the Congress Chief Minister 
of MP, Digvijay Singh, came to Shahdol to campaign for Brijesh Singh, son of the late K. 
P. Singh. A rally was held and twenty thousand people attended. Singh announced, 
‘you can vote for anybody, but you should not vote for this hijra' (Mishra Interview, 
4/4/11). Rather than warning people away, his speech garnered support for Shabnam. 
In reply to his statement, she echoed his words, asking why voters should choose a 
'fake hijra', when a 'real' one is available (Shabnam Interview, 30/1/11; Mishra 
Interview, 4/4/11; Sharma Interview, 5/4/11). Despite the light-hearted nature of such 
rhetoric, which was self-depricating to kinnar identity, playing on their assumed 
impotence, it became clear that Shabnam would win the election, to the dismay of 
candidates Lallu Singh (BJP) and Brijesh Singh. On the final Saturday before the 
election, Shabnam arrived at Labour Chowk, the local market. All the labourers 
thronged around her, away from Lallu Singh and Brijesh Singh. Journalist Ajit Mishra 
proclaimed it was then that people realised that nobody could stop her winning this 
victory (Interview, 4/4/11). It was not just lower-caste and lower-class voters who 
supported her; the general population, including well-educated and successful 
individuals, voted for her as well (Sharma Interview, 5/4/11). 
Shabnam Mausi won the by-election with a landslide of 17,863 votes, receiving 
more votes than both the BJP and Congress candidates combined (Hindustan Times 
2000; Reddy 2003: 167). Similar to the situation with Kamla Jaan in Katni, there was 
                                                      
33 This newspaper secured Shabnam’s victory. The local correspondent, Bhaskar Rao Rokde, 
was the Shahdol edition editor, and had become interested in Shabnam’s story. I noted above 
that politicians pay to have campaign news included in local newspapers. Shabnam never paid 
but Deshbandu did it voluntarily, due to Rokde’s interest in Shabnam’s candidacy. According to 
local journalists, Deshbandu was estimated to have higher circulation during the time of 
Shabnam’s campaign.  
34 The journalist who told me this story, Ajit Mishra, noted that the title ‘Mausi’ was used in this 
article and that nobody had called her ‘Mausi’ before. After that, the title was taken as part of 
her name (Mishra Interview, 4/4/11). 
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clear public resentment towards experienced but ineffective local politicians and anger 
at the political parties for failing to pick candidates who reflected the voters' wishes. In 
Shahdol particularly, the electorate were upset about the repetition of candidates. Two 
particular politicians in recent memory had always been given tickets by the two major 
parties: Lallu Singh for the BJP and K. P. Singh for the Congress Party. When K. P. 
Singh died, the party gave his son, Brijesh, their nomination, although he had little 
experience of politics and was an advocate by profession. Both Lallu Singh and Brijesh 
Singh are members of the Thakur caste (Hindustan Times, 5 March 2000). A ‘move’ 
against Thakur contenders also has been given as a reason for Shabnam Mausi’s 
electoral success, since they dominated local politics in Shahdol district (Mishra, 
Interview, 4/4/11; Hindustan Times 2000; Anonymous Interview 4/4/11; Tripathi 
Interview, 6/4/11), despite the Thakur caste only constituting a small percentage of 
Shahdol and Anuppur districts. After the election, a Hindustan Times article noted that 
it was the lower castes, especially Dalits, who hailed Shabnam’s victory as their own, 
especially with no chance of a Dalit being nominated by mainstream parties. Perhaps 
her subjectivity allowed for a shared resentment against individuals who represented 
an upper-caste or -class position, stemming from a shared subaltern status. The article 
quoted Dalits in Shahdol as saying: ‘we’ve defeated the Thakurs with a eunuch’ (5 
March 2000).35 However there did not appear to be an established relationship between 
Shabnam or other kinnars in Shahdol and Anuppur and Dalits or other lower castes as 
a result of this election,36 although their support played a prominent role in her 
electoral success. Given general resentment from large numbers of voters towards 
Thakur candidates, Anuppur-based journalist Ajit Mishra said that the victory can be 
attributed to ‘negative’ voting, in the sense of voting against, rather than for, a 
candidate. Thus, it was not a victory for Shabnam Mausi but a defeat of local 
politicians. A further reason—given by local politicians and journalists alike—is that 
disgruntled local politicians turned against their own parties because they were angry 
at not obtaining party tickets to contest the election and wanted to discredit those who 
had received the party’s support (Anonymous Interview, 4/4/11). The Hindustan Times 
article (5 March 2000) discusses internal Congress politics as a factor. Ajit Yogi, a 
Congress spokesman and tribal leader, was attributed with having engineered 
Shabnam’s victory ‘in revenge’ for his defeat in the Shahdol parliamentary 
                                                      
35 Shahdol-based journalist Kailash Aggarwal stated that resentment towards professional 
politicians was the main reason for Shabnam’s success, but that her campaign created an ‘angle 
of enjoyment’, through fielding such an unlikely candidate against the professional Thakur 
candidates and due to the fact that she might win (Interview, 6/4/11). 
36  One  limitation  of  this  study,  due  to  time  primarily,  was  that  I  was  unable  to  research  in  more  
depth   various   communities   who   made   up   local   electorates,   such   as,   for   example,   the   Dalit  
voters   in   Shahdol   and   their   impressions   of,   including   continuing   support,   of   Shabnam   as   an  
electoral   representative,   given   the   unlikelihood   of   the   nomination   of   a   Dalit   candidate   by  
mainstream  parties  (without  reservation  quotas).  
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constituency in the last general election. This defeat, in turn, is speculated as having 
been caused by the Thakur lobby.37  In addition, there had been ‘positive’ press 
reaching Shahdol and Anuppur about Kamla Jaan’s election.38 The press portrayed her 
as a candidate who could serve her constituents and her victory was read as a joke at 
the expense of local politicians. Kamla and her campaigners had been victorious, and 
this—alongside kinnars’ elections in neighbouring Jabalpur, Bina, and Sihora—might 
have inspired voters in Shahdol.39 It was not necessarily the case that anyone from a 
subordinate community could contest this election successfully: in the context of the 
Shahdol by-election in 2000, no other candidate proved that they were more capable 
than Shabnam. Moreover, no other candidate commanded the same symbolic value 
that Shabnam did in the minds of the electorate: her candidacy allowed them to reject 
other candidates and make the point that the voters desired substantial change 
regarding the candidates who were chosen as party representatives. 
Although Shabnam was persuaded to contest the MLA election on behalf of the 
constituents of Shahdol, she maintains also that she did it on behalf of other kinnars. 
Once elected, she applied to the central government to establish a category of 
reservation for kinnars in order to address their deplorable condition. Shabnam said she 
wanted to address the fact that the government does not respect kinnars or aid them in 
any way, failing to see that they have value as individuals (Interview, 30/1/11).  
Shabnam completed the final two and a half years of the MLA term. During 
this time, she managed to secure funds for Shahdol district more generally and 
completed several works, including general development works such as community 
and school buildings, and extending cement and concrete roads and providing 
electricity to rural areas. She also gave money towards the Patrakār Bhavan, the 
journalist building, in Shahdol (Tripathi Interview, 6/4/11). Mr Tripathi, a Shahdol-
based journalist, noted that before that act no other politician had given money for 
such buildings. At the same time, other individuals assessed that very little happened 
during her tenure, despite knowledge of such donations and developments. This fits in 
                                                      
37 Shabnam herself said that a former Congress state minister, Bisahulal Singh, asked her to 
contest and gave her Rs 10,000 for the campaign, acting on Yogi’s behalf (Hindustan Times 2000). 
This rumour caused a rift between Shabnam and Anuppur-based Bisahulal Singh, which might 
have been the context for their famous Assembly scuffle (mentioned below) (Anonymous 
Interview, 4/4/11).  
38 For example, Anuppur-based journalist Ajit Mishra said that the press in Katni spoke highly 
of Kamla after her election, producing positive impressions about kinnars in public office, 
portraying them as lacking greedy tendencies and therefore less likely to be corrupt (Interview, 
4/4/11). At the time of Shabnam’s campaign, four kinnars had been elected in MP, of which 
Kamla Jaan’s victory was cited the most frequently and she was perceived favourably in the 
media. The example of Kamla may have been mentioned more than the others because of the 
comparative seniority of the post, or because she was viewed as the most demure of those 
elected and therefore a more moderate example of a kinnar in a position of political power.  
39 For example, in the Hindustan Times after Shabnam’s election, a story appeared alongside the 
main article on Shabnam about Kamla Jaan’s election entitled ‘The joke that started it’ (2000). 
The article begins: ‘It all began in Katni’ and later, ‘The local media splashed the news, inspiring 
neighbouring Jabalpur, Bina, and Sehora [sic] to field eunuchs as well’.  
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with stereotypes of kinnars’ assumed incompetence and was given as an overall 
impression of Shabnam’s tenure, despite evidence of development in Shahdol. 
Shabnam set out to develop the district; this is evidenced by her explicit desire to form 
a personal connection with Digvijay Singh, the Congress Chief Minister of MP, and this 
was a politically expedient move. At a ceremony in his home in Bhopal, Shabnam tied 
a rākhī band around his wrist to denote the closeness of a relationship between a 
brother and sister, ensuring his help and support in future matters in the Legislative 
Assembly (Shabnam Interview, 20/1/11; Mishra Interview, 4/4/11).40 By ensuring 
good relations with the Chief Minister, Shabnam could get him to support her work 
and ideas. S.P. Sharma, a local politician in Anuppur, described how this connection 
with the Chief Minister, and other important and influential members of the Assembly 
such as the speaker, Shri Niwas Tiwari, were indicative of her ability as a politician. 
She proved that she was 'shrewd', drawing on aspects of her ‘kinnar’ identity to further 
her political identity. Mr Sharma noted that Shabnam could ‘go anywhere’: to the 
governor, to the home of the speaker of the Assembly, and to any of the secretaries of 
the officers and ministers of the Assembly. He explained that people thought that they 
should do whatever she asked, since they knew they would suffer if they rejected her 
or her plans (Interview, 5/4/11). I was told about several incidents from anonymous 
sources where Shabnam would want to get something done or have something, but 
was refused initially. She would pressure the individual until she got her way: this 
extended to attempts to get money or permission for development plans she had, 
donations for the temple she built in her home, or items that she desired that belonged 
to other people. I want to make clear that none of these accounts can be verified, but 
taken together, they build a picture of the way she was perceived by those who 
worked with her in the Assembly and in Shahdol district: as a kinnar who had made it 
into local politics, but who used people’s stereotypical assumptions of characteristics 
and behaviour deemed likely of a kinnar in order to get what she wanted. This strategy 
worked: Shabnam capitalised on the way people viewed her as a kinnar and thus 
ensured that people cooperated with her. My impression was that people thought this 
about her and maintained this view, rather than basing their assessments on her 
personality, or perhaps even, her political prowess.  
Supporters say that she conducted herself well, whereas those who did not 
support her or were wronged by her deem her tenure to have been unproductive. 
Although capable, Shabnam had no political experience and no party backing, and this 
factored against her ability to be effective in the MP Assembly and in development 
works for Shahdol district. Shabnam's term was short compared to a normal MLA term, 
so assessments that 'nothing was achieved' do not necessarily indicate her 
                                                      
40 Kamla Jaan had performed this same act after she was elected, which had been conceived of 
by Mr Kosta.   
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ineffectiveness as a politician. Shabnam has been criticised for behaviour that was 
expected of a kinnar and not of a 'politician', such as an incident where she apparently 
attacked a fellow MLA from Shahdol district with a slipper in the Assembly in 
Bhopal.41 This scuffle was motivated by the issue over the potential district status of 
Anuppur, instead of it remaining a part of Shahdol district.42 This behaviour was 
condemned in the Assembly as unbecoming of an MLA, as well as ‘improper’ by the 
kinnar community in MP, who fined her over the incident (NavBharat 2001: 3).43 One 
interviewee said that people perceived her as a kinnar first and foremost, so excused 
her behaviour and inefficiency. He argued that the fact that she did not achieve much 
did not upset the electorate, because they did not expect anything in the first place 
(Anonymous Interview, 4/4/11). A Hindustan Times article, published soon after her 
election, suggested that the electorate had no illusions about Shabnam, ‘who has 
already acquired the trappings of power’, that is, had herself become like other 
politicians. The article goes on to say: ‘they claim it can’t get any worse for them’ (5 
March 2000). The desire to act differently, as expressed by the public in the act of 
voting for an alternative candidate (instead of known, professional politicians), was 
evidently more significant than the fact that nothing would improve as a consequence 
of voting in this manner. As a voter quoted in the Hindustan Times article put it: ‘We 
have never been able to get near politicians after elections, let alone get our work done 
through them. So what if Shabnam doesn’t do anything for us? At least she’s our 
candidate’. Shabnam represented something different and that was why she won the 
election, despite not being able to do the work required of her (Sharma Interview, 
5/4/11) or being perceived as unable to do so.  
The Shahdol MLA seat was reserved for a member of the Scheduled Caste in 
the following 2003 election, so Shabnam did not contest the seat. Shabnam said she 
would have run again if the seat were not reserved (Interview, 30/1/11). It is unlikely 
that she would have won a second time: even those who supported her initial 
campaign said that she would not win again, intimating that Shabnam was not viewed 
                                                      
41 Shabnam not only created trouble, she was also sometimes the victim of it during her time in 
office. During our interviews, she alluded to the fact that she had faced certain difficulties as a 
politician, attributing scars on her stomach and face to attacks whilst in office. Although 
Shabnam was physically attacked, it is unclear whether it was during this time. A local 
journalist who had supported her campaign stated that the scars had been the result of a former 
incident in Mumbai (where Shabnam lived until she was about sixteen) by the family of a man 
who had adopted and cared for her once she had left her natal home (Anonymous Interview 
5/4/11). 
42 The incident in the Bhopal Assembly was over the question of whether Anuppur should be 
moved to the Badra district. Bisahulal Singh, who was the MLA for the Anuppur seat of 
Shahdol district at the time, was in favour of moving the Block of Anuppur. This move would 
have removed the possibility of Anuppur becoming a district in its own right, which many local 
politicians and people in Anuppur supported. Shabnam Mausi confronted Bisahulal Singh over 
this issue after she had filed a no-confidence motion against him, which led to their scuffle. 
43  Surraiya Nāyak, a leader in the MP community, said that Shabnam’s behaviour was 
‘improper, and nothing else’. Surraiya stated: ‘it’s not our job to dirty or abuse other persons; 
she should do good work in her constituency so the community's name is upheld. After all, she 
is an independent MLA and she should act according to that’ (NavBharat 2001: 3).  
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as a 'successful' politician and that people, at least in Shahdol, would not give her a 
second chance. Unlike Kamla Jaan, Shabnam has stayed active in local politics in MP. 
In 2008, she contested the Kotma segment of Shahdol district in the Assembly Elections, 
on a Rashtriya Janata Dal44 ticket, without success. She then unsuccessfully contested 
the 15th Lok Sabha Elections in 2009, hoping to win a Parliamentary Constituency seat 
from Khajuraho, in northern MP, as an independent candidate. In 2012, Shabnam 
contested the Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections from Kanpur, under the banner of the 
Rashtriya Viklang Party. A local in Kanpur, quoted in the Times of India, said: ‘not only 
gender-wise, Shabnam is different in other aspects also like intelligence and 
commitment to [the] masses. I would prefer her over other candidates’ (Siddiqui 2012). 
However, this support for Shabnam failed to materialise into votes. 
Following her time in office, Shabnam Mausi returned to Anuppur town, where 
she lived for over twenty years before the election. She extended her current house 
after she was elected as an MLA; it is a large property that contains a temple to Sai 
Baba, a popular saint among both Hindus and Muslims. She performs traditional work 
in town, but she lives a largely reclusive life away from the kinnar community in MP. 
 
iii. Kamla Bua, Mayor of Sagar City, December 2009 
 
Due to Kamla Bua’s position as incumbent mayor, I had expected that meeting Kamla 
Bua would be difficult. However, an ex-Municipal Corporation Official in Jabalpur 
called her on my behalf and Kamla agreed that I could interview her. Our first meeting 
was at her house. Her secretary, Mr Hussain, took me on his motorbike up the winding 
lanes to the ward where Kamla lived, which is in a central area of the city. The entrance 
to the house is unsuspecting with only a concrete plaque bearing her name. We walked 
up a dark corridor and suddenly came across a large, open room, behind which is a 
large meeting hall. This was the main meeting hall for the sammelan described earlier, 
but at the time, there was construction work going on. Kamla was sitting on the floor of 
the open room, from which I could see into the other rooms on the corridor and the 
kitchen. She was surrounded by a few people to whom she was giving orders. It was 
obvious that Kamla was a powerful individual, due as much to her status in the kinnar 
community as it was to do with being the Mayor. Kamla had taken the morning off, 
since she had arrived home late from a trip the night before. She was an imposing 
figure, dressed all in white, with a towel round her shoulders to stop her wet hair 
dripping onto her clothes. Several people were present: a few men from the Municipal 
Corporation, a people men who worked in her house, a couple of other kinnars and 
girls who were walking in and out of the kitchen. Kamla explained that she had two 
                                                      
44 A Bihar-based political party founded by Lalu Prasad Yadav. 
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celās, but also many adopted daughters and sons, who lived with her until she got 
them married. Most were children who had been abandoned by their parents so she 
wanted to raise them and give them a proper start in life.  
We sat down on the floor and Mr Hussain motioned that we should begin so 
we did not waste time. We sat in a ragged circle and the room was quite dark. Kamla 
began speaking, before I had begun to ask questions, stating that she had entered 
politics in order to fight for kinnars’ rights. She was very insistent on this point and 
showed me a letter from the Supreme Court in response to her petition asking them to 
give kinnars equal rights. We spoke about her campaign and time in office so far, 
including her joining the BJP six months into her tenure, and about her personal life. 
She said she had inherited the property from her guru, with whom she had come to 
live when she was very young. Kamla is the head kinnar of the community in Sagar 
and the nearby territories and has many celās in the district. She is wealthy and 
respected. During the interview Kamla summoned one of her daughters to comb her 
hair and tie it into a bun for her; she also called for and put on her gold jewellery. She 
obviously takes pride in her appearance, but is not vain. She was preparing for her day 
at the same time as our interview and we only stayed an hour. Mr Hussain later 
explained that as a new Mayor, with no prior experience of politics, she was still 
learning on the job, and that has counted against her as people have started to assess 
her tenure.  
On later trips to Sagar, Mr Hussain and Mr Sanjay Kareer, an independent 
journalist, aided me in learning more about Kamla’s election and tenure. I also learnt 
more about Kamla herself. I met with her again in a small chamber behind her mayoral 
chamber in the Municipal Corporation. Seven or so men were sitting in her office, so 
she showed Mr Kareer and I into the inner chamber behind the main office. We spoke 
about other topics, including her position in the community and her adopted children 
and celās; kinnar children; familial relationships among kinnars; sammelans; and caste. 
This interview was more relaxed and Kamla seemed to enjoy talking about issues with 
which she was more familiar, including explaining some aspects of kinnar society. At 
the end of the interview she invited me to accompany her to an upcoming sammelan in 
Bhopal. This interview allowed me to see another side to Kamla Bua, one where she 
was more comfortable in her dealings away from local politics.45  
Mr Hussain and Mr Kareer arranged numerous meetings with other journalists, 
individuals who worked at the Municipal Corporation, some interviews with local 
voters, and the advocate who was conducting the case against Kamla in the Sagar 
                                                      
45  At a bi-monthly Municipal Corporation meeting, Kamla Bua was watching over the 
proceedings with other Municipal Corporation officials such as the President and 
Commissioner. Although she followed what was happening—mainly discussions, some of 
which turned into heated arguments, among corporators—Kamla did not get involved or speak 
much. This was in contrast to her role at the sammelan, where she constantly asserted herself 
and appeared comfortable in her surroundings. 
117  
District Court. As Mr Hussain became busier in the Corporation, Mr Kareer stepped in 
to help me arrange interviews and act as translator. He was always as engaged and 
fascinated by the research as much as I was. Many days we would sit and discuss the 
interviews or what had happened, or some issues that I was trying to think through. 
We had to be flexible in regards to interviews, with many conducted at night. One time 
I arrived in Sagar at 8pm, only to rush off to an interview an hour later with journalist 
Mr Sudesh Tiwari. This turned out to be one of the most productive interviews and it 
lasted until nearly midnight. When we met Mr Krishna Veer Singh Thakur, the 
attorney arguing the petition against Kamla Bua, we went to his home at 10pm at night, 
where he was still working. Mr Kareer arranged interviews with voters around the city, 
visiting people’s homes or interviewing people on the street. I insisted on this although 
we eventually attracted such a large crowd it became impossible to focus and get the 
person being interviewed to respond.46  
My fieldwork experiences in Sagar were different from Anuppur and Shahdol 
and Katni since Kamla Bua was the incumbent mayor: people seemed to moderate 
their responses about her and an election that had happened less than two years earlier. 
I found this happened particularly in interviews with local voters, where they said they 
had no complaints with her tenure. On the other hand, other people were willing to 
point out in what ways they thought she had failed, particularly journalists or 
educated members of the public who did not see any physical change or developments 
in Sagar. 
In December 2011 Kamla Bua’s election was disqualified because she had run 
for a Scheduled Caste seat but did not have the correct documentation to prove her 
status.47 She was unseated and although she initially filed a petition in the Jabalpur 
High Court against the verdict, she later dropped the case and a new BJP mayor, 
Aneeta Ahirwar, was sworn into office in April 2012. After Kamla’s unseating, 
journalist Sanjay Kareer suggested that people in Sagar had lost interest in her, that 
they had ‘discarded’ her. Aneeta Ahirwar, he reckoned, was no different from previous 
politicians and so voters in Sagar found that things were ‘back to where they were 
before’ (Personal Correspondence, 13/6/13). 
 
                                                      
46 While individuals were happy to be interviewed, the informal setting and short discussions 
soon turned the process into a spectacle in which other people wanted to take part by and give 
their opinion. Once one interviewee heard another interviewee’s answer, they gave almost the 
same response. Even though Mr Kareer explained the nature of our research, he suggested that 
people suspected we might be working for a newspaper, or even Kamla Bua herself.  These 
individuals were the most reluctant to comment on the state of government in Sagar or what 
they felt were the major problems. Everyone claimed they were happy with Kamla and would 
vote for her again. 
47 A caste certificate is required when the nomination is filed. However the Returning Officer 
did not ask Kamla for her caste certificate. In the caste box on the nomination form, Kamla 
wrote ‘caste-less kinnar’ (jātivihīn kinnar). Mr K.V.S. Thakur, the advocate for Suman Ahirwar, 
stated that she only filed for a caste certificate after the petition was brought against her.  
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Kamla’s Campaign, Tenure, and Unseating 
Kamla Bua’s election was different from the other cases because she stated explicitly 
that she chose to run for office, in order to bring attention to and secure equal rights for 
kinnars. Despite the self-proclaimed intention to run on behalf of kinnars, Kamla 
generated mass support among local voters in the city. She won the directly elected 
mayoral seat with a margin of 43,433 votes. She ran as an independent candidate, 
whilst the majority of the corporators in the Municipal Corporation belonged to the BJP 
party. In June 2010, Kamla Bua joined the BJP party and her decision affected a change 
in the composition of the Mayor-in-Council to reflect the Mayor's party affiliation (that 
is, her largely independent council were replaced with members belonging to the BJP); 
interviewees said that the Corporation became more effective as a consequence, since 
the Mayor and the majority of the Corporation belonged to the same party and were 
thus able to make decisions affecting the Corporation more easily.48 
Like the other kinnars who became involved in politics, Kamla Bua had no 
background or experience of district level politics. In contrast to other kinnars who 
described that constituents urged them to contest elections, Kamla and others claim 
that it was her idea to campaign, perhaps inspired by the electoral success of other 
kinnars. She filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking them to recognise the need 
for equal rights for kinnars. This self-expressed reason was coupled with the desire to 
enter politics, as a citizen of India. Kamla expressed the sentiment that she should not 
just perform traditional work, given that she is a citizen and thus could enter other 
fields, such as the domain of politics (Interview, 2/2/11).  
When Kamla began campaigning, the mood in Sagar was similar to other 
localities in which kinnars successfully contested elections. People were frustrated with 
local politicians and she took advantage of this sentiment, putting herself forward for 
the election. Kamla is a wealthy and influential kinnar and this position worked in her 
favour, saying she would work with the sole intention of developing the city, rather 
than making a profession out of politics. Her considerable wealth helped to present her 
as a suitable candidate, since, as she argued, she would not be corrupt and dishonest.  
As with the other cases, Kamla’s candidacy was viewed as a mockery of the BJP 
and Congress candidates. At the initial campaign stage, Kamla Bua walked through 
town informally, gathering supporters and local people interested in her campaign. 
Her marches were seen as light-hearted fun, with people ‘trailing’ behind them 
through the main streets of the city, mocking and laughing at the procession.49 This 
                                                      
48 In the 2009 election, 31 out of 48 wards were won by the BJP, meaning that Kamla’s decision 
to join the party ensured a smoother running of the Corporation, given that the majority of 
councillors belonged to the BJP as well (Bahadur Singh Interview, 3/3/11). 
49 Sagar journalist Sudesh Tiwari said that the campaign was not ‘serious’ in the sense that it 
was not organised. When kinnars walk on the streets, Mr Tiwari noted, people follow them, 
laughing, taunting, and mimicking their distinctive clap. During her campaign, Kamla would 
wander on the streets with other kinnars, and would generate a following of twenty or thirty 
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was probably because people were surprised to see a kinnar contesting the election, and 
Kamla Bua was seen as a 'regular' kinnar, who, up to this point, had had no interests or 
contribution to the development of Sagar (Tiwari Interview, 28/2/11). 50  Kamla’s 
marches generated interest in her candidacy and spread news of her election among 
constituents. She began to gain support, demonstrated in the production of electoral 
material by her supporters and donations to her campaign. In the later stages of the 
campaign, material was 'donated' to five or six prominent local newspapers in order to 
advertise Kamla's campaign (ibid.). These advertisements discussed her agenda and 
urged people to vote for the 'key', Kamla's campaign symbol. 
From the outset, Kamla’s support ostensibly came from lower-class people in 
Sagar. However, support was more widespread. Dilip Chanchal, a local printing 
merchant, stated that many people in town supported her candidacy, even though they 
would not support a kinnar publicly (Interview, 5/3/11). This latent support was 
reflected in the post-election public reaction: Kamla Bua took to the streets to celebrate, 
but it was a relatively small celebration, as her support was largely invisible. This lack 
of visible support contrasts the way in which other candidates were seen. Kamla 
organised public gatherings towards the end of the campaign, but few people would 
attend. On the other hand, the Chief Minister of the state, Shivraj Singh Chauhan, 
visited Sagar to campaign for the BJP, and twenty thousand people attended the rally, 
yet, the BJP candidate was unable to secure even that number of votes during the 
election. Prominent state leaders campaigned for the Congress candidate as well, but 
failed to convert crowd numbers into voting figures. People did not want to associate 
with Kamla explicitly but still wanted to vote for her.  
Kamla Bua's election was not solely due to her perceived popularity with voters. 
Retrospectively, people commented that it was anger and disillusion with professional 
politicians that led to her victory (Chanchal Interview, 5/3/11; Tiwari Interview 
28/2/11), akin to the situation in Katni and Shahdol. Anger with experienced 
politicians made her decision to run as an independent candidate significant. In 
previous mayoral elections, the people of Sagar had shown reluctance in voting for 
independent candidates, so an outright victory was not clear or expected (Tiwari 
Interview, 28/2/11; Bahadur Singh Interview, 3/3/11). However, as an independent 
candidate, Kamla was not tied to any mainstream political party agenda and therefore 
was more attractive to many voters. Interviewees said that they did not want to vote 
                                                                                                                                                              
people. The campaign seemed unorganised since Kamla would simply choose different parts of 
the city to go to on different days, knocking on doors to meet different people. Mr Tiwari said 
kinnars would engage in familiar banter with people, instead of engaging as a ‘serious’ 
candidate who came to ask for votes. Kamla did not ask directly for votes, but instead 
suggested improvements and developments she might make to Sagar; this informal approach 
endeared voters to her (Interview, 28/2/11). 
50 Usually individuals who wish to contest elections have a background in social work or 
development in their wards or cities. Kamla Bua had no background in such work in Sagar until 
she decided to contest the election. 
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for Congress or BJP and she provided a different option. Kamla had no party backing 
or political experience and thus she was represented as an individual who was devoid 
of party ideology. In fact, her independent status was occasionally explained as the 
most significant factor in her election. Rajesh Kesherwani, a local merchant, said that 
voters in Sagar knew that she would not have support from the government (both at 
the state and municipal level), nor financial aid, but what was important was that she 
represented ‘something new’, in standing as an independent and trying to implement, 
what he termed, a ‘new ideology’ (Interview, 5/3/11). 
Different factions in both the BJP and Congress parties took advantage of 
Kamla’s independent status and popularity. Once it was evident that Kamla might be a 
real threat to the other candidates, stories began to circulate by various local BJP and 
Congress factions to discredit nominated candidates that other factions did not support. 
Journalist Sudesh Tiwari explained that individual factions felt they might be able to 
damage the prospects of other candidates so they started supporting Kamla's 
campaign (Interview, 28/2/11). This involved undermining nominated candidates and 
actively supporting Kamla. Rumours were spread to galvanise support from a variety 
of social groups. Although Kamla Bua herself states she is from the Kori caste, which is 
a Scheduled Caste (Hussain Interview, 7/3/11), there were other rumours generated 
that she was a Brahmin (Tiwari Interview, 28/2/11; Ahmed Interview, 27/2/11), or 
from a different caste altogether (Anonymous, 7/3/11). There were also rumours that 
she was a Muslim (Tiwari Interview, 28/2/11) to gain support from Muslim 
constituents. Moreover, rumours were spread in order to gain wider support from 
different local factions of both Congress and BJP.51 As an example of ‘internal sabotage’ 
in the BJP, I was given the case of the factional conflict between Mr Bhupen Singh 
Dhakur and Mr Gopal Bhargav. Mr Sandhya Bhargav was the district president of the 
Bharatiya Janshakti Party (BJS)52 and supported Kamla’s campaign to damage the BJP 
candidate’s prospects. The rural development BJP minister of MP was Mr Gopal 
Bhargav, and he was from an adjoining constituency to Sagar. Since Sandhya Bhargav 
supported Kamla, his supporters tried to intimate that Gopal Bhargav also supported 
her candidacy. Kamla’s supporters intended to undermine the BJP campaign by 
claiming that a BJP minister supported Kamla instead of the BJP candidate, Suman 
Ahirwar. Mrs Ahirwar was backed by Mr Bhupen Singh Dhakur, another prominent 
political leader and a member of parliament for Sagar constituency. Mr Dhakur and Mr 
                                                      
51 Local journalist Mr Tiwari said that factional conflicts among the Congress Party are well-
known, and would have impacted whatever candidate the state-level Congress Party chose to 
nominate (as it turned out, in this election, the Congress candidate was not a ‘serious’ threat, as 
Mr Tiwari assessed; Interview, 28/2/11).  
52 This was a party founded in 2006 by Uma Bharati, a former leader in the BJP. In 2011, the BJS 
party merged with the BJP when Uma Bharati rejoined her former party. In 2000, Uma Bharati 
indicated that the BJP was open to fielding kinnars in future elections (Indian Express 2000), and 
this statement might have given credence to her rumoured support in 2009 of Kamla Bua’s 
candidacy. 
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Gopal Bhargav were from different factions in the BJP and it was assumed that each 
would attempt to sabotage the other’s prospects. Thus, Mr Gopal Bhargav’s apparent 
support for Kamla might have been believable, as manufactured by Sandhya Bhargav 
and the BJS. If the BJP candidate lost, it would damage Mr Dhakur’s reputation (Mr 
Tiwari Interview, 28/2/11).  
Kamla Bua's campaign was soon considered a threat to the other contenders, 
despite her independent status in a city where independent candidates rarely won 
elections, coupled with the fact she was a kinnar. Evidence that she was a threat can be 
demonstrated in the election itself. Before polling day, a candidate was nominated for 
the election with the name 'Kamla Bai Kinnar', who was also running as an 
independent candidate. Kamla's name appeared as 'Kamla Bua' on the voting form. 
This tactic was implemented to confuse voters and draw votes away from Kamla Bua. 
Despite such tricks, Kamla's victory seemed certain. Even after the first round of 
counting, Kamla secured a huge margin ahead of her rivals (Bahadur Singh Interview, 
3/3/11). Her impending victory worried experienced politicians in the Corporation, 
whose own elections had been confirmed several days earlier, since they knew it 
would be difficult working with a Mayor who did not belong to either Congress or BJP, 
parties that dominated the Corporation. There was worry about working with Kamla 
Bua, a kinnar who had no experience of politics and only a few years of formal 
education. The Sagar District Collector, Mr Manish Srivastava, commented on the 
reasons for Kamla’s success, including what he perceived as a high voter turnout 
among women and a high voter turnout generally. He also mentioned that because she 
was ’bisexual’, people thought she would have no ulterior motives to collect money 
(Interview, 1/2/11).  
The first six months in office proved hard for Kamla Bua. The BJP held a 
majority in the Corporation with 31 of 48 ward councillors. As required of the Mayor, 
Kamla Bua formed an advisory council, the Mayor-in-Council. She did so with a 
smattering of independent councillors or councillors who belonged to smaller political 
parties, and a couple of Congress members who became independent candidates when 
she invited them to join the Council. This Council had little experience and no major 
party support, making progress slow initially in the Corporation.  
After six months in office, Kamla Bua joined the BJP. This was an expedient 
move since she received political, financial, and emotional support in order to manage 
the Corporation more efficiently. Kamla Bua herself recognised the significance of such 
a move, which allowed her to work more positively towards the development of Sagar 
(Interview, 2/2/11). The BJP now had a majority in the Corporation and controlled the 
Mayor-in-Council, which was reformed to consist of experienced BJP members.53 
                                                      
53 Kamla joined the BJP in July 2010. The new Mayor-in-Council was sworn in on 25th August 
2010. 
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Overall, this allowed for a more efficient running of the Corporation.54 At the same 
time, Kamla had gained valuable experience from her initial six months in office 
(Hussain Interview, 3/3/11). Her experience added to an increase in her efficiency in 
the period after her first six months in office. Another factor regarding the 
Corporation’s efficiency was the arrival of a new Commissioner in 2010. The 
Commissioner was in charge of the budget allocation and ensuring the state 
government released funds allocated to the district, as well as monitoring the 
functioning of the Corporation on a daily basis. The new Commissioner, S. B. Singh, 
ensured that the Sagar Corporation was no longer in deficit, allowing for funding for 
future projects.55  
However, Kamla’s supporters and BJP members argue that her incorporation 
into the BJP ensured the smooth running of the Corporation, based on BJP members’ 
experience, agenda, and vision. There was some criticism of Kamla Bua joining the BJP, 
based on the fact that she was voted for, in large part, because of her status as an 
independent candidate, and since she would have to adopt the BJP agenda and party 
interests.56 However, joining the BJP made little difference to many constituents.57 
Many interviewees assumed that once she joined the BJP, her individual interests and 
actions were less significant, and that the BJP would work in the city's interests. 
Alternatively, her move makes little difference if people already assumed that her 
tenure would be unimportant and that joining a party would make little difference to 
what she could achieve. Journalist Sudesh Tiwari explained that people simply wanted 
to teach local politicians a lesson, so they did not expect that Kamla would be a more 
efficient or honest politician, contradicting campaign rhetoric regarding potential 
efficiency. Since they did not expect anything, Kamla did not disappoint them, 
                                                      
54 One interviewee in the current Mayor-in-Council (MIC), Mr Naresh Yadav, noted that one 
reason for the efficient running of the Corporation was the receipt of funds from the MP 
government to the Municipal Corporation. When the state government is ruled by the same 
party as the Municipal Corporation in question (here, both BJP), the payment is made without 
delay. This was the case once Kamla Bua joined the BJP party, giving the BJP a mayor belonging 
to the party as well as the majority of wards in the Corporation. He also attributed the 
Corporation’s success (after Kamla's incorporation into the party) to experienced politicians 
joining the MIC, rather than the relatively inexperienced 'independent' and smaller party 
representatives that had made up the MIC in the first six months of Kamla's tenure (Yadav 
Interview, 2/3/11). 
55 Financial constraints are a common problem for local government bodies in MP; see Palharya 
2003 and Behar 2003. 
56 For example, Mr Kesherwani, a local merchant, gave the opinion that her independent status 
is what caused so many people to support her campaign in the first place, so it was crucial that 
she stay as an independent and try to achieve something in office from this position. This was 
her ‘moral duty’, he said, and it didn’t matter whether she succeeded or not. He argued that 
what made her supporters angry about her joining the BJP was that they had rejected the main 
political parties, including the BJP, and then she became a 'tool' of that very party. 'She is there', 
Mr Kesherwani said, 'where we didn't want her to go' (Interview, 5/3/11). 
57 Several lower-class individuals I interviewed (who wanted to remain anonymous or only 
gave their first names) said that Kamla joining the BJP meant that she got economic and party 
support and could achieve more so they supported that move, or said that her move did not 
make any difference to them because they still supported her. 
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including joining the BJP (Interview, 28/2/11).58 On the other hand, some people 
strongly criticised her move, arguing that it slowed development works in the 
Corporation. One non-BJP Corporation member stated that in the initial stages of her 
tenure, Kamla worked purely for the development of the city and the issues she 
thought were important. After she joined the BJP she could not act in this way since 
she could not make personal decisions anymore.59 This was because she had pressure 
placed on her from her Mayor-in-Council members and BJP corporators to confirm to 
the BJP agenda and their individual interests. The interviewee said that they placed too 
much pressure on Kamla, occasionally leading to inactivity due to a power struggle 
between these leaders and the Mayor. Thus, development work lost its momentum 
(Anonymous Interview, 3/3/11).  
There is one further aspect regarding Kamla’s incorporation into the BJP. After 
the election, the defeated BJP candidate, Suman Ahirwar, and her husband filed a 
petition in the Sagar District Court. The petitioners raised questions over Kamla’s caste 
status since, as they argued, she failed to provide adequate certification proving her 
Scheduled Caste status. Despite joining the BJP, the petition was not dropped. It might 
have mattered little to the BJP who the mayor of Sagar was—Kamla Bua or the instated 
Suman Ahirwar—but Kamla's supporters were disappointed that joining the BJP did 
not result in the petition being dropped, nor did it affect the outcome of this petition.60 
The Sagar Mayoral seat is always reserved for Scheduled Caste individuals; on 
this occasion the seat was reserved for a Scheduled Caste woman. The petition stated 
that Kamla Bua had failed to prove that she was a member of the Scheduled Castes, 
which was a constitutional requirement in applying for reserved political office. The 
lawyer for the petitioner, Mr K. V. S. Thakur, argued that Kamla had failed to prove 
her status to the Returning Election Officer when she submitted her nomination and 
that it was her duty to provide a caste certificate. Caste documentation is required by 
the Election Officer when the nomination is submitted.61 Moreover, there was an 
                                                      
58 Mr Tiwari went on to say that individuals knew that they did not have a good option in 
Kamla Bua and that she would also 'fail'. Their desire to punish the other candidates was so 
great that they simply chose her as an alternative (Interview, 28/2/11).  
59 Joining the BJP affected those who had helped her to campaign and given her advice in the 
initial months in office, perhaps helping form her initial agenda. Like Kamla Jaan in Katni, 
Kamla Bua had a group of supporters and advisors who placed her in office and supported her 
after the election. Upon her induction into the BJP, these supporters were forced to leave Kamla, 
and this may have affected her political vision.  
60 Discussions with non-BJP Corporation members raised the issue that MP state Ministers and 
the BJP government did not take Kamla Bua's membership of the party seriously, which is why 
she was not supported regarding the petition brought against her. One aide in the Corporation 
noted that the committee of the state government had accepted her, but not the Delhi 
Committee at the National Level. As a result, many important members in the BJP did not 
accept her, even at a local level, and give her the support she deserved as a party member. 
61 At the same time the petition was filed against Kamla Bua, there was a media storm about 
whether a different case would be filed against the Indian Administrative Services (IAS) Officer 
who was as the Returning Election Officer, Rajesh Kaul. Mr Kaul failed to ask Kamla Bua to 
provide a caste certificate, and Mr Thakur stated that Mr Kaul should be reprimanded for 
neglect of duty. He noted that once the petition against Kamla was finished in court, the court 
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‘unrecognisable’ description of her caste status on her nomination form: I use the word 
‘unrecognisable’ because Kamla Bua did clearly identify what she saw as her caste 
status, as she understood it, even though her caste status was not recognised—by the 
judiciary and the petitioners—as within the reserved category for this particular seat 
(Scheduled Caste). In our interview, Mr Thakur, at this point, stated clearly, in his own 
words, that ‘there was no mention of caste on her form’, even though she did fill in the 
box. However, she did so without reference to intelligible categories. The caste box 
options were: Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Other Backward Class. She wrote in 
the column ‘jātivihīn kinnar’, which translates as ‘caste-less kinnar’. Mr Thakur argued 
that two documents prove that she does not have Scheduled Caste status. First, on a 
passport application, made about ten years previously, Kamla wrote that she was born 
in Hoshangabad district in MP, but there was no mention of her caste. Second, on her 
caste certificate application, filed after this petition was brought against her, she wrote 
that she was of the Kori Caste and born in Sagar.62 Evidently she cannot be from both 
places and this was the main argument brought against her in the petition (Thakur 
Interview, 11/7/11). Mr Thakur’s argument was supported by the judiciary, who ruled 
that Kamla’s election was void on the grounds that she failed to prove her caste status. 
Her attempt to declare her ‘castelessness’ was not viewed with sympathy, with the 
court focusing on the fact that she had not proved her actual caste status; here, that 
would mean proving membership of a Scheduled Caste. They did not consider how 
her self-declaration of ‘castelessness’ might give a subject the same status as 
membership of a Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, or Other Backward Class might. 
Mr Thakur argued that ‘there was no mention of caste on her form’, revealing that her 
declaration of her castelessness was unintelligible to pre-understood categories of caste 
belonging, in reference to electoral reservations. Thus her desire to transcend caste 
categories, reflected by Kamla Bua’s statement during an interview that kinnars should 
be allowed to choose their own caste, was not simply accepted by the state court, 
raising questions about the potential of caste-transcending discourse, particularly 
when produced by lower-caste or –status subjects, such as in the case of Kamla Bua.63 
                                                                                                                                                              
could ask the IAS to penalise him. Mr Thakur also said that the Election Commission should be 
more diligent in their work, since such cases are not uncommon in the courts regarding failure 
to provide adequate proof for reserved seats. 
62 An application must be made to the Subcollector of the District Revenue Department, the 
tahsīldār, to obtain a caste certificate. Kamla Bua applied for a new caste certificate since she did 
not have the original. Her application was made after the petition was filed against her. Mr 
Thakur speculated it was extremely unlikely that a Scheduled Caste person would not have a 
certificate since it was necessary in order to get benefits allotted to Scheduled Caste persons. 
However, not having a certificate may not be uncommon among kinnars who are born to 
Scheduled Caste families and then join the kinnar community at a young age. For a late 
application, six witnesses must give evidence to verify the caste of the individual.  
63 I return to this discussion in chapter five in the comparative discussion of Kamla Bua and 
Laxmi Narayan Tripathi, suggesting that a discourse regarding castelessness might look 
different according to the caste and social status of the subject employing such rhetoric. 
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The case was brought to the Sagar District Court in early 2010, and Kamla Bua 
made several appeals to higher courts (both local and state), which seemed primarily to 
delay proceedings. The case was completed and verdict given in December 2011. 
Kamla Bua was unseated for contesting a Scheduled Caste seat without documentation 
to prove her scheduled caste status. Kamla Bua made an appeal to the High Court in 
Jabalpur but withdrew the petition in mid-2012, relinquishing her claim to the mayoral 
seat, due to both political pressure and personal issues. Kamla was dejected that the 
mass support she received was disregarded by the court’s verdict, but decided to 
contest the MLA election in December 2013 (Interview, 28/8/13).64 
 
IV. The Question of Representation 
 
The case studies discussed above offer a detailed consideration of the three elections of 
Kamla Jaan, Shabnam Mausi, and Kamla Bua, and this approach provides material for 
a comparative discussion of three elections of kinnars in eastern MP. Certain similarities 
are evident, such as the way in which kinnar identity was presented in order to suggest 
that each of the kinnars would make a suitable, alternative representative to 
mainstream politicians and the ways campaigns were organised and run. At the same 
time, important differences have been revealed. Kamla Jaan and Shabnam Mausi’s 
elections are more similar, particularly because both were encouraged to run by 
constituents, so that their campaigns were focused on issues relating to their own 
communities, with their ‘agendas’ shaped by voters’ demands. In comparison, Kamla 
Bua’s decision to contend the Sagar election focused—at least in part—on issues 
relating to kinnars, even if these issues became subsumed within a wider political 
position, in order to attract more supporters for her candidacy. A difference in 
personality is also evident: Kamla Jaan’s more demure role and personality provides a 
comparison to Shabnam Mausi and Kamla Bua’s more forceful temperaments. Kamla 
Bua, in turn, appears as more imposing than Shabnam Mausi, which may be due, to an 
extent, upon her status within the kinnar community in MP and within Sagar. This 
compares with Shabnam’s relative lack of influence, due to her location outside of 
mainstream kinnar society and as based in the small town of Anuppur. The roles each 
play, after their elections, also can be compared. The prominence of Shabnam Mausi’s 
position as an MLA, coupled with her lack of prior political experience and party 
support, might have hindered the role she played, such that she was sidelined within 
assembly debate and action. In contrast, Kamla Jaan and Kamla Bua’s positions as local 
mayors may have allowed them to take a more active role in these comparatively 
                                                      
64 Interestingly, Kamla suggested she would contest Naryaoli Constituency (38) seat in Sagar 
district, which was reserved for a Scheduled Caste person. She did not contest the seat however; 
the winner was the sitting MLA and former Sagar mayor, Pradeep Lariya (BJP).   
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smaller, local forums. Moreover, the mayoral role posited them as working within and 
in charge of that particular forum, unlike Shabnam’s position as one of many 
representatives from across MP state.  
 Despite clear differences, these case studies reveal similarities in the way 
kinnars were established as political candidates, impacting upon how kinnar identity 
was being reconfigured through local political discourse. In all three cases, kinnars 
were presented as an alternative choice to professional politicians in similar ways. Each 
kinnar was represented as an independent candidate who was not linked to parties or 
their agendas and who embodied specific characteristics that voters desired in their 
politicians, such as incorruptibility and dedication to their constituents. This issue of 
representation is what I turn to in the following chapter, widening and framing kinnar 
representation within a discussion of the representation of marginalised groups in 
democratic politics. The hijra or kinnar community is not recognised in current 
affirmative action policies as a group that should be afforded particular protections 
and opportunities due to their marginal status, and I explore kinnar political 
participation in relation to the representation of minority groups in democratic bodies. 
Relating to the specific cases for this thesis, I explore how kinnars were represented as 
suitable candidates, focusing on the presentation of specific aspects of their identity in 
campaign rhetoric in order to present them as appealing candidates to voters in Katni, 
Shahdol, and Sagar. While kinnars were represented as likely and able to serve their 
constituents, there were limitations to what they could achieve in office and the extent 
to which they were ‘representative’ of their constituents. 
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Chapter Three 
Representation and Rhetoric: Constructing Kinnar ‘Political’ Identity 
 
The successful contestation of elections by kinnars in MP raises questions regarding the 
possibility of representation for previously unrecognised marginalised groups in 
deliberative and legislative bodies. In the first half of this chapter, I explore theories of 
liberal democracy that justify representation for marginalised social groups in political 
institutions, questioning the potential for kinnars, as a marginalised group, to be 
included in current preferential policy schemes. I then analyse how various aspects of 
kinnar identity were re-constructed as a result of their political participation, notably 
through campaign rhetoric that sought to establish them as suitable and appealing 
alternatives to professional politicians. This discussion leads to a second question: the 
extent to which extent kinnars were representative of their constituents. 
I begin by attending to the issue of representation of marginalised groups 
within political institutions.1 I consider why group representation is necessary in order 
to ensure a fairer system of democratic participation, focusing on the justification for 
the inclusion of marginalised groups within deliberative and legislative forums. I 
assess the benefits and pitfalls associated with the inclusion of marginalised or 
subordinate groups, particularly in relation to preferential policies2 in India, including 
the creation of a ‘creamy layer’ of beneficiaries, the limits of caste-based criteria for 
beneficiaries, and a solidification of caste identities. I then consider the current 
reservation systems within Pañcāyatī Rāj Institutions (PRIs) and urban local bodies, 
questioning the potential for marginal groups to benefit from affirmative action 
schemes in local, political institutions. While kinnars do not currently benefit from 
preferential policies as a group, although two of the three individuals discussed in the 
case studies did benefit from reservation policies (for seats reserved for women and 
Scheduled Castes), I explore arguments that might be made for their inclusion in terms 
of group recognition. In the second part of the chapter, I analyse how kinnars were 
represented as a result of their political participation, focusing on the manipulation of 
stereotypical aspects of kinnar identity in the political sphere primarily through 
                                                      
1 I adopt the description of the term ‘marginalised group’ as used by Melissa S. Williams (1998: 
15-16) who distinguishes marginalised groups from other groups in relation to their specific 
representation in political bodies. She explains ‘marginalised ascriptive groups’ as having four 
characteristic features: (1) group members experience patterns of social and political inequality; 
(2) membership of the group is not voluntary; (3) membership is not usually experienced as 
mutable; (4) generally, the group identity is assigned negative meanings by the broader society 
or dominant culture.  
2 I use the term ‘preferential policy’ to refer to compensatory schemes instituted by the Indian 
government aimed at redressing inequalities faced by certain caste and class groups, which 
Sowell defines as ‘government-mandated preferential policies towards government designated 
groups’ (1990: 13). I also use the term ‘affirmative action’ which is commonly used in the Indian 
context, and ‘reservation’, which refers specifically to caste quotas mandated within democratic 
institutions. 
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campaign rhetoric. This re-presentation of kinnar identity was instrumental in 
solidifying a new form of kinnar identity, which adopted and adapted stereotypical 
kinnar characteristics in order to demonstrate that kinnars were viable candidates for 
public office. I argue that representation is inherently linked to the production of 
reality—I use the term ‘reality’ to point to the actual re-construction of kinnar identity 
as a result of a re-presentation—through a discussion of the concrete forms in which 
representation occurs. Both campaigners and kinnars highlighted particular aspects of 
kinnar identity, such as lacking membership of kinship and familial networks, 
heteronormative gender roles, and caste and religious identity, to represent kinnars as 
more honest candidates and in order to appeal potentially to a cross-section of society 
and draw from a wider base of political support. I then assess the relationship that was 
developed between kinnars and their constituents and explore the extent to which 
kinnars were ‘representative’, arguing that kinnars were not able to fill normative roles 
as representatives. A double representation thus occurred, where the traits that 
maintained their exclusion from normative social structures were harnessed to make 
them viable political candidates, at the very moment that kinnars sought to be included 
in mainstream society through political participation. Their identity was manipulated 
to embody the characteristics that voters wanted in their politicians, however, the 
stereotypes about kinnars that were used primarily to represent them as politicians only 
served to reify the marginal status of their identity. I therefore explore the ways in 
which rhetoric affected the production of kinnar identity, with the result that kinnar 
identity was (re)produced in negative terms within the political sphere.  
 
I. What Is ‘Representation’? 
 
In The Concept of Representation (1972), Hanna Pitkin offers a theorisation of the term 
‘representation’, arguing that it has come to be linked with ‘popular representation’, 
associated with the notions of self-government and representative democracy. She 
focuses on one definition in which representation, taken generally, means ‘the making 
present in some sense of something which is nevertheless, not present literally or in fact’ 
(8-9). Representation therefore makes present that which is not there, standing in for 
what is absent, such as representatives stand in for their absent constituents in the 
political arena. Pitkin’s conventional definition, while useful in relation to the notion of 
representation as political proxy, can be supplemented by the more profound 
theorisations on the concept of representation offered by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. 
Spivak focuses on the representation of subaltern groups, attending to the possibility of 
and means for representation, alongside the contradictions and dangers that are 
produced through the practice of representation. Spivak questions modes of critical 
self-representation through which ‘fractured voices’ simultaneously speaking ‘for and 
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as cannot double back to address the gaps occasioned by the omissions produced 
because of such self conscious practices of representation’ (Ray 2009: 8). The position of 
speaking ‘for’ and ‘as’ is produced through the shifting distinction between two related 
but irreducibly discontinuous forms of representation. Spivak distinguishes between 
representation, on the one hand, as ‘speaking for’ (vertretung), which is akin to political 
representation, and, on the other, ‘speaking as’ (darstellung), which she defines as 
‘placing there’ so that one thing represents another, such as in the sense of a portrait 
(1990: 108). She points to the difficulties in representation since the person who 
represents ‘is always a multiplicity’, yet will represent their position ‘as transparent’, 
usually singular or at the very least homogeneous, in the act of representing (2000: 
1432). Moreover, in the act of representing politically, she notes that a representative 
actually represents both herself and her constituency in the portrait sense as well; no 
one simply ‘speaks for’ in a political sense (1990: 109). Spivak’s theorisations 
complicate kinnars’ political participation, such that kinnars represented their (absent) 
constituents, speaking ‘for’ in the sense of political proxy, and at the same time, were 
speaking ‘as’, re-presented (both by the public and themselves) as candidates who 
would better serve their constituencies due to their very identities as kinnars, an 
identity which excluded them from normative social networks. In what follows, I use 
the term ‘re-present’ to recall Spivak’s double sense of representation, alluding to the 
second sense of ‘representation’ as speaking ‘as’, in contrast to ‘representation’, which I 
use to allude to ‘speaking for’ as political proxy. 
I use Spivak’s theorisations to discuss kinnars’ political participation, in which 
kinnars simultaneously speak for and as in the act of representation. In relation to my 
analysis of the second definition of representation, speaking ‘as’, I employ, in addition, 
the theorisations of Stuart Hall in Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying 
Practices (2002), who addresses the way in which language constructs meaning. I use 
Hall to supplement my theorisation of the re-presentation of kinnars through political 
practice, given Hall’s discussion of concrete methods by which to theorise the way in 
which representation functions in everyday practice. His discursive approach, focusing 
on the historical specificity of a particular regime of representation and the specific 
forms in which representation occurs, is an important method which develops how 
representational practices operate in concrete situations, and I employ this approach in 
my later discussion of the impact of rhetoric on kinnar identity.  
 Spivak’s theorisation of the double sense of ‘representation’, in which the 
subject speaks for and as in the act of representation, elicits an understanding of the 
subject as processually bringing their identity into being through repeated acts. This 
notion recalls the work of Judith Butler and the performance of gender identity (1990, 
1993). Butler argues that the subject is brought into being through reiterated 
performance of norms, such that the subject appears naturalised. Spivak’s arguments 
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regarding the practices of representation work well with a theorisation that focuses on 
the performance of identity through repeated acts and gestures. Throughout the 
discussion that follows, particularly pertaining to the construction of a form of kinnar 
political identity through re-presentation, it is evident that kinnar identity was brought 
into being through the repetition of narratives and the performance of their identities. 
These practices rendered their identity as kinnars legible within the fields of local 
politics, mirroring both Spivak and Butler’s conclusions regarding, respectively, the 
practices of representation and subalternity and the performance of identity and 
legibility.   
I return to Spivak’s theorisation of representation to foreground the main 
conclusion for this chapter. One of her main concerns is the way in which 
representation of the subaltern is contradictory since it renders the subject no longer 
subaltern, and I use her arguments to frame my conclusions concerning the 
remarginalisation of kinnar identity. In ‘Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing 
Historiography’, Spivak points to the way in which the project to establish a ‘subaltern 
consciousness’ presumes ‘it will lead to a firm ground, to some thing that can be 
disclosed’ (1985: 338). The subject of the subaltern consciousness is, in fact, the 
‘subaltern subject-effect’: the effect of an operating subject from the different knottings 
and configurations of an ‘immense discontinuous network’ of strands, such as might 
be termed politics, ideology, history, sexuality, and so on (ibid.: 341).  However, against 
the grain of the subaltern project—the retrieval of the subaltern subject through 
deconstructive historiography (1990: 131)—Spivak suggests that Subaltern Studies’ 
own subalternity (‘in claiming a positive subject-position for the subaltern’) might be 
reinscribed as a strategy, acknowledging that the subaltern’s: 
persistent emergence into hegemony must always and by definition remain 
heterogeneous to the efforts of the disciplinary historian. The historian must persist 
in his efforts of this awareness, that the subaltern is necessarily the absolute limit of 
the place where history is narrativized into logic.  
(1985: 345-6) 
 
Spivak is concerned with the process of ‘seeing ourselves as namers of the subaltern’ 
(1990: 158) and the effects of the act of representation. It is the non-narrativisible nature 
of the subaltern that makes subjects subaltern, since their very acts cannot be framed 
within modes of interpretation (1990: 144). Representation thus renders the subaltern 
‘narrativisable’ and intelligible, such that the subaltern ceases to exist.3 As she states, ‘if 
                                                      
3 Historical processes of naming the subaltern have occurred throughout Indian history; during 
the colonial era, such processes were part of a project of state building, in terms of 
documenting, legitimating, classifying, and bounding subjects, institutions, and territory (see 
Cohn 1996: 3-4). Cohn’s theorises particular ways in which British officials described and 
classified historical, natural, and social aspects of its most important colony, India, which 
include the ‘survey modality’, ‘enumerative modality’, and ‘surveillance modality’. Of 
particular interest in the task of ‘naming’ is the series of censuses undertaken, representing, as 
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the subaltern can speak then, thank God, the subaltern is not a subaltern anymore’ 
(ibid.: 158). In a similar way, representation for kinnars rendered their identity 
intelligible within mainstream politics, drawing upon aspects of their identity that kept 
kinnars marginal in society. Kinnars’ marginality—as subaltern’s ‘subalternity’—was 
named and rendered intelligible within political discourse, making that 
marginalisation as central to kinnar identity and ceasing to recognise the heterogeneous 
forms—that is, the non-narrativisable aspects—of kinnar identity outside a specific 
political form.  
 
II. Group Representation: Arguments for, and Problems with Identifying 
Beneficiaries 
 
i. ‘Fair Representation’ and Preferential Policies 
 
I turn to address the definition of representation as ‘speaking for’, asking how and why 
subordinate groups should be represented in legislative and deliberative bodies. 
Liberal democracies adhere to the dictum that individuals should be represented 
‘equally’, most commonly though representative democracy where elected individuals 
speak for, or on behalf of, their constituents. Melissa S. Williams, in Voice, Trust, 
Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation (1998), argues that 
liberal representation rests on notions of individual equality and individual autonomy. 
The theory of liberal representation is based upon ‘pure procedural justice’, as 
described by Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971), in which justice does not have any 
criteria for what constitutes a just outcome, but is marked by a fair procedure. This fair 
procedure ensures that individuals are treated impartially at every stage; outcomes are 
                                                                                                                                                              
Cohn writes, ‘a model of the Victorian encyclopedic quest for knowledge’ (ibid.: 8). Social 
categories were created, Cohn argues, by which India could be organised administratively; such 
categories, however, objectified linguistic, cultural, and social differences. The surveillance 
modality functioned to point out subjects who remained outside the boundaries of civil society 
and special instrumentalities were designed to control such groups, who were stigmatised as 
criminal; the Criminal Tribes and Eunuchs Act of 1897 is an example of such a practice, in 
which ‘eunuchs’ were named and their practices criminalised. Naming was part of the process 
by which ‘subalternity’ was made intelligible. Partha Chatterjee, discussing anti-colonial 
nationalist projects (in reference to subaltern studies’ projects that sought to separate the 
domains of ‘elite’ and ‘subaltern’ projects), points to the presence of subaltern politics within 
the elite domain itself, over which the elite must dominate, alongside negotiation to produce 
consent (1993: 12-13). However, he notes, the domain of subaltern politics has ‘incresingly 
become familiar with, and even adapted itself to, the institutional forms characteristic of the 
elite domain’: both are mutually constituted and, more importantly, the subaltern domain has 
rendered itself intelligible, in the terms of the discourse which the elite domain can understand, 
reflecting Spivak’s argument that narrativisibility renders the subject subaltern no more (1990: 
158). More recent ‘State’ projects to name different social groups, for example, through 
reservations for Scheduled Castes and Tribes (for a history, see McMillan 2005), and recent 
government iniatives to name ‘transgenders’ (see Dutta 2012b in reference to the distinction 
made between MSM and TG identities), might also be interpreted as part of such processes of 
naming and rendering subjects intelligible and thus controllable.   
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perceived as fair since the procedure is ‘fair’ (Williams 1998: 9). The first strand of 
liberal representation is the principle of ‘one person, one vote’; outcomes are 
considered fair because every individual has an equally weighted vote. The second 
strand is ‘interest-group pluralism’: every citizen has an equal opportunity to organise 
with other citizens in order to support certain candidates or form interest groups to 
translate into legislative policies (1998: 10). Williams notes that both strands describe 
‘slightly different standards of fairness’ in relation to political representation: the 
former produces a standard of ‘equal’ representation, based on the equally weighted 
vote, but the latter strand does not ensure every citizen will be equally satisfied since 
only majority interests are translated into legislative policies. Thus the latter procedure 
yields a standard of ‘equitable’ representation, which refers to a fair method of 
cumulating citizens’ interests.  
An alternative to ‘liberal representation’ is the theory of ‘fair representation’. 
‘Fair representation’ justifies the representation of marginalised groups in political 
institutions, based on the recognition that marginalised groups remain under-
represented in or invisible from deliberative and legislative bodies, thus their interests 
are ignored or unrecognised. The theory of ‘fair representation’ adheres to the first 
principle of liberal representation, that every individual is deemed equal by the 
principal of the equally weighted vote. However it denies the second principle, 
through which majority interests dominate and influence legislative policies that 
preserve those interests. Fair representation recognises that a ‘fair’ model of 
cumulating interests should not always ensure that legislation is produced through 
majority support, especially if it is harmful or damaging to minority groups and their 
interests. 
The notion of fair representation provides a justification for policies that 
attempt to bring marginalised groups and minority interests into deliberative and 
legislative bodies, such as preferential policies. The liberal dictum, ‘one person, one 
vote’ presupposes that all individuals have equal opportunities and resources. Yet the 
notion of ‘one vote’ presupposes that voting is the measure of democracy, where all 
votes count equally or should have equal weight. Many groups in various societies are 
disadvantaged in relation to the majority and are arguably in need of state assistance. 
Therefore, arguments for group rights should be assessed in relation to liberal theories 
of rights. Williams advocates this approach, writing that ‘although a group-based 
theory of fair representation reaches beyond liberal representation, the theory itself is 
not only compatible with but indeed is required by liberalism’s core commitments to 
individual equality and individual autonomy’ (1998: 15). Relating to Williams’ 
discussion of ‘equitable’ representation as a way of considering the interests of the 
whole electorate, certain groups might be unrecognised or marginalised within an 
electorate and thus a theory of group-based fair representation is preferable to a theory 
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of liberal representation and is not incompatible with liberalism’s key tenets. Will 
Kymlicka offers an argument that makes the interests of marginalised groups 
compatible with liberal commitments in Liberalism, Community, and Culture (1989). He 
asserts that a conception of justice that takes into consideration the differences and 
discrepancies between the majority of a culture and its minorities cannot uphold 
uniform rights for all its citizens. Rather, collective rights are required for minority 
cultures to thrive. Williams notes that what is innovative about Kymlicka’s approach is 
the insight that collective rights might be read as compatible with the ‘duties’ that 
societies owe to individuals (1995: 75).4 Elsewhere, she argues that a commitment to 
democratic equality carries with it ‘a commitment to take seriously citizens’ persistent 
sense of injustice, to attempt to understand the nature of the equality to which they lay 
claim’ (1998: 12). In relation to political participation as a collective right, Charles Beitz 
sets forth a version of procedural theory that ensures the fair political participation of 
all citizens. He writes that the application of procedures that ensure equal political 
participation can make institutions more egalitarian, in recognising each person’s 
status as an equal citizen, alongside being justifiable to each of their members (1989: 99). 
In assessing arrangements for participation, Beitz argues that in a system of complex 
proceduralism (in which institutions adhere to both substantive and procedural 
conceptions of fairness), factors such as recognition, equitable treatment, and 
deliberative responsibility should be taken into account (ibid.: 100); these factors are 
enhanced under systems that are more inclusive. Alastair McMillan, writing on the 
formation and development of reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, 
adopts this argument, stating that systems which exclude members of groups who 
have an identity distinct from those represented in the legislature could be said to 
undermine both the legitimacy and effectiveness of a truly ‘representative’ system. 
Referring to Beitz, he notes that a representative system should strive for equal 
recognition and equitable treatment, as well as encourage deliberation and implement 
special measures for politically underrepresented groups (2005: 94). 
Certain group identities make participation, or even recognition, in a political 
process more difficult. Kymlicka notes that group representation rights are often 
defended in response to various systematic disadvantages that make effective group 
representation impossible. Rights for marginalised groups are important because, 
Kymlicka suggests, ‘the historical domination of some groups by other groups has left 
a trail of barriers and prejudices that makes it more difficult for some historically 
                                                      
4 Kymlicka’s claim for the recognition of cultural membership within a liberal conception of 
justice is based upon his on the argument that membership of a cultural group is essential for 
individual agency (Williams 1995: 75). Kymlicka argues that membership of a cultural 
community is essential since it gives different ways of life meaning and defines what is ‘good’ 
(1989: 163-5) and can be regarded as a primary good in the Rawlsian sense, since a loss of self-
respect would be avoided in the original position (1989: 166). Cultural membership is thus a 
primary good, the ‘consideration of which is an important part of showing equal concern for 
individuals’ (ibid.). 
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disadvantaged groups to participate effectively in the political process’ (1995: 141). 
Disadvantaged groups further suffer from unequal access to resources that the tenet of 
‘equal opportunity’ might assume (Williams 1998: 60). For Williams, knowledge of 
historical discrimination is significant in considering whether marginal groups ought 
to benefit from group representation in legislative bodies. Groups that merit 
representation are characterised by two attributes: contemporary inequality compared 
to other social groups and a history of discrimination and oppression (ibid.: 176). A 
marginalised group might be reluctant or feel unable to enter institutions that purport 
to recognise them, since the experience of discrimination damages the trust between 
marginalised groups and the rest of society. While Williams warns against making 
explicit connections between past discrimination and current inequalities in status and 
resources, she acknowledges that certain groups are marginalised in current societies, a 
marginalisation compounded by what she terms a ‘temporary injustice’: the 
underrepresentation of historically marginalised groups in politics (ibid.: 177). Any 
government or institution interested in removing inequalities among individuals must 
address the question of historical discrimination. As Williams writes, 
Difference-blind equality assumes that so long as no attention is paid to social 
difference, it will have no effect…[and] we will never overcome the inequalities 
that difference has been used to justify. Inequality that follows the lines of social 
difference means, perhaps paradoxically, that difference can only stop mattering 
when we have effectively addressed the deep and subtle ways in which it does 
matter. 
(1998: 238-9) 
 
Williams states that the domain of her argument is limited to American constitutional 
democracy, but hopes to contribute to broader debates on claims for special 
recognition among marginalised groups. Her central claims are that a group’s 
distinctive experience provides a unique perspective that is relevant for collective 
decisions; that citizens’ capacity to trust may be compromised by historical domination 
and betrayal, while this very trust is a component of democratic legitimacy; and that 
the history of a group’s experience is relevant to moral judgments about its claims 
against the rest of society (1998: 22).  
While these are important arguments regarding the political inclusion of 
marginalised groups, there are considerable issues with the practice of group 
representation that should be considered. Anne Phillips writes that representation by 
political proxy comes in two forms: either organisations (and by extension, individuals) 
reflect the different identities and groups into which people divide, or by proportional 
representation of their constituents’ ideas and opinions (1991: 136). Representation 
relating to the political proxy definition thus attends to identities or ideas. Indian 
democracy has an indirect system, where representatives are chosen to make decisions 
on constituents’ behalf, and has a multi-party system where a multitude of parties 
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represent different regions and communities. ‘Descriptive’ representatives tend to 
reflect the different identities and groups into which people divide,5 mirroring ‘some of 
the more frequent experiences and outward manifestations of belonging to [a] group' 
(Mansbridge 1999: 628). Representatives and constituents share either the same or 
similar identifications, for example, race or gender, or the same or similar experiences, 
making the representative's opinions, ideas, and interests, akin to those of the group. 
Descriptive representation assumes that membership of the group ensures loyalty to 
the group above all else: ‘“being one of us” is assumed to promote loyalty to “our” 
interests’ (ibid.: 629). Mansbridge argues that the deliberative function of democracy is 
improved through the contingent promotion of descriptive representation to ensure 
that the presence of a variety of voices and interests.6 Deliberation produces policies 
that benefit the polity as a whole, transforming interests that are good for the whole 
polity and creating commonality.7 The inclusion of multiple groups is necessary and 
disadvantaged groups may prefer or benefit from descriptive representation. 
Mansbridge thus argues that descriptive representation is useful in (at least) four 
contexts and advocates policies that promote descriptive representation in these 
contexts. They are contexts of mistrust; contexts of uncrystallised or not fully 
articulated interests; when ability to rule has been seriously questioned or 
unrecognised in historical contexts so that creating ‘ability to rule’ is important; and in 
order to increase a polity’s de facto legitimacy in a context of past discrimination (1999: 
628).8 There are practical issues, however, regarding the inclusion of minority groups 
into legislative and deliberative forums and I outline four key problems below: 
essentialism, accountability, legislative marginalisation, and ‘Balkanisation’. 
                                                      
5 In the Indian context, Jodhka notes that the experience of participating in electoral politics in 
India has been translated as equality between caste groups instead of between caste-less 
individuals. While evidence points to a positive relationship between caste and voting 
behaviour, caste and religious communities do not vote in for a single political formation: other 
structural variables such as class and urban-rural difference matter (2010: 164). See Galanter 
1997, Kothari 1997, Shah 2002. 
6 Mansbridge argues that the essentialist features of descriptive representation can be mitigated 
by acknowledging the contingent reason for selecting certain groups, that, is, the benefits of 
descriptive representation (see 1999: 654). She emphasises historical contexts and focuses on 
contexts in which descriptive representation advances the substantive representation of 
subordinate interests. She advocates that any institutionalisation of the concept 'descriptive 
representation' is best kept fluid (652) in order to avoid essentialism (such as would be 
institutionalised through permanent quotas). 
7 The deliberative function of representative democracy aims at instituting policies that are good 
for the whole polity when group interests conflict; in contrast, the aggregative function of 
democracy produces a legitimate decision in the context of fundamentally conflicting interests 
(Mansbridge 1999: 634). 
8 In the first two functions, descriptive representation enhances the substantive representation 
of groups’ interests by improving deliberation, in which representatives are better able to 
represent interests, and thus perspectives, than nondescriptive representatives in deliberation 
(635).  In the second two functions, descriptive representation promotes goods unrelated to 
substantive representation (that is, the tendency to advocate for certain groups), particularly the 
symbolic effect of such representation (although this does not ensure ‘better’, substantive 
representation necessarily) (648). 
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First, is the problem of 'group essentialism'. The implication that members of 
some groups share an identity of distinct interests or concerns implies that in a system 
of 'fair representation' (based on group representation and interests), these groups 
should have legislative presence. However, individuals belong to a variety of groups 
with whom they identify at different times: Phillips questions how far commonality 
should be extended as a key component of representation (1991: 152). She writes that 
representatives should mirror societal composition and mechanisms should ensure this 
rather than blindly follow essentialist criteria (ibid.: 156), although representatives 
should not only be viewed as representing their own ethnic group or sex. However, in 
regards to ensuring representation for marginalised groups, Williams argues that what 
members of these groups share is 'the experience of marginalization and the distinctive 
perspective on matters of public policy that comes of that experience' (1998: 6).  
Second, is the problem of 'accountability'. Williams writes that it would be 
absurd to claim, for example, that a representative, simply because she is a woman, 
could and would represent the interests and perspectives of women generally: the 
mere presence of marginalised group representatives is not sufficient for the fair 
representation of citizens from those groups (1998: 6). Assertions of shared interests or 
identifications deny diversity within a group, as well as individual agency. There is a 
danger, therefore, in assuming that members of a group can speak for other members, 
and worse still, the descriptive characteristics of a representative might mislead the 
voter into thinking that their interests are represented, when this may not be the case 
(Mansbridge 1999: 39-40). Mechanisms should be identified to ensure representatives 
are accountable to constituents (such as through electoral connections or technological 
innovations to strengthen accountability).  
A third issue is legislative marginalisation. Group marginalisation might be 
reproduced through deliberation and at the level of the legislature (Williams 1998: 7). 
An example of this might be recognised in the functioning of decentralised 
government bodies in India, where caste, class, and gender disadvantages are 
sometimes translated into local political bodies. Grām sabhās in MP require full village 
participation, but often reproduce class and caste distinctions with the result that 
previously marginalised groups, such as women and minorities, are less likely to assert 
themselves in participatory settings (Sisodia 2007; Kulkarni 2012: 155-9). Marginalised 
groups may have a history that possibly includes less education and a lack of resources 
through which to develop argumentative skills needed for deliberative politics, such 
that they have less power in public discourses than privileged group members or will 
be unable to formulate their opinions (see Williams 1995: 82). Thus, group 
marginalisation can be reproduced in democratic bodies, despite the assumption that 
forums such as grām sabhās allow for participation on an equal footing. Aside from 
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issues with participation, Williams acknowledges that minorities might be consistently 
outvoted and that internal diversity might hinder legislative solidarity (1998: 7).9 
A final issue regarding the representation of minority groups is group 
proliferation or ‘Balkanization’. This is the risk that social groups are given incentives 
to identify as marginalised in order to secure benefits. While a history of inequality 
should be a compelling reason for identifying certain groups for preferential treatment 
(Williams 1998: 8), there are difficulties in identifying which groups should benefit 
from redistributive schemes. In the Indian context, the application of preferential 
policies has created a context in which different groups vie to be considered as 
'backward'. Further demands are put on the State (and individual states) to recognise 
more groups’ marginal status and extend quotas. Defences of group-based conceptions 
of fair representation must identify which groups have a claim to representation or 
benefits and be able to distinguish the strength of different claims (ibid.: 7). 
Distinguishing which claims are valid is an issue with the current implementation of 
preferential policies in India. Yogendra Yadav emphasises the limitations of current 
schemes which recognise beneficiaries primarily on the grounds of caste. He argues for 
a revision of the criteria for identifying beneficiaries beyond a one-dimensional 
category of caste (2009).  
Whilst Mansbridge surmises that designers of representative institutions 
should accept some of the discussed ‘costs’ of descriptive representation (1999: 652), a 
discussion of preferential policies in contemporary India can help to develop an 
understanding of these issues in a specific context. Evidently, the discrimination and 
marginal status experienced by specific groups in India has justified government 
intervention. However, the way in which intervention occurs and its duration should 
be considered, alongside further issues that arise from the introduction of special 
provisions for particular groups. 10  The aim of any policy that protects minority 
interests and reduces inequalities should be the removal of special treatment as quickly 
                                                      
9 Affirmative action schemes in India mandate that certain groups are represented in a variety 
of political institutions, such as at the pañcāyat and Municipal level, ensuring that minorities are 
represented descriptively in these bodies. Descriptive representation in these contexts fit into 
the latter two contexts described by Mansbridge above: when ability to rule has been 
unrecognised or questioned in historical contexts or when the group has suffered past 
discrimination and representation would increase a polity’s legitimacy. Mansbridge notes that 
the symbolic effect of representation is significant, although ‘better’ substantive representation 
is not ensured (where representatives advocate for certain groups). The focus is on the symbolic 
effect of representation, where presence is an important end in itself. 
10 Sowell notes that compensatory preferential policies are a ‘politically attractive response’, 
however socially ineffective or counterproductive such policies may be in practice (1990: 167). 
He addresses four illusions associated with policies which require attention: the illusion of 
control of complex social interactions (beyond the control of any individual or institution such 
that policies and incentives are perpetuated); the illusion of knowledge (beyond that of the State 
to ascertain the different statuses and needs of beneficiaries); the illusion of morality (since 
policies have a moral rationale such as indigineity, historical compensation, victimhood, under-
representation); and the illusion of compensation (with the result that sufferers are not 
compensated nor the effects of historical wrongs redressed, or even identified as sufficiently 
separate from other social factors at work). See 1990: 119-165. 
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as possible (Barry 2001: 13). Once it has served its purpose, such legislation would 
become redundant. Kymlicka argues that policy redressing group interests should be a 
‘temporary measure on the way to a society where the need for special representation 
no longer exists’ (1995: 141). This is a lasting problem with preferential policies in India. 
Thomas Sowell notes such schemes (pertaining to the lower houses of both national 
and state legislatures and employment opportunities in the civil service) were 
originally scheduled to last ten years but were extended for another ten years in 1959, 
and then 1969, and then 1980 (1990: 101). Those who drafted the Constitution placed an 
emphasis on individuals as the unit of reference for the State; however, the 
Constitution also contains provisions to ensure that ‘equality’ would be the main goal 
of Indian democracy. Certain articles prohibit discrimination against any citizen, but 
allow for the State to make ‘special’ provision for the advancement of socially and 
educationally subordinate groups (for example, see Articles 15, 16, and 46).11 The 
inclusion of these provisions placed an emphasis on groups who could be identified as 
‘backward’. ‘Backward’ group identity might be temporal since some inequalities can 
be removed through special treatment, for example, a lack of education or economic 
disadvantage. In these cases, special treatment can be employed as a temporary 
measure. Persistent group inequalities might call for more long-term measures. 
Corrective measures generate new issues for consideration. McMillan discusses how 
mechanisms that are implemented to reduce certain inequalities might actually 
‘institutionalize differences’ (1995: 89), an argument reflecting Williams’ theorisation of 
‘Balkanisation’. Preferential treatment and the mechanisms designed to deal with 
group inequalities change the structures of institutions and political incentives for 
actors. Sowell notes that incentives create a life of their own, ‘independent of—and 
often counter to—the avowed goals of preferential policies’ (1990: 123). When 
incentives are justified in order to address a social problem associated with a particular 
group, McMillan argues, these incentives ‘often counter efforts to overcome that 
particular problem’ (2005: 89). Policies become entrenched and are defended by 
individuals who can benefit from them. Sowell argues that claims that measures are 
temporary are mocked by actual events (in India, for example, see 1990: 101), including 
                                                      
11 Article 15 prohibits discrimination by the State against any citizen on the grounds of religion, 
race, caste, sex, or place of birth, but 15.4 notes that nothing in this article ‘shall prevent the 
State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally 
backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes’. Article 16 
relates to equality of opportunity in regards to public employment or appointment to any office 
under the State and citizens shall face no discrimination based on religion, race, caste, sex, 
descent, place of birth, or residence. However, 16.4 notes the State can make provisions for the 
reservation of appointments of posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which is not 
adequately represented in the State services. Article 46 specifically promotes the educational 
and economic interests of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and other ‘weaker sections’. 
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the extension of policies, such that both the duration and scope of compensatory 
policies are uncontrollable (120-127).12 
 
ii. Reservation for Kinnars? 
 
Issues regarding ‘special’ provisions—that they institutionalise differences and 
entrench policies, are uncontrollable in practice, and counter efforts to overcome 
problems—are evident in the Indian context.13 Affirmative action schemes were set up, 
temporarily, to allow access to educational establishments, civil service, and political 
institutions. Yet, policies have been extended continually to include groups deemed 
‘marginalised’. Given that the Constitution provides special treatment for individuals 
deemed ‘socially and educationally backward’,14 the State and individual states have 
been concerned with the definition of these groups and the implementation of 
provisions to remove inequalities. Identification of beneficiaries has often occurred 
along caste-based lines, securing caste as a distinguishing feature of political identity, 
                                                      
12 In contrast, the 2013 US Supreme Court judgment declaring Section 4(b) of the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act to be unconstitutional exemplifies the removal of a policy seen as no longer 
responsive to current conditions (the Section contains the formula that determines which 
jurisdictions are subjected to pre-clearance based on historical discrimination in voting: 
whether, as of 1 November 1964 the jurisdiction used a ‘test’ or ‘device’ to restrict registration 
and voting, for example, a literacy test or character reference, and whether less than half of all 
citizens eligible to vote were registered on 1 November 1964 or voted in the presidential 
election of November 1964). With Section 4(b) struck down, no jurisdiction would be subject to 
Section 5 (which requires certain states to obtain federal pre-clearance before implementing 
changes to laws or voting practices). The Court ruled that the formula was rational at the time 
of enactment but was not responsive to current needs and represents an overreach of federal 
power on certain states which have since abandoned discriminatory practices, conflicting with 
the constitutional principle of ‘equal sovereignty’ among states. The Court removed the 
provisions that protected minority interests in states in which they experienced historical 
discrimination, although critics point to the act’s continued relevance in the face of stricter 
voting laws that make it harder for minorities to vote. In the same week, the Supreme Court 
held that Section 3 of Defence of Marriage Act (codified as 1 USC § 7, stating that the word 
‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman, and the word ‘spouse’ 
refers only to a person of the opposite sex) was unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty 
of the person (Fifth Amendment), prefaced on the logic that equality should be granted to 
people in long-term relationships, irrespective of sex. These diametrically opposed judgments 
are based on the notion of equality: equal federal treatment between the states and for 
individuals to be recognised as equal in relation to marriage. Both judgments highlight a 
problem indicated by Sowell when he writes that the moral issue is not whether one group 
deserves compensatory preferences but whether other groups deserve the same compensatory 
preferences (1990: 170). If the term ‘compensatory’ is removed, and the question is based on 
equal treatment, then should (a) certain states should be seen as being treated equally by federal 
government despite the risk that the removal of protections might lead to future discrimination, 
and (b) should marriage, or state-sanctioned recognition of relationships, be seen as the end to 
which couples aspire, since marriage ‘privileges sex and love within the framework of the 
institution of marriage’ (Gross 2008: 247)? See Manayath 2013. 
13 There is a further issue of counterproductive reactions among both preferred and non-
preferred groups, which can affect even members of the preferred groups as members of wider 
society. One undesired consequence, for example, is a backlash by non-preferred groups 
(Sowell 1990: 124), for example, the Mandal Commission protests of 1990.  
14 Although the Constitution refers to a ‘backward class of citizens’, it failed to specify which 
groups this category might contain, or how they might be identified. 
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despite an intention to remove it as a marker of identity post-independence.15 In 
political institutions, provisions were established to provide reservation for Scheduled 
Castes and Scheduled Tribes; reservation was extended to ‘Other Backward Classes’ 
(hereafter OBC) after the 1980 Mandal Commission Report, which increased quotas 
from 22.5% to 49.5%.16 Individual states’ reservation quotas are based on populations 
of marginalised groups in each state; moreover, lists of castes considered for 
preferential policies change from state to state, especially relating to the OBC category. 
These measures have ‘not yet’ eradicated social and economic inequalities so as to 
warrant removal. Instead, these provisions have provided incentives for groups to be 
identified as ‘backward’, have lasted longer than intended, and have become more 
extensive in number. The incentives available have, as Sowell suggested, countered 
efforts for groups to overcome their particular status, since groups are invested in 
proving the ‘backwardness’ of their caste identity in relation to other groups, 
cementing caste as a definitive marker of identity in India. Moreover, there are 
incentives for new groups to prove their ‘backwardness’, since becoming a beneficiary 
of redistributive schemes is seen as the means through which to attain goods, office, 
and power, to which groups would not have had access otherwise.17 Preferential 
policies are therefore crucial in maintaining caste identities and in structuring how 
people relate to caste.  
A further issue is that particular marginalised groups are not recognised as 
beneficiaries since caste does not always dictate economic or social deprivation. 
Moreover, critics note that preferential schemes have created a ‘creamy layer’ of 
beneficiaries in the sense that benefits from compensatory schemes are attained among 
the already fortunate elites within a beneficiary group, while the lower margins of 
those caste groups are ignored (Sowell 1990: 156-7, 160). This creates a parallel problem, 
                                                      
15 Since the State recognises caste as a legitimate basis for social advancement, this criterion 
provides an opportunity for caste groups to demand preferential treatment and justifies their 
political mobilisation. Significantly, the boundaries for caste-based action are not fixed. One of 
the Mandal Commission recommendations explicitly states that a backward class may not 
remain so for all time, as this would nullify the function of reservation. This opens the question 
as to who might identify as ‘backward’. 
16 The First Backward Classes Commission (the Kaka Kalelkar Commission) was appointed in 
1953 to produce a definite policy for ‘backward class’ reservation. It identified 2,399 ‘backward’ 
castes or communities. The chairman Kalelkar disowned the basic recommendations of the 
report due to the problematic nature of assessing beneficiaries along caste-based lines and the 
report was rejected by the central government for failing to apply objective tests to identify the 
‘backward class’. In 1961 the Home Ministry invited each state to form its own list of backward 
classes and fix reservation quotas. These were often implemented according to caste criteria. A 
Second Commission was appointed in 1978 (the Mandal Commission). It also defined backward 
classes in caste terms, naming 3,248 castes as ‘backward’ and proposed a further 27% 
reservation for Other Backward Classes (in addition to 22.5% for Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes). For a history of reservation for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, see Sowell 1990, 
McMillan 2005. 
17  For example, individuals seeking to obtain reserved seats in political bodies must be 
recognised as a member of a ‘backward’ group, which can mean attaining a fake caste certificate 
in order to qualify for such reservation. In Sagar, Kamla Bua’s attempt to register for a caste 
certificate was occasionally seen in this way: that Kamla applied for a certificate to back up her 
nomination despite not belonging to that caste.  
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where individual cases may no longer deserve the protection and benefits of 
preferential policies, even though the caste group as a whole should be protected. In 
addition, there is a concern that policies focusing on group identity distract from the 
‘broader promotion of socio-economic egalitarianism’ (McMillan 2005: 315). Such 
measures re-focus the debate on issues of group identity and preferential programmes 
rather than the real needs of the socio-economically marginalised (ibid.). Yadav 
recognises this problem and critiques the limits of existing affirmative action schemes, 
writing about the need to reconceptualise how beneficiaries are recognised in the 
current ‘impasse of social justice in India’. He concludes that there is a need to 
reconceptualise the principles of social justice, redefine target groups and revise the 
criteria beyond a one-dimensional category of caste, and redesign the mechanism of 
affirmative action so as to extend beyond reservation policies (2009: 85-7).  
There are obvious risks in stressing the benefits of a system of affirmative action. 
Entrenching preferential schemes deepens caste identities and the need for the system 
itself through the continual identification of beneficiaries. Adhering strictly to policies 
that ensure representation can be damaging for other non-beneficiary subordinate 
minorities. There is a serious concern that a focus on group rights and policies focusing 
on socio-economic equality might distract from broader questions of socio-economic 
development and egalitarianism. McMillan writes that the system can ‘direct attention 
away from the substantive issues which determine the situation in which the vast 
majority of people live’ (2005: 326). A focus on electoral reservation promotes a small 
number of people from subordinate groups, but does not address the biases evident in 
the system of representation itself. Promoted individuals are not accountable to the 
groups they are supposed to represent and have little incentive to be responsive to 
them, outside of the initial needs of their constituents and party supporters (ibid.: 327). 
As McMillan concludes: ‘electoral reservation becomes little more than a scheme of 
political trickle-down, where the substantive interests of the socio-economically 
disadvantaged are served by symbolic representation, with the hope that, somehow, 
this will lead to a more equitable society’ (ibid.). McMillan highlights that symbolic 
representation does not address broader socio-economic concerns and egalitarianism. 
While special measures and protections can be provided for groups whose interests 
and voices might otherwise be marginalised in the political sphere, redistributive 
measures should be reassessed continually, as suggested by Yadav, to ensure that they 
respond to the socio-economic needs of recognised and potential beneficiaries. 
Despite numerous issues relating to the implementation of preferential policies, 
there is widespread use of such measures throughout India. To foreground the 
question of kinnar reservation in local political institutions, I now turn to address 
reservation policies throughout the formal structure of Pañcāyatī Rāj Institutions (PRIs) 
and urban local bodies in MP. These bodies were established to focus primarily on the 
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issue of rural development through the decentralisation of power, resources, and 
finances (Goel and Rajneesh 2003: 5). The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments to 
the Constitution of India in 1992 mandated the ‘creation of institutions of local self 
governance’ (Behar 1999: 3242), formalising the system of rural (73rd) and urban (74th) 
local bodies, which previously existed in a less institutionalised sense. The 
Amendments provided rural and urban bodies with a formalised structure, functions, 
planning machinery, detail of devolution of powers, and financial structure. A three-
tier system was implemented: village (grām), block (janpad), and district level (zilā), to 
which representatives would be elected every five years. The Amendments provided a 
reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and women in rural and 
urban bodies, dependent on the population of each groups in different states or regions. 
In the case of women, it was not less than a third of the total seats available (Basu 2010: 
175).18  
Traditionally pañcāyats were deliberative bodies, although elite in nature. 
Arguably the 73rd and 74th Amendments ‘democratised’ these bodies through the 
inclusion of members from marginalised or vulnerable groups. However, symbolic 
representation has not necessarily translated into empowerment. Esther Duflo and 
Petia Topalova note that women (and presumably, by extension, some other members 
of marginalised groups) elected to reserved seats are poorer, less educated, less 
experienced, and less likely to be literate than male counterparts (2004: 15). ‘The reality 
is,’ Medha Kotwal Lele argues, ‘that legal provisions are not proving to be a guarantee 
for empowerment. The social hierarchies and inequalities that exist in the society, deter 
the marginalised from even voicing their differences and becoming part of the 
deliberative process’ (2001: 4703). Representation does not equate to representative 
‘equality’ as members from marginalised groups often find themselves ‘re-
marginalised’ within the political sphere. Research on local institutions in India 
provides similar conclusions to those of Williams and Mansbridge regarding the 
particular difficulties that face marginalised groups within participatory democracies 
as surveyed earlier, as well as findings from my own research. 
Yatindra Singh Sisodia focuses on grām sabhās in Madhya Pradesh and assesses 
village participation (2007). Grām sabhā meetings ostensibly involve full village 
participation, rather than elected representatives, but the question of participation by 
minority or marginalised groups is crucial. He describes various issues such as 
dominance by influential locals and their associates; strong caste, class, and gender 
divides; and low turnout and participation. He writes that the ‘performance and 
efficacy of pañcāyats’ members is strongly influenced by the caste and class distinctions’, 
asserting that women and minorities are less likely to assert themselves in 
                                                      
18 For literature on quotas for women and issues of empowerment and participation, see Basu 
2010; Black 2006; Jayal 2006; Rai 1999. 
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participatory settings (see Kulkarni 2012: 159-61). Moreover, individuals are likely to 
feel that their needs are ignored or subordinated to majority concerns (2007: 22). In my 
own research, in the cases of Kamla Jaan and Shabnam Mausi, in political settings, I 
was told that they were mostly quiet and did not initiate discussion or participate 
beyond what was required. Their needs were ignored or subordinated to the extent 
that they dealt, for the most part, with the development of the overall community and 
did not focus on the kinnar community specifically. Kamla Bua was the only kinnar in 
office and I was able to attend a bi-monthly Municipal Corporation meeting in 
February 2011. Kamla Bua presided over the three-hour meeting, attended by the 
Corporation Commissioner, members of the Municipal Corporation (including the 
majority of the 48 ward corporators), and members of the Sagar press. She barely 
participated, only speaking when directly called upon.19 This was also the case for the 
female ward corporators in the room; there were about ten women present who sat 
behind their male counterparts in both blocks of seating in the room (divided between 
Congress and BJP candidates). The main participants were the BJP Mayor-in-Council 
members, male members of the Congress party on the front bench of seating, and the 
Commissioner.  
Reservation in rural and urban local bodies is designed to include previously 
unrepresented groups into decentralised political bodies more formally. Most bodies—
aside from grām sabhās, which require direct participation—operate through the use of 
elected representatives20 and marginalised groups can benefit from reservation policies. 
Reservation is a useful mechanism for ensuring symbolic representation, despite 
limitations as to its ability to empower previously marginalised groups. However, as 
mentioned above, there are marginalised social groups in India who do not benefit 
from existing schemes designed to reduce inequalities. Many have good reasons for 
wishing to be included as beneficiaries, based on previous or current marginalised 
status. Arguably, the community of kinnars could benefit from preferential policies due 
to the ostracised nature of the community from mainstream society based on their 
perceived non-normative sexual and gender status, but kinnars are not recognised 
currently as beneficiaries. One reason may be because they do not form an identifiable, 
singular caste group.  
                                                      
19 Similarly, in her discussion of a grām sabhā in Soonaghalli, Karnataka, Vani Kulkarni notes 
that the lower-caste president was ‘predominantly’ a mute spectator, who remained silent and 
appeared as a ‘nominal head’, respected because he ‘occupied a formal position, rather than 
because he exercised authority’ (2012: 160). In contrast, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay and 
Esther Duflo argue that the identity of a decision maker can influence policy decisions, pointing 
to the significance of women and Scheduled Castes as policy makers (2004a, 2004b). Evidently, 
in certain circumstances, reservation can have a causal effect on policy that is relevant to the 
needs of their own genders. 
20 For literature on grām sabhās and grām pañcāyats see Manor 2001; Singh 2002; Behar 2001, 2003; 
Kela 2003. These articles outline the strengths and weaknesses of local bodies in MP, primarily 
since MP was one of the first states to institute a more formalised system of PRIs and urban 
local bodies after the 73rd and 74th Amendments, in order to aid development and improve 
administration (Behar 1999: 3242).  
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Since caste is the primary criterion in identifying beneficiaries, it is necessary to 
discuss the factor of kinnar caste identity and political participation. Given the 
significance of caste in the petition brought against Kamla Bua, Kamla spoke about a 
‘significant’ view of caste that the kinnar community hold (Interview, 7/3/11). Kinnars 
join the community from a variety of caste and religious backgrounds and many join as 
young children. Kamla said gurus often tell the children what caste they were born into 
when they are teenagers or grown up.21 Her guru revealed her caste to her when she 
was eighteen. She insisted that kinnars should choose their own caste, a decision that 
might be influenced by the state or region and household in which they live. Choosing 
one’s caste allows individuals to decide how they want to be recognised, which is 
significant for an ostracised group, although, it is clear that such choice may not be 
recognised or intelligible to wider society, as evidenced by Kamla Bua’s choice of 
castelessness and the court’s decision that such a choice was unintelligible, or at least at 
odds, within an existing framework of categorisation (Scheduled Caste, Scheduled 
Tribe, or Other Backward Caste). Kamla suggested that kinnars should be allowed to 
choose their own caste as part of a process of working out where they are located in 
society and how they might gain from certain, but not other, identifications. Whatever 
the ‘original’ caste status of kinnars, kinnar identity bestows upon them a low status in 
society. High-caste status does not privilege kinnars so identifying with a lower-caste 
group at least provides a means by which they might alleviate their position through 
reservation (if, in turn, that identification is recognised and seen as valid): 
identification is crucial in order to receive benefits. The judgment that unseated Kamla 
applied the category ‘Scheduled Caste’ in strict terms: since she could not prove her 
status (despite attaining a caste certificate), she was unseated. The egalitarian principle 
behind preferential policies is to alleviate the position or status of members of socially 
and economically ‘backward’ groups. However, there are groups who are not 
recognised as beneficiaries, including kinnars, religious minorities who converted from 
lower castes, and other castes who simply do not fall under state lists of beneficiaries. I 
put this argument to K. V. S. Thakur, the advocate for the petition against Kamla, 
asking whether Kamla’s marginalised status as a kinnar meant that she might qualify to 
contest a seat reserved for a community deemed ‘backward’ given the socially 
‘backward’ status of the kinnar community, even if she were not a ‘legitimate’ member 
of the Scheduled Castes.22 He replied that since she did not have ‘Scheduled Caste 
status’ she did not contest the seat legally and therefore should be unseated. He argued 
that this should be the outcome of the trial, despite acknowledging the numerous 
social and economic difficulties faced by kinnars. He said that reservation could be 
                                                      
21 Sometimes kinnars do not know the caste of the child: one guru, Imran, told me that she 
adopted a child that she found abandoned (Interview, 14/7/11). 
22 I use the term ‘legitimate’ since the court ultimately unseated her based on lack of proof of 
caste status despite Kamla having a Scheduled Caste certificate. 
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extended to cover the kinnar community, but they could not benefit under existing 
categories, 23 revealing a disparity between policies intended to extend representation 
to marginalised groups and the practicality of recognising beneficiaries. On the one 
hand, some kinnars argue that policies should be extended to include their 
community,24 but on the other, other members say that there should be no extension 
since they fail to assess actual socio-economic needs.  Moreover, recognising kinnars as 
beneficiaries would entrench the assumption of kinnar identity as marginalised even 
further. This point reflects my argument regarding the double ‘meaning’ of 
representation, indicating that a re-presentation of kinnar identity is continually 
undertaken in practices that supposedly ensure political representation. However, 
while reservation policies regarding kinnars could be considered under an extension of 
gender quotas to address inequalities, kinnars are not recognised as beneficiaries, which 
may explain why kinnar individuals challenged reserved seats as a way of accessesing 
electoral representation, such as in the cases of Kamla Jaan and Kamla Bua, challenging 
a woman’s seat and a Scheduled Caste woman’s seat respectively. One interpretation 
of these actions could be that ‘pretending’ to belong to such categories could 
undermine kinnars stressing the ‘realness’ of kinnar subjecthood, by contesting seats 
reserved for other candidates, given that kinnars posited the realness of their identity to 
establish their difference from ‘fake kinnar politicians’. However, ‘woman’ and kinnar, 
and ‘woman’, kinnar, and Scheduled Caste, may not be mutually exclusive categories: 
in Kamla Jaan’s case, she sees herself as both female and kinnar, and in Kamla Bua’s 
case, she sees herself as Scheduled caste, as well as positing her identity as ‘female 
kinnar’. Voters did not seem to interpret the practice of contesting a reserved seat and 
identifying as ‘female’ or ‘Scheduled Caste’ as incompatible with kinnar identity, 
positing kinnars as ‘equally’ fake as previous politicians. Kinnars and their supporters 
portrayed the realness of their identity to undermine previous politicians, representing 
kinnars as different from such individuals, so identification with exisiting categories 
(which they identify with nonetheless) allowed access to electoral representation, 
which, at that point, did not include a category for kinnar identity specifically.  
I want to turn now to consider how kinnars were re-presented (in the second 
sense as theorised by Spivak) through discourses surrounding their campaigns and 
elections, focusing on the construction of kinnar identity as lacking.  
 
                                                      
23 There are moves towards securing special provisions for kinnars more recently in India and I 
discuss these in Chapter Five. 
24 For example, the All Odisha Eunuch’s Association met state government officials in June 
2013, demanding two percent reservation in government jobs in the state (India Today 2013).  
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III.  Constructing Kinnar Identity through Rhetoric 
 
The elections of kinnars in Madhya Pradesh indicate that kinnars were supposedly 
representative of their constituents more generally and not the kinnar community 
specifically. I want to analyse the relationship that was manufactured between kinnars 
as ‘representatives’ and their constituents. Kinnars were re-presented as embodying the 
characteristics that people wanted in their politicians, where stereotypical kinnar traits 
were manipulated through political rhetoric to present kinnars in a specific way. Hall 
writes that representation can be analysed through the ‘signs, symbols, figures, images, 
narratives, words, and sounds—the material forms—in which symbolic meaning is 
circulated’ (2002: 9). In the following discussion, I concentrate on various, concrete 
forms of representation advanced during the electoral campaigns of Kamla Jaan, 
Shabnam Mausi, and Kamla Bua, including analysing electoral rhetoric, slogans, 
symbols, rumours, and general stereotypes circulating about the kinnar community. I 
note here that contradictory representations of kinnars were employed, which are 
discussed below; a contradiction of representation that reflects Homi K. Bhabha’s 
theorisation of ambivalence, which is central to the stereotype (1983). I argue that this 
re-presentation of kinnar identity in the political sphere had an influence on the way 
kinnars were seen by the public, thus impacting the creation and construction of 
contemporary kinnar identity itself. A form of political ‘kinnar’ identity was shaped 
through the electoral space, by the people who elected them, those who did not 
support them, and by kinnars themselves. The way kinnar identity was constructed 
during campaigning alluded to a certain understanding of kinnars as self-sacrificing 
individuals who were equipped to serve their constituents better because they lacked 
normal social ties, such as to family, community, or caste or religious group. 
 
i. Lack of Experience, Lack of Kinship, and the Aspect of Fear 
 
‘Political’ kinnar identity built upon certain characteristics that were desired, but 
lacking, in professional politicians. These characteristics included being self-sacrificing, 
able to serve their constituents, and incorruptible. This representation is striking given 
the usual character portrayal of kinnars in Indian society, where they are depicted as 
money-grabbing, greedy, and selfish individuals who do little to serve society, but 
instead demand and take things for themselves. This was a common perception that 
interviewees had; when asked what they usually thought about kinnars, people 
described their behaviour on passenger trains, where kinnars demand money from men 
and, if displeased, threaten them, including raising their skirts. The repetition of this 
behaviour demonstrates the sort of behaviour commonly associated with kinnars. In 
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contrast to negative stereotypes, a specifically political identity was propagated during 
election campaigns, which developed an image of each kinnar as an individual who 
could serve the population better, or at least less badly, than previous politicians. None 
of the kinnars had political experience but this apparent disadvantage was promoted as 
a strength. Campaigners argued that kinnars did not belong to political parties and thus 
had no interest in serving that party or their agenda. More importantly, it was 
suggested that because kinnars had no family, kinship, or even caste affiliation they had 
no one for whom they would be corrupt: this line of argument was bolstered with the 
pervasive knowledge of kinnars’ marginalisation in society, as outsiders to normative 
Indian social structures, such as natal family and caste grouping. These arguments 
were used as a contrastive foil against corrupt and ineffective local politicians, whose 
ineffective and corrupt behaviour resulted in anger and resentment among the general 
population. Kinnars thus were portrayed as having a radical liberatory potential in 
embodying complete difference from the (hetero-)normative subject of Indian politics; 
a representation that mirrors Michael Warner’s invocation of queerness as a means by 
which to undo heteronormativity, drawing upon ‘dissatisfaction with the regime of the 
normal in general’ (1993: xxvii). Kinnars had the potential to offer a different politics, 
one of honesty, incorruptibility, and one that was based upon a completely different 
practice of politics from the heteronormative mould (which was demonstrated as 
having ‘failed’, resulting in the election of individuals who represented ‘something 
else’). Kinnars embodied this radical potential; such a conceptual possibility was 
transmitted through such rhetoric that portrayed them as what previous politicians 
were not, as candidates who were the exact opposite to the norm.  
From the outset of each movement kinnars’ lack of political experience was 
considered an asset. No kinnar had contested an election before, nor had they been 
involved in social work or with the community. It was commonly assumed that kinnars 
had little knowledge of affairs outside their own community:  
In politics, or in other affairs of worldly life, they are ignorant. We might say they 
are ‘illiterate’. Their only job is to visit those houses where a newborn baby is 
born...they give their blessings and they [dance]...They take some money from 
those houses. This is their main job. And [aside from] this job, they are ignorant in 
all other affairs of society.  
(Kosta Interview, 22/2/11) 
 
As if to demonstrate her political inexperience, for example, Kamla Jaan spoke very 
little during her campaign, and instead was presented as a demure and respectable 
figurehead. She hardly ever gave a speech, but instead was represented by those who 
masterminded her campaign, who, in effect, spoke for her. Journalist Anil Tiwari 
described this tactic, saying:  
She was not able to talk, she did not know how to give a lecture, and she did not 
speak during the campaign. She just stood on a vehicle or rickshaw, with folded 
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hands, and her supporters asked for votes. For the whole of the campaign, this was 
the technique... Suppose I stand like this and another person says, ‘[this] is Kamla, 
and she has the symbol of maṭkā (earthen pot)’, so this was the technique. Suddenly 
she came to politics and she did not know how to do anything.  
(Tiwari Interview, 22/2/11) 
 
This unassuming performance was in line with her personality, compared to both 
Shabnam Mausi’s and Kamla Bua, who were much more forceful and played up to 
stereotypes associated with kinnar personalities during their campaigns, such as 
making jokes and using ‘kinnar gestures’ in their interactions with people.25 Their lack 
of political experience was presented as a strength: kinnars were portrayed as 
trustworthy individuals, since they had no formal links to local politics or parties, and 
thus had no reason to be greedy, nepotistic, or corrupt.  
The kinnar community’s status as a marginalised and subordinate group was 
presented as a further advantage. Although kinnars have their own communities that 
function much like conventional social networks, they were perceived as lacking the 
natal and kinship ties that professional politicians have and frequently ‘abuse’, which 
makes them corrupt. 26  This representation obscures the fact that kinnars live in 
identifiable households and communities, but these were perceived as unusual forms 
of sociality and supplementary or secondary to, and certainly not as significant as, 
normative social formations. Anil Tiwari stated that Kamla Jaan only gave one 
interview during her election campaign to the Katni based newspaper, City Vision, 
saying: 'the leaders are worse than me, and, as I have no kith and kin, so who will 
benefit from my corrupt practices? I will be honest and do something for the city' 
(Interview, 22/2/11). Another journalist Chandra Shekhar Tripathi recalled the same 
sentiment was expressed by Shabnam Mausi in Shahdol: 'people felt that [because] 
Shabnam was a kinnar, she would not do the same wrongdoings as others, and because 
she has no family, she will do less financial irregularities…she is alone: how much 
money does she need for herself?' (Interview, 6/4/11).  
The argument that they did not desire to contest the elections benefitted Kamla 
Jaan and Shabnam Mausi since they did not decide to contest the elections but were 
persuaded by campaigners. Kamla Bua, however, contested the Sagar election under 
the premise that she was entering politics in order to fight for kinnars' rights. 
Nonetheless, it was well known that she was wealthy and this knowledge helped 
                                                      
25 Many interviewees noted that once in politics, all of the kinnars changed their behaviour, such 
as not using the kinnar hand-clap and speaking in a more formal manner. However for the 
purposes of campaigning, I was told that both Shabnam Mausi and Kamla Bua employed 
stereotypes held about the community, particularly in gestures and speech. 
26 For example, Shabnam’s rival, Brijesh Singh, was one of several candidates whom the 
Congress Party could have nominated, but he was chosen, in part, because he was the son of the 
former MLA who had proven his popularity in Shahdol by winning multiple elections for 
Congress. Both Brijesh and the state party must have hoped that those who supported his father 
would support him. 
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people believe she was sincere in serving her own community and the people of Sagar, 
rather than using public office to advance her wealth. When asked why kinnars make 
good politicians, Kamla Bua replied that they have no family or relations and no other 
interests of their own (Interview, 2/2/11). During her campaign, she referred to herself 
as a kinnar, alluding to the fact that she had ‘no’ children, unlike ‘normal people’.27 She 
stated in lieu of her own children, the whole city was like her family. Journalist Sudesh 
Tiwari referred to these words as 'emotional blackmail', making each person feel that 
she would care for them (Interview, 28/2/11). He recalled that she said if she won, she 
would 'take care of every member of the city as her own family, because she herself has 
no children, everyone in the city would be like a child to her'. He suggested that her 
words ‘shaped people’s minds’ in her favour (ibid.). Voters assumed that a lack of 
social bonds would result in kinnars’ incorruptibility and loyalty to their locality, even 
voters who supported other candidates. Journalist Arvind Gupta noted that people 
loyal to, or even members of, mainstream parties in personal interactions (so as to 
avoid recrimination) would express the opinion that Kamla Jaan was new to politics 
and had ‘no kith and kin’ and thought ‘she would not be involved in corruption and 
she would be more honest’ (Interview, 30/1/11).  
 A further consideration is the factor of ‘fear’ that is commonly associated with 
kinnar identity particularly regarding their ability to curse.28  This fear references 
mythology in which men who anger Bahuchara Mata or other hijras are turned into 
hijras themselves, or made impotent. These myths suggest that hijra identity is a curse 
or a punishment. Being cursed is linked to anger and anger is seen as a common 
behavioral trait associated with kinnars. Fear of being cursed or of angering kinnars was 
mentioned several times to me: this was especially the case with Shabnam Mausi, 
whose anger and temper is well known among the townspeople of Anuppur and 
Shahdol. Shahdol-based politician Shankar Prasad Sharma said that if she were 
angered ‘something bad could happen, because people believe their blessings have 
weight’ (Interview, 5/4/11). In Sagar, journalist Sudesh Tiwari mentioned that ‘fear’ is 
widespread in society, because kinnars’ blessings are believed to be sacred. Therefore, 
people should not hurt them ‘in case they get angry and curse you’ (Interview, 
                                                      
27 In contrast, she declared to me that she had many children, whom she had adopted from 
lower-caste families. However they were not biological offspring and presenting herself as 
‘childless’ was necessary to the representation that kinnars had no family. 
28 It was hard to assess people’s ‘level’ of fear. While many educated and cosmopolitan Indians 
seemed to disregard this fear, they still received kinnars into their homes for blessings and gave 
them money in return, as is customary. In relation to kinnar politicians, women were 
represented as being more afraid than the men in the family (often, by their husbands or 
fathers). This is despite kinnar curses being directed towards men and the anecdotal evidence of 
women interacting better with kinnars (see Reddy 2003, Nanda 1999). In one instance, an 
interviewee told me that his daughter feared having that kinnar come to their home and would 
do whatever she could to please the kinnar, including giving gifts. This woman, the interviewee 
told me, had a postgraduate degree and several children, but still feared this kinnar’s anger. 
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28/2/11). At the same time people expressed this belief however, they often smiled, 
indicating the paradoxical nature of this fear and belief.  
As discussed earlier, there was widespread anger at both the BJP and Congress 
for fielding corrupt, inefficient, or unsuitable candidates. The representation of kinnars 
as politically inexperienced individuals who lacked normative social ties fed into a 
discourse regarding commendable characteristics for politicians and the aspect of fear 
worked as a further factor in building support for their candidacies. Campaigners 
presented kinnars as ‘real’ candidates against ‘fake kinnar’ (read: impotent) candidates. I 
have previously discussed rhetoric in India equating bad or incompetent politicians 
with ‘hijras’ or ‘kinnars’, persuading voters to support a ‘real’ kinnar instead of an 
politically ‘impotent’ politician. Hall argues that the term ‘hijra’ is used as a derogatory 
epithet, used by and about politicians. She notes that Hindi poets and novelists have 
used this illusion, including the poet Ved Prakash Vatuk in a number of political 
critiques (1997: 444). She also describes how in Khushwant Singh’s novel, Delhi, he 
describes his narrator as a hijra, ‘who was neither one thing nor another but could be 
misused be everyone’ (1989: 55 in ibid.).29 This metaphor was employed in all three 
election campaigns, equating political incompetence with bodily impotence but 
distinguishing kinnars from impotent politicians. Journalist Sanjay Kareer noted that 
campaigners in Sagar promoted the allusion that mayors in the past behaved like 
‘hijras’ (Tiwari Interview, 28/2/11). Therefore, the logic was that voters should elect a 
'real' kinnar and hope she will perform her duties and take care of society. Voting 
against corrupt politicians might be interpreted as demonstrating local voters’ power. 
Katni-based journalist Nandlal Singh stated that even though there are low literacy 
rates in places like Katni, this should not be equated with stupidity. He said that 
people were ‘literate’ in the sense that they were knowledgeable through practical life 
experience. He read Kamla Jaan’s campaign as ‘resistance’, sending a ‘clear cut 
message’ to politicians that voters did not like how they behaved. A kinnar therefore 
provided an alterative solution and caught hold of the voters’ imagination (Gupta 
Interview, 30/1/11). 
 
ii. Producing Campaigns: Donations, Slogans, and Symbols 
 
Each campaign started slowly with a small support base, but was taken up with 
enthusiasm by local voters. People supported the candidates with gusto, driving the 
campaigns forward, including giving financial support by means of donations. 
Shabnam said she only had to spend one lakh and Rs 25,000 of her own money 
                                                      
29 The implication of being ‘misused’ is revealing: kinnars too, opened themselves up to be 
misused, through the manipulation of their identity in the political sphere. I discuss this further 
below and in Chapter Four. 
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(Interview, 20/1/11). Kamla Bua told me that she only spent Rs 25,000 of her own 
money, and that everything else, including banners, flags, and posters, was arranged 
for her: she said that this is what made it a people’s campaign (Interview, 2/2/11). 
Kamla’s contribution is meagre, given speculative estimates of five to seven lakhs 
spent on her campaign in total (Tiwari Interview, 28/2/11). Journalist Sudesh Tiwari 
noted that groups who supported Kamla’s candidature gave prominent local 
newspapers packages containing advertisements for print, urging people to vote in her 
favour (ibid.).  
Campaigns were conducted differently to normal local campaigns; the main 
vehicle for gaining momentum and support was by word of mouth (Tiwari Interview, 
22/2/11; Chanchal Interview, 5/3/11; Mishra Interview, 4/4/11). Notably, campaigns 
were informal. Each kinnar took to the streets with campaigners to meet potential 
voters. Dilip Chanchal, a local merchant in Sagar, noted that people enjoyed Kamla 
Bua’s campaign because it lacked the serious air that other campaigns had, where 
politicians would simply shake people’s hands and ask for votes (Interview, 5/3/11). 
One important way campaigners spread their message was through the use of 
slogans and symbols. These are common in electoral campaigns, but proved 
particularly effective in these three cases. Campaigners invented simple phrases and 
memorable symbols to help voters easily identify their candidates. This was important 
given that campaigners aimed kinnars’ campaigns at lower-caste and -class voters in 
each locality. This fact is supported by the informal nature of each campaign, which 
was primarily conduced in market places, crowded local streets where people did their 
shopping or passed time, visiting a variety of local wards to speak to potential voters, 
and in the vehicles chosen for and by kinnar candidates to present them as ‘ordinary’ 
individuals, for example, hiring an auto-rickshaw to take Kamla Jaan to file her 
nomination papers. Given the lower-caste and -class support base, it was important to 
pick simple slogans and symbols for voters to remember and talk about, especially 
given below average levels of illiteracy among the voting population. Choosing easy to 
remember election material also meant that individual voters would remember and 
discuss them, promoting each candidate.  
I mentioned one memorable slogan (kamal nahīṁ, Kamla cāhie; pañc nahīṁ, chakkā 
cāhie) used during Kamla Jaan’s campaign. The slogan was also used during Kamla 
Bua’s campaign in Sagar. Local journalist Sanjay Kareer said it came from the Katni 
election and was used because their first names were the same (Tiwari Interview, 
28/2/11).30 The slogan’s reappearance in Sagar attests to its effectiveness, nine years 
                                                      
30 Mr Tiwari noted that it was the second half of the slogan that was more popular in 2009. He 
did not explain why, and it seems strange given that it was the BJP who were the main rivals in 
the Sagar election, whereas the Congress party was seen as split by internal conflicts and less 
unified (Tiwari Interview, 28/2/11). I speculate it might have been the use of the term ‘chakkā’, 
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after Kamla Jaan’s election. A further testament to its memorable nature is that 
numerous interviewees in Katni repeated it to me in 2011. Campaign symbols also 
proved important. Kamla Jaan had a symbol of an earthenware pot, Shabnam Mausi 
had the symbol of a kite, and Kamla Bua had the symbol of a key. Each symbol can be 
interpreted in a variety of ways: the pot as a modest and familiar vessel, representing 
Kamla’s traditional values; the kite as symbol of flying high, like the hopes of those 
who voted for Shabnam; the key as a symbol to ‘unlocking’ development, the city, to 
‘lock’ out corruption. Symbols appear next to candidates’ names on the voting paper. 
In the 2009 Sagar election, a second candidate’s name appeared on the voting paper as 
‘Kamla Bai Kinnar’ to cause confusion and draw votes away from Kamla Bua. Her 
symbol helped voters cast their vote in her favour.  
Throughout the campaigns, there was a deliberate construction of kinnar 
identity in each political locality, manufactured by campaigners, voters, and kinnars 
themselves. Each was re-presented as a self-sacrificing and incorruptible individual, 
demonstrating characteristics that voters wanted their politicians to embody. A version 
of kinnar identity was presented to the public, contrasting previous assumptions and 
stereotypes held about the community. A discussion of the material forms in which 
representation occurred, including political rhetoric, narratives, slogans, and 
reinterpreting common assumptions of kinnars (such as having no kinship networks) 
has revealed that kinnar identity was actively re-presented and brought into being 
through the shared cultural space of local politics in MP. I want now to address in 
more detail the ways in which kinnar identity was re-presented as ‘lacking’, in relation 
to gender, caste, religion, and community. Kinnar identity was presented negatively in 
the sense that their identity was defined by which it was not. The practice of 
identifying what traits and social bonds that kinnars lacked ultimately served to 
maintain their marginality by placing importance on it in relation to their ability to be a 
good politician.  
 
iii. Identity as ‘Lack’: Gender, Caste, Religion, and Community 
 
All three kinnar politicians were represented as individuals who lacked normative 
characteristics, with particular reference to aspects of gender, community, religion, and 
caste. Inasmuch as kinnars came to be conceptualised as beings of lack, they became 
more malleable in the public's eyes as able to represent multiple communities at the 
same time. They could be identified with different, and occasionally contradictory, 
subject positions often assumed to be mutually exclusive and thus had the potential to 
appeal to a wider base of voters. This supports the theory of descriptive representation, 
                                                                                                                                                              
the derogatory slang word for a kinnar, which people enjoyed using, referencing rhetoric 
alluding to impotent professional politicians, also sometimes called ‘chakkā’.  
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where individuals represent constituents with whom they share either identifiable 
characteristics or shared common experience. Kinnar identity was presented as ‘fluid’ 
in the sense that it could absorb the demands of multiple identity groups who desired 
representation. Kinnars’ ‘lack’ of identity was promoted as a strength. 
The first and most obvious marker of kinnar identity was gender liminality. The 
law in MP allows kinnars to choose their gender insofar as it is recognised formally and 
recorded on the electoral roll. The majority of kinnars, including Kamla Jaan, Shabnam 
Mausi, and Kamla Bua, identify as female, although on occasion I heard people 
describe them as male. People’s uncertainty about kinnars’ gender was demonstrated 
when speaking about them: people would fluctuate between male and female 
pronouns or use them interchangeably, sometimes not knowing which to use and 
correcting themselves once they had become aware of it. Kinnars choice of gender did 
not mean public acceptance of that choice.31 People who did not respect them or value 
their time in office often, perhaps deliberately, referred to them as male. On occasion, I 
noted that slippages would occur when making jokes at their expense. Among the 
general public, there seems to be confusion regarding what a male kinnar or a female 
kinnar is, a confusion sometimes repeated among kinnars themselves. Kinnars 
themselves and other people trying to explain their gender identity identified them as 
a ‘third’ gender, occupying a space that was considered neither male nor female.32 
Kinnars occupy a space in the Indian imagination that holds them distinct from 
male or female, but recognises them as conforming to or deviating from one or the 
other. Equally in the political realm, there was a negotiation regarding whether to treat 
them as ‘male’ or ‘female’ politicians. Significantly, they were not treated as male 
politicians, but were treated with the deference and respect shown a female politician 
in an equal position. The term 'Mausi' (maternal ‘aunt’) was coined for Shabnam after 
she had decided to stand for election, and 'Jaan' and 'Bua' are terms of respect given to 
elder female ‘family’ members: 'Jaan’ meaning ‘dear’ and used to denote 
‘familial’relations or an acquaintance and 'Bua' used for a paternal aunt.  
People did not expect them to behave as a female polician might, but expected 
behaviour that was perceived as ‘unfeminine’, such as swearing or becoming 
aggressive. Such behaviour was associated with kinnars outside the political sphere, 
and was demonstrated by each kinnar on occasion, such as Shabnam Mausi’s fight with 
fellow MLA Bisahulal Singh in the Bhopal Assembly, and Kamla Jaan’s willingness to 
                                                      
31 The most obvious rejection of a kinnar’s gender choice was the petition challenging Kamla 
Jaan’s election. The court ruled that she was a hijra and thus, technically, a castrated man 
(Suresh 2011). Mayor Asha Devi of Gorakhpur in UP and Kamla Bua also had their gender 
liminality questioned, resulting in their unseating. 
32 The gender kinnars identify with is demonstrable through sartorial and speech patterns. 
Occasionally kinnars fluctuate between male and female patterns of speech but do not use a 
separate third pattern of speech (equivalent to the 'ze' form used by certain gender-neutral or 
gender-political groups in the West) or dress or act in a way that is entirely separate from male 
and female or an equal merging of the two. 
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berate Municipal Corporation members who did not take their work seriously. People 
expected their behaviour as ‘politicians’ to be different to that of experienced 
politicians, since all three did not have previous political experience and were seen as 
unaware of how to conduct themselves in the public sphere. All three kinnars 
sometimes behaved in ways that was interpreted as due to their identity as kinnars and 
this was interpreted as ‘unfeminine’, despite being addressed and treated for most 
purposes as a female politician would be. 
A second marker of identity that was called into question was caste status and 
religious belief. In the eyes of the general public, kinnars do not have discernible, 
identifiable caste or religious identities and do not see individual identifications as 
paradoxical with membership of the wider group. Therefore, the caste or religious 
identity of a particular individual cannot be known, since the group, as a whole, 
evades strict definition along caste or religious lines. Caste and religious liminality was 
used as an asset, so that each kinnar was represented as standing for multiple subject 
positions simultaneously, particularly in the cases of Shabnam Mausi and Kamla Bua. 
Both their campaigns capitalised on the way in which Shabnam and Kamla’s religious 
and caste identities were seen as unfixed or unknown because they belonged to the 
kinnar community. In both cases, there were discrepancies between the way in which 
they saw themselves and the way in which others represented them.  
In Shabnam’s case, her self-proclaimed Brahmin status was a positive force in 
generating support for her. Journalist Chandra Shekhar Tripathi said that Shabnam 
claimed to be from a Brahmin family and he suggested that this won her support 
among Brahmin voters. No Brahmin candidate had won a seat for many years and this 
made it likely that they would support a candidate from their own caste (Interview, 
6/4/11). Kamla Bua’s self-declared adherence to Islam is said to have gained her 
support among Muslim voters. At the last stage of her campaign, Kamla’s supporters 
started ‘spreading rumours’ that she was a Muslim and a Hajji, in order to demonstrate 
her religiosity and thus ‘make an influence on a particular section of society’ (Tiwari 
Interview, 28/2/11). On the other hand, there were other rumours spread about 
Shabnam Mausi and Kamla Bua that could challenge their self-asserted Brahmin and 
Muslim status. Shahdol-based journalist Kailash Aggarwal noted that some people 
were sympathetic to Shabnam’s cause before the election because they believed she 
was a Muslim and gave her support (Interview, 6/4/11). There were also multiple 
rumours at the time of Kamla Bua’s election. One rumour was that Kamla was the 
daughter of a Brahmin family (Tiwari Interview, 28/2/11; I heard this rumour myself 
in neighbouring Katni).33 It was believed that this rumour was begun by the Bhartiya 
                                                      
33 I asked journalist Sanjay Kareer how this was possible: Kamla was presented as a Brahmin 
but she was contesting a seat reserved for a person from the Scheduled Caste category. I noted 
that it did not make sense since a Brahmin is clearly not Scheduled Caste; in reply, Mr Kareer 
155  
Janshakti Party’s district president, Sandhya Bhargav, to generate support for Kamla 
Bua and undermine the BJP candidate’s chances. 
In both cases, the identity of the kinnar candidate in question was manipulated 
to appeal to different voting factions. Journalist Sanjay Kareer noted that in many cases, 
voters of your own caste ‘will blindly support you’ (Tiwari Interview, 28/2/11). By 
having multiple (and believable) caste and religious identities, kinnars were more 
appealing to different voters. These incompatible rumours were more believable than 
with other candidates since kinnars’ ‘actual’ caste and religious status was perceived as 
‘undecided’—or at least, in flux—and could not be tied down to a specific 
identification. People also assumed that kinnars moved between different identities. An 
anonymous interviewee described Shabnam Mausi in this way: ‘sometimes she says “I 
am a Brahmin”, and on her nomination form, she signed as a Mohammadan. And as 
for lands, he grabbed the land as a Tribal’ (Anonymous Interview, 4/4/11).34 The 
perception of a fluid identity was useful in generating potential voters’ support, since 
Shabnam could appeal simultaneously to Brahmin, Muslim, and Tribal voters. Seeing 
kinnar identity as fluid might have made people suspicious, interpreting their fluid 
identifications as ‘untrustworthy’. However, rumours that presented kinnars as 
embodying apparently mutually exclusive identities did not seem to cause an issue for 
voters because there was a chance that they might be true. These rumours widened the 
support base of each candidate, giving kinnars an advantage over other candidates who 
only appealed to a smaller contingent of voters with whom they shared common 
descriptive characteristics or experiences. Candidates usually represent the 
communities which they are from and cannot appeal to other caste identities in the 
same way that they appeal to their own. However kinnars had the potential to 
represent multiple groups simultaneously and thus were more appealing to a variety 
of communities. 
A third aspect linked with caste status and religious practice is that of 
community. Since kinnar groups are not linked to other social networks in Indian 
society, kinnars are perceived as ‘outside’ of society. More often than not, practices 
linked to kinnar society are shrouded in secrecy and makes it more difficult for the 
wider population to understand kinnar society. As a result, kinnars are seen as 
'community-less', in the sense that their society fails to correspond with 
heteronormative and patriarchal social models common in India. 
The perception of a ‘lack’ of community and a lack of firm caste and religious 
identities meant that kinnars appeared to belong to a range of identity categories, at 
                                                                                                                                                              
said, ‘it makes no difference which caste you belong to as a candidate only…’. I offered: ‘what 
you can prove?’ and he smiled (Tiwari Interview, 28/2/11). 
34 The land in question (on which Shabnam wanted to build her house) was apparently reserved 
for members of the Scheduled Tribes, so Shabnam, according to this interviewee, assumed a 
Scheduled Tribe identity in order to get it for herself. 
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least for the purposes of representing various groups as political candidates. An 
assumed ‘lack’ of social identity meant that kinnar identity could be reconceived in 
relation to the wider communities in which they lived, in the sense of forging a 
relationship between kinnars and their localities. This can be demonstrated by rhetoric 
that presented kinnars as having no family. People interpreted a lack of social bonds as 
a factor that would make them more loyal to their constituents, whom they saw as 
their surrogate families. Kamla Bua expressly said that she would take care of every 
member of the city since they were like her children (Tiwari Interview, 28/2/11). Proof 
of loyalty to the city might also be read into Shabnam’s payment of the Burhar 
Municipality’s electricity bill. The act was politically savvy: Shabnam intimated how 
she might provide for her district if elected. Shabnam established that she cared for 
them and in this act, confirmed she was one of them. Evidently there are other 
interpretations: for example, that Shabnam was trying too hard to represent herself as a 
caring person, by performing an act that other politicians would not have done. Or that 
she was toying with their emotions and performing a bribe in return for votes, even if 
she had no intention of acting the same way once in office. However, Shabnam 
endeared herself to the electorate by this gesture and demonstrated how she felt about 
them, even if she had her own motives. In fact, another interpretation of this gesture 
indicates her ability as politician, given that the act worked and was remembered years 
after. 
The discussion of gender, religion, caste, and community has indicated that 
kinnar identity was manipulated in certain ways to represent kinnars as good political 
candidates. Kinnars were re-presented as ‘lacking’ normal social identities and this lack 
made them more suitable politicians in the eyes of the voting public. These new 
representations were propagated and affected how the mainstream public saw kinnar 
identity. Kinnars were perceived as able to adopt a variety of subject positions and 
identities, making them more attractive as representative (in the sense of descriptive) 
candidates to a variety of groups in the community. Campaigns highlighted kinnars’ 
gender, caste, religious, and communal liminality and thus their difference from 
normative social categories was emphasised in this presentation. Their existence on the 
margins of gendered practices, social spaces, and religious and caste boundaries were 
adopted and reiterated by campaigners and voters, reinforcing an understanding of 
kinnar identity that was characterised as lacking social identifications and networks. 
However, since kinnars were represented in multiple and sometimes contradictory 
ways, such as belonging to various caste and religious groupings, the category of 
kinnar identity itself managed to retain some of its fluidity and indefinability. This 
indefinability meant that kinnar identity was only made positive inasmuch as it 
constituted a distinct subject position, albeit through its emphasis on what kinnars 
lacked. Kinnars had to trade on the definitions and characteristics that maintained their 
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status as a marginal group at the very same time that they sought to attain a central 
role in mainstream society. Participation in the political sphere thus reified their 
marginality, so that kinnars were defined as what they were not and did not have. 
Kinnar ‘political’ identity was conceptualised as ‘lacking’ with the result that 
individual kinnars were able to take on a variety of subject positions or identities—even 
ones seen as mutually exclusive—with a degree of ease. Indeed, an ability to be 
subsumed into pre-fixed group identities was an important strength in a political 
contest, where candidates logically vie to appeal to multiple groups with multiple 
interests at the same time. This ability seemed to fit naturally with kinnars’ identities, 
whose existence already revolved around existing at the margins of society, and thus 
kinnars were well placed to adopt and inhabit fixed categories that were intelligible to 
the mainstream public. For the people who initiated the campaigns in Katni and 
Shahdol, Kamla Jaan, and Shabnam Mausi were inspired choices, for their identities as 
kinnars—and the way in which a particular understanding of kinnar identity was 
manipulated—were used successfully to appeal to a variety of social groups who 
might not otherwise support the same candidate. Kamla Bua capitalised on her identity 
as a kinnar by moulding herself into what the public wanted in a mayoral candidate 
and a focus on her identity as a kinnar above everything else was adopted by varying 
support groups in order to gain support and damage the chances of rival candidates. 
 
IV.  Representatives and Constituents: Theorising Relationships 
 
I want to turn to theorise the relationship between representatives and their 
constituents, in order to discuss the extent to which kinnars functioned as 
representatives—in terms of both speaking ‘for’ and speaking ‘as’—of their 
constituents in MP. I will argue that there are two conclusions to be drawn. First, 
kinnars cannot be said to be representative since they failed to represent their 
constituents effectively (in the sense of speaking ‘for’), and nor did they embody the 
same descriptive characteristics as their constituents (in the sense of speaking ‘as’). 
What they did ‘represent’ was the disillusion felt by constituents with local political 
processes and politicians and were a symbol of their anger. Second, the main issue 
with kinnars’ participation was that representation in local political bodies only served 
to reify the marginality of kinnar identity in the political sphere. As mentioned above, 
kinnars had to trade on the very characteristics that maintained their marginality in 
contemporary Indian society, meaning that time spent in politics did little to change 
their situation, since it emphasised what was seen as negative about the community, 
albeit in relation to local political discourse.  
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i. Assessing Representative-Constituent Relationships 
 
I begin by offering an analysis of various forms of the relationship between 
representative and constituents, in order to assess whether any of the kinnars were able 
to represent their constituents in the sense of speaking ‘for’ them. Jane Mansbridge 
(2003) discusses four normative forms of representation ('promissory', 'anticipatory', 
'gyroscopic', and 'surrogate'), drawing upon empirical findings over the last twenty 
years regarding how American legislators relate to their constituents. Both the United 
States and India are federal systems with relatively strong state governments, and both 
have single-member constituencies, with simple-plurality, first-past-the-post electoral 
systems (Chhibber and Kollman 1998: 329). Mansbridge offers a theorisation of ‘what 
constitutes “good” representation’, arguing that the latter three forms she theorises 
supplement the traditional form of promissory representation and are not mutually 
exclusive forms but might interact over time with one another (2003: 526). I adopt 
Mansbridge’s theorisations for the Indian context in order to assess whether kinnar 
candidates were able to perform as representatives. 
'Promissory representation' is the traditional model of representation. It focuses 
on the idea that during campaigns, promises are made to constituents, which 
representatives then keep or fail to keep (2003: 515). The understanding of 
accountability here is that the representative is 'responsible to' or 'answerable to' those 
voters. The voter has power over the representative during their governing period (in 
line with the promises made), and the voter can reward or punish the representative 
during the time of the next election (the 'sanction'), according to the way they acted 
relating to promises made at the previous election (516). It has forward-looking 
intentionality and expresses a simple form of voter's power over the representative that 
results in accountability due to the impending sanction. While Kamla Jaan, Shabnam 
Mausi, and Kamla Bua were elected with a tidal wave of support, indicating their 
popularity as candidates, none of the three made tangible, specific promises to their 
constituents. They each claimed they would work for the ‘development’ of their 
localities, but campaigning focused primarily on presenting them as the opposite to 
professional politicians: what they were not, rather than what they would do. The 
premise of promissory representation is that candidates who failed to keep their 
promises are punished, but in each of the kinnars’ cases, specific promises were not 
made, and there was no forward looking intentionality in the sense that kinnars would 
be elected again (after all, they were not politicians by profession).35 If there was a 
                                                      
35 Supporters and campaigners suggested that there was no chance that kinnars would be 
elected again. This was evident, perhaps not immediately after each victory, but certainly soon 
after when supporters realised kinnars were no more efficient than other politicians. In the case 
of Kamla Bua, for example, the Mayoral seat was reserved in the next election for a Scheduled 
Caste man, so Kamla Bua would not have been able to contest the seat; this was also the case in 
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chance of re-election, there might have been more accountability regarding their 
achievements.  
A second form of representation is 'anticipatory': people often vote in a 
retrospective manner, looking back at the past behaviour of a representative to inform 
voting at the next election (2003: 516). The voter exercises power through potential 
punishment for broken promises, thus the representative is encouraged to try and 
please future voters (517). Mansbridge notes that the representative does not represent 
the voter at time of the previous election but at the time of the next election. The voter 
who controls the representative thus appears to be the voter of the future, and because 
the representative cannot predict a wide change of preferences, it may be important to 
consider how the representative can change the voters' mindsets and choices through 
education or manipulation (517-9). She writes that the promissory form of reputation 
puts little emphasis on communication, but in the anticipatory model, the incentive 
structure (where the focus is on the next election) has created 'an entire apparatus of 
opinion polling, focus group, and interest group activity' which increases the practice 
of good deliberation (520). Relating to Kamla Jaan, Shabnam Mausi, and Kamla Bua, 
there was no past performance to which voters could look. However, especially in the 
case of Kamla Bua’s election, kinnars had been elected before, and perhaps voters 
looked to their political performance to serve as an example of a kinnar politician. 
Certainly interviewees in Sagar, and even in Shabnam’s case in Shahdol, suggested that 
hearing positive information about Kamla helped to support their decisions. None of 
the three kinnars had any political experience, and none had much social presence in 
the sense they had undertaken social or charity work that might endear the voters to 
their personalities and commitment to each locality. At the same time, each was 
viewed primarily as a member of the kinnar community and not linked to past 
behaviour or performance of other politicians or parties. This worked in their favour: 
the past behaviour of other candidates helped to inform voters at each election of what 
they did not wish to see in the future. Voters thus acted in an anticipatory manner 
against past candidates. 
A third form is 'gyroscopic' representation. Voters select representatives who 
act in ways approved by the voters but without external incentives: these 
representatives are not accountable in the traditional sense, since representatives are 
accountable only to their own beliefs and principles (2003: 520). People select their 
representatives according to their preferences to a single issue, or a broader approach, 
for example, commitment to the public good (521). The representative is seen as having 
similar policy preferences, being honest and principled, or sufficiently skilled (Fearon 
                                                                                                                                                              
Katni. In Shahdol, Shabnam contested a general seat, but in the following election, it was 
reserved for a member of the Scheduled Tribes. The implementation of rolling reservations in 
decentralised political bodies in India makes straightforward promissory representation 
between representatives and a particular constituency more complex. 
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1999: 68, cited by Mansbridge 2003: 521); Mansbridge notes that descriptive 
characteristics, along with party identification and indicators of character can also 
influence voters. Here the voters cannot influence the behaviour of the representatives, 
but their power is over the political system by selecting and placing in it a 
representative whose behaviour is, to some degree, predictable (521). The key in the 
voter-representative relationship is not accountability but predictability: the 
representative should act accountably to themselves or the political party to which they 
are connected (522). This form of representation seems pertinent to the cases of kinnar 
representatives. Each was assumed to be ‘honest’ and ‘incorruptible’ because they had 
no social ties and apparently nothing to gain from public office, apart from serving the 
people. Campaign rhetoric presented kinnars as principled, committed to the public 
good, and more likely to listen to people’s needs, unlike professional politicians. This 
presentation reflects Mansbridge’s argument that descriptive characteristics can 
influence voters: the presentation of kinnars’ personalities helped to inform voters as to 
their future behaviour. However, Mansbridge notes that voters cannot influence 
representatives’ behaviour, but that their behaviour should be predictable. In some 
ways, kinnars behaviour was predictable, since they could only achieve so much as 
independent candidates: their decisions had to be approved or supported by other 
politicians and were shaped by advisors. 
The final form is that of 'surrogate representation'. The representative has no 
electoral relationship with their constituents but is a representative in another district 
(2003: 522). There is little accountability between constituent and representative, nor is 
there a power relation between both (523). However, this form of representation can be 
important for advancing substantive interests, for example, when the surrogate 
representative shares experiences with their surrogate constituency 'in a way that the 
majority of the legislature do not' (ibid.). Mansbridge gives the example that 
representatives who are 'female, African American, or of Polish ancestry, who have a 
child with a disability, or who have grown up on a farm, in a mining community, or in 
a working-class neighbourhood', not only feel particularly sensitive to issues in relation 
to these experiences but might also feel responsible for representing the interests and 
perspectives of these groups, even if it is only a minority of their constituents who 
share these experiences and interests (ibid.). While kinnars were elected who perhaps 
had little in common descriptively with their constituents, apart from experience of 
locality and frustration with local development, the presence of kinnars in deliberative 
and legislative bodies could be beneficial for kinnars in MP state as a whole; this 
argument has particular resonance for Shabnam Mausi as a Member of the state’s 
Legislative Assembly rather than more localised bodies like Katni or Sagar’s Municipal 
Corporation. Shabnam, who identified (on some occasions) as a member of the 
Brahmin caste, or as a member of the Scheduled Tribes, might be seen as able to 
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represent their substantive interests given that she shares a common identity and 
experiences with those communities. 
A further consideration, which might occur in any of the forms of 
representation theorised by Mansbridge (although less possible in surrogate 
representation), is the relationship that is developed between representative and 
constituents in terms of accountability. Anne Phillips discusses approaches used by 
women’s organisations that ensure the accountability of representatives and 
institutions to heterogeneous voices (1991).36 She focuses on issues of deliberation and 
participation, in order to make representatives and institutions more accountable to 
constituents, notably women. Approaches such as holding continual meetings post-
election with representatives and encouraging informal participation and feedback for 
elected representatives might function to encourage disadvantaged groups to enter the 
democratic sphere, since the process of encouraging deliberation and participation—
especially among women—is significant. 37  Post-election meetings and informal 
discussions with kinnars were one way in which kinnars were accountable to their 
constituents, especially for Kamla Bua and Kamla Jaan in municipal bodies: people 
could meet with them and express their demands. It was noted by interviewees that 
one lasting impression was that kinnars were more approachable than other politicians, 
or more available to meet with constituents, ensuring some level of accountability once 
in office. 
 
ii. Failure to Represent and Reifying Marginality 
 
In this final section, I turn to examine the extent to which kinnar politicians might be 
said to be representative of their constituents. The case of kinnars’ ‘representation’ (in 
the sense of political proxy) is interesting, as highlighted by the discussion in relation 
                                                      
36 Phillips notes that ‘truly representative democracy needs the presence of heterogeneous 
voices’, referring to research on meetings in a Vermont town, arguing that who ‘find the time, 
energy, commitment and confidence’ to attend are not a representative group (1991: 141). She 
argues that meeting based democracy in this case was biased in favour of men (ibid.: 142), given 
the restrictions on women’s time, including time and childcare constraints. In addition, there 
might be an assumption that heterogeneous voices refers to multiple people: that a single 
person, as a ‘voice’, is homogenous to itself. In the case of kinnars, it might be useful to identify 
the heterogeneity inherent in a singular voice, as eloquently noted by Spivak in the ‘knottings 
and configurations’ of the ‘identity’ strands that produce the ‘subaltern subject-effect’ (1985: 
341). 
37 Phillips points to multiple constraints on women’s time, arguing that active participatory 
democracy can fight subordination and isolation or home seclusion (1991: 161; 143); moreover 
discussion, deliberation, and the presence of heterogeneous voices helps women to develop 
their ideas and make decisions (ibid.: 142; 164). Phillips discusses one approach to deal with 
isolation as ‘computer democracy’, a means by which more women, trapped in the seclusion of 
the home, might participate more actively (1991: 143-4). There are critiques of such 
participation, especially as a type of referendum democracy, which makes majority rule 
absolute through single and self-contained decisions, and could remove the protection that 
currently exists for minorities through negotiations, trade-offs, and coalitions, where minorities 
can ensure some benefits, even if they are outvoted in numerical terms (Sartori 1987). 
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to the four styles of representation above. Arguably, kinnars did not ‘represent’ their 
constituents in any of the particular ways theorised by Mansbridge, although she does 
argue that the three latter forms (anticipatory, gyroscopic, and surrogate) supplement 
promissory representation, are not mutually exclusive, and might overlap and interact 
over time with one another (2003: 526). While kinnars fulfilled various aspects of 
representing their constituents in relation to the forms of representation theorised by 
Mansbridge, particularly regarding gyroscopic representation, in my view they were 
not able to fill normative promissory or anticipatory roles as representatives since they 
were not professional politicians who had political experience, nor was there the 
obvious option that they would be elected again. Kinnars’ entry into politics was based 
upon a re-presentation of each as an ideal candidate or alternative in a particular 
context, bringing into the political sphere the very aspects of their identities that 
characterised them as marginalised in the social sphere. These attributes identified 
them as outside of normative social structures and society at the moment they sought a 
central role in mainstream society, creating a negative subject position that could be 
filled with a variety of identifications in order to suit the public’s needs. The negative 
subject position created served to reify their marginality, so that representation failed 
to ensure kinnar participation and inclusion by maintaining their marginality in 
relation to mainstream society. 
Mansbridge argues that descriptive representation may not necessarily mean 
that the representative and constituents must have the same outward manifestations of 
identity, but rather that shared experiences and shared regional location might also be 
important in defining the relationship between representative and constituent and how 
the former might be able to 'represent' the latter (1999: 629). Kinnars did not share the 
same outward manifestations of identity as the majority of their constituents: not 
belonging to traditional caste groups or social networks, kinnars were seen as outside of 
mainstream society and faced discrimination and ostracisation in their daily lives. 
Ostensibly, kinnars’ lifestyles and experiences were distinct from the lives of the 
mainstream public, and, in many ways, did not seem to share experiences and 
common interests with people in the wider locality in which they lived. They did share 
the same regional location, but this was not sufficient to explain their electoral victories, 
given that kinnars had not been elected in the past and were not persuaded to run in 
future elections. The wide base of popular support that kinnars gained is an indication 
that traditional representatives had failed in some significant manner; the anger and 
disillusion with mainstream politicians was an important factor in securing the victory 
of kinnar candidates.  
The elections of kinnars in MP do not suggest that kinnars were representative of 
the kinnar community, nor that they were representative of their local constituencies, at 
least in a descriptive sense. There are no shared, singular descriptive elements which 
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can be attributed as the reason behind their electoral victories, such as shared caste, 
class, gender, or social identities with their constituents. However, a discussion 
regarding promissory, anticipatory, gyroscopic, and surrogate forms of representation 
suggests that some semblance of representative relationships were formed between 
kinnars and their constituents, alongside a semblance of accountability. A 
representative relationship occurred particularly in relation to anticipatory 
representation, where previous politicians were punished for broken promises and 
ineffective leadership, and gyroscopic representation, where kinnars were chosen due 
to a perceived general commitment to the public good (where previous politicians had 
failed) and where their descriptive characteristics, such as ‘honesty’, ‘incorruptibility’, 
and lack of family were taken into account by voters. These two forms of 
representation enhance an understanding of the relationship that was developed 
between kinnars and their constituents during the electoral campaigns and are helpful 
in theorising, in part, the reasons for their elections. 
More importantly Kamla Jaan, Shabnam Mausi, and Kamla Bua’s elections can 
be read as ‘representative’ of public anger and disillusion. They were elected in each 
locality as a result of protest voting. Journalist Ajit Mishra read Shabnam’s victory as a 
consequence of ‘negative voting’, where people voted against, rather than specifically 
for, a candidate. The campaigns and candidacies of the three kinnar politicians might be 
interpreted as the defeat of other politicians, rather than the success of kinnars. People 
voted for kinnars because they represented (in both senses of the term) nothing, rather 
than something, indeed, the identity ‘kinnar’ served as an empty signifier.38 Yadav 
points to the capacity of electoral politics to ‘forge social identities’: constituents in each 
locality formed ‘explicit political coalitions’ of various social identities (2010: 355). In 
each case, coalitions were formed to express a response concerning the state of politics 
in each locality. Anger and frustration at local politicians found a suitable vehicle in the 
candidacy of each kinnar. The phrase, ‘why elect a “fake” kinnar when a “real” one will 
do?’ betrays this sentiment: kinnars were an alternative choice, but only by being 
equated with the real version of the worst politician possible. Shared perceptions and 
reactions influenced voters to make a radical but uniform choice in electing a candidate 
who was seen as completely different to those who had come before.  
Even the phrases I have utilised—negative voting, ‘representing nothing’, a 
‘real’ kinnar, and a ‘completely different’ candidate—indicate how the public viewed 
these candidates and their elections. Kinnars’ identities were constructed in negative 
                                                      
38 However, the occurence of kinnars’ elections and actions in office then filled the signifier 
‘kinnar’ with new content, such that it would inform future representation of that signifier. 
Future representation of ‘kinnar’ political identity would be informed by past experience, so that 
anticipatory representation might play a prominent role for future candidates. Such an 
occurrence can be demonstrated by the influence of Kamla Jaan’s election upon other electoral 
victories in MP, including Shabnam Mausi and Kamla Bua’s, particularly in terms of media 
representation and its influence on other localities.  
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terms and they were not seen as ‘real’ representatives or politicians but only ‘real’ 
kinnars, elected in order to make a point against ‘real’ politicians. Occasionally I would 
refer to Kamla Jaan, Shabnam Mausi, or Kamla Bua as ‘politicians’. I was often told, 
categorically, that they were not politicians, revealing that even after or during tenure 
in public office, none of the kinnars were seen as politicians, but only as substitutes for 
real politicians. Thus, the nomination of each kinnar as a political candidate lent itself to 
the public need as a symbol, a cipher for voters’ frustration. The identity category 
‘kinnar’ came to be manipulated due to its presumed fluid nature and a lack of 
knowledge about the community. People placed upon kinnar identity a variety of 
identities in order to appeal to different groups and it became an identity in which 
people could reflect their own needs and desires or impose their protest.  
In all three cases, kinnars were representative to the extent that they expressed 
the needs of the voting public in a particular time and location, but were unable to be 
‘representative’ in ways that were identifiable in a descriptive or substantive sense. 
Instead, as I have argued, their identity was represented in the political sphere as one 
which embodied ‘lack’ since kinnars could not be identified as belonging to a particular 
gender, caste, class, or religion, or as having a particular, identifiable kinship group 
akin to normative social networks. In this regard, they did not ‘represent’ any group. 
The process of conceiving of kinnar identity as one which represented nothing, rather 
than something, was instrumental in presenting kinnar identity as appealing to voters 
and constructing their identity as intelligible in relation to discourses surrounding the 
pre-constructed social categories to which people belong. The potential for kinnars’ 
political representation was based upon aspects that were associated with their 
marginality, their ‘lack’ of recognisable identity. This process marginalised kinnar 
identity in the political sphere, despite the normative assumption that the 
representation of minority groups ensures greater levels of participation and inclusion. 
I return to this question in Chapter Five, questioning the extent to which participation 
and representation within Indian LGBT activism has been beneficial for kinnar identity. 
I argue that representation in the sphere of activism has also served to marginalise 
particular members of the hijra community, by positing a specific form of hijra identity 
as normative. In the following chapter, I analyse how kinnars’ participation in politics 
might be theorised as either proof or a mockery of democracy, and the extent to which 
kinnars have gained, either symbolically or materially, from political participation.  
In regards to the practice of representation, I have argued that kinnar identity 
was re-constructed and represented in order to make their identity understandable and 
appealing to the voting public. Spivak is concerned with how representation functions 
to name the subaltern: in a similar fashion, kinnars were ‘named’ through the practice 
of representation, made narrativisable within and referring to preconceived modes of 
interpretation and social knowledge. Representation in the political sphere thus 
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obscured non-narrativisable aspects of kinnar identity, particularly regarding the forms 
of society in which these kinnars were situated and the heterogeneous identifications 
that these kinnars made in constructing a sense of identity. Such a process was 
necessary in rendering kinnar identity intelligible. 
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Chapter Four 
The Symbolic and Material Benefits of Political Participation 
 
In this chapter, I investigate three ways in which kinnars’ political participation might 
be interpreted. First, stories of electoral ‘success’ for kinnars might be seen as a 
‘symbolic’ victory for marginal groups and could be read as a proof of the workings of 
decentralised ‘democracy’. In this interpretation, the successful contestation of political 
office by subordinate individuals is a testament to the opportunity that decentralised 
democracy creates for all members of society, despite a lack of social status or political 
qualifications. There might be symbolic, expressive, or educative value in electing 
kinnars to public office, as an end in itself (symbolic), to include different interests into 
deliberative debate (expressive), or to educate other members in political institutions as 
to the value of marginalised voices and change the terms of the debate (educative). In 
an alternative reading, these elections might be interpreted as a mockery of the 
democratic process. If elections are the only way in which individuals can exercise 
their democratic right, then the election of a kinnar as a representative is a mockery of 
the political system, where kinnars have no experience of politics, are perceived as 
'incompetent', and struggle to achieve anything for their constituents. Voting for 
kinnars was thus a deliberate action against professional politicians. A third 
interpretation posits these elections as unable to provide any real ‘gain’, symbolic or 
material, for the elected kinnars. This reading is not incompatible with either of the two 
interpretations above. I argue that the possibility of representation in state and 
municipal political bodies did not result in material gains, affecting economic or social 
status for the individual kinnars or their communities. I theorise kinnars lack of material 
gains using Pierre Bourdieu’s theorisations of capital, exploring the level of kinnars’ 
economic, cultural, and social capital when they contested elections and analysing why 
kinnars were not able to increase their symbolic capital once in office. 
 
I. ‘Symbolic’ Representation: A Proof of Democracy 
 
The successful contestation of elections by kinnars might be interpreted as a proof of 
decentralised democracy. There are three possible values of kinnars’ representation: (1) 
symbolic, where representation is an important end in and of itself, (2) expressive, 
where preferences are translated into public policy, and (3) educative, where the 
presence of minorities has a didactic effect on other members within political 
institutions or other non-beneficiary (but similar status) groups. The presence of 
minority voices is an important end under all three functions, presenting an 
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opportunity to change the terms of the debate and policy formation in order to include 
different interests, fulfilling the deliberative function of democracy.  
In the previous chapter, I highlighted the pitfalls of representation for 
marginalised groups under preferential policies, including formally institutionalising 
marginal identity by conceiving of identity in essentialist (caste-based) terms and 
providing incentives for groups to identify in particular ways to become or retain 
beneficiary status. However, preferential policies have been expanded continually in 
the Indian context, based on the presumption that representation in educational and 
political institutions and the civil service has the capacity to benefit previously 
marginalised groups. Above all, the voices and interests of marginalised groups are 
seen as beneficial to the polity and debate. Mansbridge advocates the benefits of 
descriptive representation of marginalised groups in contexts of historical 'inability' to 
rule and de facto legitimacy (1999: 628), to recognise the importance of their voices. 
Their presence also forces opponents in deliberative bodies to ‘formulate their 
arguments in terms that are reasonable to others’ (Williams 1995: 87), changing the 
nature of deliberative arguments and forums. She writes that it is sensible to ‘structure 
our decision-making process such that people can at least challenge each other’s 
partiality’ (ibid.), recognising that there are often other interests that are not always 
considered in legislative formation. The presence of minorities ensures a wider range 
of deliberative action by forcing those present to reform their own position and 
partiality. In support of the symbolic value of representation, Williams notes that 
simply increasing the numbers of representatives of marginalised groups in a 
deliberative body can change the dynamics of decision-making. Thus the way in which 
deliberation occurs is significant, even if it does not have a direct, substantive impact 
on the policy that is formulated. The presence of individuals from minority groups 
increases recognition and sensitivity to their concerns, as well as appreciation and 
respect for their presence and perhaps for the group more generally (ibid.). These 
arguments address the symbolic, expressive, and educative gains that occur through 
the representation of minority groups, in turn, strengthening certain functions of 
democracy such as deliberation and an increased sensitivity to minority interests. They 
run parallel to a deepening of participatory democracy and indicate how decentralised 
democracy has been effective in including minority groups and recognising their 
separate interests. As Pitkin writes, 
we show a government to be representative not by demonstrating its control over 
its subjects but just the reverse, by demonstrating that its subjects have control over 
what it does…a representative government must not merely be in control, not 
merely promote the public interest, but must also be responsive to the people. 
 (1972: 232). 
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i. The Importance of Voting 
 
Governments and politicians must be responsive to voters, at least in some way as 
bodies that are formed through constituents’ voting patterns. As Walter Hauser and 
Wendy Singer note, relating to the act of campaigning, politicians must meet voters on 
‘equal or subservient terms’, which is an ‘inversion of power from the hands of the 
politicians back to the hands of the voters’ (1986: 947). Given the enthusiasm behind 
voting in India, with impressive and increasing levels of turnout, especially in local 
and state elections, and among underprivileged groups who are often the staunchest 
supporters of elections, Mukulika Banerjee turns to the important question of why 
local populations vote and what it means (2007). She contends that elections might be 
interpreted as ‘sacred’ in India, where the vote has both symbolic power (expressing 
self-respect and –worth) and instrumental power (in warding off attacks by the state 
upon self-worth). Banerjee asks why disadvantaged groups in India are the most 
committed to democracy and participation in elections,1 despite the lack of material 
improvement or advancement of voter’s interests (1559) as rational choice theory might 
suggest (1556). She argues that voting is seen as the duty of all responsible citizens and 
is an ‘expression’ of citizenship, which contributes to clear-cut election results (1560). 
She states that the ‘egalitarian mechanics of the poll’ provide particular pleasure for 
voters, as a unique event in which equality is brought to life (1560-61). The vote is seen 
as a weapon, compelling governments to display a basic concern for voters’ interests. 
Ultimately, people vote because elections have become ‘as much an end in themselves, 
as a means to a better society’ (1561). 
Banerjee’s article, which presents fieldwork from several elections in two 
villages in West Bengal, is a compelling account that addresses Hauser and Singer’s 
statement that it is not enough to understand an election merely in terms of who won, 
by how many votes, and with what support. They argue that this information tells us 
very little about the process by which such results were achieved, writing that ‘it is 
centrally important to know what the vote means to the individuals who cast it and to 
the society that organizes its political culture around it’ (1986: 942). I have explored in 
the previous chapter the reasons behind people’s choice of vote in each locality, 
considering wider social mindsets and personal descriptive interests, and I now turn to 
address whether it is possible to read kinnars’ elections as a proof of democracy, 
addressing the initial assessment of their surprising victories in MP by newspapers and 
voters alike. 
                                                      
1 Banerjee points out that the expectation and academic theorisation that turnout is lower 
among citizens at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum is not found to be the case in 
India, where a ‘poor, lower caste person is more likely to vote here than an upper-caste, upper-
class person’ (2007: 1556). See Yadav 2010: 354. 
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According to Banerjee, the vote has both symbolic and instrumental power. 
People voted to express their self-worth and demonstrated that they (at least, in these 
particular elections in Katni, Shahdol, and Sagar) held the power over who would win. 
Kinnars won against all odds, beating professional politicians with surprising margins. 
Local and national newspapers published immediately after each victory declared that 
each victory was a proof of decentralised democracy in India, where local constituents 
were in control of government. Local constituencies ‘celebrated democracy’ 
(Ramachandran 2000) and these elections were no ‘laughing matter’ (Sharma 2000). 
Newspaper headlines heralded the elections as a ‘pox on politicians’ (Bearak 2001) and 
as the ‘revenge of the people’ (Ramchandran 2000) against incompetent politicians, 
explaining that kinnars were expected to work ‘more sincerely’ than their predecessors 
(Indian Express 2000). Journalists expressed the view that it was voters’ anger that had 
driven these elections, using ‘the ballot box to send a very strong message’ 
(Ramachandran 2000). Moreover, the elections were seen as good for kinnars. Kinnars 
were said to be marching ahead, from ‘zero to hero’ (Jain 2001), occupying the ‘centre 
stage in Madhya Pradesh politics’ (Sharma 2000). Sheetal Jain, a reporter for Bhopal 
edition of NavBharat argued that this ‘unprecendented electoral success’ would ‘open 
the door for active participation in democracy’, so that kinnars would ‘overcome social 
apathy’, alongside teaching a lesson to other politicians (Jain 2001). The elections were 
seen as proclaiming a new era in Indian politics, for both kinnars and the mainstream 
public. As well as being a ‘new chapter of enfranchisement in the history of India’s 
eunuchs’ (Jacinto 2000), the elections symbolised a ‘brighter future’, offering ‘hope for 
many’ (ibid.). While it would be too much ‘to expect that illiterate eunuchs to [sic] undo 
what “clever” politicians have done over the years’, it ‘definitely signals a positive turn 
for our woebegone democracy’ (Mishra 2000). 
Such triumphant language celebrated kinnars’ elections but none of the kinnar’s 
time in office would generate the same strength of emotion immediately evident in the 
days and weeks after their elections. The proof of democracy was that voters had 
elected their own representative, rejecting mainstream politicians and political parties. 
 
ii. Marginality, Silencing, and Lack of Self-Presentation  
 
An assessment that kinnars’ elections were a ‘proof’ of democracy becomes untenable 
given kinnars were evaluated as no more successful than previously elected male and 
female politicians. This is demonstrated by the case studies I presented in Chapter Two, 
where kinnars’ initial popularity diminished through an assessment of their tenures as 
unsuccessful. News interest and constituency support fell away, two of the three 
kinnars were unseated, and none of the three was asked, or successfully able, to contest 
another election. Certainly, kinnars’ elections indicate that the voting public control 
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democratic processes in the sense that the majority of each constituency voted for and 
secured a kinnar victory. However, I want to address the symbolic, expressive, and 
educative value of their elections so that the phrase ‘proof of democracy’ has further 
implications than a simple formula where the winner is a proof that direct elections 
work by amassing the most votes. 
The entry of minority groups into the democratic institutions deepens the 
practice of democracy through symbolic, expressive, and educative functions. First, it 
might change the dynamics of decision-making and this sort of deliberation is 
significant, even if it does not impact policy. Second, the inclusion of minority groups 
widens the scale of interests represented and might force a reconceptualisation of the 
terms and the nature of deliberative forums and arguments. Third, it ensures that 
subjects have control over democracy, and that their representatives and government 
are responsible to them. In regards to the first aspect, the presence of kinnars did force 
individuals in both local and state governments to work with kinnars, especially those 
involved in the day-to-day running of the Municipal Corporation or the MP Assembly 
in Shabnam’s case. Individuals were forced to address their assumptions about kinnars 
in order to ensure they could have a working relationship with them, and many people 
in the Corporations or MP Assembly did advise or work with the kinnars regarding 
common interests for development of each locality, learning how to treat them with 
respect and listen to their concerns. This may have had an impact on deliberation and 
the dynamics of decision-making and thus there may have been a didactic effect of 
kinnars’ participation. Interviewees in the Municipal Corporations, for example, were 
often sympathetic to kinnars and did have to change their behaviour as a result of 
learning how to work with them. However in regard to the second two aspects, the 
case studies demonstrate that kinnars’ presence in local bodies did not change the 
nature of deliberative forums, given that the government institutions functioned in 
much the same manner as before, where each kinnar was expected to fit in and conduct 
themselves in a way appropriate with that forum. Moreover, the scale of interests 
represented did not necessarily increase, given that none of the kinnars had an explicit 
agenda in relation to the kinnar community and their locality or represented interests 
that were only pertinent to the kinnar community and not other constituency groups. 
Kinnars, like other representatives, were expected to represent their constituencies and 
their interests, functioning as a representative from any other social group might have 
done.  
Further, the way in which kinnars were represented as marginalised individuals 
who failed to represent their constituencies, as discussed in the previous chapter, is 
another reason to suggest that their elections were not a proof of democracy. Kinnars 
entered mainstream political institutions but were unable to serve as descriptive 
representatives to their constituents. In each locality, the elected kinnar was represented 
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as someone who was outside of mainstream society, someone who could be spoken for, 
and someone who could be represented in whatever way the public wanted. I 
elaborate on these three issues below, to argue that such a representation was not 
commensurate with an assessment of their representation as having symbolic, 
expressive, or didactic value.  
First, kinnars were repeatedly presented as marginal to mainstream society and 
these characteristics were portrayed as making them more likely to be effective 
political candidates. Their marginality was made a central focus of political rhetoric to 
prove their ability to serve because they would not be corrupt or nepotistic, since they 
lacked normative social bonds. Thus, entry into politics was not intended to rectify 
their marginality: in fact their marginality had to be maintained because it was the very 
basis on which kinnar identity had been renegotiated in order to present them as 
potentially good electoral candidates. Each kinnar maintained the marginal position 
from which they had come while in office. Although they were treated as any other 
politician from a subordinate community might have been, they had entered politics as 
individuals whose marginality was the core facet of their identity. Kinnars thus 
symbolised, and maintained, marginality rather than being representative of their 
constituencies. Symbolically, therefore, they did not represent a proof of democracy 
because their elections were set up as a joke, rather than to prove someone could be 
elected because of their merits. 
Second, kinnars were often silent or silenced through their campaigns and 
during their time in office, limiting the expressive effect that participation might have. 
For each kinnar, a significant aspect of the way they were brought into politics has to 
do with the issue of silence. Although each held a place of importance within the kinnar 
community, status in the sphere of their own community did not give them the status 
to speak in the political sphere, or at least speak credibly. Their identity as kinnars, 
albeit as significant members of their communities, was unintelligible to the 
mainstream public. It was thus their campaigners and supporters, who were members 
of mainstream society, who spoke for them, explaining who they were and what they 
would do if elected. ‘Speaking for’ also extended to the multiple communities they 
could represent: different communities could decide what they stood for and 
represented. There was no referent to which kinnar identity referred—caste, kinship, 
religion—making kinnar identity appeal to and represent various groups and their 
interests. Thus the political identity ‘kinnar’ became an ‘empty signifier’, a signifier 
without a signified (Laclau 2007: 36). Laclau argues that this is not to say that the 
signifier has multiple signifieds to which it might be attached (‘equivocal’) or that it is 
‘ambiguous’, in which an overdetermination or underdetermination of signifieds 
prevents it from being fixed (ibid.). Rather, the ‘empty signifier’ introduces the 
theoretical possibility of something that points, within the process of signification, to 
172  
the discursive presence of its own limits (ibid.). He writes that ‘if what we are talking 
about are the limits of the signifying system, it is clear that those limits cannot be 
themselves signified, but have to show themselves as the interruption or breakdown of the 
process of signification (37). The being or institution represented through the empty 
signifier is ‘constitutively unreachable’ (39), as an ‘impossible object’ which shows itself 
‘through the impossibility of its adequate representation’ (40). It thus follows that the 
identity term ‘kinnar’ was represented as not referring to any particular social 
identification and was an identity which could not be represented adequately, a 
signifier in which people presented their own objectives and projected their own 
desires and meanings by speaking on each kinnars’ behalf. More significantly, the term 
‘kinnar’ pointed to the unreachable limit of the process of signification, where the 
object—kinnar identity—could not be represented adequately. 
Even when kinnars did speak for themselves, or on the rare occasions for their 
communities, their voices were subsumed by larger issues and into a more general 
agenda. Kamla Jaan was literally silent during the campaigns and was spoken for by 
local campaigners who manufactured her campaign for the needs of the wider 
community. In office, her advisors were there for every decision. However she was not 
necessarily compliant: certain instances point to her attempts to be heard and make her 
own interests known, such as finding ways to test those around her. Although 
Shabnam Mausi and Kamla Bua, on the other hand, were more vocal in their 
participation, the issue of silence and silencing can nonetheless be demonstrated in 
their cases. Both said they had joined politics on behalf of local needs, although both 
also stressed the importance of equal rights for the kinnar community and their equal 
desire to enter politics (Kamla Bua’s assertion was always stronger). At the same time, 
these self-described interests were subsumed by mass interests in order to generate a 
larger support base and ultimately, more votes. Although explicitly campaigning on 
issues regarding kinnar rights, for example, Kamla Bua’s campaign evolved into 
representing a variety of groups and their interests. In this sense, even self-motivated 
kinnar interests became secondary to other causes and interests, silencing their voices.  
A third issue is that of self-presentation, or re-presentation. In the previous 
chapter, I argued that kinnars’ identity was re-presented in relation to gender, caste, 
religion, and community, contending that a lack of social ties became a significant 
element in presenting kinnars as viable candidates for public office. Kinnar identity was 
constructed in such a way that they were not representative of their constituents, but 
became a vessel through which various groups could express discontent. A focus on 
campaign rhetoric and other modes in which the re-presentation occurred indicates 
that there is very little evidence to show that there was an active self-presentation of 
their identity by kinnars themselves, aside from that which would bolster their support 
by feeding off mainstream narratives (for instance, arguing that they would treat their 
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constituents as family was part of the greater rhetorical allusion that kinnars had no kin 
and thus were self-sacrificing). What did occur was a significant negotiation of 
characteristics and traits that were stereotypes of or associated with kinnar identity, by 
both local campaigners and voters, presenting kinnars as suitable candidates with social 
identities that were made intelligible to the mainstream public.  
These issues do not suggest that kinnars were considered ‘worthy’ candidates to 
represent the general public, but rather that their identity, as marginal and ‘unfixed’, 
lent itself to manipulation, to being ‘misused’, in public rhetoric and modes of 
representation. Given that kinnars were not portrayed as representing ‘actual’ kinnars 
or their constituents, symbolically they did not represent anyone in particular, apart 
from being a mockery of professional politicians. It becomes untenable to argue that 
kinnars’ elections had symbolic, expressive, or educative effects, given the way in 
which kinnar identity was represented in the political sphere, and thus cannot be a 
proof of democracy for two reasons. First, it was not the case that simply any 
individual could be elected from a minority group. These elections were the product of 
a set of specific conditions, where kinnar identity, perceived as a fluid social identity, 
was manipulated to appeal to voters. Second, there were few positive effects in 
symbolic, expressive, or educative terms. The presence of kinnars in democratic 
institutions was not celebrated as an end in and of itself. Additionally, their presence 
did not translate specific community interests or preferences into policy, nor did it 
change, in any substantial way, the functions of political bodies, nor the terms of 
deliberative discussion. Therefore, their elections cannot be read as simply a ‘proof’ of 
democracy. 
 
II. ‘Anyone’ Can Be Elected: Making a Mockery of Democracy 
 
A second interpretation regarding the representation of individuals from marginalised 
is as a 'mockery' of democracy, given that ‘anyone’ can be elected, despite a lack of 
qualifications, experience, or ability to represent their constituencies (conceiving of 
representation as promissory). Many individuals described the elections in Katni, 
Shahdol, and Sagar as a 'joke' after the event, because kinnars were seen as unfit 
representatives through a lack of political experience or education and did not make 
any significant headway once in office. Kinnars represented public anger and 
frustration, and because they were perceived as unable to perform well in politics, they 
were used to make a mockery of the democratic process.  
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i. Voting Rationally and Mocking the System 
 
Elections and voting are recognised as a significant feature of decentralised democracy; 
the process of voting itself is almost synonymous with ‘democracy’ given people’s 
emotional response towards to the process of voting (Banerjee 2007). Due to the 
decentralisation of power within various political institutions from state and local level, 
many social actors have come to view elections as a way to gain access to the State and 
to goods. Kanchan Chandra describes how elections are viewed as an ‘auction’ of 
access to goods, with the potential to gain alleviation from one’s inherited status 
(2004b). Electoral success is associated with access to power and material gain and is 
deeply coveted. It is in the interests of various groups to gain access, through a group 
representative, to resources through political office or to influence policy that is 
beneficial to the group (see Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004b). Therefore, voting 
behaviour is often based around collective action in order to secure such access. 
Elections and voting are influenced by individual and group identity, along caste, class, 
and occasionally gender lines, ensuring that candidates are 'representative' of their 
constituents, and that the group has access to resources through the positioning of that 
representative. 
Hanna Pitkin describes voting as 'essentially a group experience' (1972: 223). 
She writes that ‘we vote, indeed we perceive political reality, through the people with 
whom we are in contact’ (ibid.). Although Pitkin’s argument might be updated to take 
into account the various forms of social media in which political reality is described to 
the masses, perceptions are shaped by other people and our reactions to them and their 
reactions to us. Many people ‘with whom we are in contact’ may not share similar 
descriptive characteristics, such as the same outward manifestations of identity, but are 
likely, in many respects, to share similar viewpoints and experiences, especially in 
political localities, such as Katni, Shahdol, or Sagar. These commonalities shape 
perceptions and political views. This sort of collective reasoning might help to explain 
why kinnars’ campaigns were so successful. People shared similar experiences and 
localities, including knowledge of the political landscape. Thus, 'what the public thinks 
or does must (in theory) be translatable into the behaviour or attitudes of 
individuals…[E]ven if most people vote in an irrational and uninformed response to 
primary group pressures, this does not preclude the system as a whole from displaying 
a degree of “rational” response' (Pitkin 1972: 224). Such a 'rational response' could be 
the election of someone seen to be unsuitable, like a kinnar, in the sense that their 
election is an expression or representative of, the response of the public to certain 
issues: lack of choice among badly nominated political candidates, or anger at the state 
political parties. Pitkin argues that 'representation may emerge from a political system 
in which many individuals, both voters and legislators, are pursuing quite other goals' 
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(ibid.). By this reasoning, kinnars became representatives as a result of quite other 
constituent goals: not securing representation for kinnars, but due to the public’s desire 
to punish professional politicians. This was a rational outcome, even though people 
voted in an ‘irrational’ way.  
Although kinnars’ elections might prove that the system works because they 
gained the majority of votes, their election simultaneously mocked the system because 
they were unqualified candidates who could not perform their roles effectively. People 
voted for them because there were no other options; casting a vote for a kinnar 
candidate was considered as casting a ‘negative’ vote, reflecting campaign rhetoric 
regarding real ‘hijra’ politicians. Voting for a kinnar was voting for a ‘real’ kinnar, where 
kinnar identity was associated with impotence and incompetence.  
There is a further reason why such elections were a mockery of the democratic 
process. Both Kamla Jaan and Kamla Bua were unseated for contesting a seat reserved 
for a category to which they were judged not to belong. Following the 2011 judgment 
against Kamla Bua, Gwalior-based Professor Ayub Khan argued that the court had 
failed to address the basic issue regarding what category kinnars belonged to and 
therefore what seats they could contest in elections (Indian Express 2012). Since kinnars 
had been democratically elected, their election ‘should be honoured in a democracy 
more than anything else’ (ibid.); moreover, it was pointless nullifying the polls since 
people knew that they are voting ‘for a eunuch’. In the same article, Bhopal-based 
Professor Gyanendra Gautam agreed with Khan.  He said that since the Constitution 
has given voting rights to kinnars, the court should decide what seats they could 
contest and remove the ambiguity. It is significant that Khan stresses the democratic 
nature of the election: this is a further reason to consider these elections as a mockery 
of the process. Adhering blindly to reservation policy produced the result that 
democratically elected individuals from marginalised communities were unseated. 
This is against the ‘spirit’ of affirmative action schemes, where reservation, because it 
has formally institutionalised certain groups as worthy of benefits and not others, 
benefits a Scheduled Caste woman, but not a caste-less kinnar. Kamla Bua’s removal 
from office confirms that only certain group identities benefit from reservation policies, 
but not other marginalised groups who face similar, or even worse, economic and 
social disadvantage.2 It distracts, McMillan argues, from the 'broader promotion of 
socio-economic egalitarianism' by focusing the debate on issues of group identity and 
preferential programmes rather than actual group needs (2005: 315).  
In order to explore further the mocking aspect of these elections, I want to 
examine how many constituents in each locality conceptualised their experience of 
kinnars’ tenure as a ‘failed experiment’. This retrospective analysis of kinnars’ political 
                                                      
2 One might argue that kinnars are more marginalised than women, and that belonging to no 
identifiable caste group puts them in a worse position than belonging to a caste group since 
caste is the criterion for identifying beneficiaries of affirmative action schemes in India.  
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participation lends itself to the idea that their time in politics was a mockery of 
democracy, by demonstrating how the democratic system was unable to recognise 
their positioning (as kinnars and as elected officials) and the ways in which the public 
had already acknowledged the failure of contemporary democratic processes in 
meeting their needs. 
 
ii. Joke to Popular Revolt to Failed Experiment 
 
By the end of each of their tenures, none of the kinnars was judged to be more effective 
or successful in office than previously elected professional politicians. From the start, 
the notion of a kinnar contesting political office was considered a joke. Although kinnars 
were not seen as particularly promising candidates, their campaigns were extremely 
popular, resulting in significant victories. However, initial support dissipated and 
people began to view kinnar candidates in a similar way to previously elected 
politicians. Even at the time of their elections, people assumed they would not achieve 
much in office, due to their lack of qualifications, experience, education, and party 
support. This sentiment evidently contradicted the rhetoric that they would make 
‘better’ politicians, in terms of assumed incorruptibility and selflessness. Curiously, 
people hoped they would be better than other politicians, with little evidence to 
suggest that this would be the case. Somewhat contradictorily, there was both a feeling 
of hope and hopelessness at the time of the elections in 1999/2000 and 2009, an 
argument that further supports an interpretation of kinnars’ elections as a mockery of 
the democratic process. On their whole, each kinnar’s tenure was judged to be 
unremarkable or unsuccessful and thus was deemed a ‘failed experiment’. 
News of a kinnar fighting an election was immediately interpreted as a ‘joke’. 
How could anyone expect a kinnar to win or have a job in politics? The immediate 
reaction reflects how kinnars were seen in mainstream society: as ostracised figures, 
figuratively and literally. People did not believe that they would or could contest an 
election and news of their campaigns was taken in a lighthearted manner. In addition, 
these campaigns were engineered to humiliate local politicians. ‘Real’ politicians’ 
incompetence was made the subject of people’s derision through the election of a ‘real’ 
kinnar. In each case, the public, local journalists, and politicians did not take the 
campaigns seriously until it became evident that each individual would win (Bahadur 
Singh Interview, 3/3/11; Tiwari Interview, 28/2/11; Mishra Interview, 4/4/11). 
Behind the façade of a lighthearted campaign was a serious message: constituents 
wanted and would support a ‘real’ candidate, instead of ‘fake kinnar’ politicians.3  
                                                      
3 Local people did however worry how others might perceive them: in Sagar, people worried 
that their image would become ‘distorted’ due to their support of a kinnar. As Sudesh Tiwari 
stated, people ‘looking at Sagar from other places simply think the people of Sagar are stupid 
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Two issues are revealed through the view that (potential) kinnar politicians 
were a joke. First, kinnars are assumed to have nothing to offer society due to their lack 
of social position in mainstream society. Second, an initial understanding of such 
campaigns as a joke reveals their ‘disposability’ by mainstream society. When asked 
how Shabnam Mausi could win an election from a district to which she did not belong, 
journalist Ajit Mishra said, ‘there was nothing to lose…and everything to gain. After all, 
she was not afraid to lose her image or her money; she was afraid of nothing’ 
(Interview, 4/4/11). Shabnam, like other kinnar candidates, was perceived as a misfit 
within society, and had little to lose by seeking public office. Sadly, an attempt to be 
recognised and accepted by the mainstream public was read as a ‘joke’. The statement 
that Shabnam had nothing to lose politically, but also socially, suggests that her defeat 
and potential humiliation would not affect her due to her low status in society. It may 
have been a joke to the public, but it was no joke to the kinnars who contested the 
elections who believed they were doing something important and meaningful for the 
people who supported their campaigns. They did not, moreover, seem to have been 
‘in’ on the joke and were not aware, or at least, did not admit to being aware, of the 
social reading that their attempt to be elected was a ‘joke’. They believed they were 
doing the right thing in contesting elections, encouraged as they were by potential 
voters. However, a staunch belief that they were doing the right thing could have been 
maintained in order to retain a sense of dignity, even if individuals became aware that 
this is what the public thought. Kinnars did seem to be aware that they were ridiculed 
figures according to most social discourses, but did not admit in interviews that they 
were aware of this mockery in relation to their political participation, instead choosing 
to portray themselves as candidates who the public really did want and support.  
As the campaigns grew, a description of each as ‘popular revolts’ became 
commonplace. Above, I noted that journalist Mr Singh said that although people could 
not read or write, they were still ‘literate’ in terms of life experience. He explained that 
people supported these campaigns because they knew what they wanted: to send a 
clear-cut message to local politicians about their failure (Interview, 28/1/11). 
Independent kinnars candidates represented an alternative choice and this was the 
reason for their popularity. People gave donations and support to each candidate, 
providing campaign materials and spreading news of the campaign. Kinnars were 
unable to run expensive campaigns and hold large rallies, like candidates nominated 
by the BJP and Congress,4 instead campaigning door-to-door and generating support 
                                                                                                                                                              
enough to vote for a kinnar’. He assessed that Sagar’s reputation was damaged by this election 
(Interview, 28/2/11).  
4 Many professional politicians have greater resources at their disposal, including access to 
resources through support from a political party. There is a limit set by the Seventy-Fourth 
Amendment Act (1992) on the amount to be spent on a campaign in Urban Local Bodies, and 
each candidate must submit a budget along with their nomination which outlines the 
178  
through word of mouth. There was little planning involved in organising the 
campaigns (Kosta Interview 22/2/11; Chanchal Interview 5/3/11). At the same time, 
the campaigns were outwardly popular among lower-caste and –class groups, and also 
generated invisible support among middle- and upper-class members of society, since 
people were ashamed to support a kinnar candidate openly (Chanchal Interview, 
5/3/11). Both this ‘political undercurrent’ (Tiwari Interview, 28/2/11) among middle- 
and upper-class voters, alongside clear support among the lower-classes, garnered 
mass support throughout each locality, generating a popular revolt against 
professional politicians and established parties.  
A further aspect to the notion of a ‘popular revolt’ was that support for these 
candidates was seen as part of a social ‘experiment’. Nobody expected kinnar 
candidates to win, so no one thought about what would come after the victory, 
marking a victory as an end in itself. Once each was elected, people turned to the 
question of what would happen once kinnars were in office. All three kinnars entered 
office without party support, political experience, or the educational qualifications that 
would help them adapt to the job. It is unsurprising that none of these kinnars are 
thought of as having done a particularly ‘successful’ job in office, in comparison to 
professional politicians.  
In the initial ‘experiment’ in Katni, Kamla Jaan was illiterate and reliant upon 
those who masterminded her election. Although she worked to improve the 
Corporation office’s efficiency and completed some development works, her tenure 
was deemed ‘unsuccessful’. Katni-based journalist Arvind Gupta was the first who 
used the term ‘experiment’, saying that it had failed miserably’ because she was not 
qualified for the job in terms of education and political experience (Interview, 30/1/11). 
An assessment of ‘success’ is related to politicians who became before and after Kamla 
Jaan: although it was a success for voters in choosing their own candidate, her success 
as a mayor was based on her lack of efficacy compared to previous politicians. Even 
though Kamla was perceived as more successful than her successor, her tenure was 
assessed generally as a failure, suggesting that her identity as a kinnar and assumptions 
generated regarding her incompetence in office were the deciding factors in the overall 
assessment of her tenure as ‘unsuccessful’.  
Shabnam Mausi was in a similar position to Kamla Jaan: she had no party 
backing and no political experience, although she had some basic educational 
qualifications. There was slow development in the district during her tenure, likely 
because of a lack of party backing within the Legislative Assembly, which impeded her 
desire to develop Shahdol district. Her tenure was characterised as unremarkable, 
despite the quite notable achievement of contesting a general seat and coping with a 
                                                                                                                                                              
campaigns’ costs. During my fieldwork, it was suggested that many candidates did not comply 
with the budget limit, spending vast sums of money to raise awareness about their campaigns. 
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move to Bhopal and daily activity within the state Legislative Assembly. Even during 
the elections, people assumed Shabnam would be unable to do the job, contradictorily 
positing hope that she would be better than nepotistic and ineffective politicians 
alongside a more sober appreciation of the limitation of her ability as a politician. Local 
politician Shankar Prasad Sharma noted that voters wanted change, ‘whether she could 
do the work or not’ (Interview, 5/4/11). What was important was voting for a new face 
in politics, whatever Shabnam could actually achieve in office.  
By the time of Kamla Bua’s election in 2009, her nomination was seen as less of 
an experiment. Book merchant Rajesh Kesherwani said that given the present political 
scenario in Sagar (alluding to anger at politicians and stagnation of development), it 
was not surprising that a kinnar was going to contest the election. People expected 
some sort of controversial reaction like the nomination of a kinnar, so her candidacy 
was no surprise (Interview, 5/3/11). Given positive impressions of other kinnars, 
alongside common rhetoric regarding kinnars’ incorruptability, the media represented 
Kamla as a good alternative to the major political parties’ candidates (Tiwari, 28/2/11), 
playing again on the real/fake kinnar trope. Since both BJP and Congress had chosen 
‘bad’ candidates who had no popularity or sway with local voters, demonstrating that 
the state-level parties were unaware of voters’ needs (Yadav Interview, 2/3/11). For 
example, Suman Ahirwar, the losing BJP candidate, was nominated at the state level. 
Ahirwar was a new face in the party, even though her husband had been a senior 
member of the BJP for many years (ibid.).  
People supported Kamla Bua but did not expect much of her as a politician. 
Interviewees stressed that her election was to punish other candidates, an experiment 
aimed at teaching them a lesson for past incompetence and failure to keep their 
promises. In consequence, they did not expect anything from Kamla in the mayoral 
role and there was an assumption that she might ‘fail’ once in office. Sudesh Tiwari 
said that the public knew she was not a good option but had a greater desire to punish 
the other candidates (Interview, 28/2/11). A lack of belief in her ability was due to her 
status as an independent candidate, with no prior political experience (Kesherwani 
Interview, 5/3/11).  
Arguably, an assessment of each of the three tenures as ‘unsuccessful’ could be 
unfair. Each victory could be interpreted as a ‘success’, as a collective message to 
professional politicians. Moreover, an assessment of each tenure as a failure does not 
acknowledge the scale of these victories: each kinnar received little political support as 
an independent candidate and none had prior political experience, nor the educational 
qualifications to cope once in office. It was unrealistic to expect that the kinnars would 
achieve ‘more’ than their predecessors, thereby problematising the reason for which 
they had been elected: to do ‘better’ than other local politicians. In fact, such an 
argument is contradictory and reflects both the hope and hopelessness that surrounded 
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each campaign: kinnars were expected to do better than previous politicians by virtue 
of being (according to campaign rhetoric) more honest and more self-sacrificing, 
despite a more realistic expectation that they could not achieve anything while in office. 
Each kinnar was thus positioned in an impossible situation, expected to be both capable 
and incapable. In both regards, their tenures were conceptualised as unsuccessful since 
they could not achieve what was expected: they could not perform better than previous 
politicians nor could they overcome stereotypes of kinnars as incapable, both based on 
the reality of their situations (lack of education, experience, support).  
The notion of failure may be problematised further by taking into account 
Judith Halberstam’s work in The Queer Art of Failure (2011). For Halberstam, ‘failure’, 
‘unbecoming’, and ‘not knowing’ may offer ‘more creative, more cooperative, more 
suprising ways of being in the world’ (2), critiquing heteronormativity and 
heteronormative conceptions of space and time. She writes that ‘failure allows us to 
escape the punishing norms that discipline behaviour and manage human 
development’ (3), providing an opportunity to challenge multiple facets of 
contemporary life in which the subject is constrained and made predictable. Using 
James C. Scott’s work on the demand by the state for legibility through standardisation 
and uniformity (1999), alongside Michel Foucault’s theorisations of ‘subjugated 
knowledges’, as forms of knowledge that have been buried or masked through formal 
systematisations of knowledge, Halberstam writes that ‘investing in counterintuitive 
modes of knowing such as failure or stupidity’ can provide a form of resistance (11), 
both to narratives of success and in proposing different relations to knowledge (23). In 
this vein, reading kinnars’ ‘failure’ in electoral politics might produce new 
interpretations, in which their failure might reveal the heteronormative dynamics of 
political participation and the assumed standards of success in public life. Halberstam 
locates her project within queer studies, as a mode for imagining an existing alternative 
to hegemonic systems (89) and her work has the potential for reimagining conceptions 
of both failure and success. At the same time, despite a potential reinterpretation of 
hegemonic systems of dominance and knowledge production on a theoretical level, the 
common assessment of ‘failure’ was posited in this case to discredit kinnars’ 
participation in political spheres. ‘Failure’ was used simply to explain away each of the 
kinnars’ tenures, despite particular examples that indicate the significance of their 
victories or their ability to function as politicians.   
Even if each case was deemed a failed experiment, constituents still acted 
within the democratic system to register their ‘protest’. Banerjee writes that democracy 
is ‘really an untrue but vitally important myth of social cohesion’, where elections are a 
ritual enactment that maintains equilibrium (2007: 1556). Voting as a regular ritual 
enactment, a ‘necessary safety valve’, allows people to air grievances and opinions. As 
Yogendra Yadav notes, elections ‘often appear as the only bridge between the people 
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and power, as the only reality check in the political system’ (2010: 352). However, the 
process maintains the status quo. Banerjee argues that ‘elections require the complicity 
of all participants in a deliberate mis-recognition of the emptiness of its procedures and 
the lack of any significant changes which this ritual brings about, but are yet a 
necessary charade to mollify a restless electorate’ (2007: 1556). As one interviewee put 
it (once a new mayor was elected after Kamla Bua was unseated), ‘things are back to 
where they were before’, intimating that while kinnars were elected to show voters’ 
disillusion, no systematic change came about as a result: it was only a mockery of the 
process. 
 
III. When Representation Does Not Translate into Gains 
 
Representation might have a further function: the ability to bring about tangible, 
beneficial change. Change comes in a variety of forms: economic change, change in 
social status, educational opportunities, or favourable policy. Preferential policies seek 
to provide both symbolic and material benefits, as the symbolic representation of 
minority identities should not be promoted at the expense of redressing social and 
economic disadvantages. McMillan writes that 'the purpose of policy is to change, 
rather than reflect, the social structure’ (2005: 100). In 1949, B. R. Ambedkar pointed out 
that the definition of democracy was not purely political, addressing the gap between 
constitutional or political equality and material equality, noting that political equality 
recognised the principle of one vote, one value, while the basic economic and social 
structure in India denied that value (Jaffrelot 2003: 2). Ambedkar recognised that 
policies that do not also amend material discrepancies would remain paradoxical to the 
ideas behind the equality described in the Constitution of India. McMillan writes that 
'issues of group representation, therefore, should be approached in terms of their 
political consequences, rather than abstract, and essentially contested, conceptions of 
group identity and development’ (2005: 312). Writing on the impact of electoral 
reservation policies for the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, McMillan concludes 
that his broad socio-economic analysis implies that there has been 'no relative 
improvement' of the position of these two groups, in regards to both class status or 
educational attainment, and that the various implemented strategies, despite intentions 
that they would lead to improvements, have had limited impact (2005: 315). Similarly, I 
argue that the symbolic value of representation should not be emphasised over actual 
changes in the status of minority groups, whether educational, economic, material, or 
status based. I want to address the question of whether the kinnars of MP have 
benefited from political representation through an examination of changes in their 
socio-economic status after their political participation. Initial excitement regarding the 
representative potential of kinnars’ elections was surpassed by lasting impressions of 
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their inefficiency, reinforcing stereotypes about kinnar identity. Moreover the way that 
kinnars are treated today suggest little or no improvement in comparison to their status 
before they were in office. I will focus on a change in social-economic status in regards 
to the three kinnars, alongside wider conclusions about the kinnar community in MP 
when necessary. Evidently educational opportunities or favourable policy are not 
immediately relevant as proof of the benefits of kinnars’ representation in MP, although 
I address these concerns in the following chapter when analysing the impact of 
representation as part of LGBT activism on kinnar and hijra identity. In the discussion 
that follows, I turn to focus on social status as indicative of material gains, asking 
whether each of the three kinnars’ social status was able to benefit as a result of 
participation and representation in local politics. 
 
i. Reinforcing Stereotypes 
 
The election of kinnars has had an impact on the way people in Katni, Shahdol and 
Anuppur, and Sagar view kinnars, and particularly the ones who contested the 
elections, specifically in terms of reinforcing negative stereotypes. In my interviews, I 
made a point of asking almost all of the non-kinnar interviewees what people thought 
about kinnars at that time, after the election of particular kinnars in their localities. As a 
result of campaign rhetoric, people explained that initially they were more open to 
kinnars and accepting of their differences and different abilities. Interviewees said they 
thought kinnars might be able do something for them, or act in a different manner than 
previous politicians, so that their difference (as kinnars) seems to have been tolerated 
initially. However, widely held stereotypes about kinnars were eventually confirmed, 
based on an assessment of their tenures as ‘unsuccessful’, alluding to the fact that 
kinnars were perceived as inefficient, incompetent, and no better than professional 
politicians. I discuss some of the negative stereotypes that occurred as a result of 
kinnars’ political participation below. 
Homi K. Bhabha theorises the stereotype as that which is ambivalent. He writes: 
Likewise the stereotype, which is its major discursive strategy, is a form of 
knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is always 'in place', 
already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated... as if the essential 
duplicity of the Asiatic or the bestial sexual license of the African that needs no 
proof, can never really, in discourse, be proved…For it is the force of ambivalence 
that gives the colonial stereotype its currency: ensures its repeatability in changing 
historical and discursive conjunctures; informs its strategies of individuation and 
marginalisation; produces that effect of probabilistic truth and predictability 
which, for the stereotype, must always be in excess of what can be empirically 
proved or logically construed. 
(1983: 18) 
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Bhabha argues that stereotypes must be constantly repeated, like Butler’s gender 
performances, where repetition shores up the norm. Butler also points out that 
repetition itself creates instability, such that mutations or subversions can enter the 
system. Thus performance itself contains moments of rupture, which mirrors the 
anxiety Bhabha is calling attention to in describing any stereotype’s instability. For 
Bhabha, the ambivalence of the stereotype is found in its very instability, as that which 
is ‘always “in place”’ and yet must be ‘anxiously repeated’, and that which ‘must 
always be in excess of what can be empirically proved or logically construed’. Bhabha’s 
theorisations of the stereotype can inform an understanding of stereotypes associated 
with kinnars, as concepts and narratives that were constantly repeated in order to 
maintain that kinnars embodied such characteristics. Moreover, stereotypes 
surrounding kinnars pointed to ‘excessive’ constructions of their identity, beyond what 
could be proved. This might account for constituents’ feelings of both hope and 
hopelessness that I discussed above, where kinnars were expected to perform better 
than previous politicians and simultaneously ‘fail’, to be both capable and incapable. 
Kinnars could not meet that stereotype surrounding their supposed abilities, as that 
which was ‘in excess’ of what could be demonstrated. The ambivalence found in kinnar 
stereotypes produces a reality in which kinnars are both ‘an other’ and simultaneously 
knowable and visible; as Bhabha writes: ‘[such discourse] resembles a form of narrative 
whereby the productivity and circulation of subjects and signs are bound in a reformed 
and recognisable totality’ (ibid.: 23). Stereotypes render kinnars recognisable and thus 
intelligible, despite the fact that any stereotype is ‘an impossible object’, given that ‘the 
recognition and disavowal of “difference” is always disturbed by the question of its re-
presentation or construction (ibid.: 33). Such ambivalence and impossibility should thus 
be kept in mind in the following discussion in order to complicate the common and 
inconsistent stereotypes often employed in relation to kinnars’ political practice. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, kinnars were represented as self-sacrificing 
individuals with no normative social ties, who would make more honest politicians. 
These were idealistic visions of what kinnars could offer the general public and were 
ultimately projections by local voters about the sort of qualities they wanted 
professional politicians to embody. Thus, kinnar identity was manipulated to present 
the picture of a kinnar politician who would better serve the needs of the public. 
However, once each was in office, support diminished and negative depictions 
emerged regarding their political inefficacy. Their tenures were characterised as 
‘failures’ and this led to negative stereotypes being generated about kinnars in office 
and the community more generally. 
The first stereotype generated was that none of the individuals elected was 
qualified for the job. It was obvious that none of the kinnars had the usual educational 
qualifications or the social background from which politicians usually come, such as 
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experience in social or development work, or a political family. Education was seen as 
an important criterion for entry into the political sphere.5 No kinnar candidates had 
experience of local politics and none belonged to a political party at the time of the 
election, which would have provided party-backing and guidance in office. All of the 
three kinnars had to learn on the job, and served terms that were shorter than the usual 
tenure of five years. 
A further reason that all three candidates were seen as disadvantaged was due 
to the fact that they were kinnars. Each campaign had focused explicitly on this aspect 
of their identity, portraying them out as ‘real’ kinnars. As a result, nobody assumed 
they would make good politicians by virtue of being bright and adaptable human 
beings, but instead the kinnar aspect of their identity was highlighted and seen as both 
an advantage and a disadvantage because kinnar identity is shrouded by negative and 
uninformed stereotypes. They were expected to be different from other male and 
female politicians and people were afraid or hesitant to engage with them (Tiwari 
Interview, 28/2/11). Avoiding or being unable to work with kinnars undermined their 
position in the political system as elected representatives. Each individual suffered 
because of this fear. These limitations—lack of education, party backing, political 
experience, and kinnar identity—were crucial in the assessment that they achieved 
‘nothing’, proving as impotent as the politicians they replaced. As I argued above, 
people felt both hope and hopelessness in supporting kinnar candidates, knowing they 
could not achieve more than other politicians and expecting it nonetheless. Ultimately, 
people explained a lack of achievement was due to their identity as ‘kinnars’, assuming 
that they could excuse a kinnar politician for not doing better because they were a 
kinnar.6  
A second stereotype concerns their perceived impotence in political office. A 
‘lack of knowledge about politics’ presumed that kinnars did not know what they were 
doing. For example, Naresh Kosta stated that there was no pressure on Kamla Jaan 
since she did not know what the functions of being mayor were (Interview, 22/2/11). 
Similarly, BJP politicians in the Sagar Corporation noted how that the previous mayor 
of Sagar, Pradeep Lariya, had a background as a politician and a developmental vision 
of the city. They assessed that Kamla Bua did not have this background or experience 
of the responsibilities she was undertaking which affected her performance in office, at 
least at the start of her tenure (Yadav Interview, 2/3/11; Khan Interview, 3/3/11).7 A 
                                                      
5 It was acknowledged that a lack of education was often not kinnars’ fault, but that the 
education system and society at large had failed them, resulting in a lack of qualifications. Some 
people took a more sympathetic view, saying that since they had entered politics, it was the job 
of other politicians to help them (Bahadur Singh Interview, 3/3/11). 
6 An anonymous interviewee also noted that people did not blame them in the same way they 
might put blame on another politician, because they were kinnars and kinnars were already 
assumed to be useless (Interview, 4/4/11). 
7 They followed this assessment by saying now that she had joined the BJP, there was a much 
clearer role and purpose set out for Kamla Bua. This, no doubt, is due to the influence of the 
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lack of direction and vision for political office was assumed to be a further reason why 
kinnars were unsuccessful. Interviewees often stated that there were no notable changes 
to their lives or the city or town in which they lived.8 
While Shabnam and Kamla Bua’s tenures were characterised as a time when 
few changes could be seen, Kamla Jaan’s tenure is deemed better in comparison. While 
Kamla Jaan and her supporters attest to a variety of development works, it is an overall 
impression of Kamla’s tenure that is important. Her tenure was viewed by a variety of 
interviewees as ‘good’ because the mayor who followed her was viewed as worse (that 
is, corrupt and less efficient). Many saw Kamla as running the Corporation more 
efficiently, even though she did not achieve a great deal, in part because of a lack of 
funds (Ahmed Interview, 27/2/11). Similarly in Sagar, some positive assessments were 
circulated about the running of the Municipal Corporation, even if few developments 
were seen in Sagar more generally. These developments were attributed to Kamla 
joining the BJP, and were proliferated by BJP supporters or party members, arguing 
that it was easier to secure funds from the state government with a Mayor and majority 
from the same party (Yadav Interview, 2/3/11; Bahadur Singh Interview, 3/3/11). 
Kamla’s incorporation into the BJP meant that she received emotional and technical 
support and could work towards achieving collective aims with government funding. 
Despite some positive outcomes being evident, people still perceived the tenures 
overall as not being particularly remarkable and this is what supports the view that 
kinnars achieved nothing in office.  
A further stereotype linked to their perceived incompetence was kinnars’ 
reliance upon other people. Given their lack of qualifications, each kinnar necessarily 
depended upon other people. Potentially, this opened the door for people to take 
advantage of them, both Municipal Corporation members and people who had helped 
the kinnars campaign. Whether people took advantage or not, kinnars were assumed to 
be incompetent to the point where people could manipulate them, and this fed 
negatively into stereotypes about kinnars’ ability to perform a political role. In the case 
studies, I discussed significant individuals—almost exclusively men—who ‘advised’ 
and instructed all three kinnars when they began to campaign, and this role was 
extended when they were in office. Kamla Jaan was initially persuaded to contest the 
election by a group of local businessmen, three of whom acted as her advisors. 
Shabnam Mausi was persuaded to run by local people in Shahdol and was given 
extensive advice by local politicians in Anuppur before she began to contest the 
election and when she was the MLA. Certain individuals in Sagar gave Kamla Bua 
                                                                                                                                                              
senior members in the Municipal Corporation. Some of these same members were the ones who 
provided this assessment of her initial tenure. 
8 A lack of change led to indifference. For example, people in Sagar seemed indifferent as to 
whether Kamla Bua was unseated or not as a result of the ongoing petition (Chanchal 
Interview, 5/3/11; Kesherwani Interview, 5/3/11).  
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advice and helped to organise her campaign. They also advised her initially in office. 
BJP Corporators took over once Kamla Bua joined the BJP, especially those in her 
Mayor-in-Council (MIC). A few interviewees noted that there were tensions that 
existed between Kamla and the BJP MIC. This reveals that she did not do everything 
they wanted and they did not take full advantage of her. Some people who advised the 
kinnars had previously been or were involved in politics but many were lay people 
who became involved in the kinnars’ campaigns.  
A third stereotype generated by kinnars’ participation in politics was related to 
behaviour seen as unacceptable from politicians. In certain instances, all three were 
able to impress people with their behaviour, through acting ‘unlike a kinnar’, but there 
were also occasions where people disapproved of ‘unsuitable’ behaviour. When each 
kinnar acted ‘unsuitably’, they enforced widely held stereotypes about kinnars’ 
behaviour. These stereotypes were confirmed by particular stories and rumours that 
were circulated about their time in office and were reinforced by the media. Kamla 
Jaan was often represented as ‘foul mouthed’, shouting and swearing in order to get 
the job done (Bearak 2001; Hindustan Times 2000). The incident of Shabnam Mausi’s 
disagreement with a fellow MLA in the Bhopal Assembly was reported widely in 
newspapers, possibly due to its sensational value of a kinnars’ ‘bad’ behaviour in a 
political forum (Upadhyaya 2001). Such reporting verified certain types of behaviour 
associated with kinnars and damaged not only each of their reputations but that of the 
kinnars more generally. Moreover, both lay people and Municipal Corporation 
members alike suggested that their behaviour was at times rude, pushy, and that they 
treated people in a way that was not suitable for a politician. Often such behaviour was 
performed in order to get something achieved and was usually effective, since people 
preferred to avoid confrontation with a kinnar. 
Despite stories of ‘bad’ behaviour, many interviewees suggested that the three 
kinnars who were involved in politics were ‘unlike’ other kinnars, or that their 
behaviour, despite being ‘better’ than other kinnars to begin with, improved while in 
office. Kamla Jaan, Shabnam Mausi, and Kamla Bua were all described to me as not 
being like ‘other’ kinnars but were perceived as better, which could suggest that their 
elections and the visibility of their behaviour had the potential to change stereotypes 
about kinnars. Their behaviour was assessed to have changed through conducting 
themselves in a professional setting. Kamla Bua’s behaviour was described as the ‘most 
improved’: people in the Municipal Corporation expected that her tenure would be 
difficult because she was both a kinnar and an independent candidate. Once she joined 
the BJP, people noted that her behaviour changed, explaining this change as due to her 
role in representing the party and not only making decisions and acting for herself. 
Merchant Dilip Chanchal said she used to act in a ‘non-traditional’ way, doing 
whatever she pleased, including treating people roughly. He said that once she joined 
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the BJP, she adopted the style of behaviour as ‘other party men do’, as if she were ‘like 
any other public representative’ (Interview, 5/3/11). Naresh Yadav, a Mayor-in-
Council member, said her way of talking changed, making her behaviour fall more in 
line with other politicians (Interview, 2/3/11). Naeem Khan added that she changed 
her habits, including her way of walking, dressing, and general behaviour, becoming a 
more professional politician (Interview, 3/3/11). Kinnars’ behaviour in office had the 
potential to change the way in which people saw these individuals and the MP 
community, but people often emphasised that these kinnars were ‘different’. I want to 
discuss, therefore, how each was regarded as ‘different’ from other kinnars in order to 
assess whether these positive representations could change negative stereotypes about 
kinnars more generally.  
Generally speaking, Kamla Jaan was held in highest regard of all the kinnars 
who were elected. Generally, interviewees held a favourable impression of her 
behaviour. Kamla Jaan was one of the more demure kinnars, and the least forceful in 
her behaviour or opinions, with the result that people held her in relatively high 
esteem. MIC member Firoz Ahmed noted she ‘behaved well’ in the Corporation and 
worked ‘as a Mayor’ should (Interview, 27/2/11). He said that she did not conduct 
‘her kinnar behaviour’, a statement that reveals that most people assume there is a 
particular form of ‘kinnar behaviour’, dictating how they act. Kamla was viewed as 
different for not complying with ‘kinnar’ behaviour and performing it once in office; 
therefore, people judged that she conducted herself well.. 
Kamla Bua was the Mayor in Sagar at the time of my fieldwork, and she was 
regarded well by many individuals in the Corporation. People commented on her 
behaviour, because she did not act like a ‘usual kinnar’. Naeem Khan was a staunch 
supporter of and loyal to Kamla Bua,9 explaining that the BJP state level committee did 
not know what to expect when she requested to join but were impressed with her and 
welcomed her into the party. He assessed that this was due to her behaviour; she 
cannot be compared to other kinnars as her behaviour was so ‘saintly’ and she did not 
have ‘other habits’ that kinnars have (Interview, 3/3/11). Mr Khan said that Kamla did 
not wear make-up, or bright clothes like other kinnars, but is demure in her appearance 
and behaviour. He assessed that this impression of Kamla Bua has changed the way 
the public see kinnars generally, since they are like other people in Sagar. However he 
maintained that Kamla is ‘better’ than other kinnars. It should be noted that at the time 
of this interview, Kamla Bua was still Mayor and this may have affected the way in 
which interviewees chose to speak about her. In contrast, one anonymous interviewee 
said that Kamla Bua’s behaviour was no different from other mayors. He said that he 
                                                      
9 Naeem Khan was a member of the Congress party when he won his ward seat in the 2009 
Corporation. He then became an Independent when Kamla Bua asked him to join the Mayor-in-
Council, but was removed when she joined the BJP and the Council was reformed. He then 
applied to join the BJP party when she did. 
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wanted to be anonymous because he was saying something negative about the current 
mayor, but did not have a problem being named in relation to other things which 
could be construed as negative. He went on to say that her behaviour was not unlike 
other mayors and elected officials in relation to the question of improper financial 
behaviour, interestingly assessing her not as a kinnar but as a mayor.10 Like other 
mayors in the past, informal complaints had been brought against her and many 
suspected that corruption was being practiced in the Municipal Corporation.11 These 
were only rumours and could not be verified. However, suspicion is common in local 
political bodies, given that political office is seen as linked to access to goods and 
benefits (Chandra 2004). 
Although rumours of corruption against elected officials are not uncommon, 
people might be more likely to believe them in relation to certain social groups. 
Contrary to election rhetoric that portrayed kinnars as less likely to steal, a common 
stereotype presented kinnars as greedy and selfish. This could be based on badhāī work 
that, in contemporary society, has become less gift-giving on the part of the family 
visited and more of an economic transaction that involves bargaining and compromise. 
This behaviour, alongside the common practice of kinnars ‘extorting’ money from 
businesses in their territories, informed the stereotype that kinnars were greedy and 
materialistic. Interviewees held this view about Shabnam Mausi and Kamla Bua in 
particular, although both have notable wealth. 12  An anonymous interviewee 
complained that Shabnam did whatever she could to get what she wanted, including 
changing her identity from Brahmin to Muslim to Scheduled Tribe. While I could not 
test the veracity of this statement, it reveals an assumption that kinnars get what they 
want, and therefore the practices of individuals in political office—whether true or 
not—fed into stereotypes that circulated about kinnars’ greed. I heard other stories in 
which Shabnam was said to have taken objects or money from people or their homes, 
but these are hearsay and there were no instances where I spoke to the person from 
whom the object was apparently taken. In Kamla Bua’s case, the size and nature of her 
sammelan raised suggestions that the money had been obtained from the Municipal 
Corporation, extorted as a ‘donation’. People were surprised by the gathering’s 
magnificence, but no proof was provided as to the veracity of these suggestions.  
                                                      
10 He gave the example of construction works, which are notorious for providing opportunities 
for ‘corruption’. Since there is no general public works department, it is necessary to hire 
private companies. The contractor is granted on the basis of ‘who they know’ in the 
Corporation, and as a result of giving the contract, the person granting it takes a cut. This is 
fairly widespread practice, known as a ‘commission’.  
11 For example, one interviewee said: 'there were some instances when the commissioner 
stopped her from taking particular actions on paper, and we know those actions were meant to 
do some corruption, which is why commissioner stopped them' (Anonymous Interview, 
7/3/11). 
12 Such wealth in turn may reinforce the stereotype of kinnars as greedy and materialistic. 
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While certain rumours are explainable as a result of the position that each 
kinnar held, important opinions were generated about Kamla Jaan, Shabnam Mausi, 
and Kamla Bua’s behaviour and ability to ‘transcend’ their kinnar identity. Accounts 
testifying to their behaviour as ‘different’ from other kinnars had the potential to create 
a positive stereotype, not just about these individuals but kinnars in general. If people 
could explain a change in behaviour—to that which was seen as more acceptable to the 
mainstream public—as a result of kinnars entering mainstream spaces, then there might 
be an incentive for them to be more tolerant and welcoming of kinnars into other spaces 
in which they were previously marginalised. However, this does not seem to have 
worked. This was mainly due to the fact that people argued that these three kinnars are 
different to other kinnars, viewing Kamla Jaan, Shabnam Mausi, and Kamla Bua as 
more like ‘normal’ people. As a result, other kinnars remained stigmatised according to 
public opinion, despite an assessment that these kinnars behaved favourably, in some 
regards, once elected. On the whole, people did not view kinnars any more 
sympathetically because they focused on the negative aspects that they heard 
regarding Kamla Jaan, Shabnam Mausi, and Kamla Bua, including stereotypes about 
their lack of qualifications for the job, their impotence and reliance on other people, 
and their bad behaviour. A focus on negative stereotypes that confirmed widely held 
assumptions about kinnars served to damage the reputation of the three individuals 
and the community more generally. 
The negative stereotypes generated, despite clear examples that demonstrate 
they do not represent all of kinnars’ behaviour, all of the time (thus, maintaining a form 
of ambivalence), equated kinnar identity with incompetence and bad behaviour, albeit 
in the political arena. Journalist Shankar Prasad Sharma suggested that for each kinnar, 
identity as a kinnar precluded them from contesting and winning future elections 
(Interview, 5/4/11). The ‘experiments’ in Katni, Shahdol, and Sagar were possible 
because of a specific context in which kinnar individuals could be elected, but these 
were unique conditions. Support faded away as quickly as it was generated, and 
alongside an assessment of each tenure as a failed experiment, the lasting impression 
was that of failure which will not quickly be repeated. The stereotypes that were 
generated continue to have a lasting impact on how each of the three kinnars are 
viewed, and people’s impressions of the wider kinnar community. The production of 
negative stereotypes from the political sphere served to reinforce widely held negative 
stereotypes, with the result that the way the community is viewed has not changed.  
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ii. The Inconvertability of Capital 
 
To conclude this chapter, I turn to theorise why the representation of kinnars in local 
politics in MP has not resulted in actual change for their communities or the 
individuals involved. I have argued that there were no substantial benefits for the 
kinnar individuals who were involved in politics, considering the symbolic, expressive, 
and educative functions of representation, and focusing on the social status of the 
group through which to assess some form of material gain for the community. 
Participation in politics did not serve to raise the social or material status of any of the 
three kinnars, nor the community, but in fact reified negative stereotypes regarding 
kinnars. On an individual level, none of the three kinnars was able to raise their social 
status as a result of political participation, nor have they translated their political 
success into greater social acceptance, economic benefit, or a more tolerant view of the 
community at large. Adapting Pierre Bourdieu’s theorisations on capital and the 
possibility for conversion of capital in various fields, I argue that kinnars entered the 
political sphere with less ‘capital’ than a fellow politician—or even a lay person—
might have done, and this disabled them from being recognised as a true politician 
during their time in office which would have allowed them to benefit, in regards to 
their social status, from political participation. The issue I want to address, therefore, is 
why the limited capital that kinnars entered the political field with, particularly ‘social’ 
capital, was unable to be translated into symbolic capital for the kinnars during their 
time in office.  
Bourdieu’s model of social capital posits that capital may present itself as 
economic, cultural, or social, which acts as a social relation ‘within a system of 
exchange’ (Harker et al. 1990: 13). Actors strive for the accumulation of capital, 
particularly symbolic capital, as the form in which different forms of capital ‘are 
perceived and recognized as legitimate’ (ibid.). Individuals generate symbolic power 
through the accumulation of symbolic capital, which functions as a power and a credit 
(Bourdieu 1989: 23), in order to gain a legitimate position in a variety of fields, within 
which the struggles for different forms of resources are played out (Jeffrey 2001: 220).  
 Bourdieu’s theorisations of social capital are effective in explaining how actors 
move within and between fields through the accumulation of capital. Significantly, 
Bourdieu theorises that it is not possible that ‘at each moment anyone can become 
anything’ (1986). Rather, capital, in objectified or embodied forms, takes time to 
accumulate (ibid.). However, in the case of the kinnars who contested elections, I argue 
that the capital that they already possessed, accumulated as a result of their position 
within kinnar society, was unintelligible to normative modes of interpretation, with the 
result that capital conversion was not possible, despite entry into the mainstream 
sphere of politics. Considering the forms of economic, cultural, and social capital 
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available to Kamla Jaan, Shabnam Mausi, and Kamla Bua, allows for an assessment of 
the extent to which such capital was convertible within the political sphere and beyond. 
 One anonymous interviewee noted that politics in India was not ‘for the 
common man’, but for those ‘already in power’, who have the means to generate huge 
support and have the economic means to campaign (Anonymous Interview, 4/4/11). 
He stated that politicians ‘use politics to run their business and [run] businesses in 
order to run their politics’ (ibid.), demonstrating the need for capital which is 
convertible—and intelligible, as I discuss below—between, for example, the different 
spheres of business and politics. Kinnars were disadvantaged in relation for their 
capital to convert, particularly their social capital. 
Economic capital is directly convertible into money. I have discussed how 
Kamla Bua was rumoured to be wealthy, and how Shabnam was said to have 
accumulated some wealth during her tenure. However, all three had homes and lived 
in poorer areas of their localities and were certainly not considered wealthy in the way 
that other politicians were. While economic capital is important for entry to politics, all 
three were given donations by their campaigners, so that none had to spend much 
money on their campaigns. Each kinnars’ economic capital was thus unimportant to 
their campaigns, although some accumulation of wealth may have been a motivating 
factor once in office.  
Cultural capital can exist in three forms: in the embodied state, the objectified 
state, and the institutionalised state (Bourdieu 1986). The embodied state presupposes 
embodiment, in which ‘the work of acquisition is work on oneself’ (ibid.). It is an 
integral part of the person and cannot be transmitted instantaneously, unlike money or 
rights, for example. Bourdieu notes that capital can be acquired depending on the 
period, the society, and the social class of the individual, and thus quite unconsciously 
(ibid.). Cultural capital can also be accrued in the objectified state, in material and 
transmissible objects, such as writings, paintings, monuments, and so forth. In the 
institutionalised state, cultural capital is linked to institutional recognition, such as 
achieving academic qualifications, which confer cultural competence. In the case of 
kinnars and their ability to generate cultural capital, kinnars were seriously limited in 
their ability to obtain all three forms. Kinnars, by virtue of their identity, were unable to 
generate embodied cultural capital, given the way in which their social class is valued 
by both the period and society. Moreover, all three of the kinnars did not have 
academic qualifications, which might attest to their competence in a field such as the 
political one. Although I am not in a position to attest to any objectified cultural capital 
they might own, such material objects could not be swapped for symbolic capital.  
Social capital, Bourdieu writes, is: 
the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of 
a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition—or in other words, to membership in a group—
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which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively-owned 
capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit. 
(1986) 
 
The volume of social capital possessed is dependent on the size of the networks of 
connections that can be mobilised and the volume of the capital that each member of 
each network has (economic, social, or cultural). Solidarity with a wider network 
results in more profits and more social capital, and, moreover, any network of 
connections can be broadened. Bourdieu writes that social capital is the product ‘of an 
endless effort at institution, of which institution rites…mark the essential moments and 
which is necessary in order to produce and reproduce lasting, useful networks that can 
secure material or symbolic profits’ (1986). Given kinnars’ social ostracisation, the 
primary network for kinnars is the wider kinnar community. There are households and 
communities all across India, with arguably very powerful and influential members, 
both within the community, and a few who have wider influence in other fields, such 
as fields pertaining to LGBT activism, HIV/AIDS prevention, and the realm of 
celebrity. However, I posit that the social capital available for Kamla Jaan, Shabnam 
Mausi, and Kamla Bua, as a result of being a member of the kinnar community, could 
not be converted to symbolic capital when entering the political field. The kinnar 
community contains a vast network of households, with many rich and powerful 
individuals, but such capital is only intelligible within the field of the kinnar 
community itself, where hierarchical status, ritual role, and social power are deemed as 
symbolic power. It was not that social capital did not exist for the kinnars who entered 
politics, but rather that the capital generated was unintelligible within other fields in 
mainstream society. 
An extension of this argument would be that kinnars’ habitus and dispositions 
were also different based on their life experiences and membership of their 
communities. Since dispositions include one’s knowledge of the world (the kinnar 
community, primarily) and drive one’s practices and perceptions, they affect the way 
in which any given field is contested. Moreover, dispositions are constrained by the 
material conditions of the surrounding world and are influenced by socialising agents. 
It therefore follows that a kinnars’ habitus might be different to that of a person in 
mainstream society. One interviewee said that Kamla Bua faced difficulties because she 
belonged to a community that was not within mainstream society. He said that they 
‘have their own way of thinking and way of life, which is very different to that of a 
common man or woman’. By suggesting that they think and do things ‘in their own 
style’, he alluded to what might be seen as a ‘kinnar habitus’ (although there would not 
be a single habitus for all kinnars). 
Kinnars were therefore unable to enter the field of politics with a significant 
amount of capital, and this meant that they could not be recognised as a ‘true’ 
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politician or were not given a real chance to prove themselves. Kinnars did not have 
economic or cultural capital on which to rely, and their social capital was not 
recognised through normative modes of interpretation in a way that benefited their 
status. In entering the field of politics with little capital they were unable to generate 
symbolic capital in office such that it could be translated back into social or cultural 
capital that would raise their social status once they finished their tenures. Accruing 
capital in office was almost impossible, based on their inability to perform due to a lack 
of qualifications, party support, and experience, and given the negative stereotypes 
that were generated about the community, reinforcing commonly held views about 
kinnars. Kinnars were therefore further unable to convert any capital they had or could 
gain into symbolic capital, which had the potential to translate into real gains, 
including economic, cultural, and social capital.  
I have argued that representation in local political bodies was unable to raise 
kinnars’ social status and provide material gains, alongside a lack of symbolic, 
expressive, and educative functions. While the representation of marginalised groups 
has the potential to allow previously marginalised voices to speak and to recognise 
subordinate and minority interests, in the case of the three kinnars discussed, I have 
argued that representation has also had the converse effect of reifying the marginality 
of kinnars’ identity (Chapter Three) and of reinforcing negative stereotypes about the 
community (Chapter Four). Representation, therefore, might have unintended effects, 
alongside promoting group visibility and recognition. Moreover, an exploration of 
how a specific group is rendered visible might reveal certain contradictions and 
problems inherent in the act of representation itself. In the final chapter, I will turn to 
consider how kinnar and hijra identity has come, in comtemporary India, to be 
represented within a different field, that of LGBT activism. In recent years, there has 
been growing interest by the Indian State in expanding the rights of the ‘transgender 
community’, a category in which hijras and kinnars are included. This is a significant 
arena in which hijra identity is being constructed in contemporary India, driven, in part, 
by national and international LGBT activism. It is therefore important to consider the 
effects of such representation as part of a study into the construction of the hijra subject 
in modern India. Moreover, considering representation within a different field extends 
this study to consider further contradictions inherent in the act of representation itself, 
particularly focusing on problems that have arisen as a result of shoe-horning the 
figure of the hijra to fit within the ‘transgender’ category and in rendering the hijra 
intelligible to the Indian State and LGBT discourse.  
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Chapter Five 
LGBT Activism and ‘Transgender’ Identity 
 
In the previous two chapters, I have argued that the participation of kinnars in local 
politics in Madhya Pradesh resulted in a re-presentation of stereotypical traits of 
kinnars’ identity that in turn established kinnars as suitable political candidates 
(Chapter Three) and that this representation did not benefit the community in terms of 
raising their social status in mainstream society or providing ostensible material and 
social gains (Chapter Four). The representation of marginal groups in political bodies 
has the potential to give previously subordinate communities a space in which to 
defend group interests. However, representation in local political bodies in MP, on the 
contrary, served to reify kinnars’ marginality at the same moment that kinnars 
attempted to enter mainstream spaces as equal citizens. I want to turn in this chapter to 
address the representation of hijras in LGBT and queer activism, to question further the 
problematic nature of the practice of representation. In recent years, Indian LGBT 
activism has played a significant role in rendering the hijra subject visible to the Indian 
State in order to gain previously inaccessible rights and social benefits for a severely 
marginalised group. I will explore key issues that are raised in relation to the inclusion 
of hijras within the field of LGBT activism, particularly as a form of ‘transgender’ 
identity, in order to explore the contradictions inherent in the practice of representation 
and to ask what impact State recognition of hijra identity has had on the construction of 
hijra and kinnar identity in contemporary India.  
In recent years in India there have been significant movements to address the 
marginal status of ‘minority sexualities’. Often, hijra communities are identified as 
members of the LGBT collective, identified under the ‘T’ for transgender. I want to 
discuss in this chapter, therefore, how hijras are represented as part of the wider 
‘transgender’ community and the effect that inclusion in such discourses has had on 
‘hijra’ identity. Since the historic ruling in 2009 ‘reading-down’ Section 377, a piece of 
legislation in the Indian Penal Code that criminalised same-sex sexual acts, there has 
been a general exploration of the rights and the protections needed for minority 
sexualities in India, both by activist groups and the Indian State. I enquire how hijras fit 
into these debates, particularly those regarding the definition of ‘transgender’ identity, 
given current moves seeking to afford rights to transgender individuals. I particularly 
want to focus on the question of representation as part of the label ‘transgender’. There 
are varying discourses within the wider ‘hijra community’ relating to interests and 
needs and it is pertinent to note that not all of these discourses are recognised, or 
perhaps visible, at the national level. This is problematic for particular groups whose 
interests do not seamlessly ally with ‘national’ interests, with the result that their voices 
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might remain marginalised within the mainstream discourse. I explore the possibility 
of heterogeneous and perhaps incompatible interests through a discussion of the 
differences and divisions between the kinnars of MP and the hijras of Mumbai, focusing 
on the figures of Kamla Bua and Laxmi Narayan Tripathi. I discussed earlier how my 
fieldwork highlighted the difference between Laxmi and the kinnars of MP, and I chose 
Kamla Bua for my analysis in this chapter both because she is the kinnar who was most 
clearly invested in advocating representation for the community in MP and due to her 
senior status in the community. Throughout this chapter, I explore the issues that arise 
from treating and representing distinct identities within a single categorisation as 
‘similar’ or the ‘same’. Hijra identity has been negotiated to fit with contemporary 
discourses on the ‘transgender’ community in India and with current transnational 
conceptions of gender and rights. This negotiation has led to a codification of hijra 
identity, in order that the identity can be recognised by the State. I argue that hijra 
identity is being made intelligible in order to secure representation and rights that 
would alleviate the marginal status of the group members, but, at the same time, that 
representation within the LGBT sphere might have the potential to shut down 
heterogeneous voices and interests and codify a particular form of hijra identity so that 
it is intelligible to the State and its mechanisms. 
 
I. Representation and LGBT Activism 
 
In earlier chapters, I employed the theorisations of Spivak and Hall to frame two 
related but discontinuous forms of representation, as political proxy and as re-
presentation. Spivak explores how one speaks both ‘for’ and ‘as’ in the self-conscious 
practices of representation, questioning the inherent contradictions due to the 
multiplicity of the subject who represents themselves as singular (or at least, 
homogeneous; 2000: 1432). She points out that representation renders a subject 
‘narrativisable’, framing their acts within modes of interpretation (1990: 144), such that 
they become intelligible (and no longer remain ‘subaltern’). I want to formulate a 
similar enquiry in this chapter, analysing how the hijra subject has been rendered 
intelligible to the Indian State through LGBT activism, exploring a crucial mode in 
which hijras have been represented in contemporary India. Representation in the 
debates regarding rights for sexual minorities, I argue, has had a similar effect as that 
seen in the representation of kinnar identity in the political sphere. By being 
represented as part of the LGBT collective, hijra identity is made intelligible to and for 
mainstream activist (and indeed transnational LGBT) discourse, codifying a particular 
form of body, behaviour, and interests as normative. I want to highlight certain 
contradictions that have arisen as a result of being represented within the LGBT 
collective, particularly the assumption that individuals who can be collated under the 
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label ‘hijra’ might share a common identity and experiences. Aside from the variety of 
identifications—anatomical, gendered, psychological—that are included under the 
term 'hijra', there are important regional, urban or rural, and individual, historical 
dimensions that affect individual’s lives and their agendas and interests. The 
conceptual possibility of heterogeneous identifications is closed off by determining 
what hijra identity is according to a singular (here, the State’s) definition. As will be 
demonstrated throughout this chapter, the Indian State is invested in ascertaining 
‘who’ counts as a hijra to grant rights and benefits to these subjects. Part of the problem 
of identifying beneficiaries is relying upon the voices of certain members of the 
community, not necessarily at the expense of others, but rather by positing those voices 
as representative of hijras in general. The focus for this chapter is therefore the effect 
that representation has had on the hijra community as a result of inclusion within 
contemporary queer activism and the role and problems of privileging particular 
voices who speak for and as ‘hijras’. I note that the problem is not the question of which 
person is doing the representing and why but rather the fact that the practice of 
representation itself is fraught with difficulties. Spivak articulates that we speak in 
‘fractured voices’ (Ray 2009: 8), revealing that the act of representation itself is 
problematised through an insistence on the singularity or homogeneity of the voice in 
question. Similarly, representation of the ‘hijra community’ is ultimately impossible, 
prefaced on an assumption of the singularity or homogeneity of those identified as 
‘hijra’. 
Earlier in the thesis I noted the regional distinction between the terms ‘hijra’ 
and ‘kinnar’ and I have primarily used the latter to refer to individuals and their 
communities in MP and the former to refer to the ‘community’ as a whole across India. 
As highlighted by the discussion of Laxmi and the kinnars in MP, in addition to a 
regional distinction, there are further differences between those who identify as ‘hijra’ 
or ‘kinnar’. Some individuals may identify as both at different times, others, such as the 
kinnars of MP, categorically identify with only one of the terms, citing a difference in 
outlook, belief, and ‘nature’ to explain the distinction between identity categories. 
While there are similarities between those identifying as hijra and those identifying as 
kinnar, there are important differences. It is the insistence on similarity through the 
practice of representation that I want to explore below, asking how certain voices and 
bodies are posited as particularly representative of the group. The consequence is that 
individuals who identify in divergent ways may remain unrecognised by the State as 
beneficiaries, so that representation fails to recognise their interests and needs. In this 
chapter, I use the term ‘hijra’ to refer to the wider community of individuals (as used 
by the Indian State). However, I use the term ‘kinnar’ to highlight that there may also 
be individuals who could be classified as hijras, who refuse such categorisation, and 
197  
this refusal is crucial. The implication is that within the identity category ‘hijra’, there 
are multiple, distinct, and sometimes opposing voices and interests.  
 
II. Section 377 and Decriminalising Consensual Same-Sex Acts in Private 
 
In 2001, a lawsuit was filed in the Delhi High Court by the Naz Foundation (India) 
Trust, which sought to repeal Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code and to legalise 
homosexual intercourse between consenting adults. The Naz Foundation is an NGO 
that focuses on preventing and treating HIV/AIDS and provides education and 
training regarding issues of sexual health. The criminalisation of same-sex sexual acts 
was contained in Section 377, which criminalised sexual activity ‘against the order of 
nature’. The Section reads: 
Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any 
man, woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with 
imprisonment of either description for term which may extend to ten years, and 
shall also be liable to fine. 
 
Explanation – penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary 
to the offence described in this section 
(Indian Penal Code, Section 377)1 
  
The Indian Penal Code (IPC) became an Act of the British Governor-General in Council 
on October 6, 1860 (Wintemute 2011: 43). In 1837, the all-British ‘Indian Law 
Commission’ submitted its draft penal code to Lord Auckland, the British Governor-
General of India. The crime of ‘buggery’ (as per the 1828 Act in England, and for all 
parts of India in which British criminal courts had jurisdiction), which was punishable 
by death, was replaced by two broader offences in the 1837 draft, pertaining to the 
gratification of ‘unnatural lust’. The 1860 IPC merged the offences into one offence of 
‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature’, requiring a form of penetration, 
although it depended on what interpretation the courts would give to the offence. In 
1955, the penalty of ‘transportation for life’ to the Andaman Islands was replaced with 
imprisonment for life (ibid.: 43-44).  
Although convictions under Section 377 were rare, with few men booked or 
prosecuted under the law,2 it has been widely acknowledged that the law was used to 
                                                      
1 Section 377 is contained in Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code titled ‘Of Offences Affecting 
the Human Body’. Section 377 is categorised under the sub-chapter titled ‘Of Unnatural 
Offences’ (Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi Verdict 2009: 4). 
2  Govindan (2009b) gives two notable exceptions of Desmond Hope and Miles Patrick. 
Desmond Hope was detained for a month for allegedly sexually abusing a youth in south Goa 
(the ‘youth’ was twenty years old, Gupta 2011: 504; Times of India 2007; Goan Voice 2007). His 
unlawful detention was justified under Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, allowing 
police to detain anyone suspected of a serious offence, establishing that he was not caught 
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justify police harassment of NGOs working on sexual health in India, sex workers, and 
LGBT individuals, including hijras, often with a view to gaining monetary or sexual 
benefits. Many abuses are discussed in a report written for Human Rights Watch in 
2002. In a notorious case in 2001 in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, four men working on 
HIV/AIDS prevention among men who have sex with men (hereafter MSM) were 
arrested. Staff from Naz Foundation International and Bharosa Trust were imprisoned 
for forty-seven days after the police raided their offices and accused them of running a 
gay ‘sex racket’ (Csete 2002: 19). They seized HIV/AIDS-related information materials, 
denouncing them as ‘legally obscene’, and charged the men under several sections of 
the IPC, including Section 377 (conspiring to commit ‘unnatural sexual acts’), 120B 
(criminal conspiracy to commit a serious offence), 107 and 109 (aiding and abetting a 
crime), 292 (sale of obscene materials), and the Indecent Representation of Women 
(Prohibition) Act (ibid.).3 Despite both NGOs being registered and recognised by the 
Uttar Pradesh state AIDS Control Society for their HIV/AIDS prevention work among 
MSMs (ibid.), the police deliberately targeted these organisations. Other cases of 
harassment include the arrest of eleven members of Sahayog, an NGO working on 
sustainable development and human rights issues (including HIV/AIDS education) in 
Almora, Uttar Pradesh in 2000 (see Csete 2002: 21), harassment of staff working at Naz 
Foundation (India) Trust and MSMs in Delhi in 2001 and 2002 (ibid.: 23-4),4 and abuses 
on staff of Sangama in Bangalore, Karnataka, in March 2002. Sangama works with 
MSMs in Bangalore, particularly men living in poverty, and their work includes 
HIV/AIDS information and counselling, but not condom distribution. Despite orders 
to discontinue harassment of Sangama’s staff by both the deputy commissioner of 
police in Bangalore at the request of Sangama staff and members of the People’s Union 
for Civil Liberties of Karnataka (PUCL-K), police prevented individuals from attending 
meetings and harassed the organisation by turning up unannounced at their offices. 
Further harassment has been recorded by outreach workers at Sahodaran in Chennai, 
                                                                                                                                                              
indulging in a sexual act but was arrested on suspicion (Gupta 2011: 505). Miles Patrick, who 
lived in Mahabalipuram in Tamil Nadu, was given a five-year jail sentence in July 2008 for 
‘seducing’ a local fisherman (Belonsky 2008). In regards to being prosecuted, Csete writes that 
the Lawyers Collective ‘notes that in the case of anal sex, charges under 377 are made against 
the insertive partner while the passive partner is considered an abettor and may be charged 
under section 114 of the Penal Code…in recent years formal charges under section 377 have 
been filed largely in cases involving sexual assaults on minors’ (2002: 26, n. 153). 
3 This Act of 1986 prohibits indecent or ‘derogatory’ depictions of women in a variety of media 
and carries a minimum sentence of two years in prison (Csete 2002: 19, n. 103). 
4 Naz Foundation outreach workers reported intensified harassment at this time and attributed 
it to a greater police presence in Delhi after the December 13th, 2001 attack on the Indian 
Parliament (Csete 2002: 24), the increased visibility of MSMs following the Lucknow Incident, 
leading to individuals visiting cruising areas in order to ‘entrap and blackmail, harass or harm’ 
them (ibid.), and confusion between Naz Foundation International in Lucknow and Naz 
Foundation (India) Trust, which were, as Csete notes, two distinct organisations (ibid.). The 
Delhi-based Naz Foundation (India) Trust was targeted by police and thugs, believing that the 
organisation had moved to Delhi after Lucknow. Even before the Lucknow Incident, the Naz 
Foundation was forced to close an MSM drop-in centre, including a sexually transmitted 
disease clinic, due to violence against men who visited the centre (ibid.). 
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Tamil Nadu. Outreach workers visit ‘cruising sites’ with condoms and HIV/AIDS 
information. Csete records that UNAIDS has recognised Sahodaran’s work in its ‘Best 
Practice Digest’, stating that the organisation has contributed to national advocacy and 
networking and technical issues related to sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and 
male-to-male sex (2002: 22). Yet, Sahodaran’s workers reported that they and MSMs 
suffered general harassment. Sahodaran’s director Sunil Menon states that it is ‘all 
about money extraction or free blow jobs’, explaining that ‘if the kothi has no money on 
his person, they [police officers] extract sex’ (ibid.: 23).5 
Section 377 played an important role in sanctioning or enabling police 
harassment of NGOs and their staff who worked on HIV/AIDS issues. In Csete’s 
report, Shaleen Rakesh, coordinator of Naz Foundation (India) Trust’s work with 
MSMs, stated that ‘as long as section 377 exists, they will always have it in their power 
to harass us’ (ibid.: 24). The existence of Section 377 had serious consequences on the 
ability of outreach workers to target MSM groups and hindered much-needed 
HIV/AIDS prevention and education. It also had a devastating individual effect on 
MSMs and other sexual minorities. Aditya Bondyopadhyay, an attorney in the 
Lucknow case, gave testimony on abuses against sexual minorities before the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in April 2002 (ibid.: 25-6). He said 
that NGO field-staff faced harassment from police ‘every day’ in public spaces where 
MSMs socially interact. Moreover, outreach workers were often sexual minorities 
themselves and were ‘regularly beaten, blackmailed, extorted, threatened, and 
sometimes even sexually assaulted and/or raped by policemen on duty’ 
(Bondyopadhyay 2002). Explicitly linking the existence of 377 and its ability to threaten 
sexual minorities, Bondyopadhyay argued: 
Policemen take advantage of this fear of the judicial process to threaten sexual 
minorities with Section 377. They employ such threats to blackmail, extort, rape, 
and physically abuse, their victims. And because obtaining rapid redress is a 
virtual impossibility, members of sexual minorities usually pay up or accede to the 
abuse. This also means that the police records never reflect the fact that the threat 
of 377 was used, for no case is ever registered. This lack of a paper trail—of records 
of the prosecution of consensual sexual acts between adult males—is in turn used 
by the police to claim that Section 377 is a benign provision chiefly enforced, as 
they falsely claim, to deal with cases of male rape.  
(2002) 
 
Evidently Section 377 was used both to harass sexual minorities, sex workers, and 
outreach workers. NGOs and sexual minorities were constantly subject to State 
surveillance, mirroring the position of the eunuch subject in colonial India. In Chapter 
One, I noted how ‘every aspect of the eunuch’s existence was subject to surveillance, 
premised on the threat of criminal action’ (PUCL-K 2003: 45). In a similar fashion, for 
                                                      
5 Menon suggests that although senior individuals might be sensitized through the police 
training offered by Sahodaran on the importance of prevention work regarding HIV/AIDS, 
harassment comes from grassroots-level cops (Csete 2002: 33).  
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sexual minorities and those who worked with them, surveillance was an everyday 
reality, alongside the threat of police harassment and criminal action under Section 377. 
Following the arrests in Lucknow, along with harassment of the Delhi-based Naz 
Foundation (India) Trust, the same NGO filed a petition with the Delhi High Court on 
December 7th, 2001, challenging the constitutional validity of Section 377. The challenge 
was founded on the plea that Section 377 infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed 
under Articles 14 (fundamental right to equality), 15 (forbids discrimination based on 
certain characteristics including religion, caste, sex), 19 (protection of certain rights 
regarding freedom of speech), and 21 (protection of life and personal liberty) of the 
Constitution of India. The petitioners submitted that Section 377 should only apply to 
non-consensual penile non-vaginal sex and penile-non-vaginal sex involving minors 
(Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi 2009: 2). This strategy was necessary to 
cover lacunae in the law related to child sex abuse and forms of sexual abuse that do 
not fall under rape law, which was limited by gender and applicable to women only 
(Narrain 2004: 156). Csete writes that the petition argued against Section 377’s 
unconstitutionality on several grounds, including  
(1) the prohibition of private, consensual relations violates the right to privacy, 
which is guaranteed ‘within the ambit of the right to liberty’ in the Indian 
constitution; (2) a distinction between procreative and non-procreative sex is 
unreasonable and arbitrary and undermines the equal protection provision of the 
Constitution; (3) the punishments prescribed in 377 are grossly disproportionate to 
the prohibited activity; (4) 377 effectively violates the prohibition of discrimination 
on the grounds of sex because it criminalizes predominantly homosexual activity; 
and (5) the right to life guaranteed in the Constitution is violated by 377’s 
jeopardization of HIV/AIDS prevention efforts, by the denial that sexual 
preferences are an inalienable component of the right to life, and by the social 
stigma and police abuse that the section perpetuates.  
(2002: 26-7) 
 
The writ petition particularly emphasised the HIV/AIDS aspect, stating that 377 
‘provides a tangible threat to individuals and NGOs who wish to target the MSM or 
gay community as part of HIV interventions’ (ibid.: 27). 
Chief Justice Ajit Prakash Shah and Justice S. Muralidhar delivered the 
judgement on July 2nd, 2009. Although they did not strike down the Section as a whole, 
it was declared constitutionally invalid relating to private 6  sexual acts between 
                                                      
6 Sen argues the ‘right to privacy’ was necessary to challenge the constitutional validity of 
Section 377, although it has been problematic to both the queer movement and the legal 
challenge (2009: 493). In 2004, Arvind Narrain noted  that asking for the decriminalisation of sex 
in private would have limited consequences for the wider queer community, including hijras, 
kothis, and sex workers, since Section 377 would be operative in regards to the public space 
(2004: 156). Access to private space is a matter of privilege, Oishik Sarkar argues, which could 
lead to the creation of normative standards of sex, where ‘good’ sex is conducted in private and 
‘bad’ sex in public spaces (2008). In an article published online after the judgment, Lawrence 
Liang and Siddharth Narrain argue that ‘the court’s interpretation of “privacy” to refer to a 
broad notion of autonomy and personhood has meant that Section 377 cannot be applied in 
public spaces, where much of same-sex intimacy takes place’ (2009). Sen writes that privacy in 
the judgment has a physical dimension, where privacy refers to an agent’s enjoyment of spaces 
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consenting adults, or, they suggested that Section 377 should be ‘read down’ to exclude 
consenting same-sex sexual acts between adults (Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of 
Delhi 2009: 23). The Section remained applicable to non-consensual, non-vaginal 
intercourse and intercourse with minors, since, the court noted that ‘Section 377 IPC is 
the only law that punishes child sexual abuse and fills a lacuna in rape law’ (ibid.). The 
Court stated that the role of the judiciary is to  
protect the fundamental rights. A modern democracy while based on the principle 
of majority rule implicitly recognizes the need to protect the fundamental right of 
those who may dissent or deviate from the majoritarian view. It is the job of the 
judiciary to balance the principles ensuring that the government on the basis of 
number does not override fundamental rights. 
(ibid.: 100) 
 
In line with this sentiment, they ruled that Section 377 violated the constitutional 
guarantee of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution (ibid.: 73-79) and because it 
specifically targeted homosexuals as a class (79)—holding that sexual orientation is a 
ground analogous to sex—stated that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
was not permitted by Article 15 (85). Section 377 was said to impact sexual minorities, 
particularly men who have sex with men and gay men, solely on the basis of their 
sexual orientation, a provision which ‘runs counter to the constitutional values and the 
notion of human dignity which is considered to be at the cornerstone of our 
Constitution’ (91). The Justices noted that a ‘provision of law branding one section of 
people as criminal based wholly on the State’s moral disapproval of that class goes 
counter to the equality guaranteed under Articles 14 and 15’ (92). Since the Section was 
said to infringe upon Articles 14, 15, and 21 (protection of life and personal liberty), the 
court left open the issue of violation of Article 19 (protection of certain rights regarding 
freedom of speech) (101). 7 In their conclusion, the Justices invoked the notion of 
inclusiveness, which they noted to be an underlying theme of the Indian constitution. 
They said that the Court believed that the Indian Constitution reflected this value 
deeply ingrained in Indian society and that this inclusiveness is manifest in 
‘recognising a role in society for everyone’ (104). Therefore even those perceived by the 
majority as ‘deviant’ or ‘different’ cannot be excluded or ostracised, but rather should 
be assured a life of dignity and non-discrimination (ibid.).  
It is important to locate the context of this victory for the LGBT community. 
Backing the petition was ‘Voices Against 377’, a coalition of non-governmental 
                                                                                                                                                              
from which others may be excluded and within which their activities are not monitored without 
knowledge and consent (2009: 494). 
7 For excellent analyses of the judgment and unresolved issues, see NUJS Law Review, vol. II 
(July-September 2009), including Kapur on the regulation of sexual subalterns through 
‘tolerance’ (381-396); Basheer, Mukherjee, and Nair on ‘the order of nature’ and indeterminate 
terms such as ‘unnatural’ and ‘natural’ (433-443); Narrain on the ‘queer’ precedent of the 
judgment (455-470); Sen on ‘elite’ responses (481-503); and Mandal on ‘the right to privacy’ (525-
540). 
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organisations and activist groups based in Delhi. Its website states that this coalition is 
a ‘point of intersection and dialogue between various social movements…where a 
united voice is being articulated against Section 377’ 
(http://www.voicesagainst377.org). Groups in this coalition include Amnesty 
International India, Haq: Center for Child Rights, Jagori (a women’s training, research, 
and resource centre), Nigah (a Delhi-based collective working on issues of gender and 
sexuality), and Prism (a Delhi-based forum which raises awareness about issues 
affecting minority sexualities).8 These voices, alongside the Naz Foundation, were 
instrumental in bringing the plight of the ‘LGBT community’ in India to both national 
and international attention through the petition against Section 377, locating the LGBT 
movement in India in relation to transnational discourses on rights for minority 
sexualities.9 At the same time, these voices were negotiating what it meant to be ‘LGBT’ 
in the context of the fight against 377, and thus were taking part in constructing—even 
unintentionally—a normative LGBT subject in the Indian context. It is clear that their 
interests and agendas alone are not representative of the full heterogeneity of subjects 
who can be located as part of the wider ‘LGBT community’ in India, reflecting 
contradictions inherent in the act of representing between the multiplicity of non-
narrativisable subjects and the singular or homogenous voice which represents, 
speaking for and as ‘the LGBT community’. I want to turn to examine certain debates 
within LGBT discourses in India and specifically to question the nature of hijras’ 
inclusion within these debates and discourses, highlighting contradictions that arise in 
the act of representing ‘hijras’. 
 
III.  ‘LGBT’: Whose Fight Is It? 
 
Hakan Seckinelgin writes that global activism constitutes ‘particular sexualities that are 
justified according to a sexual ontology linked with the Western experience’ (2009: 104). 
Yet, identity categories, such as ‘gay’, are taken up in ‘subtle and diffuse ways’ by 
subjects across the globe, appropriating identities in ways that are ‘far from uniform, 
and are infused with locally conceived meanings’ (Boyce 2006: 84). As identity 
categories are assumed and integrated within Indian State discourses on rights for 
those classified under the ‘LGBT’ banner, categories that are employed to designate 
different groups are taken up by individuals and they become identities in the process. 
The issue, therefore, is what happens to individuals who do not identify with 
                                                      
8 See http://www.voicesagainst377.org/content/view/12/26/. 
9 Rahul Rao notes that subaltern movements have ‘strong incentives to frame their grievances in 
global terms and express their political utopias in cosmopolitan vocabularies’ (2010: 199). Here, 
the Indian LGBT movement has contextualised its position in relation to global LGBT 
movements to gain support on an international level and draw upon transnational rights’ 
discourses. 
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sanctioned categories, and whether the State can recognise their rights and interests. 
The LGBT ‘community’ has clear intentions to include and recognise various identities 
and preferences demonstrated by individuals with ‘minority sexualities’, with a focus 
on gaining rights and the acquisition of citizenship.10 At the same time, rendering such 
identities intelligible may have a normalising effect on the multiple, overlapping, and 
heterogeneous forms that exist as part of the ‘LGBT community’, so that certain 
identities must be subsumed within or left outside the definition of the normative 
LGBT subject. In particular, hijras have an uneasy relationship with the ‘T’ (transgender) 
in LGBT and I want to explore how identification with the State-used and -approved 
‘transgender’ label may result in problematic negotiations for heterogeneous forms of 
hijra identity. This is not to suggest that no hijras are important or present within LGBT 
discourse, or that none identify as transgender, or that no hijra groups participate as 
part of the wider LGBT community. In fact, my investigation is complicated by the 
instance of certain hijras’ strong involvement with LGBT activism, and others’ rejection 
or lack of knowledge about it. I consider it important to attend to how representation 
functions to include the hijra community under the label ‘LGBT’, as well as how certain 
hijras represent ‘hijras’ in general, speaking for and as ‘hijras’. In my discussion, I 
explore the limitations of the practice of representation in creating a singular and 
intelligible subject for identification by the State.  
In the 1990s, two factors hastened the acceptance of a new sexual paradigm, 
where a new ‘class’ of individuals was created for whom ‘sexuality seems to have 
replaced gendered practice as a marker of self-identification’ (Reddy 2007: 97). Reddy 
states that one factor was the establishment of Bombay Dost, the first magazine for 
‘alternative’ sexualities in 1990, and the other was the liberalisation and globalisation of 
the Indian economy in the early 1990s, facilitating the emergence of a wealthy upper-
middle and middle-class population (98). This emerging population had access to ‘out-
of-reach’ narratives and objects, including an ‘evolving gay culture’ (ibid.). These 
narratives included global activist discourses on LGBT sexualities. Aniruddha Dutta 
states that the 1990s was marked by ‘visible representations of same-sex desiring and 
gender variant subjects’ in and by the media, even at the same time that dominant 
discourses on national identity attacked these representations as foreign to Indian 
culture and perhaps even as dangerous to national security (2012a: 119). LGBT 
legitimacy was dependent on being able to draw upon global discourses on rights and 
LGBT sexualities and re-write discourses of cultural nationalism in order to produce 
                                                      
10 Narrain writes that the ‘abstract figure of the citizen has to have a specific character so as to be 
deserving of rights’ (2007: 62), arguing that the queer person is an ‘incomplete’ citizen, based on 
the ‘primacy of heterosexuality’ encoded in societal institutions (he refers to the family and 
marriage as prime examples; 64). Dominant lesbian and gay organisations tend to fight for 
assimilation and social acceptability, where access to institutions, such as marriage, signal 
acceptance for the community (Oswin 2007: 656). However this assimilation, Oswin argues, 
upholds dominant heteronormative assumptions.  
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revisionist histories that would justify the (Indian) LGBT community’s position within 
them. Rahul Rao writes that ‘queer activism has had to operate within a force field 
constituted by the teleological pulls of cosmopolitan global activism and the ongoing 
reality of communitarian homophobia’ (2010: 193), negotiating both discourses within 
the postcolonial Indian context. An instance of this negotiation is the 1998 controversy 
over Fire, a film depicting the same-sex relationship between two married women. At 
the same time as being praised for its subject matter, the film attracted criticism and 
sparked mass protests (Jain 1998), especially by the Hindu right, who declared that 
lesbianism was a western import which would corrupt Indian womanhood and family 
values.11 Dutta argues that dominant LGBT activism has managed to perform a double 
move in seeking equal status, by ‘contesting and re-claiming the ”intimate core” of 
national culture and identity on the one hand’ by portraying non-heteronormative 
sexual identities as part of Indian culture, and by ‘evoking transnationally circulating 
models of liberal democracy and metropolitan culture on the other’ (2012a: 120).12 In 
line with this second thread, the LGBT movement in India has demonstrated ‘[a] desire 
to keep up with transnational patterns of conspicuous consumption and display that 
have become a hallmark of metropolitan gay/lesbian culture’ (ibid.: 123). As an 
example, Dutta discusses the ‘Pink Rupee Party’, organised by Delhi-based collective 
Nigah in the summer of 2009, a fundraising event at the start of a week-long 
‘QueerFest’ in Delhi, which included film screenings, workshops, and performance 
(ibid.). Members of the ‘queer’ community were invited to a prominent city club for a 
donation of 400 Rupees, ‘to show your support and dance the night away with us’ 
                                                      
11 The film’s protagonists are Radha and Sita, the names of prominent women in Hindu 
mythology (Radha was the lover of Kṛṣṇa and Sita was the wife of Rāma, often considered the 
epitome of womanhood). Fire was released by the Indian Central Board of Film Certification 
without cuts, but they suggested that ‘Sita’ should be changed to ‘Nita’ in the Indian version 
(Ghosh 2010: xiii). Protests began two weeks after the film was released (see Jain 1998). On 2nd 
December, a matinee show in Mumbai was interrupted by women from the right-wing Shiv 
Sena Mahila Aghadi, smashing glass panes and burning posters. They called on state Culture 
Minister, Pramod Navalkar, to protest the depiction of the ‘lesbian relationship’. Chief Minister 
of Maharashtra, Manohar Joshi, supported them: ‘I congratulate them for what they have done. 
The film’s theme is alien to our culture’ (Jain 1998). He later said he supported protest but not 
vandalism. Shiv Sena founder Bal Thackeray stated, ‘in the name of art and progressive 
intellectualism, you can’t manipulate [this] public medium and corrupt tender minds. 
Tomorrow it might start in all ladies hostels. It is a sort of social aids [sic]’ (ibid.). Two weeks 
after the Mumbai protest, Thackeray said that his party would stop the attacks if the two 
women were given Muslim names, since ‘lesbianism’ did not exist in Hindu families (GMax 
News 1998). 
12 However Dutta notes that by claiming a national culture and identity, individuals use 
essentialisms of their own. For example, lesbian activists in response to the Fire controversy 
highlighted the historical tolerance of same-sex desire in Indian culture, though Dutta writes 
this could be a ‘nostalgic idealisation of a libertarian Hindu antiquity or of the purported pre-
colonial tolerance of different sexualities’ (2012a: 120). Revisionist readings of pre-colonial India 
are commonly adopted which present homophobia as a Victorian imposition (see Human 
Rights Watch 2008). Dutta notes that these claims refer to high or classical culture, are Hindu-
normative, and might account for homophobic attitudes as a result of Muslim invasions, 
mirroring themes developed in Hindu right nationalism (2012: 121). 
205  
(ibid.).13 Dutta notes that the use of the term ‘queer’ immediately indicates the class 
privilege and discursive access of Nigah and its constituency, but such events also 
indicate the rising economic presence and visibility of the metropolitan gay or lesbian 
consumer and their ability to take part in social transformation (‘show your support’), 
without ‘necessitating further ethical or political commitment  (just “dance the night 
away with us”)’ (123-4). Only certain individuals have access to these spaces, either 
socially or economically, and the ‘queer’ community, and thus normative ‘queer’ 
subjectivity, remains inaccessible to many sexual minorities whose identities also 
intersect with lower socio-economic status.14  
Economic and social distinctions also intersect with an ability to speak English. 
Many individuals who live in metropolitan cities, who might ‘dub’ themselves as ‘gay’, 
or ‘lesbian’, or ‘queer’15 also are likely to have some command over the English 
language.16 For example, the invitation to the Pink Rupee Party was only posted on the 
Nigah website in English. However, posts from 2011 onwards on this website are 
posted in both English and Hindi, perhaps indicating the changing face and/or nature 
of the Nigah community in Delhi. Ability to speak English is one way in which to 
directly tap into Western discourses regarding the agency of the sexual subject. 
Lawrence Cohen quotes Kira Hall as saying that the upper-middle class gay 
community embraces English as ‘an index of progressive sexuality’, in contrast to 
comparatively lower class hijra and kothi communities (2005: 277). Shivananda Khan 
writes that among English speaking middle class groups, Western terms are used 
almost exclusively and the discourses adopted relate to Western understandings of gay 
rights, lifestyles, and identities (2001: 102). 17 This effort locates the LGBT movement in 
India as part of the global movement for sexual minorities, echoing Rao’s argument 
that subaltern movements have incentives to posit their struggles in cosmopolitan 
terms (2010: 199). For example, the initial writ petition challenging the constitutional 
                                                      
13 See http://nigahdelhi.blogspot.co.uk/2009_08_01_archive.html.  
14 For example, Sharma (2010) discusses an incident in Uttar Pradesh (UP) where around twenty 
men were arrested at what was reported as a ‘gay party’ by the local Hindi-language 
newspaper, Amar Ujala. Sharma comments on ‘irresponsible’ reporting of the event in Hindi 
and English media. He uses the arrests to draw attention to the divide between these ‘gay men’ 
(in an ‘ultra-conservative’ town in UP, who probably ‘have nowhere else to meet and many 
perhaps still live with their families’) and the (relative) freedoms enjoyed by the ‘gay’, ‘queer’, 
and ‘LGBTQ’ men and women at Delhi’s gay pride march the month before. He ends by asking, 
would any of these men have even wanted to attend the Delhi pride march, and ‘would they 
understand what “queer” meant at all?’ 
15  Ashley Tellis argues that the ‘queer?’’movement?’ has appropriated the term ‘queer’, 
revealing the elitist and uncritical stance of the ‘movement’ (2012: 149). 
16 Tom Boellstorff (2005) uses the concept of ‘dubbing’ to address complexities behind the use of 
foreign terms and concepts in local contexts. ‘Mimicking’ and ‘borrowing’ suggest an authentic 
identity behind the ‘inauthentic’ appropriation of a term. Sinnott eloquently states that in 
dubbing, ‘a fusion is created in which the seams are visible’ (2010: 24). 
17 Khan also questions the influence of diasporic lesbian and gay Indians on the development of 
a ‘queer India’. He writes that lesbian and gay diasporic groups carry with them their ‘newly 
wrought identities’ and discourses on rights, lifestyles, and identities on trips ‘back home’. 
Discourses are often conducted in English and he suggests that Indians privileged enough to 
access these discourses might then adopt them (2001: 104). 
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validity of Section 377 included a variety of transnational discourses on the rights of 
sexual minorities. One concern was sexual health and the perceived impact that Section 
377 had on preventing access to healthcare and education and hindering HIV/AIDS 
prevention to a particularly vulnerable community. In the verdict, the Delhi High 
Court noted that  
homosexuals, according to the petitioner, represent a population segment that is 
extremely vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infection. The petitioner claims to have been 
impelled to bring this litigation in public interests on the ground that HIV/AIDS 
prevention efforts were found to be severely impaired by discriminatory attitudes 
exhibited by state agencies towards gay community, MSM or trans-gendered 
individuals, under the cover of enforcement of Section 377 IPC, as a result of which 
basic fundamental human rights of such individuals/groups (in minority) stood 
denied and they were subjected to abuse, harassment, assault from public and 
public authorities.  
 (Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi Verdict 2009:6-7) 
 
A focus on HIV/AIDS prevention is an important aspect of NGO work in India, 
especially in relation to minority sexualities.18 Since the 1990s, India has seen a large 
increase in NGOs working with ‘sexual minorities’, especially in the sector of 
HIV/AIDS prevention, often targeting MSMs (Cohen 2005: 291; Dutta 2012b).19 This in 
turn, has complexified relations among different groups seen as falling under the label 
‘MSM’. NGOs are funded by both the Indian State and foreign donors, and has created 
what Dutta terms a ‘normative script for identity’ through both implicit and explicit 
aid conditionalities through which these ‘sexual minorities’ attain funding (2012b). 
Dutta explains that in order to be recognised and identified by these donors, 
community-based organisations (hereafter CBOs) working to gain gender/sexual 
rights or freedoms increasingly need to identify themselves and those they seek to help 
through categorisations that donors can recognise. In relation to HIV/AIDS funding, 
the health ministry and the National AIDS Control Organisation (hereafter NACO) 
mediate foreign aid,20 thereby influencing and controlling which and how varying 
                                                      
18 Cindy Patton argues that the quest for sexual liberation is interlinked with the discourse on 
HIV/AIDS (1984: 4). The spread of HIV/AIDS on a global scale has made necessary the work of 
LGBT activism, intertwining both forms of activism. 
19 Arvind Narrain argues that hijras and kothis are the specific targets of a public health 
intervention against HIV/AIDS, constituted as both the vectors in spreading the HIV/AIDS 
and as ‘frontline participants’ in the war against it (2007: 68). An example of a primary focus on 
HIV/AIDS prevention in relation to transgender/hijra identity is the SAATHII Report (2009). 
The primary focus of the report is on HIV/AIDS (2009: 5), despite recognition of other social 
issues hijras face. One participant asked whether the National AIDS Control Organisation 
(NACO) was interested in other issues aside from HIV. One speaker replied that ‘NACO was 
focused on HIV’ and that the ‘prioritized issues of a particular set of people might not be their 
priority’ unless it related to HIV prevention, such as reducing sexual violence (ibid.). The report 
suggests that NACO is focused on HIV prevention over other issues that beneficiaries, the 
subjects of such intervention, might find equally or more important. 
20 India receives ‘technical assistance and funding’ from a variety of United Nations (hereafter 
UN) partners and bilateral donors. The DFID (UK Aid from the Department for International 
Development) and the World Bank are pooling partners with India’s NACO in financing the 
National AIDS Control Programme (NACP) III (2007-12), in which the programme 
‘dramatically scaled up targeted interventions in order to achieve a very high coverage of the 
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identities are recognised. This creates divisions among these organisations and 
identities, as well as presenting challenges to communities who fail to fit neatly into 
these aid categories (ibid.). 
Dutta highlights the main issue with these efforts as the separation between 
MSM and transgender (‘TG’) identities, conceptualised as if based on a man-woman 
divide, where TG is used for men identifying as or desiring to be women, based on 
some normative idea of womanhood (2012b). The distinction is problematic in 
numerous ways. (1) It fails to identify the variety inherent in both MSM and TG 
communities, creating a consistent identity with which individuals must identify. TG 
presumes gender variance, whereas MSM is seen as a sexual identity, and ultimately 
ignores the lived reality of networks and communities where gender identity and 
sexual orientations overlap in divergent ways. (2) MSM and TG are perceived as 
separate and mutually exclusive identities and communities, prohibiting flexible 
identification in different situations and at different points in an individual’s life. A 
system of binary categorisation is problematic in cases where individuals do not 
acknowledge a clear split between ‘gay’ and ‘transgender’ identity: the need for 
flexible identification is evident in the variety of both English and regionally specific 
terms used by individuals to identify in different contexts and at different times. (3) In 
an increasingly standardised funding application process, CBOs must identify whether 
they work with either MSM or TG communities, or sub-divide their population into 
enumerated groups. To do so causes confusion and stress for organisations, delays in 
funding, and problems working among lower socio-economic and rural communities 
who might not identify according to these strict categorisations (but who ultimately 
depend upon such funding). Once funded, that organisation must appear to focus on 
the group they have identified, for example, Dutta recalls that at a new TG intervention 
near Kolkata, ‘too MSM’ behaviour was discouraged, since the CBO had to appear as a 
‘TG’ organisation. This normativises TG identity and organisations may only feel 
accountable to a particular identity, rather than complex communities of individuals. (4) 
Lastly, a separation between MSM and TG identities divides communities through 
competition for funds. It breaks down potential solidarities and destroys the notion 
that MSM and TG identities are groups that can function in dialogue, rather than as 
separate entities. 
Grants for HIV/AIDS prevention, from both the Indian State and foreign 
donors, are a major source of funding for both larger and smaller organisations 
working with ‘sexual minorities’ (Dutta 2012a: 115, n. 20).21 Thus, outreach work 
                                                                                                                                                              
most at risk groups’. Donors include primarily US-based initiatives targeting AIDS (Global 
Fund, USAID, CDC, PEPFAR), various UN bodies (UNAIDS, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNDP) and 
the World Health Organisation (World Bank 2012). 
21 Organisations, especially smaller CBOs, working in rural and lower socio-economic areas, are 
more dependent on funding than LGBT groups in metropolitan cities may be. These latter 
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undertaken in the Indian context concerning MSM or TG communities is linked to 
HIV/AIDS prevention strategies and discourses, which themselves feed into 
transnational concerns and agendas. The insistence placed on HIV/AIDS prevention, 
through funding opportunities, might place undue emphasis on the relation between 
HIV/AIDS and the MSM/TG community. This is not to say that HIV/AIDS 
intervention and prevention among these communities is not important, especially 
since they have been made vulnerable through social factors (such as a lack of access to 
medical facilities, resources, and education, and at high risk of social violence, 
including rape), but this approach conceives of MSM/TG as primarily a sexual identity 
that is high risk in its behaviour.22 Dutta notes that this sort of funding economically 
facilitates institutional queer and LGBT activism (2012a: 114, n. 17). It drives intentions 
and expectations of HIV/AIDS policies and outreach work itself.23 Given the divides 
between ‘TG’ and ‘MSM’ identity, I want to investigate how hijras are conceptualised 
as part of the ‘transgender’ category. Moreover, the way in which the term 
‘transgender’ has been institutionalised is a good example of how the intentions and 
expectations of funders and activists are introduced and entrenched in the Indian 
context. 
 
IV. ‘TG’ for Transgender 
 
i. Who Counts as Transgender? 
 
‘Transgender’ in the Indian context is often referred to as ‘TG’ and usually assumes a 
transition from male to female or is a term relevant to men who identify as or desire to 
                                                                                                                                                              
groups may therefore carry out work that is not tied to the agenda of the Indian state or foreign 
aid organisations. For a critique of the ‘politics of funding’, see Tellis 2012: 146ff. 
22 Sexually variant individuals, especially those born male, are perceived as a particularly high-
risk group for HIV/AIDS (see World Bank 2012). An International Labour Organisation 
Operational Guideline entitled Targeted Interventions for High Risk Groups (n.d.) notes that only 
some MSM groups are most at risk. In this document (dating from between 2007 to 2012 given 
its focus on NACP III), ‘high-risk MSM’ groups are identified as ‘hijras, kothis, and double 
deckers (not panthis) (12)’. ‘Double deckers’ are males who ‘both insert and receive during 
penetrative sexual encounters’ (10); panthi refers to a ‘masculine’ insertive male partner (11). 
However, in regards to ‘high risk behaviour’, queer women and FTM (female to male) 
transpersons are often left out of HIV/AIDS funding (which usually focuses on female sex 
workers). They are also less visible in institutional activism (see Dutta 2012a: 114, n. 17). 
Regarding the institution of the kothi-panthi framework within AIDS prevention, see Cohen 
2005. 
23 In indirect ways, the intentions and expectations of policies and funding bodies can indirectly 
harm intended beneficiaries. In a report entitled Chasing Numbers, Betraying People: Relooking at 
HIV Related Services in Karnataka (2011), Chacko notes that there are barriers involved in 
HIV/AIDS testing and information access, pointing to issues such as meeting unrealistic 
numerical targets and people being forced into testing, lack of confidentiality, and bad quality 
of counselling (15). Chacko notes that staff members at the CBO or NGO level felt that they are 
‘being policed’ (19), since they cannot hold accountable staff members belonging to funding or 
support agencies. 
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be women. Activists demanded that funding policy be revised in order to better 
accommodate gender, with the result that ‘TG’ entered policy discourse. For example, 
a 2008 United Nations Development Programme (hereafter UNDP) report advocates 
that support processes are needed in order to implement Targeted Interventions for 
Sexual Minorities (in line with NACP III’s focus on targeted interventions). A summary 
of the report notes that they need to ‘sharpen focus on the needs of the TG (transgender) 
community’ (United Nations Development Programme 2008). The National AIDS 
Control Programme Phase III had initially designed targeted interventions for MSM, 
with MSM and TG marked as a single entity. Activists noted that this ignored gender-
based violence and discrimination, as well as neglecting the fact that not all male born 
sexual minorities identified as male (Dutta 2012b). The term ‘TG’ was thus introduced 
to cover gender variance but soon became instituted as a separate identity,24 instead of 
policy makers’ initial intention that the term allow for gender variance among existing 
MSM identities and consider gender discrimination (ibid.).25 The institution of ‘TG’ as a 
separate identity required that activists and development agencies sufficiently define 
what ‘TG’ is. 
Given that ‘TG’ is commonly glossed as referring to those identifying or 
desiring to be women, individuals among the hijra community are often classified as a 
subsection of TG identity in India, or are perceived as a group that is closely linked to 
this identity (although some hijras identify as men). In the UNDP report (2008) 
focusing on targeted interventions for sexual minorities, MSM and TG identities are 
separated, noting that while the State AIDS Control Societies initially combined both 
populations, it was necessary to separate them (17). Although the issues of MSM and 
TG populations are similar, they require ‘specific attention’ (16). Hijras are classified 
with TG populations, for example, ‘hijras and other TG populations’ (17) and 
‘Advocacy for Hijras (Eunuchs) and TGs’ (24), conflating these identities as similar or at 
least part of the same group. The classification of TG as distinct from MSM marks a 
shift in perceptions where homosexuality and gender variance are seen as closely 
related or the same thing (for example, assuming that all gay men are effeminate) 
                                                      
24 Dutta notes that the institution of the term ‘TG’ paralleled adding ‘other’ as a gender ‘option’ 
in the census and other government documentation (2012b). However I was told that the 
identity ‘other’ was not an ‘option’ but was allocated by census officials, ignoring hijras/kinnars’ 
preferred identification as ‘male’ or ‘female’. 
25 The category ‘TG’ fit in with NACP Phase III intentions, allowing for ‘targeted interventions’ 
among ‘high-risk’ groups. The World Bank report (2012) designates transgender individuals as 
a high risk group, with HIV prevalence according to HIV Sentinel Surveillance (HSS) 2010 as 
18.80%. The actual report, HIV Sentinel Surveillance 2010-11: A Technical Brief (2012) reveals that 
only three sites were surveyed (one in Maharashtra and two in Tamil Nadu). Observed HIV 
prevalence at TG HSS sites ranged from 0.8 to 18.8% (2012: 32). Confusingly, Annex 6 of the 
report (2012: 40) includes a data table of ‘HIV prevalence among single male migrants, long 
distance truckers and transgenders, state wise (2005-11)’, so it is unclear whether the data is the 
same for all three groups or all three groups were counted together. In this table, Maharashtra 
in 2011 has 18.80% HIV prevalence and Tamil Nadu has 3.82%, with an average given for 
‘India’ as 8.82%. This figure is given elsewhere in the report as the prevalence for ‘transgenders’ 
(5, 11) and they are called a high-risk group (alongside ‘MSM’ identity, with 4.43%). 
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(Dutta 2012b). TG is thus seen as a gender identity, as living ‘in the gender role 
opposite to the one in which they are born’ (SAATHII 2009: 16), although the term 
‘opposite’ presumes a binary framework in which the choices must be male or female 
and the transformation is from one identity to the other. A UNDP Issue Brief on the 
‘Hijras/Transgender’ (Chakrapani 2010) notes that the term ‘transgender people’ 
describes ‘those who transgress social gender norms’ and defy ‘rigid, binary gender 
constructions’, ‘express[ing] or present[ing] a breaking and/or blurring of culturally 
prevalent gender roles’, acknowledging that these people may live part or full time in 
the gender role ‘opposite’ to their biological sex (ibid.: 3). Both the SAATHII Report 
(2009: 14-17) and UNDP Issue Brief (Chakrapani 2010: 3) give a list of identities 
included within ‘transgender’, acknowledged to be an ‘umbrella’ term. Both reports 
posit hijra identity as included within transgender identity, despite its specificity. The 
SAATHII report notes that ‘a few transgender persons also believe in a traditional 
culture known as Hijra’, which it terms a ‘historical cult’ (2009: 17). Chakrapani goes 
further and identifies problems with inclusion, arguing that the term ‘transgender’ 
may ‘hide the complexity and diversity of various subgroups’ within the Indian 
context and may hinder the development of specific HIV prevention, care, and policies. 
He acknowledges that certain hijras may prefer to be called ‘hijras’ and not be 
subsumed under the term ‘transgender’, although they might use this term in a global 
platform (2010: 3). He accounts for the preference for a separate ‘hijra’ category by 
explaining that hijras have a ‘long history, culture, and tradition’, which is not made 
evident when using the (Western) term ‘transgender’.  
Seeing hijra identity as a sub-group of transgender identity more generally 
allows for hijra identity to be ‘appropriated’ by the mainstream LGBT community, 
widening the scope of the term ‘LGBT’ in contemporary India and allowing for a 
coalition of individuals with variant sexualities. Hijras perform a labour of cultural 
authenticity through their membership of the LGBT collective, as an ‘authentic’ ‘LGBT’ 
identity that has an established history and place in Indian society, in contrast to other 
‘lesbian’, ‘gay’, ‘bisexual’, or ‘transgender’ identities, seen as modern identity forms. It 
is necessary that the LGBT movement include hijras, especially given the size and 
visibility of the group in contemporary India. Hijras are one of the most visible 
identities among ‘minority sexualities’ in contemporary India, even if their 
categorisation as ‘transgender’ is not quite as simple. Significantly, representation 
within the LGBT movement re-classifies hijras as sexed and gendered subjects, against 
popular representations of the group as asexual subjects, propagated by both hijras and 
society alike (as demonstrated by hijra rhetoric on their asexuality and social rhetoric 
on their lack of family and kinship ties).  
Identification of ‘hijra’ with the ‘T’ of ‘LGBT’ is also important for classification 
purposes, in order to deal with the problems and discrimination that hijras face. The 
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Indian State’s intention to classify is evidenced by the increasing visibility of the term 
‘TG’ and the debates surrounding ‘TG rights’ by the State in the years following the 
reading-down of Section 377. Moreover, the process of collating identities under the 
‘LGBT’ category allows opportunities for people to participate in the politics of 
recognition through which they can articulate a collective identity. The process creates 
solidarity and is an attempt to claim a common ground for an identity and draw 
people together from different contexts under that identity (Seckinelgin 2009: 116). 
Seckinelgin writes that while the LGBTI category sets out a framework for 
identification, where people are required to identify with it in order to join the demand 
for rights, on the other hand, public reaction to categories is ‘producing violent 
responses’ towards those identifying with said categories (2009: 108).26 He questions 
whether people can have sex without being identified with one of the letters in the 
category, and if they do, he asks, ‘what happens to their rights to have a sexuality (and 
gender) that is not captured by the LGBTI rights?’ (ibid.). He argues that in order to be 
a political actor, one needs to be intelligible within a particular political debate, 
struggle, or activity. ‘Thus’, he writes, ‘the reality of homosexuality as sexual practices 
in everyday lives needs to be translated into identities that are assumed to be 
politically intelligible’ (109). Seckinelgin argues that two steps are necessary: to 
construct one’s self as a subjectivity that is linked to a particular politics, and in this 
political participation, to think of one’s self ‘consciously and elaborately’ in relation to 
the LGBTI category, even if this is not how a person sees themselves in their everyday 
sexual practices (ibid.). Then the subject can be recognised and identified. While 
Seckinelgin advocates the possibility of alternative categories that might align with the 
LGBTI category, in order to attain rights, identification with the label ‘TG’, at least 
currently, is necessary for hijras. Part of the issue is the wide range of terms with which 
the community currently identify, differing according to the labels used by the Indian 
State, aid and donor agencies, and among hijras themselves, often informed by regional 
location. The wide range of identity groups can cause confusion for the State and 
among the mainstream public as to the chosen identities of individuals—which can 
lead to issues such as harassment in train carriages, inability to receive medical 
attention, and denial of rights such as voting and standing for election—and anxiety 
among the hijra population.  
                                                      
26 Rao makes an important point about how the increased naming of subjects as ‘LGBT’ has led 
to increased visibility and thus policing by state mechanisms, although he is discussing the role 
of Western activists in naming subjects as LGBT. He argues that such visibility is the result of 
‘gay rescue narratives’, where states that do not respect rights around sexual diversity are 
characterised as backward and gay subjects of these states are perceived as in need of saving 
(2011: 43; 2010: 179-189). These rescue narrative signal the ‘contemporary eagerness of white 
gays to save brown gays from brown homophobes’, Rao writes, paraphrasing Spivak’s own 
critique of colonial paternalism, and traces the emergence of this discourse through Puar’s 
notion of homo-nationalism (the collusion between homosexuality and American nationalism) 
(2010: 182). 
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There are a wide variety of ‘identity’ options for hijras. Although members of 
the community are commonly referred to as ‘hijras’, this term is not always applied in 
regional contexts. For example, almost all the hijras I met in MP and Gujarat identified 
as ‘kinnars’, which was also the term used by the majority of the mainstream 
population. Individual states can influence how populations are named, for example, 
in Tamil Nadu, hijras are referred to as ali or aravaṇi, but more recently, under an 
initiative of the state government, are called ‘tirunaṅkai’, meaning ‘auspicious woman’ 
(Craddock 2012). Not all aravaṇi have adopted this term, but some have, given that it 
has a positive meaning for the community.  
There are alternative ‘identities’ that hijras can adopt. The Indian State allows 
hijras to identify as ‘male’ or ‘female’, such as on the Electoral Roll. On occasion, 
alternative or ‘third’ categories are created. In 2005, the Indian State introduced onto 
the website version of the passport form the choice of ‘E’ for ‘eunuch’ in the column for 
‘sex’, meaning that there were three choices: male, female, or ‘eunuch’ (Telegraph 2005). 
In the most recent census of 2011, hijras were counted as ‘other’ in the column for sex; 
again, there were three choices: male, female, or other. Although hijras could identify 
as ‘eunuchs’ for passport applications, they were designated as ‘other’ in census 
counting. Many individuals in MP refused to be counted because they did not see 
themselves as an ‘other’ gender, but as ‘male’ or ‘female’. Kamla Bua and Heera Bai 
told me that 200 kinnars they knew refused this categorisation; they met with the 
election commission in Bhopal requesting that they take this matter to the central 
government. This indicates a tension between State and individual classification, where 
certain members of the public failed to be recognised by the State. The census in 2011 
was the first time that the hijra population in India was enumerated, but only according 
to the designated classification ‘other’.27 
A wide choice of identification terms is also problematic to the extent that 
individuals might have different ‘identities’ on different documents, such as on the 
electoral roll, their ID card, their passport, or their ration cards. This has led to 
problems for hijras, including being turned away from voting, receiving rations, or 
healthcare28 because of identity discrepancies. There are further issues that hijras face 
                                                      
27 This issue works both ways: some hijras want to be identified as ‘other’ (or some ‘other’ 
category, such as ‘third’ or ‘transgender’). In 2009, some ‘eunuchs’ avoided voting due to a 
‘third sex dilemma’, since they were ‘unwilling to identify themselves as male or female on 
voter registration forms’ (Agence France Presse 2009).  
28 Hijras often cannot access free healthcare facilities or find discrimination so intolerable that 
they no longer seek help. Hijras face discrimination due to their transgender status, presumed 
or real occupation (sex-work), or presumed or real HIV status (Chakrapani et al. 2004: 12). 
Forms of discrimination reported include deliberate use of male pronouns; registration as 
‘males’ and admittance in ‘male wards’; abusive language and harassment by staff and male 
patients; lack of knowledge and insensitivity of healthcare providers; and even denial of 
medical status (Chakrapani 2010: 10). However, there are calls to better understand 
‘transgender’ needs, particularly in relation to sex reassignment surgery or endocrine treatment 
(India HIV/AIDS Alliance 2013; Kalra 2012) or the role of psychiatry (Chandran 2009; Kalra 
2010).  
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through being conceived of in multiple ways by the State. For people who change their 
sex or gender identity, gaining legal recognition of their lived identity is difficult, and 
this impacts other aspects of their lives including their right to marry and adopt, and in 
relation to inheritance and wills and employment discrimination (see Chakrapani 2010: 
10).  
In addition to issues relating to identification, the hijra community struggle 
with various aspects of their daily lives. This includes lack of opportunities for 
education and employment; lack of State provision in regards to healthcare facilities 
and housing; a lack of protection against social and sexual violence by the law; and a 
general lack of recognition by the State in regards to their rights as citizens. Although 
an extension of laws may not be able to make substantial changes to the way hijras are 
perceived by the mainstream public, there have been important developments in 
attempts to rectify the inequalities experienced by the hijra community with regards to 
education, access to healthcare, social marginalisation, and general human and civil 
rights. 
Responding to demands made by ‘transgender’ individuals and activists, the 
Indian State has embarked on a series of hearings and public forums to discuss issues 
of importance to the ‘transgender community’ (see Chowdhury 2011, Ali 2012). 
Although there have been welfare boards established in individual states, such as the 
notable case of the Transgender Welfare Board formed in Tamil Nadu in 2008,29 no 
such board exists to help the transgender community on the national level, even 
though there have been numerous calls for its inception.30 The first public forum was 
organised in Mumbai in November 2011 by Article 39, a division of the Center for 
Legal Aid and Rights, with support from the UNDP (Chowdhury 2011). The intention 
of these forums was to gather testimonial evidence from various sources, which would 
suggest the necessary steps that the government should undertake in ensuring greater 
human and civil rights for hijras. Laya Medhini of the Centre for Legal Aid and Rights 
stated that ‘the public hearings will be held to map needs, to articulate problems, talk 
about rights denied, violence faced and to find a common thread in the stories of the 
hijra community’ (ibid.). Ernest Noronha, the Programme Officer from the UNDP 
described these hearings are part of a ‘larger sensitisation programme’. Although there 
is huge variation among the transgender community, Noronha noted that there 
‘should be a larger push to establish their legal identity so that they can at least be 
recognised as citizens of the country’ (ibid.). Some of the issues raised by members of 
the transgender population were sex change surgery, access to education, social 
                                                      
29  For an initiative undertaken in East India by SAATHII, see 
http://saathii.org/calcuttapages/undp-tg-hijra-cnslttn-report-final.pdf. 
30 The UNDP Report of 2008 notes that the creation of both a National Task Force and a Hijra 
Welfare Board was highly recommended by participants at the UNDP consultation (24), which 
included NACO and other AIDS control groups, the Lawyer’s Collective and rights 
associations, and organisations working on minority sexualities and sexual health (27). 
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stigmatization, HIV prevalence and health issues, access to basic services, violence 
against the community, and rights’ violations (Ali 2012; Chowdhury 2011).31 The 
project continued throughout 2012, with meetings held in Ahmedabad, Lucknow, and 
Delhi. It is a nascent project, with initiatives being raised, but thus far none have been 
implemented.32  
 
ii. Who Speaks on Behalf of ‘TGs’? 
 
Given the development of initiatives and consultations into the status of the TG 
community in India and the impact this is likely to have on individuals, including the 
hijra community, it is pertinent to ask the question, ‘who speaks on behalf of TGs’? As 
Noronha pointed out above, there is significant variation among the transgender 
community (Chowdhury 2011), so there are competing interests and agendas. Dolly 
Thakore, a theatre actress and social activist, was a member of the jury that oversaw 
the first public forum addressing transgender issues in Mumbai in November 2011. She 
identified that many transgender individuals are uneducated, saying ‘hence, they are 
not aware of their rights. As a result they are exploited by others’. Thakore went on to 
emphasise that among the community, ‘there are members who are educated and 
doing their bit for the upliftment of the transgender/hijra community’ (ibid.). Certain 
educated hijras or transgender individuals are the ones invited to speak on behalf of 
the community, such as the hijras who were invited to speak at these public forums.  
While hijra participating in these forums can identify community needs to an 
extent, they cannot be said to represent all members of the group. It would be 
ludicrous to suggest that any member of a group can speak for all of its members. The 
issue of ‘who speaks’ for TG interests mirrors a concern seen around the prominence of 
privileged voices in the mainstream LGBT/queer community, who, more often than 
                                                      
31 By extension, certain programmes have been implemented to gather in-depth information 
and put forward proposals for government action, such as ‘Pehchan’, a programme 
implemented by the India HIV/AIDS Alliance, focusing on the HIV response for vulnerable 
sexual minorities (supported by the Global Fund). An example of a response to an issue was a 
brief released by Pehchan on access to gender transition services, including hormonal 
treatment, breast augmentation, and sex reassignment surgery. The brief provides 
recommendations regarding developing policy and clinical guidelines at the national level and 
provision of services (India HIV/AIDS Alliance 2013). 
32 In contrast, there have been significant developments in Tamil Nadu, the most active state in 
ensuring better treatment for aravaṇis as early as 2003 (when they formed a state subcommittee 
on transgender welfare): providing ration cards, giving a choice of gender (male or female) on 
applications for official documents, and offering free and subsidised housing (Govindan 2009a). 
In December 2006, the state subcommittee issued a government order with recommendations to 
improve their ‘living conditions’, including counselling and sensitisation programmes and 
counselling for MSMs against pursuing sex-reconstruction surgery (SRS) (see Government of 
Tamil Nadu 2006). This order also provided disciplinary guidelines for schools and colleges 
who refused to admit aravaṇis and information for medical institutions regarding SRS (ibid.). 
The Aravani Welfare Board was formed in May 2008, who issued another government order 
guaranteeing reserved seats to transgender individuals in colleges and universities across Tamil 
Nadu (ibid.).  
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not, tend to be middle-class, metropolitan, English-speaking ‘lesbian’, ‘gay’, ‘bisexual’, 
or ‘transgender’ identifying individuals. While hijra identity has been subsumed within 
the wider LGBT collective, it is likely that only certain hijra or TG voices are heard 
within LGBT debates. 
LGBT activism in India, through identifying a variety of minority sexualities as 
part of the collective, has the potential—as any movement that distinguishes itself as 
fighting for rights for a specific group—to speak about, and thus construct, a normative 
subject. Ratna Kapur points out that through engagement with the law, the ‘sexual 
subaltern’ is de-radicalised. This leads to a ‘flattening out’ of the sexual subject, so that 
they are produced and regulated through, what Kapur terms, the ‘discourse of 
tolerance’ (2009: 384). In this sense, the subject is rendered intelligible through a 
process of normalisation, and thus becomes visible to and is policed by State 
mechanisms. Kapur argues that tolerance performs both a space for the proliferation of 
sexual identities and a regulatory function when it cannot ‘totally exclude or efface the 
sexual “Other” with ease’ (ibid.: 396). Tolerance addresses ‘the excess’, that which is left 
out by ‘formal equality’, which is limited or shaped according to dominant norms (ibid.: 
384). Dominant religious norms and normative sexuality proscribe certain norms 
relating to behaviour, propriety, and sexual conduct. Lisa Duggan’s notion of 
‘homonormativity’ is useful here, which refers to a politics that does not contest 
dominant heteronormative assumptions and institutions but instead upholds and 
sustains them. Claudia Schippert writes that ‘homonormativity’ dictates the 
‘“normality” of the “good” and responsible gay subject along similar lines to the ones 
defining the heteronormative subject’ (2011: 77). Thus, minority sexualities are 
tolerated, as long as they confirm to dominant heteronormative patterns relating to 
identity. Schippert notes that through homonormativity a ‘gay moralism’ has 
developed, marked by attacks on promiscuity and other sexual practices viewed as 
deviant from within the gay community (ibid.). A growing literature in the West 
records how LGBT recognition and visibility tends to include ‘elite queers’ into 
discourses of nationality, citizenship, and socio-cultural respectability, Dutta writes, at 
the cost of the ‘continuing or increased marginalisation and deprivation of racial and 
socio-cultural others’ (2012a: 113). In the Indian context, the continuing marginalisation 
of certain groups is the result of regulative practices and discourses in response to 
forms of ‘gay’ identity seen as ‘too deviant’. Certain behaviours are viewed as 
inappropriate or disruptive, especially those of minority LGBT identities such as the 
hijras, which makes evident a tension that has arisen through inclusion of hijras among 
the LGBT collective. As an example, Dutta discusses an article entitled ‘Let’s Keep the 
Pride’, which marked the first anniversary of the 2009 High Court Judgement (2012a: 
110-111). The article supports the political legitimacy of the LGBT community, but 
focuses on the ‘inappropriate behaviour’ of a few transgenders, who ‘started lifting 
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their skirts and shouting swear words—enough to embarrass those of their own 
community who were till now enjoying the party’ (Afaque 2010).33 Dutta rightly notes 
that the ‘middle class visibilisation’ of queer identity references metropolitan (and 
international) LGBT culture and this is seen as ‘provocative’ and ‘in good fun’, 
borrowing words from the Hindustan Times article (2012a: 130). The news article 
records how ‘men kissed men’ and ‘women hugged women’, wearing t-shirts ‘bearing 
provocative images (two London bobbies kissing), or words (“Unf**k the world”)’ 
(2010). Yet certain hijra and kothi modes of visibility ‘embarrass’ the LGBT community: 
the Hindustan Times article quotes non-hijra participants as saying ‘they are spoiling the 
moment’s sanctity’, ‘this kind of behaviour at a place like Jantar Mantar is so 
unacceptable’, and ‘the worst part is that we can’t stop anyone from participating’ 
(Afaque 2010). Ashok Row Kavi, one of India’s most prominent LGBT rights activists, 
is quoted as saying that the ‘gay’ community has to show whether it can behave 
responsibly’, and, ‘like all oppressed people, we must learn how to use our rights 
sensibly’ (ibid.).  
The imposition of regulative discourses and practices upon behaviour seen as 
disruptive and deviant is evident, revealing that the inclusion of hijras has disrupted 
‘middle-class’ modes of sensibility: the LGBT movement need the hijras in creating an 
authentic LGBT identity, despite a rejection of some of their practices. Dutta writes that 
LGBT behaviours and discourses can be disruptive, but ‘not too much’. She points out 
the balancing act that LGBT discourse has to manage: 
The valorisation of middle class ‘provocation’ speaks to the contradictions of the 
dominant LGBT evocations of cultural-national and political-civic citizenship, 
which must disrupt nationality and civility (through ‘provocative images […] or 
words’) but not too much – establishing a delicate balance between normative 
culture and LGBT difference by precluding acts too aggressive, excessive or crass 
for middle class ‘provocation’. 
(2012a: 131) 
 
Since the LGBT movement claims a space within civil society, there is an assumption 
that their social and sexual practices should measure up to heteronormative standards, 
and this has created a form of homonormativity in India that is policed by both the 
mainstream ‘gay’ or LGBT community and the State, demonstrated by the tension with 
hijra and kothi performances, seen not just in relation to their sexual practices, but also 
                                                      
33 Mitra argues that mainstream news coverage focuses on the spectacle angle of marches, rather 
than that protest aspect (2010: 172; however, Mitra is discussing the June 2008 pride marches 
where one of the protest demands was the amendment of Section 377; p. 174). Following a 
network of Indian ‘queer bloggers’, Mitra writes that, in their opinion, the media panders to 
stereotypes of queer, particularly queer as hijra (172). He adds that the blogs studied are not 
representative of all queer Indian blogs, or the only queer Indian bloggers’ community, and are 
made up of Indian and diasporic bloggers (168). Alongside the media’s focus on the spectacle of 
hijra participants, the Afaque article’s focus on hijra and kothi behaviour is representative of 
mainstream LGBT concerns. The ‘queer’ bloggers might be said to belong to a normative LGBT 
community, at least those located in India, given their access and presence online. 
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their civic and social ones. Alongside media reports dictating what behaviour is seen as 
acceptable and what is not (including by members of the LGBT community), reports of 
the consultations involving hijras and other ‘minority’ sexualities reveal what is 
expected of these individuals. The Report of the Regional Transgender / Hijra Consultation 
in Eastern India outlines specific ‘ground rules’ for the meeting, as suggested by a 
participant who was on the convening committee (SAATHII 2009: 4). The rules 
included ‘to maintain discipline, no clapping and no personal attacks’, and also listed 
‘no threats to anyone’, ‘asking respectfully for meaning of new terms if needed’, 
‘speaking one at a time’, and ‘raising one’s hand to speak’. It is not uncommon to set 
ground rules, but these rules allude to behaviours commonly expected of hijras: 
clapping, strong and forceful language, and general disregard for ‘common decency’. 
Specific forms of behaviour are advocated here, as well as an assumption of what 
practices should be erased. This sentiment may extend to religious practices. Govindan 
notes that in Tamil Nadu, activists see that the ‘rehabilitation’ of transgender women 
by the Tamil Nadu government and activists can lead to an ‘erasure of all that is 
oppositional, subversive, and empowering about the re-authoring of heterosexist 
Indian traditions’ by aravaṇi religious practices, particularly the popular aravaṇi event 
at the Koovagam Festival (2009a). Govindan stresses the empowering space that 
aravaṇi performance might open up, through what she terms a ‘subaltern re-reading of 
an episode from the Mahabharata’. She notes that the Tamil Nadu state’s ‘reformist 
tendencies’ are revealed 
in the following observation made in The Hindu in a news item on the aravanis’ 
response to the constitution of the Aravani Welfare Board: ‘KM Ramathal, of the 
Tamil Nadu State Commission for Women, said the transgenders had rights to 
celebrate, but by taking part in certain rituals like tying the “thaali and removing 
them” in Koovagam, the transgenders were only lowering themselves’.  
(2009a) 
 
By seeing this practice as ‘lowering’ transgender identity, the state made a judgement 
about what sort of practices should and should not be acceptable for the aravaṇi 
community, in line with what it saw as respectable practices for the community in 
relation to mainstream practices.  
Regulative practices impact various ‘minority’ sexualities within the LGBT 
community through an insistence on modes of practice that align with conservative 
sensibilities, but I have focused here on hijra practices and the way in which hijra 
identity is being constructed in relation to ‘transgender’ identity. Evidently, certain 
interests and agendas are set by the mainstream LGBT/queer movement, primarily 
focused on redressing previously disregarded rights and needs pertaining to minority 
sexualities. At the same time, there are different demands being made and different 
actors behind those demands. While hijras are included within the LGBT movement, 
they might be seen as a ‘minority’ sexuality within a coalition of ‘minority sexualities’, 
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loosely identified with the term ‘transgender’. Seckinelgin argues that many people on 
whose behalf rights are claimed are recognised as LGBTI people but are unable to 
reformulate and rethink their own position within that framework (2009: 113). 
Similarly, many hijras have not reformulated their own position in response to 
positioning within the LGBT category. It is unsurprising that many of the hijras who 
engage with or are aware of LGBT discourses are confined to metropolitan cities and 
have access to global discourses. As a result, their interests might conflict with those of 
hijras in other parts of India. Many hijras living in rural areas do not identify with the 
LGBT movement, or may not even be aware of it. Listening to voices that speak as 
representatives of the hijra community without an acknowledgement of the variations 
between hijras has the potential to regulate that heterogeneity and ignore contrasting 
opinions and interests. I now turn to consider an example of this heterogeneity that 
became evident during my research.  
 
iii. Disparate Voices 
 
An example of variant discourses within the hijra community can be demonstrated by 
comparing different attitudes and interests among the kinnars in Madhya Pradesh and 
the hijras in Thane district, Mumbai, although the discussion that follows cannot be 
generalised to represent all ‘kinnars in Madhya Pradesh’ in contrast to ‘hijras in Thane’. 
Rather, I want in the following discussion to highlight the disparaties between two 
particular voices from two widely diverse backgrounds, with the caveat that they, in 
turn, are not fully representative of the communities to which they belong but rather 
exemplify two possible, albeit prominent, perspectives in a spectrum of various 
positions. This discussion is limited in its scope by focusing on two individuals in 
order to draw a comparison: Kamla Bua, the most vocal on ‘hijra’ issues of the kinnars I 
interviewed, and Laxmi Narayan Tripathi, a well-known hijra activist in Mumbai. I 
want to highlight differences between what they believe is important for the hijra 
community, informed by their opinions, personal contexts, and experiences. I use this 
discussion to highlight divergent positions, which are problematised further because 
both, on different occasions, have been established (particularly by the State and other 
institutions of governance) as representative of their communities, or the wider 
community of ‘hijras’. Indeed, their positionality as individuals who could be identified 
as representative might disqualify them from representing others; it is clear that both 
are exceptional figures who are limited in their ability to be representative (in a 
descriptive sense). However, this discussion is intended to draw out two divergent 
positions, in order to suggest that an awareness of their difference of positionalities 
and opinions points to a need to consider further the different voices within the hijra 
community, which might, in fact, advocate for different ends.  
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My initial discussion in Chapter Two revealed that both Kamla and Laxmi have 
a different understanding of what ‘hijra’ identity is, what it means to be a hijra, and to 
belong to the hijra community. I want to discuss three subjects in order to demonstrate 
the difference between their lives and beliefs: gender identification, forms of activism, 
and opinions on the ‘future’ of the hijra community. By contrasting these individuals, I 
explore the ways in which they speak for and as hijras, how they represent ‘their’ 
community, and highlight differences that arise from context and location and 
proximity to or place within (predominantly English) LGBT discourses. These are just 
two of the possible discourses within the hijra community, demonstrating how the 
community does not speak with a single voice, and considering how the dominance of 
one voice—the normative ‘hijra’ voice—is problematic in attempting to provide 
representation for the wider community. 
The first time I met Laxmi in Thane, I asked her opinion on the elections of 
kinnars in MP. She said that while their elections were a good thing, they had ‘not done 
enough’ for the hijra community whilst were in office: they had not fought for hijra 
rights. Laxmi’s critique should be framed within the context of her own social work 
and her self-presentation: as an educated and socially mobile activist, in a metropolitan 
context, who is engaged with debates the lack of rights afforded trans people and other 
subordinate communities. In the following discussion, I explore how Laxmi and Kamla 
Bua may, in fact, be fighting for different ends, and that both may not view each 
other’s agendas as relating to their own.  
First, both hold different positions over the theme of gender identification. 
Laxmi’s work raises awareness of what might be termed ‘hijra’ and ‘transgender’ 
issues,34 often framed by transnational rights’ discourses. Her own identity as a hijra 
has been instrumental as a place from which to speak about interests that she sees as 
pertinent to the transgender community, although her education, experience in the 
NGO-sector (both in India and internationally), fluent English, and access to western 
concepts and discourses on sexual health and human rights have played a large part in 
informing her sense of identity as a hijra or transgender person. For example, in 2009 
Laxmi is reported to have said that she had never voted and refused to do so until 
there is a ‘transgender option’ on identity cards. ‘It's the question of the identity of our 
whole community,’ she said, ‘in spite of so many years of independence we haven't got 
our own identity, our own place in the constitution of India’ (Agence France-Presse 
2009). By focusing on hijra identity as separate from and not male or female, Laxmi 
constructs hijra or transgender identity as distinct from male and female. This 
distinction reflects how she sees her own gender identity. She told me that she ‘enjoys’ 
her femininity more than a woman might, but does not identify in the same way a 
                                                      
34 I use both terms when referring to Laxmi as she uses both in her conceptualisation of the 
community, with nuance used for different forums. 
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woman might (as a ‘woman’). It is hyper-femininity in her case. On the other hand, 
Kamla Bua clearly establishes her identity within the binary framework of male or 
female. Kamla identifies as a female kinnar and took pains to stress the gendered aspect 
of her kinnar identity. Her refusal to be counted as ‘other’ during the 2011 Census 
counting reveals a strong conviction that kinnars should not be seen as a separate sex, 
counted apart from male and female categories.35 I noted in other instances in MP that 
kinnars would identify as either male or female kinnars, but not simply ‘kinnar’ without 
gender clarification.  
Linked to the issue of not wanting to be named as ‘other’ is a demonstration of 
Kamla’s ‘social’ activism on behalf of kinnars in MP. Both Kamla and Heera Bai, one of 
Kamla’s celās, said they refused to be counted by the census officials, along with ‘over 
200 kinnars’ who felt the same way. On their behalf, Kamla and Heera visited the state 
government election commission to submit a petition that refused the imposition of the 
‘other’ gender categorisation, protesting the layout of the form and asking that kinnars 
be allowed to choose their gender as female or male (as possible on other State 
documentation). It is not clear whether Kamla and Heera encouraged other kinnars not 
to be counted or whether it was individually motivated, but both their past political 
experience and willingness to engage with the state apparatus on behalf of other 
members of the community is evident. Kamla showed her willingness to advocate for 
what she terms ‘kinnar rights’—in the sense of equal rights for kinnars, not special 
rights—on previous occasions. She sent a letter to the Supreme Court before her 
election, advocating that kinnars should have equal rights, as men and women did, 
under the Constitution of India. She proudly showed me a letter she had received back 
from the Court, acknowledging that ‘transgender’ people should have equal rights, 
and Kamla read it as recognition of her hard work. More recently, Kamla was invited 
to participate in a meeting on the 23 August 2013, held at the Department of Social 
Justice and Empowerment in Delhi. More than fifty kinnars from across India were 
present, including Shabnam Mausi (Singh 2013). Kamla said that the State was ready to 
draft a law relating to kinnars’ right to choose their gender and religion, and that three 
more meetings were scheduled which she would attend (Interview, 28/8/13).  
Such activism is significant for the ostracised community in MP and Kamla Bua 
might be identified as a ‘natural’ leader due to her status among kinnars in Sagar 
district and her prior experience of municipal politics. Her invitation as a 
representative of the MP community to the Delhi meeting may have been due to 
familiarity with her name as a result of political participation. Kamla is used to 
speaking for the kinnar community and working with press, with government officials, 
                                                      
35 Her emphasis on the female aspect of her kinnar identity could have been influenced by the 
petition in the Sagar District Court, which also challenged her gender status. At the time of 
Census counting and when I interviewed Kamla, she was answering this petition in the court. It 
was therefore important that she stress the ‘female’ aspect of her identity. 
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and making her opinions known to the wider public. Laxmi also shares the latter 
experience, with the added benefit of her social status. She is a well-known personality 
in Mumbai, in social, activist, and celebrity circles, and relating to her work in an 
international context (for example, on the UN Civil Society Task Force on HIV/AIDS 
and as part of the Asia Pacific Transgender Network, part of the International Gay and 
Lesbian Human Rights Commission). Laxmi therefore speaks from a powerful and 
respected position on hijra and transgender issues, uniquely qualified as a person from 
within the hijra community itself. She is perceived widely as a representative of the 
community through her advocacy and visibility: in a report announcing the formation 
of the Asia Pacific Transgender Network, Laxmi is named as ‘one of the most 
recognisable faces of hijras in India’ (IGLHRC 2009). 
Laxmi advocates for hijra and transgender rights in the same way that Kamla 
does, but reaches a wider audience, positioned as she is in Mumbai and within global 
discourses on human rights. While Kamla is concerned with what kinnars need in the 
context of the state of MP, Laxmi attends forums and consultations on all areas of hijra 
and transgender issues that the NGO sector and the Indian State is interested in, for 
example, taking part in a UNDP National Consultation on HIV related needs and 
concerns in 2008 (from which the UNDP ‘Missing Pieces’ Report was compiled) and 
giving testimony at the Article 39 first public forum on ‘transgender issues’ in Mumbai 
in November 2011. She is a highly visible participant and often features in photos at 
events and consultations she attends; for example, she appears in numerous photos in 
the UNDP ‘Missing Pieces’ Report (2008). This form of representation, often as one of 
the few hijras present at consultations, reinforces her position as a representative of the 
community. At the 2008 UNDP consultation she represented an organisation that she 
founded that works on issues related to minority sexualities, Astitva, and was one of a 
few hijras present. Additionally, Laxmi has a strong presence, and uses her education, 
sharp mind, and fluent English to her advantage, which helps her position as an 
advocate for the hijra community more generally. Since she is familiar with both 
communal (that is, hijra) and global discourses, Laxmi is able to position herself as a 
representative for the community. This is also performed through her image as an 
‘atypical’ hijra, for example, when she appeared as a contestant on Big Boss, a national 
television. Before the show, Laxmi told me it would give the public an opportunity to 
see that hijras were ‘just like anybody else’, and since she has the ability to move easily 
between a hijra world and a non-hijra one, she is more ‘intelligible’ as an individual to 
the public, as an actor that is more commensurate to the public view of what a hijra 
should be by fitting in with a normative LGBT subject identity.  
Laxmi’s positioning impacts on how she views the future of the community. 
She is heavily invested in the fight for LGBT rights (among other struggles), focusing 
on rights that have been previously ignored by the Indian State and on sex and gender 
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practice in relation to HIV/AIDS discourses. Laxmi advocates for the equalisation of 
rights, as well as the need for practices that target the transgender community 
specifically. On the other hand, there are instances where the kinnars of MP, and 
particularly Kamla Bua, demand equality of rights, with the assumption that there will 
be added benefits or preferential policies for the kinnar community. A difference 
between the forms of rights demanded can be demonstrated in relation to the issues of 
caste and reservation, and these are linked concerns. Laxmi is from a Brahmin family in 
Uttar Pradesh, and Kamla is from the Kori caste, a Scheduled Caste in MP. The 
distinction between high Brahmin and lower Scheduled Caste status itself might have 
an impact on the way in which these two individuals see these issues in the first place, 
as well as the way such rhetoric is produced by subjects and accepted by different 
audiences. In chapters two and three, I discussed Kamla’s efforts to express her chosen 
‘castelessness’, in the face of the petition brought against in the district court, as well as 
her view that caste should be chosen by kinnar individuals. Kamla’s efforts to 
transcend her caste and social status by choosing ‘castelessness’ remained 
unrecognised, since the court ruled that castelessness was not an equivalent status to 
that of being a member of the Scheduled Castes, even though the marginalisation and 
discrimination that kinnar communities face could be comparable to certain Scheduled 
caste groups. It thus might matter what caste positionality a subject has at the moment 
of accepted transcendence of caste structures, where Kamla’s decision to choose 
castelessness is interpreted differently from Laxmi’s decision to place less significance 
on her caste (although, she does not reject her caste status, which is not unimportant, 
given the social status it accrues, and which might offset whatever social deficit hijra 
identity produces for her).  
Both have a view of caste that is not reflected more widely in mainstream 
society. Kamla maintains that there is ‘no such thing as caste’ in the kinnar community, 
while Laxmi downplays the role of caste among hijras. However, caste does matter, 
particularly in dealings with non-hijra society. Kamla ran for a mayoral seat that was 
reserved for a Scheduled Caste woman. While she may be Kori or from another 
Scheduled Caste, she maintains that she was given to her guru when she was very 
young (maybe three or four years old) and that her guru did not tell her what caste she 
was, viewed as unimportant because it did not relate to kinnar social distinctions. She 
did not have a caste certificate and had to apply to one at the time of her nomination. I 
once asked Kamla if she wanted to tell me anything else related to the community or 
her household. Kamla said this first: that gurus should not reveal the caste of a child to 
them until they are eighteen and that kinnars should be allowed to choose their own 
caste when they were old enough. This is significant, given the way Kamla’s own caste 
was challenged in the Sagar District Court. Caste is important, even if it does not 
function in a normative sense in kinnar society, since it is one form in which kinnar 
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identity is rendered intelligible within mainstream social discourses. Moreover, the 
State identifies beneficiaries by caste for preferential policies, so having a caste identity 
is important if individuals want to benefit from preferential schemes, including 
reservation quotas in politics. By extension, Kamla Bua (and other kinnars in MP like 
Shabnam Mausi) 36  believes that reservation should be extended to the kinnar 
community, due to their status as a marginalised group who do not have access to 
existing benefits. Kinnar identity here is equated to a caste identity, where their 
marginalisation is given as the reason for particular treatment.   
In contrast, Laxmi identifies as from a Brahmin family from Eastern Uttar 
Pradesh, but does not focus on the fact of her caste more than casually stating it. At the 
same time, it is part of her identity: it links her to her family, with whom she is in close 
contact, and through the socio-economic benefits associated with her caste, she has 
been formally educated and has an apartment next to her family in a suburb in 
Mumbai. These factors are variously linked: her family did not disown her, nor did she 
leave them, but lives next door to her mother’s, but equally makes money from 
traditional work and her position as a guru. However Laxmi’s position on reservation 
is adamant: that reservation should not be extended to cover the hijra community and 
moreover that affirmative action itself is a flawed system of redistribution across India. 
Her view is consistent with that found among some higher caste individuals in India, 
since the system primarily rewards members of the lower castes and is seen as non-
meritocratic. I do not believe that Laxmi’s position is entirely dependent upon her 
identity as a Brahmin, however, it is a factor when analysing her view. Moreover, 
Laxmi advocates for the equalisation of rights, that is, that members of the LGBT 
community receive equal, general rights, and not special rights for specific groups, 
such as reservation policies for the hijra community. This, in turn, would entrench hijra 
identity in the political sphere.  
The contrast between the positionality and opinions of Laxmi and Kamla Bua 
are only one specific example of two disparate views that exist among the hijra 
‘community’ and I do not mean to suggest that wider inferences can be drawn from 
these narratives. Clearly, these are only two possible trajectories based on these two 
individuals, and two remarkable and visible individuals at that, employed here to 
underline my general argument that it is problematic to refer to the hijra or kinnar 
‘community’ as a singular community with identifiable and static needs and agendas. 
In regard to the question of who speaks for the ‘transgenders’ in India, or the hijras as a 
‘subset’ of transgender identity, listening to certain individuals in the community—
while admirable in highlighting needs and wants from the point of view of an 
‘insider’—might fail to take into account the multiple positionalities within this group, 
                                                      
36 Shabnam Mausi said she filed a petition with the government in Bhopal requesting that 
kinnars be recognised as a separate gender and that reservation policies should be extended to 
cover them as a subordinate community. She has not received an outcome to her petition.  
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with the result that certain groups, and their opinions and own interests, remain 
unrecognised. Arvind Narrain asks the important question of how the LBG community 
might learn from a ‘different’ political culture of the hijras and kothis (and presumably, 
‘different’ sexualities), asking whether sexuality can be a commonality that can 
overcome the barrier of class (2007: 70). I believe that this question can be extended to 
ask whether ‘class’ can be overcome specifically when talking about the hijra 
community and whether those who mediate as representatives between local groups 
and the State can speak in a way that is representative of different interests, including, 
significantly, those that are not their own. The issue of representation becomes 
increasingly problematic if those collated under a particular label such as ‘transgender’ 
do not identify with the label itself. I did not meet a single kinnar in MP who defined 
their identity as ‘transgender’. Only a couple used the term ‘hijra’. The question of who 
mediates between a community and the outside world is pertinent: the issue of how 
the practice of representation functions should be addressed, rather than simply taking 
membership of a community as a qualification for speaking about that community. 
Indeed, the discussion of Kamla Bua and Laxmi’s viewpoints demonstrates two points: 
that both fail to agree on certain points of view, such that consensus would be 
impossible, and, that their position as ‘representatives’ of their own communities 
should, in turn, be questioned and complexified; they should not be simply taken as 
‘representatives’, but rather ‘representative’ of the process of representation. A 
consideration of ‘who speaks’ is all the more urgent, given the status of the hijra 
community as one which continues to be subordinate in mainstream society and 
regarding the contemporary possibility, at the instigation of the State, of redressing 
their (multiple) grievances. If individuals do not inhabit an identity that is intelligible 
to and sanctioned by the State, or identify in a way that donors and State agencies can 
recognise, what happens to those individuals? There is no doubt that important strides 
have been made towards addressing certain issues, including HIV/AIDS prevention, 
health access, and rights regarding personal security and social rights. Nonetheless, the 
categories used to identify beneficiaries are not as extensively representative as might 
have been intended by policy makers. Through forums and consultation efforts, the 
Indian State is working to identify subject groups among those who are seen as 
‘minority sexualities’ and establish targeted mechanisms to help previously 
disregarded communities. At the same time, efforts ensuring the representation of 
previously marginalised groups, such as the hijra ‘community’, have been shown to be 
problematic, through the inherent contradictions that are evident in the practice of 
representation. I have argued that Spivak points to the paradoxical effort in speaking 
for and as, as both subject and object, representing a subject that appears homogeneous, 
but in fact is deeply and inconsistently heterogeneous. Hijra and kinnar identity is 
being represented as a form of transgender identity, ‘flattening out’ (Kapur 2009) the 
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sexual subject so that they are produced and policed through normative constructions 
of the citizen as a subject of rights. The hijra subject is made narrativisable through pre-
determined ‘modes of interpretation’ (Spivak 1990), rendered intelligible and 
recognisable, at the cost of closing down avenues for heterogeneous and non-
narrativisable voices. 
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Conclusion 
 
Throughout the thesis, I have explored the practice and experience of representation, 
specifically considering the ways in which, in both a political proxy and re-
presentation sense, it has entailed the necessary normativisation of kinnar or hijra 
identity. This process has rendered hijra identity intelligible within mainstream 
discourses, both in politics at various local levels in Madhya Pradesh and through 
LGBT activism. An investigation into two related but discontinuous forms of 
representation, as theorised by Spivak, through which a subject speaks ‘for’ and ‘as’, 
has revealed contradictions inherent in the practice of representation of kinnars, 
particularly the complex positioning of the subject as singular, or at least, homogenous. 
I have argued, looking at the case of hijra subjectivity, that the assumed homogeneity of 
the subject complicates the practice of representation, since groups—and individuals 
(given the intricate and individualistic ways in which the hijra subject is constructed)—
are inherently and discontinuously heterogeneous, taking into account factors 
including belief, ideology, caste, class, religion, space, sexuality, and life-history. 
Representation as part of a subject group or as a subject has been demonstrated to 
affect the reality of that subject and their self-construction, through a study of the 
kinnars of Madhya Pradesh and the space that they inhabit as part of—but not 
reducible to—the wider hijra community and as part of mainstream society. Identity 
construction is contingent upon and bound up with the practice of representation, by 
which the subject is made intelligible to State mechanisms and the social imagination.   
 In each chapter, I have sought to demonstrate how representation and the 
construction of kinnar identity are inherently interlinked. In Chapter One, I discussed 
how hijras have been represented in a variety of spheres, including the literary, 
gendered, religious, and social, by both hijras themselves, in the act of representing 
their identity as historically and socially significant and legitimating their particular 
bodies and behaviours in relation to mainstream narratives, and non-hijras, who seek 
to explain the unintelligibility of hijra identity through comprehensible discourses. 
Focusing on kinnar identity in MP, I discussed multiple facets of hijra identity in order 
to explore some of the various strands through which the hijra subject is configured, 
much like the ‘subaltern subject-effect’ discussed by Spivak: an operating subject 
constructed from multiple and variously organised strands which produces the subject 
of subaltern consciousness (1985: 338). In Chapter Two, I explored the three case 
studies chosen for this thesis, focusing on how kinnars and their campaigners reflected 
upon these electoral victories. Each kinnar was represented as a suitable candidate, who 
could speak for and as their constituents, fulfilling both senses of the term 
‘representation’ I have highlighted. Kinnars spoke for their constituents as 
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representatives who were assumed to be better than professional politicians, and 
simultaneously spoke as constituents, who were angered by the state of local politics. 
In Chapters Three and Four, I addressed a more concrete theorisation of both forms of 
representation, concentrating on how kinnars were established as political 
representatives in the sense of political proxy and how kinnar identity was re-presented 
afresh within the political sphere to demonstrate their suitability as candidates. This re-
presentation generated new stereotypes about kinnar identity, which served to 
reinforce widely held narratives about kinnars that represented them as impotent and 
reified their marginality as central to their identities. Using Mansbridge’s theorisations 
on forms of representation (2003), I argued that kinnars were only able to act as 
‘representatives’ to their constituents in gyroscopic or anticipatory ways, given general 
public feeling towards previous politicians, which points to the specific contexts in 
which each was elected. Moreover, kinnars failed to become representatives through a 
re-presentation in political rhetoric of their identities as ‘lacking’ and marginal. 
Ultimately, I argued that representation and political participation was unable to 
secure lasting material or symbolic benefits for kinnars in the political sphere and 
beyond, using Bourdieu’s theorisations on capital to argue that kinnars’ were unable to 
convert forms of capital that were intelligible within the kinnar community into a 
different sphere of politics. This inconvertability of ‘kinnar capital’ indicates that there 
was no framework of intelligibility that bears fidelity to the complex reality of kinnar 
lives, by which to understand and appreciate these three kinnars’ political participation. 
In Chapter Five, I attended to the representation of hijras as part of the wider LGBT 
collective in contemporary India, extending the scope of my focus on representation to 
outside of the sphere of decentralised democracy in Madhya Pradesh. I argued that 
representation as part of the LGBT movement has normativised a specific version of 
hijra identity, rendering it visible and intelligible to both State and NGO mechanisms. 
Hijra identity has been made narrativisable—effectively homogeneous—through its 
representation as a form of transgender identity, constructing the hijra as an 
identifiable subject of rights, a practice that already relies upon pre-constructed and 
sanctioned categories that are intelligible to the State and mainstream society.  
 There were certain limitations to this study. First, I adopted a case study 
approach focusing on three individuals and three locations in eastern Madhya Pradesh. 
This allowed me to draw and analyse comparisons and differences between three cases 
of kinnar elections; however, I was unable to consider other kinnars’ electoral victories, 
with their own contextual specificities, including elections in Jabalpur, Bina, Sihora, 
and Sehore. My approach, however, allowed for an in-depth discussion of these three 
cases, focusing on specific, local contexts in which three elections occurred, which a 
study of kinnar political participation demanded. Moreover, the possibility of 
extrapolating wider conclusions based upon the political practice of these particular 
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localities or the way in which kinnar identity came to be manipulated in these spaces is 
limited, such that the conclusions drawn in this thesis relate to this specific study and 
to the cases of these three kinnars. At the same time, although conclusions may not 
necessarily be deduced with reference to wider electoral contexts in which previously 
marginalised community members are elected into local electoral bodies, I suggest that 
frameworks of conceptualisation and conclusions pertaining to the representation of 
liminally gendered and socially ostracised individuals could be referred to other 
contexts in order to structure new approaches and methodologies for consideration. 
Second, due to limitations of time and resources, I was unable to pursue further 
research in each locality that would consider more substantially how each electoral 
victory and kinnar identity mobilisation was reflected upon by different electoral 
communities. Given the substantial distances between localities, I did not have the time 
to more thoroughly research these areas, in the sense of being able to organise and 
conduct more interviews with different communities who comprised different 
electorates, which could have offered different avenues for analysis. This leads to a 
third limitation: that of language. In certain regards, my access to interviewees was 
hindered through the presence and use of interpreters, particularly access to language 
or meaning. At other times, the process was hindered by interpreters themselves, since 
most lived and worked in each locality and was therefore already enmeshed within a 
particular local context, which in turn influenced interactions with interviewees. Each 
of these factors served as limitations for this study and ultimately shaped the findings 
that I have discussed throughout.  
 There are several main findings for this thesis, based upon both representation 
within the field of local politics in MP as indicated by my three case studies and 
broader assessment of LGBT activism in contemporary India. First, kinnar identity was 
characterised as inherently ‘lacking’. One slogan used generally in kinnars’ campaigns 
was ‘you don’t need genitals for politics; you need brains and integrity’ (Reddy 2003: 
164). Yet, kinnars in MP were represented as not needing anything to contest elections: 
political experience, formal education, party support, a particular agenda, or even 
belonging to intelligible social networks. Kinnars were not re-presented by belonging to 
existing social categories in any descriptive sense, which is often required in practices 
of descriptive representation (Mansbridge 1999). By not standing for anything and not 
‘representing’ anything, the identity category ‘kinnar’ functioned as an empty signifier, 
as inherently lacking: not a signifier which pointed to multiple signifieds (although this 
occurred through voters’ desire to identify kinnar identity with their own descriptive 
positions and comprehensible modes of signification) but a signifier which 
demonstrated the theoretical possibility of the limits of discursive signification (Laclau 
2007: 36). That which was represented by the empty signifier—kinnar identity—was 
ultimately unreachable because it could not be represented adequately (ibid.: 40). While 
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earlier kinnar politicians might have filled the signifier with new meaning for ‘later’ 
kinnar politicians (such as Kamla Jaan to Kamla Bua), such that voters could act in an 
anticipatory manner as theorised by Mansbridge (2003), it was ‘kinnar’ identity itself 
that was conceptualised as lacking. Kinnars thus were represented as inherently lacking 
a sense of identity according to normative social discourses. Yet, positing kinnar 
identity in this way was necessary to render it intelligible for voters through and 
within mainstream, sanctioned modes of interpretation.  
Second, through a focus on ‘lack’ as a core component of kinnar identity—in 
relation to familial and social networks and their identity and gender1—kinnars’ very 
marginality was brought into political discourse in Katni, Shahdol, and Sagar. Their 
marginality was maintained at the very moment that kinnars sought to attain a central 
position and role in mainstream society. Reifying kinnar marginality was necessary in 
order to render kinnar identity as legible to constituents, framed within normative 
discourse, and, as a result, their marginality was normativised and made the key facet 
of their identity. Conceptualising kinnars as lacking normative social characteristics 
served to represent them as ‘outsiders’ in yet another sphere, the sphere of politics, 
similar to the way they have been conceptualised in other spheres relating to literature, 
history, gender, and society. This representation reinforced stereotypes relating to the 
inherent difference of hijras from mainstream society. Thus, ‘representation’, instead of 
securing benefits for kinnars, foregrounded their marginality, allowing hijras to ‘rule’—
echoing Rāma’s prophesy—only once they entered ‘mainstream’ spaces on the terms 
dictated by non-hijra society and after hijra identity had been rendered intelligible for 
such spaces.  
 Third, representation has ensured that a specific version of hijra identity be 
posited as normative; this has been demonstrated in both the realms of local politics in 
MP and within LGBT activism. Representation is necessarily normativising because the 
practice of representation relies on an identifiable subject. Seckinelgin argues that 
practices relating to the reality of everyday lives need to be ‘translated’ into identities 
that are ‘politically intelligible’, where the subject, in order to be a political actor, must 
be understandable within a particular debate or activity (2009: 109). Yet, the 
articulation of an identity so that it belongs to a pre-established, sanctioned category 
leads to a ‘flattening out’ of the sexual subject (Kapur 2009: 384), or indeed any subject, 
in order to be recognised by State mechanisms. In this process, heterogeneous 
identities and identifications are shut down, so that a homogeneous subject can be 
identified as the subject of rights. 
                                                      
1 Although, as has been demonstrated throughout, kinnars’ own understanding of their own 
familial and social networks and gender practice and identity is not conceptualised as ‘lacking’ 
but such an understanding or positionality is unintelligible within normative modes of 
interpretation. 
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Fourth, recognition and representation is only possible through the visibility of 
the subaltern subject. Spivak points to the contradictions inherent in naming the 
subaltern, since it is, in part, the non-narrativisable nature of the subaltern that 
maintains their subalternity (1990: 144). Representation results in subaltern acts being 
framed within sanctioned ‘modes of interpretation’ (ibid.), erasing the subaltern subject, 
since they no longer remain, as Spivak writes, at the ‘absolute limit of the place where 
history is narrativized into logic’ (1985: 346). Or, according to Laclau, the subject no 
longer remains within the ‘interruption or breakdown of the process of signification’ 
(2007: 37) since it is signification that renders the subject adequately represented. 
Through representation, kinnar or hijra identity no longer remained on the discursive 
limits of signification, since recognition of the subject ensured that a specific figuration 
of kinnars or hijras be brought into and rendered intelligible within the sphere of local 
politics and the sphere of LGBT activism. Hijras and kinnars were thus made ‘visible’ 
subjects, ironically maintaining a position in which they remained both hyper-visible, 
as the subjects for representation through State and society’s mechanisms, and invisible, 
with respect to the immense heterogeneity of the hijra and kinnar subject. The 
normativised hijra subject is hyper-visible, at the expense of necessarily rendering 
heterogeneous forms of that subject (that are not recognised within given modes of 
interpretation) as invisible.  
Representation is thus inherently contradictory and has served on the one hand, 
to secure benefits for the hijra community, and on the other, to necessarily marginalise 
and render invisible heterogeneous forms of hijra identity in modern India. The way 
forward must be to rethink ways of representation that allow for inclusivity, rather 
than homogeneity and the closing down of difference. Appreciating both the multiple 
ways in which subjects are configured and the possibility of untintelligible 
subjectivities are necessary, in order to maintain heterogeneity within public 
discourses and state mechanisms that demand simplification. James C. Scott’s work 
points to the necessary role of simplification and legibility in the process of governance. 
Scott argues that the modern state has trampled over and erased undisciplined forms 
of knowledge in its demand for legibility through standardisation and uniformity. 
Legibility is identified by Scott as a central problem in the high-modernist ideology 
involved in statecraft, which excludes other, more local practices of knowledge 
(described as ‘mētis’: knowledge that comes from practical experience that has no 
claim to universality; 1999: 313, 340). Scott argues that he is not providing a view of 
uncritical admiration for the local and traditional, nor is he providing an anarchist 
argument against the state. Rather, the state is defined as ‘the vexed institution that 
grounds both our freedoms and unfreedoms’, which must, despite its deeply coercive 
relationship with its subjects, maintain some elements of the practical knowledges it 
dismisses (ibid.: 7). 
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The State’s techniques for grasping large and complex realities transform 
details into a set of categories for officials, which is necessary for direct rule. Thus, such 
simplification inevitably provides a departure from whatever reality such static 
abstractions are supposed to capture (ibid.: 76-7). Scott notes that such simplifications:  
can be considered part of an ongoing ‘project of legibility,’ a project that is never 
fully realized. The data from which such simplifications arise are, to varying 
degrees, riddled with inaccuracies, omissions, faulty aggregations, fraud, 
negligence, political distortion, and so on. A project of legibility is immanent in any 
statecraft that aims at manipulating society, but it is undermined by intrastate 
rivalries, technical obstacles, and above all, the resistance of its subjects. 
(ibid.: 80) 
 
While a project of simplification and standardisation is necessary for direct rule, Scott 
argues further that the modern state, through its officials, attempts—with varying 
degrees of success—to create a population with ‘standardised characteristics that will 
be easiest to monitor, count, assess, and manage’ (ibid.: 81-2). Thus legibility does not 
simply reduce disorder, but also creates the population that it names: categories ‘that 
may have begun as…artificial inventions…can end by becoming categories that 
organize people’s daily experience precisely because they are embedded in state-
created institutions that structure that experience’ (ibid.: 83). The narratability of 
subjects brings that very subject into being, such as Spivak argues with the subaltern 
subject and as I have sought to demonstrate through the construction of a form of 
‘political kinnar’ identity.  
‘Any substantial intervention in society’, Scott concludes, ‘requires the 
invention of units that are visible’ (ibid.: 183). However, his discussion of the presence 
of various local knowledges—indeed, those ‘subjugated knowledges’ Halberstam 
investigates (2011)—within techniques of statecraft, call attention to the ways in which 
the dominant ideology is incomplete, as that which cannot fully grasp the complexity 
of local situations and subjects.  Mansbridge notes that any scheme of representation in 
which one individual represents many, by inhabiting a particular category, inevitably 
suppresses difference (2005: 633). Thus, schemes of representation, which are part of a 
wider project in which subjects are recognised by the state, must acknowledge that 
there is a separation between representatives and those for whom the representative 
speaks, a separation between reality and representation (which is simplification). This 
recognition is necessary in order to avoid essentialism and the silencing of 
heterogeneity. Moreover, forms of categorisation might not be comprehensible for 
those collated under such a label given that, as Scott argues, the creation of visible, 
legible categories to the state may be at odds with the complex lived realities of social 
beings. Giving people the autonomy to identify through different modes and 
frameworks of reference, perhaps drawing upon ‘subjugated’, local forms of 
knowledge, can be more beneficial than forcing them to adopt a particular, pre-
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established identity. This autonomy might add to the resistance of subjects and can 
undermine the project of statecraft, if Scott is right, recalling the subversive potential in 
any subject’s unstable identity, as theorised by Butler. Paul Boyce provides an example 
of the use of local knowledges in relation to the dominant modes of identification 
among certain same-sex subjects in India. He argues that an approach in the petition 
against Section 377, regarding the right to privacy for consensual same-sex sexual 
relations, allowed people to determine ‘their sexual preference and identity’ instead of 
making people identify in a way that may have been ‘inimical’ to many subjects, even 
though it would afford identity-based, constitutional protections (2006: 96). Since 
identification as a ‘gay’ or ‘queer’ subject was unintelligible to many people, the 
approach in the petition focused on the question of rights for same-sex sexual subjects 
and simultaneously acknowledged the limits of categories that individuals would not 
find meaningful. A theorisation of representation should thus concede that there are 
discrepancies, both in the separation between the representative and the represented, 
which is part of the coercive project of statecraft in forming legible subjects, and in the 
use of categories that may fail to be comprehensible and meaningful to subjects. Thus 
the potential for heterogeneity and the unintelligible forms of subjectivity formed in 
the ‘moments or processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences’ 
(Bhabha 1994: 1-2) can be maintained within public discourses that demand identities 
be articulated in a simple and intelligible way. Bhabha notes that what is ‘theoretically 
innovative and politically crucial’ is developing narratives beyond original 
subjectivities, demanding that we investigate the processes, the in-between spaces, in 
which self-hood is configured and knotted together from various strands, histories, 
and spaces. If subjectivities are formed at the intersections of modes of interpretation, 
at the very limits ‘where history is narrativized into logic’ (Spivak 1985: 346), it is 
crucial to recognise the possibilities for new configurations of subjectivity and the 
constant limitations of categories and modes of intelligibility, particularly those which 
form part of the machinery of the modern state. Recognising the limitations of both 
categories and the act of representation can allow subjects to determine their identities 
and preferences in ways that are more meaningful and intelligible to them whilst still 
recognising them as the bearer of rights. 
I want to end with a note on heterogeneity and representation. Towards the end 
of my fieldwork, Laxmi had just taken me to a badhāī ceremony and we were driving 
towards a meeting in another affluent suburb in Mumbai where she was going to sign 
the contract for her appearance on the nationally televised, new Big Boss season. She 
explained she was going on the popular programme to reveal to audiences across India 
that hijras were just like ‘normal people’. ‘But what is normal?’, I asked. She thought for 
a minute. She turned to me and said, ‘but who am I? I am different people for different 
purposes. These are all just representations; these are all just faces’. An 
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acknowledgement of the act of representation in constructing one’s identity seems like 
an appropriate way to end this thesis. Perhaps more subtle, but no less self-conscious, 
was a moment following an interview with Kamla Bua. We had spoken for about an 
hour in the back chamber of her office whilst several men waited for her advice or 
clearance on Corporation business. We spoke about the world in which she usually 
lived. Speaking about regional gatherings, Kamla had invited me, again, to attend the 
sammelan she was organising. She was relaxed and happy, animatedly speaking about 
the event and her excitement. We stood up to leave, waiting for Kamla. She got ready 
to return, straightening her clothes and composing herself. She paused, looked down, 
and took a deep breath. Then, with her head raised, she walked out into the Mayoral 
office, resuming her position as the Mayor of Sagar city. 
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Appendix A: 
Heera Bai, Ward Corporator, Jabalpur, 2000-2004 
 
Heera Bai was elected as the Corporator for Ravindranath Tagore ward in the City of 
Jabalpur in the December 1999 elections. She was sworn into the Municipal 
Corporation in January 2000 and served the full term until the end of 1994. I met and 
interviewed Heera Bai several times in Jabalpur. The interviews were conducted at her 
home in Ravindranath Tagore ward, one of the poorer wards in the city. The first time I 
met Heera, she was adamant that she would not speak about her personal life, but only 
her political experiences. On later occasions she spoke more freely, explaining about 
her household, the kinnar community in MP, and issues that were of importance to her 
and other kinnars.   
Mr Sharm Bhatt, President of the Jabalpur Municipal Corporation, knew Heera 
Bai and made an appointment for us to visit her. We drove on his motorbike to a group 
of houses set back from the main road in one of the poorer and more underdeveloped 
wards. Heera Bai appeared from one of the houses, wearing a white cotton kurta, 
pajama trousers, a black and white scarf, and sunglasses. She told Mr Bhatt that we 
should follow her to her home and hopped onto her own motorbike. We drove a short 
distance to her house, parking at the end of the lane, which led up towards the tall blue 
house. We climbed the stairs to get to the front door, which was open. In front of the 
house was an open patch of land, on which several goats were grazing. A kinnar 
squatted on the front steps, watching the goats and cleaning vegetables. We entered 
the house and sat down next to the door with our backs to the wall. Heera sat opposite 
us, so she could look out of the door. There were stairs immediately next to me leading 
to an upstairs floor. There was a much larger room next to the one we were in, raised 
by one step, which was fairly empty apart from a television, and another room off that, 
forming an L-shape. Heera speaks some English and is evidently smart and quick-
witted. She finished her tenth grade of education, marking her out among kinnars as 
having attended formal education until she was 16. By Heera’s estimation, there are 
around 350 kinnars in Jabalpur, based in two localities in the city.1  
Heera is the head of her household and one of the most well known kinnars in 
the city. She is regarded favourably by the local population for her behaviour and 
mannerisms. Heera said that people who enter politics think that they should contest 
elections because they believe it is the right thing to do. Heera might have felt this way, 
but her victory was down to the support of her ward. Interviewees spoke about her 
good behaviour, saying that she endeared herself to the public through her nature and 
that had a good reputation before she contested her seat (Bhatt Interview, 22/1/11; 
                                                      
1 These localities are Uttar Milloniganj, near Khusera Masjid, and Mahaśi Ravindwar; both 
localities are Scheduled Caste wards.  
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Godbole Interview, 15/2/11; Bhanot Interview, 16/2/11). She was well-known and 
popular among women in the ward, which was important given nearly equal voting 
rates between men and women (Bhatt Interview, 22/1/11). Similar to Katni, Shahdol, 
and Sagar, voters wanted to see her contest the election, especially as an independent 
candidate. Sadanand Godbole, the opposition leader of the BJP in the Municipal 
Corporation2 speculated that the public disliked both the BJP and Congress candidates 
and, as a result, gave Heera a chance (Interview, 15/2/11; see Saxena Interview, 
16/2/11). He noted that the voters might have supported her candidacy because Heera 
did not behave like ‘those other third persons who usually act the way they do’ (ibid.), 
alluding to behaviour seen as typically kinnar.3 Mrs Godbole, who also served as a 
ward corporator for Vivekanand ward, suggested that Heera impressed her 
constituents, in spite of being a kinnar. Ravindranath Tagore ward was described by 
several interviewees as a ‘slum’ area, with people with low literacy rates (although this 
was a description given by middle class people who were involved with the Municipal 
Corporation who did not live in the ward).4 Mr Godbole surmised that constituents 
may have disliked the nominated BJP and Congress candidates because they were not 
truly ‘representative’, in the sense of sharing common experiences and livelihoods, 
whereas the voters wanted someone to actually represent them, who knew them and 
‘[could] express their problems to the government exactly’ (ibid.; Shah Interview, 
18/2/11). Tarun Bhanot, a Congress member of the Mayor-in-Council (1999-2004), 
disagreed with this assessment, saying that it was the media that sensationalised the 
election of a kinnar and played up the factor of disillusion with mainstream parties 
(Interview, 16/2/11). He said he did not agree with the explanation that voters were 
disillusioned with BJP and Congress candidates because, as he argued, people were 
elected from ‘all aspects of life’, from all political parties, and while some people might 
have interpreted kinnars’ elections as a sign of disillusion with mainstream political 
parties, it was only a few cases where these elections occurred and mainstream 
politicians lost. As he put it, Congress candidates lost in other wards as well, and BJP 
candidates lost in others, so it was not the case that independent candidates won every 
                                                      
2 Mr Vishwanath (V.N.) Dubey won the December 1999 direct mayoral election. He was a 
member of Congress, but the BJP held the majority in the Jabalpur Municipal Corporation from 
1999-2004 (with 37 ward corporators belonging to the BJP). In 2004, Mr Dubey was nominated 
by the Congress Party to contest the Member of Parliament elections, but was defeated. When 
he lost, he resigned his mayorship, in early 2004. Mr Godbole was nominated from among the 
corporators as the new mayor and sworn in as mayor on 6 June 2004.   
3 Although Heera might not have behaved as a typical kinnar, one interviewee described the 
‘factor of fear’ as an additional reason that secured her election. He said that some people were 
scared of being cursed by her; the ‘fear factor’ also aided her work while in office (Saxena 
Interview, 16/2/11).  
4 I was told that there were 150 or so brothels (‘koṭhā’) near Khusera Masjid (where the kinnars 
lived), where men are entertained by ‘singers’ and ‘dancers’ (the ‘profession’ of many women in 
that area since Jabalpur has no license for prostitution; they are known as ‘koṭhevālī’). Mr Bhatt 
described the area we had been as a ‘slum area’, saying that kinnar households are scattered 
throughout the area. He said categorically that no kinnars are involved in this business, but later 
said that if they were involved, it was not declared openly (Interview, 22/1/11).  
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seat in that election, which would have sent a very clear message to both BJP and 
Congress that their politicians were rejected. Yet, it seems apparent that frustration 
played a role, particularly in Heera Bai’s election in this particular ward, given that 
other politicians and journalists attribute her victory as a sign of anger with nominated 
candidates and to teach a lesson to mainstream political parties (Bhatt Interview, 
22/1/11; Godbole Interview, 15/2/11; Saxena Interview, 16/2/11; Shah Interview, 
18/2/11; Kohli Interview, 18/2/11). Vinay Saxena, a current Congress corporator and 
during the time of Heera’s tenure, stated that Heera’s election revealed to both parties 
that their candidates were incompetent by selecting a ‘third gender’, an alternative 
choice (Interview, 16/2/11). The Mayor of the Municipal Corporation from 1999-2004, 
Vishwanath Dubey, elaborated on the reason for the anger of local voters: he said that 
there was a lot of dissatisfaction with politicians because the Corporation did not 
extend many services to Ravindranath Tagore ward, since hardly anyone was a tax-
payer due to the poor and lower socio-economic status of the ward residents. As a 
result, both the problems and the request for investment were ‘enormous’, leading to 
dissatisfaction (Interview, 16/2/11). Both BJP and Congress ‘failed’, by being unable to 
satisfy public demands. He argued that the ‘climate’ was set for a ‘third alternative’ 
and that her initial campaigners understood the political situation and created the 
context in which she could win. In fact, as Mr Dubey argued, it should not be 
understood that ‘a kinnar’ won there but it just happened that Heera Bai was a kinnar: it 
was negative voting against other parties rather than positive voting for Heera Bai. 
Other leaders were said to have lost their credibility so that a new leadership emerged, 
and Heera just happened to be a kinnar.  It was a normal election, Mr Dubey stated, but 
the fact that Heera was a kinnar inevitably made her victory exciting news. If she had 
not been a kinnar, people may have been indifferent to the result of the election of an 
independent candidate, as with any other election in which BJP and Congress 
candidates did not win (ibid.). 
During the election campaign, Heera Bai was actively courted by the media for 
interviews and her campaign made public throughout Jabalpur. Given that electronic 
media was the very latest technology, candidates attempted to spread news of their 
campaigns as widely as possible (Shah Interview, 18/2/11; Kohli Interview, 18/2/11). 
Digi Cable News Chief Editor, Pankaj Shah, pointed out that candidates were as 
interested in publicising themselves as the media was in finding out about them. They 
were even more interested in Heera’s case because her campaign was a ‘very unique 
matter’, as one of the first kinnars to campaign in Madhya Pradesh (Interview, 18/2/11). 
Support was generated quickly among the residents in Heera’s ward, a form of 
support based on ‘address’, rather than party affiliation, interviewees suggested 
(Godbole Interview, 15/2/11; Shah Interview, 18/2/11). Her campaign was different 
to that of party candidates: she went door to door asking for votes. While this method 
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was not specific to kinnars, Mr Shah noted that the style of going door to door was 
different, according to ‘their habit and nature’ (Interview, 18/2/11). Their way of 
publicity drew upon their style of traditional work, asking for the vote but also 
dancing and singing in groups of kinnars. He noted that the public enjoyed Heera’s 
approach of dancing, singing, and playing instruments, especially noting the use of 
some beautiful kinnars who appealed to male voters (ibid.). There were no specific 
slogans associated with Heera’s campaign: her campaign, unlike the other three 
kinnars’ campaigns discussed for the thesis, only had to appeal to the constituents of 
her ward. Unlike Kamla Jaan, Kamla Bua, and Shabnam Mausi’s elections, which had 
to be far-reaching and appeal to numerous groups and their individual interests across 
larger geographical areas and numerical numbers, Heera Bai’s campaign was limited 
to Ravindranath Tagore ward. Interviewees highlighted the numerous problems in the 
ward relating to a lack of development (such as electricity, sanitation, and 
infrastructure). It was crucial that Heera could appeal to constituents by being able to 
represent their interests in the Municipal Corporation as a corporator, especially by 
portraying other candidates as ‘unrepresentative’ of the ward and constituents. Heera 
was represented as better placed to understand constituents’ problems as they 
themselves saw them (Godbole Interview, 15/2/11). While campaigning were 
important, Heera was already represented as someone who understood what it was to 
belong to and live in the ward, and had a good reputation and standing with her 
potential constituents. One story that was adopted was the myth in which Lord Rāma 
gives a boon to kinnars that future generations will rule. Although people ‘did not 
believe’ the story (Shah Interview, 18/2/11; Kohli interview, 18/2/11), it was used to 
attract voters towards supporting Heera’s campaign, where she was represented as 
fulfilling the prophesy of kinnar rule. While the myth was an important rhetorical 
allusion that helped her campaign, journalist Mr Kohli noted that people only focused 
on the factor of development (Interview, 18/2/11), and Heera primarily was 
represented as committed to developing her ward and knowing what needed to be 
done. 
The election results were announced in January 2000 and Heera Bai began her 
role, representing her ward at monthly municipal meetings and allocating the funds 
that were set aside for the development of her ward.5 Both Heera and fellow politicians 
judged her tenure to be fairly successful, as she was able to complete many projects in 
her ward with the financial quota that had be set aside for the ward’s development. 
                                                      
5 Heera also contested a Member of the Legislative Assembly seat for Jabalpur (one of five seats) 
when the incumbent BJP MLA passed away, but lost to his wife. Ex-corporator Tarun Bhanot 
gave one reason for her defeat as a lack of party backing. He explained that representing a ward 
is very different from a constituency, for example, the ward she represented, he speculated, 
only had around 8,000 to 10,000 people registered to vote, whereas the assembly election 
constituency is anywhere between 1.8 to 2.5 lakhs. Thus, anyone would need party backing, 
public relations, and to be well known throughout the whole constituency in order to 
successfully contest the election. 
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Heera provided a list of projects she had undertaken, including the installation of 
twenty five hand pumps for water, covering fourteen roads with concrete, ensuring 
ration cards were given to thousands of individuals and securing pensions for widows, 
and buying cows to provide milk for the poor without cost (Interview, 26/1/11).6 She 
was an active corporator and other interviewees suggested she had managed to 
undertake important development work. However, she was criticised for doing the 
work that was needed but no extra: for example, securing extra funds from different 
budgets in order to undertake more development work (Kohli Interview, 18/2/11). 
Arguably there were limits to her ability to attain extra funds, such as a lack of party 
support as an independent candidate 7  and, as an individual with no political 
experience, she had no one to give her advice. While a corporator’s job is fairly simple, 
it is time-consuming and there is a lot of work to be done, such as meeting constituents 
and addressing their grievances and planning and completing development works. Ex-
mayor Mr Dubey stated that it was ‘a superhuman task’ to satisfy everyone and that 
nobody could do justice to the job (Interview, 16/2/11). The task was magnified, he 
said, when corporators did not have staff, support, or even an office. He said that 
Heera, despite her activity and intentions and social position as a kinnar leader, was 
less affluent and politically inexperienced. He noted that often people in this 
situation—with little political experience—are helped by people who can take 
advantage of their position in order to benefit themselves, and believed that Heera too 
was ‘exploited’ in this way.  
Heera’s behaviour in office was perceived favourably on the whole, and she 
changed aspects of her personality and behaviour to suit her political role. Corporator 
Tarun Bhanot said that she was composed from the beginning, but it took several 
months for everyone else to get used to her behaviour and presence (Interview, 
16/2/11). After that, he stated, ‘she was just like any of us’. Her dignity during her 
tenure was mentioned frequently: ex-mayor V. N. Dubey particularly recalled her 
dignity in the following story. After he was elected mayor, he was about to announce 
his Mayor-in-Council (MIC). Heera Bai came to him dressed up ‘nicely and very 
decently’ and thanked him for inducting her into the MIC, even though he had no 
intention of doing so. Mr Dubey said that one of her supporters had told her this story 
                                                      
6 Testifying to her desire to benefit the constituents of her ward, ex-mayor Mr Dubey told a 
story in which Heera got him to sanction an illegal pipeline to supply water to the ward. He 
noted that there were many illegal water connections in Jabalpur, in which someone could 
connect their pipe to the mains and take water whenever they wanted, which was an illegal 
practice. Heera wanted to buy a pipeline with corporation money and undertake the job with 
corporation labour, not realising that the act was illegal. He said he saw the matter like this: the 
illegality of the act was probably not important to Heera, but what mattered was to ensure a 
supply of water. He decided he could not explain the constitutionality or legality of the 
situation, so sanctioned it so that she could help her ward residents, taking the blame since he 
was the one who was doing something illegal (Interview, 16/2/11). 
7 Among the corporators elected during 1999-2004, Heera was the only independent candidate 
(without affiliation to a political party), and there was one corporator representing the Bahujan 
Samaj Party and one representing the Shiv Sena (Godbole Interview, 15/2/11).   
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to make a fool of her, and that this person was a ‘mischief monger’. He had to tell her 
that it was not his intention and that he couldn’t do it, but ‘she accepted it gratefully’ so 
that he could see intelligence, grace, and dignity in this act (Interview, 16/2/11). 
People treated her with respect due to her decent behaviour and due to her role as an 
elected corporator, but no one treated her with ‘more respect that what was required’, 
Mr Dubey noted, in the sense that they were too supportive, or patronising (ibid.). 
Journalist Pankaj Shah stated that she was not a politician before the election 
but only a very famous kinnar, but ‘she looked like a politician after the election’ 
(Interview, 18/2/11). Her identity as a kinnar and her good reputation, alongside her 
‘activities, look, and personality’ endeared her to her constituents (ibid.). However, her 
identity as a kinnar had both positive and negative aspects. If she wanted a job done, 
people had to listen, because ‘if she became brash’, nobody knew how to handle her 
and were scared of her (Dubey Interview, 16/2/11; Kohli Interview, 18/2/11). She was 
‘street-wise’, certainly more so than other members of the Municipal Corporation, and 
they wanted to avoid arguments and unnecessary clashes with Heera. Mr Dubey 
interpreted this as advantageous: ‘it was an advantage… [people] would rather do the 
job than face her wrath’ (ibid.). On the other hand, her identity as a kinnar, even though 
she did not misbehave with anyone (Godbole Interview, 15/2/11) and acted in a 
composed manner (Bhanot Interview, 16/2/11), meant that she was not taken 
seriously. Ex-mayor Sadanand Godbole said that she was taken as a ‘laughing-stock’ 
by many and was not paid proper attention or sincerity, even though she always raised 
her voice on behalf of her constituency and presented herself and her points 
confidently (Interview, 15/2/11). People treated her as a kinnar: Mr Godbole explained 
this meant people did not see kinnars as common people and did not consider them as 
having a good reputation or equal standing in society, thus she was not respected or 
given the same chance afforded a non-kinnar person. Moreover, she was an 
independent, which made it more difficult for her to get her work done. Her identity as 
a kinnar may have made people reluctant to deal with her, or treat her badly, but 
interviewees also allude to Heera deliberately taking advantage of her identity as a 
kinnar, which reinforced stereotypes about kinnar behaviour in the political arena. One 
interviewee said that she would sometimes create a disturbance over specific issues in 
public meetings. This sort of nuisance gained media coverage, since she always 
protested against the establishment and this made for interesting news for the public, 
especially on local television channels (Shah Interview, 18/2/11). The presence of the 
media might have generated this behaviour and vice versa, so that attention would be 
focused on Heera Bai in meetings. Mr Shah noted that Heera Bai would often clap to 
protest an idea, which stood out from ‘normal’ behaviour among politicians, even 
though he stated that these actions were in accordance ‘with her nature’ (ibid.; Godbole 
Interview 15/2/11). At the same time, Heera Bai was said to have spent time on her 
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appearance and behaviour during her tenure, acting in a way a commendable way and 
being courteous to all (Shah Interview, 18/2/11). This behaviour was not different 
from her behaviour before her election, which was presumably the basis for her good 
reputation. However, she did not change her behaviour, increasing in dignity, literacy, 
or presentation (ibid,), and thus, as her tenure went on, there was diminished interest in 
her presence in the Municipal Corporation. 
Due to Heera’s identity as a kinnar, there were certain negative stereotypes 
assumed to belong to her identity that were developed during her time in office, 
similar to the stereotypes generated as a result of Kamla Jaan, Shabnam Mausi, and 
Kamla Bua’s tenures, that reinforced assumptions about kinnar identity. While several 
ex- or current politicians assessed her work as competent, Journalist Pankaj Shah noted 
that as time went on, there was less and less interest in Heera and her work, as the 
public found that she did not achieve very much. She was perceived as not particularly 
competent and her tenure seen as ‘unsuccessful’ (Interview, 18/2/11), despite 
managing to complete development works in her ward and maintaining a generally 
favourable reputation. In Mr Shah’s assessment, Heera’s ‘capability’ was not 
satisfactory and he said that the public were not satisfied with her work, and 
welcomed the next election of the Congress candidate. His assessment is based on the 
fact that she did not do extra work in her ward, but only used the amount that was 
already allotted for each corporator, according to the demands of their ward. He 
concluded by saying that ‘by no definition’ could he say that Heera Bai was a success 
in politics, compared, for example, to Bharat Gangoria, the next corporator for 
Ravindranath Tagore ward. Journalist Mr Kohli agreed with Mr Shah, adding, ‘I’ll tell 
you one thing: kinnars are not politicians. You cannot compare [them] to other 
politicians’. He stated that many other politicians ‘have it in their blood’, or are part of 
a political family (Shah Interview, 18/2/11). In contrast, Heera lacked an identity, or 
status, as a politician (Bhanot Interview, 16/2/11). Instead, she was identified as a 
kinnar, and being a kinnar meant that people assumed she could not work properly, or 
did not treat her fairly, despite attending every meeting and trying to work with 
everyone (Godbole Interview, 15/2/11). Yet, her independent status—as a kinnar and 
without party backing—meant that she could not work with either the BJP or Congress 
in the interests of the city but was only focused on the problems of her ward (ibid.). 
Neither majority party tried to adopt Heera Bai and get her to join them, nor did she 
try to join them (ibid.; Bhanot Interview, 16/2/11), although Heera told me that both 
parties asked her to join them (Interview, 22/1/11).   
Heera completed her tenure and was successful in completing development 
works for her ward and in attending and participating in the daily workings of the 
corporation. In the 2004 election, the Ravindranath Tagore ward seat was reserved for 
the general category. Heera Bai intended to fight the election, but said she withdrew in 
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the end to support the Congress candidate, Bharat Gangoria (Interview, 26/1/11). Mr 
Gangoria was said to have had a lot of influence in the ward ‘in all spheres of power, 
including money, men, muscle power: he had everything’ (Godbole Interview, 
15/2/11); an assessment that reflects the importance of convertible capital in rendering 
an individual intelligible and commanding in a new sphere. There seems to be a 
positive impression of her time in office in terms of her overall behaviour, mannerisms, 
and appearance (Shah Interview, 18/2/11; Godbole Interview, 15/2/11; Bhanot 
Interview, 16/2/11). Mr Bhanot went on to say that he felt his opinion of Heera Bai and 
kinnars more generally changed a lot after being in touch with her and working with 
her. She proved, despite being a member of a group that society do not see as ‘regular’, 
that she could maintain her dignity and manage herself in the political arena in 
Jabalpur (Interview, 16/2/11). Although attitudes may have changed such that Heera 
Bai entered local politics and completed her tenure, she has been unable to contest 
another election and has returned to her traditional work; Mr Dubey assessed that 
essentially attitudes will return to what they were before, based on negative 
stereotypes of kinnars. Political participation was only a temporary distraction that had 
some positive rewards for one ward in Jabalpur, but kinnars retain the same position 
they held in the social imagination, primarily as ‘singers’ and ‘dancers’ (Kohli 
Interview, 18/2/11). There did not seem to be a future expectation that a kinnar will 
return to politics, given that Heera Bai was not seen as particularly successful, it is 
unlikely she, or other kinnars, would be given another chance, unless the conditions 
were right, such as disillusion with mainstream parties or the nomination of improper 
candidates (ibid., Godbole Interview, 15/2/11). However, during our interviews, Heera 
said she was considering contesting the MLA seat from the western constituency in 
Jabalpur (scheduled to take place in December 2013). She expressed that if she did fight 
it would be as an independent candidate. Heera also said she might contest the 2014 
Member of Lok Sabha (Lower House of National Parliament) election but would have 
to wait to find out the reservations on particular seats.8 Heera expressed her ambition 
to stay in politics by saying she would run for these seats, saying that politics had 
become a business to her. Yet, according to local journalists, Heera has not kept up her 
social work or presence (Kohli Interview, 18/2/11; Shah Interview, 18/2/11), which 
was necessary to contest future elections. While she has returned to her traditional 
work, Heera has remained active in regard to kinnar issues, particularly discussing the 
imposition of the census category ‘other’ on kinnars’ gender, instead of allowing them 
to choose the designation ‘male’ or ‘female’ (Interview, 10/4/11). Identifying as a 
                                                      
8 Reservations are declared before the elections are announced, so Heera would have to wait to 
decide which seat to contest. Heera Bai can contest seats reserved for women, since she is 
entered on the electoral roll as a woman (Interview, 22/1/11). Generally, there was some 
confusion among interviewees as to which category kinnars can contest: they suggested that 
kinnars could contest both Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe seats because ‘they are very 
much in the minority’ (Godbole Interview, 15/2/11; Bhatt Interview, 22/1/11). 
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woman, Heera demanded that ‘we are also human’ and should be put in the women’s 
category. She expressed anger at the ‘other’ category, saying that ‘three crores’ (thirty 
million) kinnars were put in this category but want to be in the female category. While 
this number may be exaggerated, Heera wanted to indicate the seriousness and scale of 
the problem of designating kinnars as an ‘other’ gender, given that kinnars have their 
own gender presentations and preferences, and are allowed to identify and are 
recognised by the state as women elsewhere. She said that they all think of themselves 
as women, and it is very upsetting to be counted as ‘other’: she did not understand 
why this choice existed at all. Heera and Kamla Bua attended a meeting in Bhopal with 
the election commission in March 2011, asking them to take the matter to the central 
government. They boycotted the census counting, along with hundreds of other kinnars 
who, as Heera said, also ‘understood the importance’ of the boycott. However, the 
counting had already happened and despite Heera believing that the government 
would respond to their demands, kinnars were counted as an ‘other’ gender, perhaps 
with many hundreds or thousands across the country protesting that designation and 
remaining uncounted, like Heera Bai and Kamla Bua. More distressingly, on the 
Provisional Population Totals Papers available online from the 2011 Census website, 
‘others’ have been counted alongside ‘males’ for working out national and state 
population, gender ratios, and literacy rates, among other rates and ratios relating to 
age. Kinnars thus remain categorised as male, despite Heera’s insistence that they be 
categorised as female. 
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